Haydar Jefferies
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2024-0702-wp94639
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
HMP Coldingley lacked systems for recording welfare information, collating prisoner details, checking mental health referrals, and providing out-of-hours clinical mental health support, leading to inadequate crisis management.
View full coroner's concerns
Evidence was provided by HMP Coldingley and Central North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“CNWL”) in relation to the matters found by the jury. The organisations have taken the matters that led to Haydar’s death seriously.
CNWL are putting in place protocols and training to ensure that staff are better informed before assessing and reviewing prisoners on CSU.
HMP Coldingley are in the process of amending their safer custody policy but to date this has not been produced.
I therefore remain concerned as follows:
In relation to HMP Coldingley:
1. There is no system in place to ensure that information provided in telephone calls in relation to a prisoner’s welfare is recorded.
2. Matters of concern in relation to prisoners are recorded across a number of different records and there is a risk that the information is missed and not disseminated in daily briefing sheets.
3. There is no composite document for clinicians to review to see all relevant information recorded by custodial staff about a CSU prisoner for the proceeding 24 hour period.
4. There is no system in place to check that referrals to the mental health teams requested by senior members of the prison staff have in fact been made.
5. Custody staff are not trained in mental health presentations and are unable to recognise red flag indicators of declining mental health.
In relation to HMP Coldingley and NHS England:
6. Outside of weekday office hours there is no clinical mental health provision. Overnight staffing levels are such that it is difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result:
a.) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions.
b.) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30 pm and 7am the following morning.
7. The ACCT process is not designed nor effective to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
In relation to the Parole Board:
8. Imprisonment under an IPP is a recognised suicide risk. The delay in dealing with the IPP parole hearing exacerbated the risk. There is currently no process in place to expedite face to face parole hearings for IPP prisoners when allegations leading to their recall have been withdrawn and no criminal action is being considered.
CNWL are putting in place protocols and training to ensure that staff are better informed before assessing and reviewing prisoners on CSU.
HMP Coldingley are in the process of amending their safer custody policy but to date this has not been produced.
I therefore remain concerned as follows:
In relation to HMP Coldingley:
1. There is no system in place to ensure that information provided in telephone calls in relation to a prisoner’s welfare is recorded.
2. Matters of concern in relation to prisoners are recorded across a number of different records and there is a risk that the information is missed and not disseminated in daily briefing sheets.
3. There is no composite document for clinicians to review to see all relevant information recorded by custodial staff about a CSU prisoner for the proceeding 24 hour period.
4. There is no system in place to check that referrals to the mental health teams requested by senior members of the prison staff have in fact been made.
5. Custody staff are not trained in mental health presentations and are unable to recognise red flag indicators of declining mental health.
In relation to HMP Coldingley and NHS England:
6. Outside of weekday office hours there is no clinical mental health provision. Overnight staffing levels are such that it is difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result:
a.) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions.
b.) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30 pm and 7am the following morning.
7. The ACCT process is not designed nor effective to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
In relation to the Parole Board:
8. Imprisonment under an IPP is a recognised suicide risk. The delay in dealing with the IPP parole hearing exacerbated the risk. There is currently no process in place to expedite face to face parole hearings for IPP prisoners when allegations leading to their recall have been withdrawn and no criminal action is being considered.
Responses
Noted
(AI summary)
(AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Topping,
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Haydar Jefferies who died on 5 March 2023 at Frimley Park Hospital whilst under detention at HMP Coldingley.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter ‘Report’) dated 20 December 2024 concerning the death of Haydar Jefferies on 5 March 2023. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Haydar’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen to assure the family, and the Coroner, that concerns raised about Haydar’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.
I am grateful for the further time granted to respond to your Report, and I apologise for any anguish this delay may have caused Haydar’s family or friends. I realise that responses to Coroners’ Reports can form part of the important process of family and friends coming to terms with what has happened to their loved ones, and I appreciate this will have been an incredibly difficult time for them.
Your Report raises the concern that, outside of weekday office hours, there is no mental health clinical provision and that overnight staffing levels at HMP Coldingley make it difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result, you raised that:
a) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions; and
b) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30pm and 7.00am the following morning.
I note your concern around overnight staffing levels and the lack of clinical presence overnight, outside of weekday hours. For clarity, I can explain that not all prisons in England provide 24-hour healthcare so there is no overnight clinical presence. HMP Coldingley is a Category C establishment, which means it is considered as someone’s ‘usual residence’, or home. There is therefore no provision for overnight healthcare.
