UK Inquiry Tracker

Brandon Pryde and David Faulkner

PFD Report All Responded Ref: 2022-0250

Date of Report 12 August 2022

Coroner Adrian Farrow

Coroner Area Manchester South

Response Deadline ✓ from report 7 October 2022

Road (Highways Safety) related deaths

Judiciary.uk Report PDF

All 4 responses received · Deadline: 7 Oct 2022

Sent To

Greater Manchester Police and Roads and Crime Unit and Response

Response Status

Responses 4 of 1

56-Day Deadline 7 Oct 2022

All responses received

About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Coroner’s Concerns

I received evidence in both inquests that there is a Protocol between GMP and NWMPG (which is based at the Cheshire Constabulary) dated June 2015 in accordance with the College of Police Authorised Professional Practice for Police Pursuits, for the Command and Control of pursuits. That Protocol is intended to provide a mechanism for Command and Control to be undertaken and transferred between GMP and NWMPG when pursuits move between the normal road network and the motorway network, so that Command and Control is maintained throughout. The Supervising Officer in the control room has the authority to direct that a pursuit be discontinued if they assess that it is right to do so, having regard to all of the circumstances which are known to them, which may include information not immediately available to the police officer(s) involved in the pursuit. Although I found that the absence of any control-room Command and Control had not contributed to either death in this case, the following matters gave rise to concern, having regard to the inherent risk of pursuits, which are likely to move between ordinary road and motorway networks in the Greater Manchester area; (1) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so; (2) The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly; (3) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network; and (4) The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit.

Responses

Greater Manchester Police

30 Sep 2022

Greater Manchester Police has established a PFD working group and, with Cheshire Police, revised the managing pursuits protocol to clarify command and control. They are designing and scheduling extensive training for various staff roles including Force Duty Supervisors, tactical phase commanders, and dispatch operators for future delivery. AI summary

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Dear Mr Farrow Re Regulation 28 report following the inquest into the deaths of Brandon James Pryde (Brandon Geasley) and David Ernest Faulkner Thank you for your report dated 12 August 2022 in respect of the tragic deaths of Brandon James Pryde (Brandon Geasley) and David Ernest Faulkner and pursuant to Regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 and Paragraph 7, Schedule 5, of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Having carefully considered your report and the evidence submitted at the inquest I make the following observations and recommendations to hopefully address the areas of concern. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) use the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) as the relevant guidance for the management of police pursuits. GMP is part of a collaboration with other Northwest forces in respect of policing the motorway network. The collaboration is known as the Northwest Motorway Patrol Group (NWMPG) and is managed by Cheshire Police. The NWMPG is a communications and command and control collaboration rather than a fully integrated operational collaboration. It is the position of GMP that pursuits should be authorised and commanded by the most appropriate authority in the specific circumstances as they are presented. This is an agreed position with the NWMPG. GMP accepts that during this pursuit, no authority accepted formal responsibility to authorise or command the pursuit prior to the collision, other than the pursuit commander, under appropriate self-authorisation, in line with APP. GMP agree with the coroners findings that this omission did not contribute to the outcome and observe that, having reviewed similar pursuits, that failure to take command and control is not a common issue. GMP submits that, had the pursuit continued, there would have been further communication between control rooms resulting in confirmation of which authority had command and control responsibility. It was the relatively short nature of the pursuit that contributed to the omission. Were this set of circumstances to arise in future pursuit situations the updated managing pursuit protocol supported by the training being implemented would result in GMP taking command and control responsibility. Postal address: Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11 2NS

