Sally Burr

PFD Report All Responded Ref: 2025-0297
Date of Report 13 June 2025
Coroner Joseph Turner
Response Deadline est. 8 August 2025
All 1 response received · Deadline: 8 Aug 2025
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Responses 1 of 1
56-Day Deadline 8 Aug 2025
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Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Coroner’s Concerns
Regulation 28 – After Inquest Template Updated 23/05/2025 TG Whilst the Trust applied its policy on mobile phone use and internet access to Sally Burr correctly, it was clear that Sally was able to exploit this in order to research and obtain the means to end her life whilst a sectioned and detained patient. Staff at Meadowfield lacked any practical ability or means to know of, monitor or respond to Sally’s internet use. Whilst encouraged to express curiosity with patients as to their use of the internet, there were no technical means to control or monitor use, other than removal of devices or denial of internet access. However, this obviously risked a negative effect on Sally’s wellbeing and progress due to the wider impact of denying contact or information which would help and support her recovery (there was evidence that Sally was in contact with online support for her mental health). I heard evidence from the Trust as to revision of their policy and improved steps to try and prevent access to harmful or malign internet sites, but – rightly – such steps have to be balanced against the patient’s right to privacy, including communication. Those improved steps include blocking certain search terms and sites when using Trust wi-fi, identifying any attempted access by noting URLs, further restricting the time available for use, and heightening staff vigilance and awareness. However, the blocks can be easily circumvented by using 4G or 5G, and – as I know you will be aware – malign sites and searches often use euphemisms or seemingly innocent language and descriptions to avoid detection. I noted that the revised policy as regards patients under 18 includes only permitting phones which do not have internet access and/or that internet access is only available via public equipment which can obviously be monitored and checked after use. As such, my concern remains that permitting adult patients who have been detained under section access to the internet clearly provides an opportunity for them to be exposed to malign influences, and to obtain the means and methods to cause serious self-harm. I fully accept the difficulty and balance in recognising a patient’s right to a private life and how the least restrictive regime possible (including permitting communication) is intended to facilitate their recovery. I also and unreservedly accept the impossible task of policing the internet, but I identify that clearer and stricter rules, guidance and investment in technology (perhaps including AI) at a national level may be needed, to enable Trusts to be able to act consistently and uniformly in at least reducing the potential for patients to secure the means to end their lives whilst detained.
Responses
NHS England
13 Jun 2025
NHS England has published national 'Principles for using digital technologies in mental health inpatient treatment and care' (February 2025) and ensures all PFD reports are discussed by its Regulation 28 Working Group for shared learning. AI summary
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Dear Mr Turner, Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Sally Burr who died on 30 May 2024.

Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 13 June 2025 concerning the death of Sally Burr on 30 May 2024. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Sally’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen to assure the family and yourself that the concerns raised about Sally’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.

Your Report raises the concern that allowing adult patients who have been detained under section, access to the internet provides an opportunity for them to be exposed to malign influences, and to obtain the means and methods to cause serious self- harm. In the circumstances, you consider that clearer and stricter rules, guidance and investment in technology may be required at a national level.

Your Report highlights the complexities of balancing a person’s right to a private life, their continued connection with loved ones, enabling them to access information and support online, and adopting a least restrictive approach to their care while maintaining safety and minimising risk. NHS England’s Mental Health, Learning Disability and Autism Inpatient (MHLDA) Quality Transformation Programme is working with providers of inpatient mental health settings through the Culture of Care Programme to support and improve understanding of a personalised approached to safety planning. This includes prioritising the therapeutic relationship and connection between staff and patients as a more reliable way of understanding a person’s risk of harm to self and being able to collaboratively plan for ways to help keep people safe. Whilst it is recognised that some inpatient mental health settings may have to implement some blanket restrictions, we would always support a human rights based and least restrictive approach to care that is based on individual needs.

We do, however, recognise that the use of technology within mental health settings is a rapidly moving landscape and that staff need support to be able to make decisions about how to implement new technologies safely and in a least restrictive way. We recently published the Principles for using digital technologies in mental health National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG

30 July 2025

inpatient treatment and care in February 2025 which includes a number of key principles as well as practical suggestions for providers.

My Patient Safety colleagues from NHS England’s South East region have engaged with Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (SPFT) about the concerns raised in your Report. The Trust has informed us that their internet use policy has been amended to reflect this incident, strengthening the ability of frontline staff to take organisationally supported decisions about restricting internet access / the use of phones and laptops. We have been informed that the Trust has shared this policy with yourself.

I would also like to provide further assurances on the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors, and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learnings and insights around events, such as the sad death of Sally, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level and helps us to pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.

Thank you for bringing these important patient safety issues to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 4 June 2024 I opened an investigation into the death of Sally Burr, aged 47. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 11 June 2025. The conclusion of the inquest was that Sally Burr had died by suicide.
Circumstances of the Death
Sally Burr had struggled with her mental health for much of her life. In January 2024 she was in crisis due to a number of stressors. Between January and April 2024 she attended the Emergency Department of local hospitals at least 3 times following overdoses or other attempts at serious self-harm. She was treated by a variety of the mental health services local to her in East Sussex, before being sectioned under s.3 MHA 1983 on 2 April 2024 and then admitted to Meadowfield Hospital in Worthing some days later. She had requested a transfer as she had worked as an Occupational Therapy Assistant in her local area and hence knew and feared that mental health staff there would know her, such that she felt unable to contemplate returning to work. Once at Meadowfield, she was allowed use of her mobile phone and access to the internet, in line with Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust’s (SPFT – the Trust) policy. She was able to order legally available, but toxic, plant material (including ) online and have them delivered to her home address. She also contacted a number of organisations and forums around ending her life. She extensively researched means and methods of ending her life. She did not inform or indicate to staff that she was doing so. On return from limited leave on 12 May 24 she managed to bring some of the needles bought online back in to Meadowfield, hidden in her socks; despite personal and room searches these were not found. She then consumed these whilst detained on 30 May 24 with fatal results, despite emergency treatment.

Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.