National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG
12 March 2025
In the event of there being serious concerns about an individual’s health, it is expected that a 999 call is made to request an ambulance in the same way an ambulance would be called for a person in their own home. This falls under what is described as ‘urgent referrals’.
I would also like to inform you that since Haydar’s tragic death, the healthcare at HMP Coldingley, including mental health services, has been re-commissioned.
As of 1 April 2023, the new provider is contracted to provide the following:
• Primary care services: Delivered seven days per week between the hours of
07.00 and 19.00 Monday to Friday, and between 08.00 and 17.30 on weekends and public holidays.
• Mental health services: These services are delivered seven days a week at a minimum, Monday to Friday 08.00 until 20.00 and ‘on call’ from 10.00 until
16.00 on weekends and public holidays. There is also on-site attendance available seven days a week.
Within the new contract, if there is a requirement for any emergency treatment, such as medication to alleviate any mental health symptoms, for example, the following applies:
• Emergency referrals: Must be made within two hours when primary care services are on-site
• Urgent referrals: Must be made within twenty-four hours, with protocols in place with out of hours (OOH) service providers to manage any urgent cases that arise during the OOH period. These are provided through Integrated Care Board (ICB) commissioned services or specialised services. This also includes 999 calls where there are serious concerns as mentioned above.
Contract Management Processes are in place to ensure that emergency and urgent referrals are reviewed and monitored regularly. This is a quarterly process which is audited and recorded. With regards to any urgent issues identified, these are reported via Datix (a digital system for reporting incidents and risks used to support risk mitigation and regulatory compliance) and acted upon immediately.
The Service Specification for primary (medical and nursing) and dental care provision in prisons, published in 2020, and the Service Specification for integrated mental health service for prisons in England, published in 2018, both support the regional commissioning and contract management process for primary care and mental health service provision. These service specifications detail core service delivery and the standards that providers are expected to prioritise, including expected outcomes.
A review of the NHS England health and justice service specifications is being undertaken by NHS England through 2025 to 2026, and any learning from this case will be used to ensure that the primary care specification continues to support commissioners to be able to tailor services to meet the needs of their prison population.
In addition to this, NHS England and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) are working collaboratively to produce the Joint Care and Separation Unit Standards Framework. This will be rolled out later in 2025, along with a range of resources to support implementation, at establishment level, once the Segregation Policy Framework is published. This supports a multi-disciplinary approach to healthcare, including mental health, for people in segregation. There will be a planned implementation phase to support healthcare, and governors will adopt the standards over an agreed period, which will be determined by HMPPS.
I note your Report also directs a concern to both NHS England and HMP Coldingley, that the Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) process is not designed, nor effective, to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
Ownership of the ACCT process and policy lies with HMPPS. NHS England are therefore not able to comment on this point and would recommend that this is directed to HMPPS for a full response.
The findings, information and any learning from this case will be tabled at a future NHS England Health and Justice Delivery Oversight Group (HJDOG). The HJDOG is the senior leadership forum, which holds responsibility for the oversight of delivery and continuous improvement in Health and Justice commissioned services, through both national and regional teams. All health and justice related Reports to Prevent Future Deaths are shared and discussed at the HJDOG, and assurance is sought from regions where learning and action is identified.
NHS England’s national health and justice team has also engaged with colleagues from the South East region on the concerns raised in your Report. For improvements to be made, a notice will be issued to healthcare staff that they should record a case note when they ask prisoners if they are having thoughts of self-harm, and they will be advised that negative responses should also be recorded. Good order and discipline reviews will now include questions around prisoners’ thoughts on self-harm and responses will be recorded, and mental health teams will log all referrals on SystmOne. A new template form for mental health referrals is also being designed, which will include prompts to include key information to aid triage and details on what to do with the referral. HMP Coldingley’s Governor will ensure that the new template is circulated to all operational staff.
I would also like to provide assurance about the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learning and insight around events, such as the sad death of Haydar, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level. This helps NHS England pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.
I would like to thank you for bringing these important issues to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Haydar Jefferies who died on 5 March 2023 at Frimley Park Hospital whilst under detention at HMP Coldingley.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter ‘Report’) dated 20 December 2024 concerning the death of Haydar Jefferies on 5 March 2023. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Haydar’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen to assure the family, and the Coroner, that concerns raised about Haydar’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.
