Iraq Inquiry

The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, was established in 2009 to examine the UK's involvement in Iraq from 2001 to 2009, including the decision to go to war, the conduct of military operations, and post-conflict planning. The inquiry's report, published in July 2016, identified eight key lessons rather than formal recommendations.

The government accepted seven of these lessons and accepted one in principle. According to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) review in 2018, seven were recorded as completed and one as partially delivered.

The government response describes several institutional changes. The Chilcot Checklist was developed as a practical framework for policy-making and integrated into departmental training. The Ministry of Defence produced The Good Operation handbook and developed immersive decision-making scenarios. The role of FCO Legal Advisors was strengthened to ensure international law considerations are central to decisions on military action.

Intelligence processes were reformed, with the Joint Intelligence Committee introducing enhanced mechanisms to communicate uncertainties and caveats. The fusion doctrine was launched to improve cross-departmental coordination, though PACAC recorded this as only partially delivered by 2018.

The government committed to maintaining defence spending at 2% of GDP in line with NATO targets and established regular strategic defence and security reviews. The Armed Forces Covenant was enshrined in law. The FCDO's Diplomacy 20:20 programme incorporated lessons about maintaining independent policy analysis.

The PACAC Committee noted that Chilcot identified lessons rather than making formal recommendations, which may explain the limited tracking of implementation beyond 2018. No formal implementation reviews or subsequent progress updates have been recorded in the available evidence since the PACAC assessment.