Cont.d pg2 ..... Notwithstanding those observations, it is clear from the evidence that individuals within the control room were not clear on the guidance set out in the managing pursuits protocol. It is also acknowledged that the guidance itself could be clearer on the general principles of command and control. It is the case that guidance documents cannot cater for every specific situation and, to some degree, must rely on subjective decision making of those in the control rooms as to who is the most appropriate authority to accept and retain command and control in spontaneous pursuits. It is the agreed position of GMP and the NWMPG that when a spontaneous pursuit is initiated then the 'Pursuit Commander' will self-authorise until a control room supervisor is in a position to take command and control of the pursuit. Where a pursuit commences, the authorising authority shall be that upon which the Pursuit Commander is communicating unless specifically instructed otherwise. · If a pursuit moves from one authority area to another, or the pursuit commences on a different authority area to which the communication platform is aligned, then communications links will be established between the respective control rooms, but the command and control will remain with the originating authority until such a time is deemed appropriate by the respective control room supervisors to hand over command and control. In response to the below three areas of concern raised in the regulation 28 notice I make the following observations; The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so. The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly. The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network. GMP have committed to further training for all those who may be involved in the command and control of police pursuits. It was identified that whilst drivers had received significant investment over recent years this had not been the case for officers and staff engaged on the command and-control element of pursuit management. GMP now has a Pursuit Management Working Group which is leading on a review and re development of training for dispatch operators and commanders. The below is a summary of the current position:
• A 1-day initial pursuit course has been devised by the Driver Training Unit. This will be delivered to Supervisors and operators involved in the management of initial phase pursuit and will align with training provided to Police drivers who have completed the Initial Pursuit course (IPP). A training schedule is being drawn up now for delivery anticipated to be completed within the next 6-9 months due to high numbers requiring training. Postal address: Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11 2NS

Contd pg 3 .. ...
• A 4-day tactical phase commanders' course is in the final stages of design by the Driver Training Unit and Command Training (Specialist Operations). This will be delivered to the 8 Force Duty Officers (FOO) and 7 Assistant Force Duty Officers (AFDO) within GMP. This will enable a policy change with the authorisation ofpursuits moving from the Force Duty Supervisor to the FDOIAFDO role. A training schedule is being drawn up and delivery anticipated within the next 6 months.
• Training for Team 3 dispatch operators - those managing specialist resources - is being designed. Delivery of this is planned to take place within the next 6-9 months.
• Accreditation, re-training and Continuous Professional Development (CPD) are in design and final details will be confirmed through the working group. This training will include revised guidance in relation to the command protocols for cross border pursuits, and specifically the nuance of the NWMPG collaboration. Training will be given to new staff and refreshed with those who remain in their role. The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit. As a result of this tragic incident GMP and Cheshire Police (on behalf of the NWMPG) have revised the managing pursuits protocol and produced a clearer document which removes the previous ambiguity on the issue of Command and Control. This document will be circulated to all GMP control room staff involved in the management of police pursuits.

Chief Constable Postal address: Greater Manchester Police, Openshaw Complex, Lawton Street, Openshaw, Manchester M11 2NS

Cheshire Constabulary

Cheshire Police, on behalf of the NWMPG and in collaboration with GMP, has revised the managing pursuits protocol to remove ambiguity regarding command and control transfer. They have also committed to delivering a training package on command protocols for cross-border pursuits to regional control centre staff. AI summary

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_______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ CHESHIRE CONSTABULARY Regulation 28 Response Cheshire Constabulary acknowledges the points raised by His Majesty’s Coroner following the inquests into the deaths of David Faulkner and Brandon Pryde. The North West Motorway Patrol Group (hitherto known as NWMPG) is a police collaboration of three North-West forces including Greater Manchester Police (hitherto known as GMP). The collaboration is led by Cheshire Constabulary under which, a regional control centre coordinates and directs the policing response to all incidents occurring on the strategic roads network within the area of the collaboration only. The NWPMG is a communications, command and control collaboration. Cheshire Constabulary and the NWMPG adhere to the Authorised Professional Practice published by The College of Policing for the management of all police pursuits. In line with this guidance, pursuits are authorised and commanded by the most appropriate authority, an appropriately trained operator within the control room. If a pursuit moves from one command area to another, or the pursuit commences on a different command area to which the communication platform is aligned then communications links will be established between the respective control rooms, but the command and control will remain with the originating authority until such a point in time as is deemed appropriate by the respective control room supervisors to hand over command and control. It is the agreed position of NWMPG and the three forces involved within the collaboration that when a pursuit enters the strategic road network then the transfer of command will commence when communicated between the originating force and the NWMPG. In response to the areas of concern raised in the Regulation 28 notice, namely: (1) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so; (2) The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly; (3) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network; and (4) The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit. Cheshire Constabulary acting as lead force on behalf of the collaborative forces is committed to ensuring continuous professional development and training for all staff within the regional control centre. The NWMPG governance board chaired by Assistant Chief Constable (Chief Officer lead) convened on 28 September 2022 and each lead officer for the tri-force collaboration committed to delivering a training package in relation with command protocols for cross border pursuits. This training will ensure awareness of the requisite protocols. The progress of the roll out of training will be tracked at the bi-monthly governance meetings moving forward.