I am grateful for the further time granted to respond to your Report, and I apologise for any anguish this delay may have caused Haydar’s family or friends. I realise that responses to Coroners’ Reports can form part of the important process of family and friends coming to terms with what has happened to their loved ones, and I appreciate this will have been an incredibly difficult time for them.
Your Report raises the concern that, outside of weekday office hours, there is no mental health clinical provision and that overnight staffing levels at HMP Coldingley make it difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result, you raised that:
a) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions; and
b) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30pm and 7.00am the following morning.
I note your concern around overnight staffing levels and the lack of clinical presence overnight, outside of weekday hours. For clarity, I can explain that not all prisons in England provide 24-hour healthcare so there is no overnight clinical presence. HMP Coldingley is a Category C establishment, which means it is considered as someone’s ‘usual residence’, or home. There is therefore no provision for overnight healthcare.
National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG
12 March 2025
In the event of there being serious concerns about an individual’s health, it is expected that a 999 call is made to request an ambulance in the same way an ambulance would be called for a person in their own home. This falls under what is described as ‘urgent referrals’.
I would also like to inform you that since Haydar’s tragic death, the healthcare at HMP Coldingley, including mental health services, has been re-commissioned.
As of 1 April 2023, the new provider is contracted to provide the following:
• Primary care services: Delivered seven days per week between the hours of
07.00 and 19.00 Monday to Friday, and between 08.00 and 17.30 on weekends and public holidays.
• Mental health services: These services are delivered seven days a week at a minimum, Monday to Friday 08.00 until 20.00 and ‘on call’ from 10.00 until
16.00 on weekends and public holidays. There is also on-site attendance available seven days a week.
Within the new contract, if there is a requirement for any emergency treatment, such as medication to alleviate any mental health symptoms, for example, the following applies:
• Emergency referrals: Must be made within two hours when primary care services are on-site
• Urgent referrals: Must be made within twenty-four hours, with protocols in place with out of hours (OOH) service providers to manage any urgent cases that arise during the OOH period. These are provided through Integrated Care Board (ICB) commissioned services or specialised services. This also includes 999 calls where there are serious concerns as mentioned above.
Contract Management Processes are in place to ensure that emergency and urgent referrals are reviewed and monitored regularly. This is a quarterly process which is audited and recorded. With regards to any urgent issues identified, these are reported via Datix (a digital system for reporting incidents and risks used to support risk mitigation and regulatory compliance) and acted upon immediately.
The Service Specification for primary (medical and nursing) and dental care provision in prisons, published in 2020, and the Service Specification for integrated mental health service for prisons in England, published in 2018, both support the regional commissioning and contract management process for primary care and mental health service provision. These service specifications detail core service delivery and the standards that providers are expected to prioritise, including expected outcomes.
A review of the NHS England health and justice service specifications is being undertaken by NHS England through 2025 to 2026, and any learning from this case will be used to ensure that the primary care specification continues to support commissioners to be able to tailor services to meet the needs of their prison population.
In addition to this, NHS England and His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) are working collaboratively to produce the Joint Care and Separation Unit Standards Framework. This will be rolled out later in 2025, along with a range of resources to support implementation, at establishment level, once the Segregation Policy Framework is published. This supports a multi-disciplinary approach to healthcare, including mental health, for people in segregation. There will be a planned implementation phase to support healthcare, and governors will adopt the standards over an agreed period, which will be determined by HMPPS.
I note your Report also directs a concern to both NHS England and HMP Coldingley, that the Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) process is not designed, nor effective, to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
Ownership of the ACCT process and policy lies with HMPPS. NHS England are therefore not able to comment on this point and would recommend that this is directed to HMPPS for a full response.
The findings, information and any learning from this case will be tabled at a future NHS England Health and Justice Delivery Oversight Group (HJDOG). The HJDOG is the senior leadership forum, which holds responsibility for the oversight of delivery and continuous improvement in Health and Justice commissioned services, through both national and regional teams. All health and justice related Reports to Prevent Future Deaths are shared and discussed at the HJDOG, and assurance is sought from regions where learning and action is identified.
