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We also consider that the Government’s scientific advisers were too passive in accepting assurances that...

Conclusion
We also consider that the Government’s scientific advisers were too passive in accepting assurances that the clinical operational capacity of Public Health England could not be changed. Even in March 2020, Professor Neil Ferguson explained that “much 254 Q129 255 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q121 256 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 21 July 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q1176 257 GOV.UK, ‘Everyone in the UK with symptoms now eligible for coronavirus tests’, accessed 17 September 2021 258 Oral evidence taken before the Health and Social Care Committee on 17 March 2020, HC (2019–21) 36, Q78 259 See, for example: Q825, Q1256, Q1264 and Q1280 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 63 more widespread testing” was required but that SAGE had received “very clear messages from PHE that we would have nowhere near enough testing capacity.”260 It would have been quite possible for SAGE to advise that a significant increase in testing capacity was needed. It may be that continued adherence to the early four-stage flu plan contributed to this absence of effective scientific pressure for more testing capacity.
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government Acknowledged
The government partially accepts this recommendation. The government agrees that there is positive learning and engagement to be had with other countries, practitioners, and disciplines, as it has done since the start of the pandemic and continues to do so. The government will do this flexibly, as appropriate and proportionate against other priorities, especially during emergencies. The NSRA process is undertaken by the Cabinet Office and assesses the most significant malicious and non-malicious risks facing the UK and its interests overseas. These risks are presented as reasonable worst-case scenarios and scored by their likelihood and impact. The NSRA is used to inform planning in central and local government and support prioritisation and funding decisions. The NSRA is the basis of the public-facing National Risk Register (NRR). The Cabinet Office works in collaboration with the lead department for each risk and a range of expert bodies, including industry partners, academics, and subject matter experts, to assess existing and emerging risks in the UK. Sound expert challenge is a key element of the NSRA process, providing a means of ensuring the risk scenarios presented are robust and evidence based, incorporating the latest technical knowledge. Ahead of every cycle, the Cabinet Office reviews the methodology of the NSRA. For the first time, the Cabinet Office has commissioned an external group, the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), to undertake a review of the NSRA methodology. RAEng has drawn on its extensive network of Fellows as well as academic and industry contacts to review the role of expert challenge in the NSRA and make recommendations for how this can be improved. As the methodology review concludes, the Cabinet Office is considering ways to substantially increase the accessibility of the NSRA to external experts and increase the diversity of challenge during and after the process. Learning from and sharing international practice is integral to the UK’s preparedness for and response to emergencies. The UK is a forefront Ally in NATO’s Civil Preparedness work, including meeting the baselines for national resilience, and the government is committed to the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable Development Goals. Such frameworks and relationships with partners foster learning from international practice to improve the UK’s own resilience and enable cooperation to address trans-border challenges.
Addressee Bodies
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Timeline
Recommendation age 4.6 yrs
Report published 12 Oct 2021