Brian Burrows
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2025-0459
143 days overdue · 1 response outstanding
Sent To
Response Status
Responses
1 of 2
56-Day Deadline
4 Nov 2025
143 days past deadline — 1 response outstanding
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coroner’s Concerns
(1) The inquest was told that no training is given to prison officers about decision making in dynamic situations where competing priority tasks needs to be completed namely what to do when faced by a number of emergency cell bells and a number of ACCT checks.
(2) The inquest was told that briefings delivered by senior staff on the wing do not assist prison officers by providing guidance on how to complete tasks of competing priority.
(2) The inquest was told that briefings delivered by senior staff on the wing do not assist prison officers by providing guidance on how to complete tasks of competing priority.
Responses
HM Prison and Probation Service is reforming foundation training for prison officers to focus on experiential learning including dynamic risk assessment, and HMP Leeds will implement High Reliability Checklist Briefings from October 2025. Senior managers have also embedded a process for daily review of ACCT caseloads and resource allocation, and new Supervising Officer and Safety Floorwalker roles will be introduced.
AI summary
View full response
Dear Ms McLoughlin,
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 9 September 2025 addressed to the Governor at HMP Leeds following the inquest into the death of Brian Burrows (also known as Brian Smith) at the prison on 15 May 2024. I am responding on behalf of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) as the Director General of Operations.
I know that you will share a copy of this response with Mr Burrow’s family, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.
You have raised concerns that prison officers lack adequate training to support decision- making when faced with competing priorities, and that briefings from senior staff on the wings at HMP Leeds do not offer sufficient guidance to help manage these tasks effectively.
I would like to assure you that HMPPS is committed to strengthening the support and training it provides to prison officers, recognising that these are essential to improving staff retention. At the heart of this commitment is the ‘Enable’ programme, which is a psychologically and operationally informed workforce transformation initiative. ‘Enable’ is designed to reshape how HMPPS trains, develops, leads and supports prison staff, with the ultimate goal of creating safer, more supportive working environments where staff feel valued and empowered.
A key part of this transformation is the Foundation Training Reform, a long-term review of the initial training offer for prison officers. The future model will focus on experiential learning delivered over a 12-month period, ensuring new officers are better supported from the outset of their careers. This extended and immersive approach is designed to build confidence, competence, and a stronger sense of belonging. It contains a focus on how staff would carry out a dynamic risk assessment in order to prioritise work.
The leadership team at HMP Leeds has engaged directly with the ‘Enable’ programme to strengthen their training locally and reinforce these principles. From October 2025, the prison will implement High Reliability Checklist Briefings across all wings. These structured, short meetings are designed to provide clear guidance on managing competing priorities, enhance confidence and capability in defensible decision-making and improve communication and
operational awareness in high-risk environments. This approach is informed by practices from other High Reliability organisations.
Senior managers also meet daily to assess the manageability of Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) caseloads and resource allocation, enabling deployment of additional staff where necessary. These processes have been embedded for over 12 months and support early intervention when ACCT volumes or observation levels are elevated.
Additionally, the prison will introduce a new Supervising Officer (Wellbeing, Care and Coaching) role to provide enhanced support and coaching for staff. Safety Floorwalkers will work closely with landing staff and managers to reinforce guidance and offer real-time support.
I hope the measures outlined above provide you with reassurance that learning has been taken from the circumstances of Mr Burrow’s death and that the matters of concern that you identified have been addressed.
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 9 September 2025 addressed to the Governor at HMP Leeds following the inquest into the death of Brian Burrows (also known as Brian Smith) at the prison on 15 May 2024. I am responding on behalf of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) as the Director General of Operations.
I know that you will share a copy of this response with Mr Burrow’s family, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.
You have raised concerns that prison officers lack adequate training to support decision- making when faced with competing priorities, and that briefings from senior staff on the wings at HMP Leeds do not offer sufficient guidance to help manage these tasks effectively.
I would like to assure you that HMPPS is committed to strengthening the support and training it provides to prison officers, recognising that these are essential to improving staff retention. At the heart of this commitment is the ‘Enable’ programme, which is a psychologically and operationally informed workforce transformation initiative. ‘Enable’ is designed to reshape how HMPPS trains, develops, leads and supports prison staff, with the ultimate goal of creating safer, more supportive working environments where staff feel valued and empowered.