NHS England’s national health and justice team has also engaged with colleagues from the South East region on the concerns raised in your Report. For improvements to be made, a notice will be issued to healthcare staff that they should record a case note when they ask prisoners if they are having thoughts of self-harm, and they will be advised that negative responses should also be recorded. Good order and discipline reviews will now include questions around prisoners’ thoughts on self-harm and responses will be recorded, and mental health teams will log all referrals on SystmOne. A new template form for mental health referrals is also being designed, which will include prompts to include key information to aid triage and details on what to do with the referral. HMP Coldingley’s Governor will ensure that the new template is circulated to all operational staff.
I would also like to provide assurance about the national NHS England work taking place around the Reports to Prevent Future Deaths. All reports received are discussed by the Regulation 28 Working Group, comprising Regional Medical Directors and other clinical and quality colleagues from across the regions. This ensures that key learning and insight around events, such as the sad death of Haydar, are shared across the NHS at both a national and regional level. This helps NHS England pay close attention to any emerging trends that may require further review and action.
I would like to thank you for bringing these important issues to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Action Taken
• The prison has developed and embedded a new process to ensure that important information relating to the welfare of prisoners is recorded and shared appropriately. • Any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner must be logged as a case note on P-NOMIS and the Safety team must be informed. • That information is then added to the daily briefing sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM). (AI summary)
• The prison has developed and embedded a new process to ensure that important information relating to the welfare of prisoners is recorded and shared appropriately. • Any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner must be logged as a case note on P-NOMIS and the Safety team must be informed. • That information is then added to the daily briefing sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM). (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Topping,
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 20 December 2024, addressed to the Minister of State for Prisons, Probation and Reducing Reoffending, and to the Governor of HMP Coldingley. I am responding as Director General of Operations for His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS).
I know that you will share a copy of this response with the family of Mr Jefferies, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.
Following evidence heard at the inquest, you have raised concerns about the recording and sharing of key risk information and around mental health awareness. I will address each of your concerns that relate to HMP Coldingley in turn.
Firstly, I wish to clarify that the prison sent an updated copy of the safer custody policy document, named the Safety Strategy, by the agreed deadline of 18 December 2024. As you have been provided with a copy, I will not detail the changes made to the policy but can assure you that the strategy does set out relevant action which addresses the concerns you raised during the inquest.
You have raised concerns that there is no system in place to record welfare concerns about prisoners when they are reported into the prison, and that when matters of concern are recorded this is not always documented in the same place. I have received assurance from the Governing Governor of HMP Coldingley that the prison has developed and embedded a new process to ensure that important information relating to the welfare of prisoners is recorded and shared appropriately. Any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner must be logged as a case note on P-NOMIS, the National Offender Management Information System used by the prison service, and the Safety team must be informed. That information is then added to the daily briefing sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM), a weekly multi-disciplinary meeting where the most at risk
OFFICIAL OFFICIAL prisoners are discussed. This requirement has been added to the updated local Safety Strategy. You may wish to note that in response to Mr Jefferies’ death, the prison now discuss prisoners serving an Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence at the SIM.
I understand that your concern that relevant risk information was not consolidated in one place and disseminated in daily briefing sheets was addressed by the prison in a letter sent to you on 18 December 2024. I do not wish to duplicate the response but can assure you that the prison remains committed to ensuring that relevant information is identified and shared appropriately.
You have raised a concern that there is no composite document for clinicians to review which contains relevant information recorded by prison staff about prisoners in the Care and Separation Unit (CSU). There is now a morning briefing for CSU staff, attended by healthcare and the mental health team which takes place prior to healthcare’s rounds, when all CSU prisoners are reviewed. Documented concerns are shared each morning at the briefing. Collaborative working and communication between prison staff, healthcare and mental health colleagues has improved through multi-disciplinary meetings which support the sharing of relevant risk information and actions to help prisoners identified as at risk of suicide and self-harm.
Your final concerns relate to prison staff’s awareness of mental health, including making referrals to the mental health team and recognising when a prisoner’s mental health is declining. Following Mr Jefferies’ death, the mental heath referral process was reviewed and the referral form was redesigned to simplify the process. The form is now available electronically so that staff can easily access it when needed, and when a referral has been requested by a senior member of staff they must document that this request has been made and record the name of the staff member tasked with completing the referral. Through improved multi-disciplinary working, there are more opportunities to check that referrals to the mental health team have been completed and received by the mental health team.
The prison is piloting an online e-learning course called ‘introduction to Mental Health’ for all staff working in the CSU to support staff in identifying indicators of declining mental health and to upskill staff to complete the mental health referral forms with relevant risk information. All new staff applying to work in the CSU must complete this course.
