Michael Thorley
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2015-0260
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 1 Sep 2015
Sent To
Response Status
Responses
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56-Day Deadline
1 Sep 2015
All responses received
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Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coronersconcerns
There was an inordinate and inexcusable in gaining entry to the premises where it was known that the caller to the ambulance service had apparently collapsed mid-call: they got kin gain delay
There was no clearly thought-out and applied policy as to whether it was better to risk breaking down a door unnecessarily or whether to risk the Iife of someone who be collapsed inside. When the officers searched the premises they failed to find approximately five empty methadone bottles which were in a kitchen cupboard: The telephone which was used to make the call was found (after the ambulance service re-called it), well away from the body: No explanation for this was forthcoming: This issue was not even considered as needing examination by the attending officers. None of the investigating officers considered that a third party may have made the phone call and then tidied up the and left; locking the door from the outside. When the officers gained entry there was no drug paraphernalia nor were there any opened prescribed medication packets. There was a large quantity 0f prescribed medica none of which had been opened. There was no explanation as to why or how this situation may have arisen: This despite the fact that it was known that the deceased's friend had been present the previous nightlearly morning; and that she could have had a It was assumed that the door had been locked from the inside although there was no evidence to support that contention: The Detective Inspector did not attend the scene on the as it was deemed not a Special Procedure Death and not one where he needed to attend: The representative of the Professional Standards Branch concurred with the view expressed by the Coroner that a D.l. should turn out to this type of death. ActioN SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you have the power to take such action.
There was no clearly thought-out and applied policy as to whether it was better to risk breaking down a door unnecessarily or whether to risk the Iife of someone who be collapsed inside. When the officers searched the premises they failed to find approximately five empty methadone bottles which were in a kitchen cupboard: The telephone which was used to make the call was found (after the ambulance service re-called it), well away from the body: No explanation for this was forthcoming: This issue was not even considered as needing examination by the attending officers. None of the investigating officers considered that a third party may have made the phone call and then tidied up the and left; locking the door from the outside. When the officers gained entry there was no drug paraphernalia nor were there any opened prescribed medication packets. There was a large quantity 0f prescribed medica none of which had been opened. There was no explanation as to why or how this situation may have arisen: This despite the fact that it was known that the deceased's friend had been present the previous nightlearly morning; and that she could have had a It was assumed that the door had been locked from the inside although there was no evidence to support that contention: The Detective Inspector did not attend the scene on the as it was deemed not a Special Procedure Death and not one where he needed to attend: The representative of the Professional Standards Branch concurred with the view expressed by the Coroner that a D.l. should turn out to this type of death. ActioN SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you have the power to take such action.
Responses
Response received
View full response
Dear Mr Pollard; Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report following the inquest into the death of Michael Lee THORLEY, from which note the following concerns_ There was an inordinate and inexcusable delay in gaining entry to the premises where it was known that the caller to the ambulance service had apparently collapsed mid-call There was no clearly though-out and applied policy as to whether it was better to risk breaking down a door unnecessarily or whether to risk the life of someone who may be collapsed inside. When the officers searched the premises failed to find approximately five empty methadone bottles which were in the kitchen cupboard The telephone which was used to make the call was found (after the ambulance service recalled it) , well away from the body: No explanation for this was forthcoming: This issue was not even considered as needing examination by attending officers:
5. None of the investigating officers considered that & third party may have made the call and then tidied up the flat and Ieft, locking the door from the inside. When officers gained entry there was no drug paraphernalia nor were there any opened prescribed medication packets: There was large quantity of prescribed medication, none of which had been opened. There was no explanation as to why or how this situation may have arisen: This despite the fact that it was known that the deceased"s friend had been present the previous nightfearly morning and she could have had a was assumed that the door had been locked from the inside although there was no evidence to support that contention: Detective Inspector did not attend the scene on the day as it was deemed not a Special Procedure Death and not one where he needed to attend. The representative of the Professional Standards Branch concurred with the view expressed by the Coroner that a D.l should turn out to this type of death. Points and 2 relate mainly to dynamic decision making and to some extent, to the availability of methods of entry: The Specialist Operational Training Unit which is responsible for training officers in both decision making and tactics will use this example during their method` of entry training modules. will highlight the need to balance the thresholds required for entry under Section 17 PACE Act with factors that indicate urgent entry is required to save life_ In addition an internal message will be issued forcewide to encourage and empower officers reluctant to execute forced tactics in cases where there is concern for welfare. The Locatlon address: GMP Force Headquarters_ Central Park; Northampton Road, Manchester M4O 5BP Postal address; Greater Manchester Police , Openshaw Complex awton Street, Openshaw; Manchester M11 ZNS Tel: 101 they key: The They entry
