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Two months earlier, in July 2020, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, told...
Conclusion
Two months earlier, in July 2020, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, told the Science and Technology Committee that extra testing capacity would be “essential” ahead of schools reopening.306 However, he suggested that the Government did 298 GOV.UK, UK reaches 200,000 coronavirus testing capacity target a day early: 31 May 2020, accessed 17 September 2021 299 National Audit Office, The government’s approach to test and trace in England—interim report, 11 December 2020, page 10 300 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 17 September 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Qq1327–1329 301 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 17 September 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Qq1314–1326 302 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 17 September 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q1306 303 HC Deb, 20 July 2020, col 1855 [Commons Chamber] 304 Q346 305 National Audit Office, The government’s approach to test and trace in England—interim report, 11 December 2020, page 50 306 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 16 July 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Qq1149– 1154 70 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date not have the capacity to meet the potential demand of over 350,000 tests per day, a figure suggested by the Academy of Medical Sciences at the time.307 Nevertheless, Baroness Harding suggested that the level of demand encountered in September was “in none of the modelling” used by NHS Test and Trace to assess capacity.308 She told the Science and Technology Committee that capacity plans had been “based on SAGE modelling for what we should be preparing for in the autumn”, and that it was SAGE’s assessment rather than NHS Test and Trace’s.309 However, she later wrote to the Committee in a follow-up letter to clarify that SAGE had not informed the capacity targets: SAGE has not been responsible for providing modelling analysis on operational testing capacity […] In order to model and for
Government Response
Acknowledged
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
The government partially accepts this recommendation. The government agrees that there is positive learning and engagement to be had with other countries, practitioners, and disciplines, as it has done since the start of the pandemic and continues to do so. The government will do this flexibly, as appropriate and proportionate against other priorities, especially during emergencies. The NSRA process is undertaken by the Cabinet Office and assesses the most significant malicious and non-malicious risks facing the UK and its interests overseas. These risks are presented as reasonable worst-case scenarios and scored by their likelihood and impact. The NSRA is used to inform planning in central and local government and support prioritisation and funding decisions. The NSRA is the basis of the public-facing National Risk Register (NRR). The Cabinet Office works in collaboration with the lead department for each risk and a range of expert bodies, including industry partners, academics, and subject matter experts, to assess existing and emerging risks in the UK. Sound expert challenge is a key element of the NSRA process, providing a means of ensuring the risk scenarios presented are robust and evidence based, incorporating the latest technical knowledge. Ahead of every cycle, the Cabinet Office reviews the methodology of the NSRA. For the first time, the Cabinet Office has commissioned an external group, the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAEng), to undertake a review of the NSRA methodology. RAEng has drawn on its extensive network of Fellows as well as academic and industry contacts to review the role of expert challenge in the NSRA and make recommendations for how this can be improved. As the methodology review concludes, the Cabinet Office is considering ways to substantially increase the accessibility of the NSRA to external experts and increase the diversity of challenge during and after the process. Learning from and sharing international practice is integral to the UK’s preparedness for and response to emergencies. The UK is a forefront Ally in NATO’s Civil Preparedness work, including meeting the baselines for national resilience, and the government is committed to the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Sustainable Development Goals. Such frameworks and relationships with partners foster learning from international practice to improve the UK’s own resilience and enable cooperation to address trans-border challenges.
Source
Inquiry
Coronavirus: lessons learnt
Report
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons learned to date
12 Oct 2021
HC 92
Addressee Bodies
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Timeline
Recommendation age
4.6 yrs
Report published
12 Oct 2021