The prison’s Safety Strategy also sets out that all managers, particularly night Orderly Officers and those in charge of the prison when healthcare colleagues are not available must consider using out of hours options when concerns for a prisoner’s mental health have been raised. This includes phoning 111 – the NHS emergency non-life threatening phone number which now offers mental health crisis support.
In addition to the action taken locally at HMP Coldingley, I can confirm that all new prison officers complete a training module called ‘Introduction to Mental Health Awareness’ as part of their initial prison officer training.
Thank you again for bringing your concerns to my attention. I trust that this response provides assurance that action has been taken to address your concerns.
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 20 December 2024, addressed to the Minister of State for Prisons, Probation and Reducing Reoffending, and to the Governor of HMP Coldingley. I am responding as Director General of Operations for His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS).
I know that you will share a copy of this response with the family of Mr Jefferies, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority.
Following evidence heard at the inquest, you have raised concerns about the recording and sharing of key risk information and around mental health awareness. I will address each of your concerns that relate to HMP Coldingley in turn.
Firstly, I wish to clarify that the prison sent an updated copy of the safer custody policy document, named the Safety Strategy, by the agreed deadline of 18 December 2024. As you have been provided with a copy, I will not detail the changes made to the policy but can assure you that the strategy does set out relevant action which addresses the concerns you raised during the inquest.
You have raised concerns that there is no system in place to record welfare concerns about prisoners when they are reported into the prison, and that when matters of concern are recorded this is not always documented in the same place. I have received assurance from the Governing Governor of HMP Coldingley that the prison has developed and embedded a new process to ensure that important information relating to the welfare of prisoners is recorded and shared appropriately. Any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner must be logged as a case note on P-NOMIS, the National Offender Management Information System used by the prison service, and the Safety team must be informed. That information is then added to the daily briefing sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM), a weekly multi-disciplinary meeting where the most at risk
OFFICIAL OFFICIAL prisoners are discussed. This requirement has been added to the updated local Safety Strategy. You may wish to note that in response to Mr Jefferies’ death, the prison now discuss prisoners serving an Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) sentence at the SIM.
I understand that your concern that relevant risk information was not consolidated in one place and disseminated in daily briefing sheets was addressed by the prison in a letter sent to you on 18 December 2024. I do not wish to duplicate the response but can assure you that the prison remains committed to ensuring that relevant information is identified and shared appropriately.
You have raised a concern that there is no composite document for clinicians to review which contains relevant information recorded by prison staff about prisoners in the Care and Separation Unit (CSU). There is now a morning briefing for CSU staff, attended by healthcare and the mental health team which takes place prior to healthcare’s rounds, when all CSU prisoners are reviewed. Documented concerns are shared each morning at the briefing. Collaborative working and communication between prison staff, healthcare and mental health colleagues has improved through multi-disciplinary meetings which support the sharing of relevant risk information and actions to help prisoners identified as at risk of suicide and self-harm.
Your final concerns relate to prison staff’s awareness of mental health, including making referrals to the mental health team and recognising when a prisoner’s mental health is declining. Following Mr Jefferies’ death, the mental heath referral process was reviewed and the referral form was redesigned to simplify the process. The form is now available electronically so that staff can easily access it when needed, and when a referral has been requested by a senior member of staff they must document that this request has been made and record the name of the staff member tasked with completing the referral. Through improved multi-disciplinary working, there are more opportunities to check that referrals to the mental health team have been completed and received by the mental health team.
The prison is piloting an online e-learning course called ‘introduction to Mental Health’ for all staff working in the CSU to support staff in identifying indicators of declining mental health and to upskill staff to complete the mental health referral forms with relevant risk information. All new staff applying to work in the CSU must complete this course.
The prison’s Safety Strategy also sets out that all managers, particularly night Orderly Officers and those in charge of the prison when healthcare colleagues are not available must consider using out of hours options when concerns for a prisoner’s mental health have been raised. This includes phoning 111 – the NHS emergency non-life threatening phone number which now offers mental health crisis support.
In addition to the action taken locally at HMP Coldingley, I can confirm that all new prison officers complete a training module called ‘Introduction to Mental Health Awareness’ as part of their initial prison officer training.
Thank you again for bringing your concerns to my attention. I trust that this response provides assurance that action has been taken to address your concerns.