Cheshire Constabulary are aware of the enhanced training package by GMP pursuit management working group. As part of the strategic oversight the governance board of the NWMPG will monitor and share feedback from GMP training package and disseminate best practice throughout the collaboration. Cheshire Police (on behalf of the NWMPG) and GMP have revised the managing pursuits protocol and produced a clearer document which removes the previous ambiguity on the issue of Command and Control. This document will be circulated to all NWMPG control room staff involved in the management of police pursuits. It is expected that measures will promote a standard operating procedure to address fully the four areas of concern highlighted by His Majesty’s Assistant Coroner Adrian Farrow. Dated: 29 September 2022 Signed:

Superintendent (Roads and Crime Response Unit) Cheshire Constabulary For and on behalf of: North West Motorway Patrol Group

Cheshire Constabulary 1

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_______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ CHESHIRE CONSTABULARY Regulation 28 Response Cheshire Constabulary acknowledges the points raised by His Majesty’s Coroner following the inquests into the deaths of David Faulkner and Brandon Pryde. The North West Motorway Patrol Group (hitherto known as NWMPG) is a police collaboration of three North-West forces including Greater Manchester Police (hitherto known as GMP). The collaboration is led by Cheshire Constabulary under which, a regional control centre coordinates and directs the policing response to all incidents occurring on the strategic roads network within the area of the collaboration only. The NWPMG is a communications, command and control collaboration. Cheshire Constabulary and the NWMPG adhere to the Authorised Professional Practice published by The College of Policing for the management of all police pursuits. In line with this guidance, pursuits are authorised and commanded by the most appropriate authority, an appropriately trained operator within the control room. If a pursuit moves from one command area to another, or the pursuit commences on a different command area to which the communication platform is aligned then communications links will be established between the respective control rooms, but the command and control will remain with the originating authority until such a point in time as is deemed appropriate by the respective control room supervisors to hand over command and control. It is the agreed position of NWMPG and the three forces involved within the collaboration that when a pursuit enters the strategic road network then the transfer of command will commence when communicated between the originating force and the NWMPG. In response to the areas of concern raised in the Regulation 28 notice, namely: (1) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so; (2) The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly; (3) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network; and (4) The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit. Cheshire Constabulary acting as lead force on behalf of the collaborative forces is committed to ensuring continuous professional development and training for all staff within the regional control centre. The NWMPG governance board chaired by Assistant Chief Constable (Chief Officer lead) convened on 28 September 2022 and each lead officer for the tri-force collaboration committed to delivering a training package in relation with command protocols for cross border pursuits. This training will ensure awareness of the requisite protocols. The progress of the roll out of training will be tracked at the bi-monthly governance meetings moving forward. A4

Cheshire Constabulary are aware of the enhanced training package by GMP pursuit management working group. As part of the strategic oversight the governance board of the NWMPG will monitor and share feedback from GMP training package and disseminate best practice throughout the collaboration. Cheshire Police (on behalf of the NWMPG) and GMP have revised the managing pursuits protocol and produced a clearer document which removes the previous ambiguity on the issue of Command and Control. This document will be circulated to all NWMPG control room staff involved in the management of police pursuits. It is expected that measures will promote a standard operating procedure to address fully the four areas of concern highlighted by His Majesty’s Assistant Coroner Adrian Farrow. Dated: 29 September 2022 Signed:

Superintendent (Roads and Crime Response Unit) Cheshire Constabulary For and on behalf of: North West Motorway Patrol Group A5

Greater Manchester Police

The provided response text contains no substantive information or description of actions, plans, or position taken by the organisation. AI summary

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Report Sections

Investigation and Inquest

On 28th May 2021 an investigation was commenced into the death of Brandon James Pryde, otherwise known as Brandon Geasley. The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest on 8th July 2022. The conclusion of the Inquest was that he died from multiple injuries in a road traffic collision. On 28th May 2021, an investigation was commenced into the death of David Ernest Faulkner. The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest on 14th July 2022. The conclusion of the Inquest was that he died from multiple injuries in a road traffic collision in which his car was struck by a car which was being driven at speed on the wrong carriageway of a motorway.

