We accept that it is difficult for Ministers to go against a scientific consensus among the body set up to provide scientific advice during a national emergency. We also understand the reluctance to introduce measures with significant negative economic impact. But the 141 Imperial College London, ‘COVID-19 transmission chains in the UK traced back to Spain, France and Italy’, accessed 17 September 2021 142 Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Chair, Science and Technology Committee (Qq75–76); Correspondence from the Chair to Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser, relating to SAGE Membership, 30 March 2020; and correspondence from Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser, relating to transparency of scientific evidence: social distancing, 28 May 2020 143 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2019–21, The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice, HC 136, paragraphs 55 and 71–72 144 GOV.UK, ‘List of participants of SAGE and related sub-groups’, accessed 17 August 2021 145 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q81 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 41 early weeks of the pandemic expose deficiencies in both scientific advice and Government action. In the early days of an emergency, formulating the best scientific advice is challenging: there are, for example, inevitable lags in acquiring and analysing data. Other countries took early decisions that were more seen as those of Government leaders rather than from established scientific evidence146 and it is possible that this provided a greater licence to take decisions more quickly, and on a more precautionary basis than happened in the UK—contributing to better overall outcomes. Was there sufficient challenge to scientific advice during the first weeks?