Action Planned
• The prison is rolling out mental health training for Custodial Managers and CSU Staff to assist with populating the referral form with all relevant information. • The prison expects all existing staff in these positions to have completed the training by the end of January 2025 and that new recruits into these positions will be required to complete the training before taking up post. • The Prison is willing to publish an amended version of the referral form if the Mental Health team identify that they require the inclusion of specific information. (AI summary)
• The prison is rolling out mental health training for Custodial Managers and CSU Staff to assist with populating the referral form with all relevant information. • The prison expects all existing staff in these positions to have completed the training by the end of January 2025 and that new recruits into these positions will be required to complete the training before taking up post. • The Prison is willing to publish an amended version of the referral form if the Mental Health team identify that they require the inclusion of specific information. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Ms Topping
Haydar Jefferies (Deceased) ( ) - Death in custody on 5 March 2023 - HMP Coldingley
Please find enclosed a copy of the Safety Strategy Policy dated December 2024, for HMP Coldingley. The updated policy encompasses the key learning outcomes following the sad death of Haydar Jefferies.
The two further queries and responses are dealt with as follows:
1. The fact that says that the new referral form does not always include enough information? As outlined on page 12 of the December 2024 Safety Strategy, the prison is rolling out mental health training for Custodial Managers and CSU Staff to assist with populating the referral form with all relevant information in respect of risk and to support custodial prison staff in identifying mental health concerns more readily. Custodial Managers can check that mental health training has been completed by accessing officer training records through the online management system. Any new staff that have successfully passed a board to work in the CSU, must have also completed the online training prior to being invited for interview. The prison expect all existing staff in these positions to have completed the training by the end of January 2025 and that new recruits into these positions will be required to complete the training before taking up post. The prison is committed to ensuring mental health concerns are referred to the mental health team as early as possible. This may mean on occasion that the information is slightly more limited than the mental health team would like in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the issues, but this at least puts the mental health team in a position to make further enquiries and bring their expertise to the assessment urgently. It is important to acknowledge that the referral form is designed by the Mental Health team. The Prison is willing to publish an amended version if the Mental Health team identify that they require the inclusion of specific information. Assistant Coroner Topping HM Coroner for Surrey HM Coroner's Court Station Approach Woking Surrey GU22 7AP Litigation Group 102 Petty France Westminster London SW1H 9GL T 020 7210 3000
Your ref: Haydar Jefferies (Deceased) Our ref: 18 December 2024
- 2 -
2. The jury finding that records are across multiple systems with different levels of access with no set expectation for cross referencing.
The prison is committed to ensuring information is captured and disseminated efficiently and effectively. Certain information needs to be recorded in specific areas/working logs to ensure that information is noted by the correct staff members who then filter and prioritise the information so that it is actioned meaningfully. Necessarily there are systems to filter and distil the information to key facts and issues, otherwise, there is a real risk of information overload. For example, what is useful and important for a wing officer to read in the Observation Book may be excessive detail for the senior managers to read in the daily briefing sheet.
It is also important to note the necessity of having a separate healthcare system to ensure patient confidentiality.
To drive improvement in terms of better cross referencing of information, there is now an expectation that any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner is recorded as a case note on P-Nomis and the Safety Team will be notified of the interaction. The entry is then added to the Daily Briefing Sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting. Where applicable, there is also an expectation that these entries are captured in other areas such as the Wing Observation Book, ACCT records and/or Mercury Intelligence Reports. These requirements have been implemented in the December 2024 Safety Strategy Policy as annexed to this letter. The importance of logging calls has been communicated to staff by weekly video links, a notice to staff and discussed at staff briefings. Any failure to comply with this requirement will be challenged and may result in disciplinary or performance management action being taken.
We do hope this clarifies the position of the prison.
If the prison can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to get in touch.
Haydar Jefferies (Deceased) ( ) - Death in custody on 5 March 2023 - HMP Coldingley
Please find enclosed a copy of the Safety Strategy Policy dated December 2024, for HMP Coldingley. The updated policy encompasses the key learning outcomes following the sad death of Haydar Jefferies.