A key part of this transformation is the Foundation Training Reform, a long-term review of the initial training offer for prison officers. The future model will focus on experiential learning delivered over a 12-month period, ensuring new officers are better supported from the outset of their careers. This extended and immersive approach is designed to build confidence, competence, and a stronger sense of belonging. It contains a focus on how staff would carry out a dynamic risk assessment in order to prioritise work.
The leadership team at HMP Leeds has engaged directly with the ‘Enable’ programme to strengthen their training locally and reinforce these principles. From October 2025, the prison will implement High Reliability Checklist Briefings across all wings. These structured, short meetings are designed to provide clear guidance on managing competing priorities, enhance confidence and capability in defensible decision-making and improve communication and
operational awareness in high-risk environments. This approach is informed by practices from other High Reliability organisations.
Senior managers also meet daily to assess the manageability of Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) caseloads and resource allocation, enabling deployment of additional staff where necessary. These processes have been embedded for over 12 months and support early intervention when ACCT volumes or observation levels are elevated.
Additionally, the prison will introduce a new Supervising Officer (Wellbeing, Care and Coaching) role to provide enhanced support and coaching for staff. Safety Floorwalkers will work closely with landing staff and managers to reinforce guidance and offer real-time support.
I hope the measures outlined above provide you with reassurance that learning has been taken from the circumstances of Mr Burrow’s death and that the matters of concern that you identified have been addressed.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 18th June 2024, an investigation was commenced into the death of Brian Burrows (also known as Brian Smith), born on 23 June 1980 and died on 15 May 2024. The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest which held before a jury between 1 and 8 September 2025. The medical cause of death was: 1a Hypoxic Ischaemic Encephalopathy 1b Hanging The conclusion of the inquest was suicide.
Circumstances of the Death
Brian Burrows was admitted to HMP Leeds on 28 March 2024. He experienced a number of self-harm incidents between 22 April 2024 and 9 May 2024 before the incident on 10 May 2024 which led to his death on 15 May 2024. Mr Burrows died as a result of using a ligature.
Mr Burrows was on an ACCT and was assessed as requiring 3 observations per hour. The inquest heard evidence that the wing where Mr Burrows resided was extremely busy on 10 May 2024 with one officer stating that it was the busiest day of his career so far. There was one officer who was alone responsible for conducting ACCT checks on 3 prisoners on one landing including Mr Burrows. Mr Burrows was not checked between 13:50 and 14:43 despite him being assessed as requiring 3 ACCT checks per hour. Between 14:00 and 14:43, 22 emergency cell bells were activated on the landing where Mr Burrows resided. The inquest heard evidence that prison officers are instructed in training to treat a cell bell as an emergency and not walk past a cell bell when activated for any reason. Prison officers were also aware of the need to perform ACCT checks as required as a priority task. The inquest heard evidence that there was no guidance given to prison officers by senior officers or management about how to prioritise these tasks in such circumstances. Evidence was also heard that during the daily briefings there was no guidance given to prison officers about how to manage such tasks. Additionally, evidence was heard that no training is given to prison officers about making decisions in such circumstances and how to critically assess which task to prioritise.
Mr Burrows was on an ACCT and was assessed as requiring 3 observations per hour. The inquest heard evidence that the wing where Mr Burrows resided was extremely busy on 10 May 2024 with one officer stating that it was the busiest day of his career so far. There was one officer who was alone responsible for conducting ACCT checks on 3 prisoners on one landing including Mr Burrows. Mr Burrows was not checked between 13:50 and 14:43 despite him being assessed as requiring 3 ACCT checks per hour. Between 14:00 and 14:43, 22 emergency cell bells were activated on the landing where Mr Burrows resided. The inquest heard evidence that prison officers are instructed in training to treat a cell bell as an emergency and not walk past a cell bell when activated for any reason. Prison officers were also aware of the need to perform ACCT checks as required as a priority task. The inquest heard evidence that there was no guidance given to prison officers by senior officers or management about how to prioritise these tasks in such circumstances. Evidence was also heard that during the daily briefings there was no guidance given to prison officers about how to manage such tasks. Additionally, evidence was heard that no training is given to prison officers about making decisions in such circumstances and how to critically assess which task to prioritise.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.