Circumstances of the Death

The deaths of Brandon Pryde and Ernest Faulkner arose out of the same road traffic collision on 27th May 2021 on the M60 motorway between junctions 1 and 27 at Stockport. A BMW X4 SUV that had been stolen earlier that day in Stockport was seen by a police officer at about 8.30pm in the Wythenshawe area and officers of the Greater Manchester Police Tactical Vehicle Intercept Unit (“TVIU”) went to that area later that evening to try to locate and recover the vehicle. At about 9.50pm, the BMW was seen by a TVIU patrol, now bearing false number plates. Brandon Pryde was the driver of the BMW at that time. The BMW drove away from the TVIU car at speed and a spontaneous pursuit began. The TVIU officer was trained in both initial and tactical pursuit and self-authorised the pursuit, which began on A roads towards the motorway network at speeds around 70 mph. The pursuit was monitored by the GMP control room operators, who alerted the Force Duty Supervisor to the pursuit. That officer began to monitor the pursuit, which moved onto the M56 motorway just over a minute after it commenced. Once on the motorway, the speed of the BMW increased to over 100 mph, reaching speeds of 130 mph. The TVIU car travelled at similar speeds in pursuit. The weather conditions were described as clear and dry and the motorway traffic was light, but the dashcam and CCTV footage showed that there were a number of other vehicles, including the Vauxhall Insignia driven by David Faulkner, travelling in the same direction as the pursuit, with the BMW and TVIU car predominantly in the outside lane as they travelled onto and along the M60 towards Stockport. The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not take any active role in the supervision of the pursuit, assuming that as the pursuit had joined the motorway network, that the equivalent officer of the North West Motorway Patrol Group (“NWMPG”) had taken over the supervision of the pursuit. Although the NWMPG control room was aware of and monitoring the pursuit during the time that it was on the motorway network, the Supervisor was undertaking their assessment of the situation and did not take control of the pursuit. David Faulkner’s car was overtaken by the pursuit. Although other police patrols followed, none was in a position to be part of the active pursuit. A trained GMP Tactical Advisor did give advice to deploy a stinger device and containment and if the BMW were to attempt to travel in the wrong direction (“go contra”), to consider tactical contact if safe to do so. The BMW left the motorway at junction 27 and was lost from the sight of the following TVIU car. The pursuit had been in progress for approximately 4 minutes by this time. 20 seconds later, as a GMP dog van patrol arrived at the end of the slip road at junction 27, the BMW was driven past the police van, back up the slip road to re-join the M60, but now travelling in the opposite direction, against the flow of traffic. It drove in the outside lane at speed past a second TVIU car (which was travelling in the correct direction), before moving to the inside lane and into collision with the Vauxhall Insignia driven by Mr. Faulkner in the middle lane about 550 metres from the point at which the BMW had re-joined the M60 carriageway. The three police vehicles had begun to follow in the same direction, but on the parallel, correct carriageway of the motorway. The topography and relative speeds of the vehicles meant that neither Mr. Faulkner nor Mr. Pryde had any opportunity to avoid the collision which had an estimated closing speed of at least 150 mph and which resulted in an extremely forceful impact, causing destructive damage to both vehicles and fatal injuries to both drivers, who died at the scene. CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the Inquests the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. I received evidence in both inquests that there is a Protocol between GMP and NWMPG (which is based at the Cheshire Constabulary) dated June 2015 in accordance with the College of Police Authorised Professional Practice for Police Pursuits, for the Command and Control of pursuits. That Protocol is intended to provide a mechanism for Command and Control to be undertaken and transferred between GMP and NWMPG when pursuits move between the normal road network and the motorway network, so that Command and Control is maintained throughout. The Supervising Officer in the control room has the authority to direct that a pursuit be discontinued if they assess that it is right to do so, having regard to all of the circumstances which are known to them, which may include information not immediately available to the police officer(s) involved in the pursuit. Although I found that the absence of any control-room Command and Control had not contributed to either death in this case, the following matters gave rise to concern, having regard to the inherent risk of pursuits, which are likely to move between ordinary road and motorway networks in the Greater Manchester area; (1) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor assumed that the NWMPG Supervisor had taken Command and Control when they had not done so; (2) The NWPGM Supervisor did not communicate whether they had taken Command and Control clearly; (3) The GMP Force Duty Supervisor did not consider that they had any authority to perform Command and Control of the pursuit once it had entered the motorway network; and (4) The Protocol did not operate in practice so that there was no effective Command and Control at any point during the pursuit.

Copies Sent To

Dunsmore, Coventry CV8 3EN