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The UK did not impose blanket or rigorous border controls at the onset of the...
Conclusion
The UK did not impose blanket or rigorous border controls at the onset of the covid-19 pandemic as compared to other countries, particularly in East and South East Asia.140 Instead, the UK implemented light-touch border controls only on countries and regions where there was a recorded high incidence rate. While the UK initially focused on China, Iran, South Korea and Italy, a significant number of cases came from elsewhere. A 131 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 16 July 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q1079 132 GOV.UK, SAGE 16, 16 March 2020 133 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 16 July 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q1079 134 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020 135 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020 136 For example, see: Financial Times, ‘The shocking coronavirus study that rocked the UK and US’ 137 GOV.UK, SPI-M-O: consensus view on behavioural and social interventions, 16 March 2020 138 See paragraph 91. 139 GOV.UK, SAGE 15, 13 March 2020 140 For example, on 28 January 2020, all inbound travellers from Wuhan were subject to isolation; from 26 February 2020, Singapore banned all arrivals from Cheongdo and Daegu in South Korea; from 3 February 2020, Hong Kong began to close border crossing posts. 40 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date study found that 33% of cases during the first wave were introduced from Spain and 29% were introduced from France.141 The number of seeding events that occurred early in the pandemic, coupled with the lack of data, made the lockdown almost inevitable.
Government Response
Acknowledged
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
The government partially accepts this recommendation. The government agrees that there is positive learning and engagement to be had with other countries, practitioners, and disciplines, as it has done since the start of the pandemic and continues to do so. The government will do this flexibly, as appropriate and proportionate against other priorities, especially during emergencies. The NSRA process is undertaken by the Cabinet Office and assesses the most significant malicious and non-malicious risks facing the UK and its interests overseas. These risks are presented as reasonable worst-case scenarios and scored by their likelihood and impact. The NSRA is used to inform planning in central and local government and support prioritisation and funding decisions. The NSRA is the basis of the public-facing National Risk Register (NRR). The Cabinet Office works in collaboration with the lead department for each risk and a range of expert bodies, including industry partners, academics, and subject matter experts, to assess existing and emerging risks in the UK. Sound expert challenge is a key element of the NSRA process, providing a means of ensuring the risk scenarios presented are robust and evidence based, incorporating the latest technical knowledge. Ahead of every cycle, the Cabinet Office reviews the methodology of the NSRA. For the first time, the Cabinet Office has commissioned an external group, the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), to undertake a review of the NSRA methodology. RAEng has drawn on its extensive network of Fellows as well as academic and industry contacts to review the role of expert challenge in the NSRA and make recommendations for how this can be improved. As the methodology review concludes, the Cabinet Office is considering ways to substantially increase the accessibility of the NSRA to external experts and increase the diversity of challenge during and after the process. Learning from and sharing international practice is integral to the UK’s preparedness for and response to emergencies. The UK is a forefront Ally in NATO’s Civil Preparedness work, including meeting the baselines for national resilience, and the government is committed to the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable Development Goals. Such frameworks and relationships with partners foster learning from international practice to improve the UK’s own resilience and enable cooperation to address trans-border challenges.
Source
Inquiry
Coronavirus: lessons learnt
Report
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons learned to date
12 Oct 2021
HC 92
Addressee Bodies
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Timeline
Recommendation age
4.6 yrs
Report published
12 Oct 2021