details of this case have also been shared with Detective Inspector of the GMP Vulnerability Review, Who is currently undertaking work to review training; resourcing and skills required to deliver safeguarding at force, borough and Iocal levels. It is apparent that most officers understand their powers of entry and are willing and able to force entry when it is clearly necessary and appropriate. However it seems that there are some occasions when the particular circumstances and the available information appear to cause degree of hesitation. Our training and prioritisation is clearly emphasising public safety, and am not aware of any policy issues that might have affected the officers' decisions in this particular case. Point involves Patrol Sergeanth who was spoken to by Detective Inspector on Wednesday 8t July 2015. has acknowledged your concerns in relation to the quality of his search of Mr Thorley's premises and accepted management advice_ This point is also symptomatic of the oversight of this particular investigation. The discovery of the methadone bottles should have prompted further questions by the officers concerned and presented an opportunity to reconsider the investigation: This aspect has been identified in the existing action development plan Points 4, 5 and 6 have been subject of a review of the investigation into the death of Mr Thorley by Detective Chief Inspector Crompton of the Major Incident Team_ This review focused on initial attendance, oversight of the investigation and court preparation. The findings and recommendations have been reported b to senior investigating officer Detective Inspecton of the Professional Standards Branch and Assistant Chief Constable Wiggett: (discussed his findings and recommendations with Detective Inspector Stainton on Wednesday 2nd September 2015 is to remain on an action development plan which will continue to be managed by his immediate line manager (Specific aspects of this action plan involve recognising the circumstances that require deployment of a senior investigating officer and risk factors that make the attendance of a Dl more compelling] will ratify successful completion of this action plan with Detective in due course. understand that you have raised these points in person with The handling of the incident has been reviewed and feedback and management advice given to the officers concerned: Whilst the investigation did go on to address the important lines of inquiry, agree that the initial decision making and supervision should have carried out actions sooner and more thoroughly. hope that our response will reinforce this with the individuals concerned and that our training and guidance will continue to emphasise the need for prompt action and good investigation:
5. None of the investigating officers considered that & third party may have made the call and then tidied up the flat and Ieft, locking the door from the inside. When officers gained entry there was no drug paraphernalia nor were there any opened prescribed medication packets: There was large quantity of prescribed medication, none of which had been opened. There was no explanation as to why or how this situation may have arisen: This despite the fact that it was known that the deceased"s friend had been present the previous nightfearly morning and she could have had a was assumed that the door had been locked from the inside although there was no evidence to support that contention: Detective Inspector did not attend the scene on the day as it was deemed not a Special Procedure Death and not one where he needed to attend. The representative of the Professional Standards Branch concurred with the view expressed by the Coroner that a D.l should turn out to this type of death. Points and 2 relate mainly to dynamic decision making and to some extent, to the availability of methods of entry: The Specialist Operational Training Unit which is responsible for training officers in both decision making and tactics will use this example during their method` of entry training modules. will highlight the need to balance the thresholds required for entry under Section 17 PACE Act with factors that indicate urgent entry is required to save life_ In addition an internal message will be issued forcewide to encourage and empower officers reluctant to execute forced tactics in cases where there is concern for welfare. The Locatlon address: GMP Force Headquarters_ Central Park; Northampton Road, Manchester M4O 5BP Postal address; Greater Manchester Police , Openshaw Complex awton Street, Openshaw; Manchester M11 ZNS Tel: 101 they key: The They entry
details of this case have also been shared with Detective Inspector of the GMP Vulnerability Review, Who is currently undertaking work to review training; resourcing and skills required to deliver safeguarding at force, borough and Iocal levels. It is apparent that most officers understand their powers of entry and are willing and able to force entry when it is clearly necessary and appropriate. However it seems that there are some occasions when the particular circumstances and the available information appear to cause degree of hesitation. Our training and prioritisation is clearly emphasising public safety, and am not aware of any policy issues that might have affected the officers' decisions in this particular case. Point involves Patrol Sergeanth who was spoken to by Detective Inspector on Wednesday 8t July 2015. has acknowledged your concerns in relation to the quality of his search of Mr Thorley's premises and accepted management advice_ This point is also symptomatic of the oversight of this particular investigation. The discovery of the methadone bottles should have prompted further questions by the officers concerned and presented an opportunity to reconsider the investigation: This aspect has been identified in the existing action development plan Points 4, 5 and 6 have been subject of a review of the investigation into the death of Mr Thorley by Detective Chief Inspector Crompton of the Major Incident Team_ This review focused on initial attendance, oversight of the investigation and court preparation. The findings and recommendations have been reported b to senior investigating officer Detective Inspecton of the Professional Standards Branch and Assistant Chief Constable Wiggett: (discussed his findings and recommendations with Detective Inspector Stainton on Wednesday 2nd September 2015 is to remain on an action development plan which will continue to be managed by his immediate line manager (Specific aspects of this action plan involve recognising the circumstances that require deployment of a senior investigating officer and risk factors that make the attendance of a Dl more compelling] will ratify successful completion of this action plan with Detective in due course. understand that you have raised these points in person with The handling of the incident has been reviewed and feedback and management advice given to the officers concerned: Whilst the investigation did go on to address the important lines of inquiry, agree that the initial decision making and supervision should have carried out actions sooner and more thoroughly. hope that our response will reinforce this with the individuals concerned and that our training and guidance will continue to emphasise the need for prompt action and good investigation:
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On g"h February 2015 commenced an investigation into the death of Michael Lee Thorley dob 3" September 1968. The investigation concluded on the 25" June 2015 and the conclusion was one of an Open Conclusion. The medical cause of death was 1a Combined opiatelopioid toxicity
Circumstances of the Death
The deceased was at his home address which is a first floor flat reached by a staircase from the ground floor: There was a telephone call made to the North West Ambulance Service, by a female voice, saying that 'she' was Michael Thorley and that he was unable to breathe. The caller then collapsed and nothing further was heard and an ambulance was despatched to the scene: The ambulance call taker notified the police and police officers attended. When to the scene they found that the outer door was locked and there was a metal grille type door over that front door; and that too was locked. Consideration was given to breaking down the door; but instead; despite two of the officers being trained in the use of wham-rams, one officer then went off to try to find the next of to see whether a key could be obtained to entry. By the time that officer returned to the flat with the next of kin (who did not have a key) some 23 minutes had passed since the police first arrived at the scene: The pathologist gave evidence to me; that had the deceased been treated with a dose of naloxone (the 'antidote' to morphine) immediately upon their arrival, there "is a chance that his life might have been saved" , The officers then broke down the door; which took about 30 seconds and found the deceased in the property:
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.