20 Rejected

Dissatisfaction with inland BCP plant checks persists; PoD inspections could improve system efficiency.

Conclusion
Industry has expressed dissatisfaction with the current system of SPS checks on plants and plant products conducted at inland Border Control Posts (BCPs), citing concerns around value for money, inspection standards, and biosecurity. While a future SPS agreement with the EU may significantly reduce or remove the need for such checks, improvements to the current system are necessary to rebuild industry trust and ensure continued compliance and biosecurity in the interim. The competing demands for APHA plant inspectors across BCPs and Control Points, restricts the availability of inspections at CPs, industry’s preferred location, at the time consignments arrive. Reintroducing Place of Destination (PoD) inspections for a limited number of consignments could ease pressure on the system and improve inspector availability at CPs without requiring a significant expansion of the workforce. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
Government Response Summary
The government rejects reintroducing Place of Destination (PoD) inspections, stating the scheme was temporary, concluded in April 2024, and did not meet necessary biosecurity standards or legislative requirements for permanent facilities.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government Rejected
The Place of Destination (PoD) scheme, introduced in January 2021, was explicitly designed as a temporary measure to facilitate plant health checks on high-risk goods inland during the post-EU Exit transition period. This approach was adopted to mitigate disruption while appropriate border infrastructure was being developed. The scheme concluded in April 2024, in line with the phased implementation of the UK’s SPS import regime, and as such the Government rejects the recommendation to return to this model. While PoDs provided short-term flexibility, they did not meet the necessary biosecurity standards or legislative requirements for permanent inspection facilities. Specifically: • PoDs lacked standardised infrastructure and quarantine controls, increasing the risk of pest escape and contamination. • Inspections at PoDs were not conducted under customs supervision, raising concerns about the potential release of unchecked goods into the UK market. • The scale of the scheme, over 7,000 registered PoDs across Great Britain, posed significant logistical and resource challenges for APHA, particularly in maintaining inspection consistency and oversight. The current border inspection model, which utilises designated BCPs and inland Control Points (CPs), offers a more robust and compliant framework. CPs are formally designated by competent authorities, operate under customs supervision, and meet the required biosecurity and legislative standards. This model provides industry with flexibility while ensuring the integrity of the UK’s biosecurity regime. Guidance on biosecurity protocols and measures to prevent cross-contamination at BCPs has previously been shared with industry. While this information is not currently published in the public domain, it remains available to stakeholders through direct engagement with APHA, and we have included it in the attached annex (Annex A).
Timeline
Recommendation age 0.7 yr
Report published 15 Sep 2025