The two further queries and responses are dealt with as follows:
1. The fact that says that the new referral form does not always include enough information? As outlined on page 12 of the December 2024 Safety Strategy, the prison is rolling out mental health training for Custodial Managers and CSU Staff to assist with populating the referral form with all relevant information in respect of risk and to support custodial prison staff in identifying mental health concerns more readily. Custodial Managers can check that mental health training has been completed by accessing officer training records through the online management system. Any new staff that have successfully passed a board to work in the CSU, must have also completed the online training prior to being invited for interview. The prison expect all existing staff in these positions to have completed the training by the end of January 2025 and that new recruits into these positions will be required to complete the training before taking up post. The prison is committed to ensuring mental health concerns are referred to the mental health team as early as possible. This may mean on occasion that the information is slightly more limited than the mental health team would like in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the issues, but this at least puts the mental health team in a position to make further enquiries and bring their expertise to the assessment urgently. It is important to acknowledge that the referral form is designed by the Mental Health team. The Prison is willing to publish an amended version if the Mental Health team identify that they require the inclusion of specific information. Assistant Coroner Topping HM Coroner for Surrey HM Coroner's Court Station Approach Woking Surrey GU22 7AP Litigation Group 102 Petty France Westminster London SW1H 9GL T 020 7210 3000
Your ref: Haydar Jefferies (Deceased) Our ref: 18 December 2024
- 2 -
2. The jury finding that records are across multiple systems with different levels of access with no set expectation for cross referencing.
The prison is committed to ensuring information is captured and disseminated efficiently and effectively. Certain information needs to be recorded in specific areas/working logs to ensure that information is noted by the correct staff members who then filter and prioritise the information so that it is actioned meaningfully. Necessarily there are systems to filter and distil the information to key facts and issues, otherwise, there is a real risk of information overload. For example, what is useful and important for a wing officer to read in the Observation Book may be excessive detail for the senior managers to read in the daily briefing sheet.
It is also important to note the necessity of having a separate healthcare system to ensure patient confidentiality.
To drive improvement in terms of better cross referencing of information, there is now an expectation that any contact from a concerned relative or friend of a prisoner is recorded as a case note on P-Nomis and the Safety Team will be notified of the interaction. The entry is then added to the Daily Briefing Sheet and discussed at the next Safety Intervention Meeting. Where applicable, there is also an expectation that these entries are captured in other areas such as the Wing Observation Book, ACCT records and/or Mercury Intelligence Reports. These requirements have been implemented in the December 2024 Safety Strategy Policy as annexed to this letter. The importance of logging calls has been communicated to staff by weekly video links, a notice to staff and discussed at staff briefings. Any failure to comply with this requirement will be challenged and may result in disciplinary or performance management action being taken.
We do hope this clarifies the position of the prison.
If the prison can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to get in touch.
Sent To
- HMP Coldingley
- HMPPS
- Ministry of Justice
- NHS England
Response Status
Linked responses
3 of 4
56-Day Deadline
14 Feb 2025
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
An inquest into the death of Mr Haydar Jefferies was opened on the 4th April 2023 and resumed with a jury on the 11th November 2024. The inquest was concluded on the 29th November 2024. The jury concluded that Mr Jefferies died on the 5th March 2023 at Frimley Park Hospital, Frimley and the medical cause of his death was: 1a. Hypoxic Brain Injury and Bilateral Pneumonia 1b. Suspension
They concluded with a narrative conclusion and found that: MATERIAL CAUSES
Haydar died as a result of tying a ligature around his neck. It is not possible to determine his intention.
The following are facts that, on the balance of probabilities, have been found to have happened and have made a material contribution to Haydar Jefferies’ death:
Between the 18th February 2023 and the 1st of March 2023, Haydar was suffering from psychosis as referenced by the expert psychiatrist. The fact that Haydar was an IPP prisoner and that his parole hearing was delayed more than minimally contributed to the development of this psychosis, due to the psychological stress.
In February 2023, during Haydar’s detainment at HMP Coldingley, there was a serious failure by the custodial staff to record risk relevant information in regard to his presentation. Specifically, concerns raised by his family through numerous telephone calls and concerning comments made by Haydar to custodial staff. There was an additional failure to ensure that risk relevant information was shared with prison officers and clinical staff.
Between the 18th and 27th February 2023, there was a serious failure to refer Haydar to the Mental Health team. This was despite evidence showing acknowledgement and intent to make a mental health referral on more than one occasion. By 17.30 on the 28th of February 2023, Haydar was floridly psychotic as evidenced by the expert psychiatrist. The proper response would have been to ensure his immediate safety by putting him on constant supervision and taken him to an external place of safety due to Coldingley’s unsuitable provision of safer cells. That none of this was done represents a serious failure by HMP Coldingley custodial staff.
There was a failure to undertake a substantive mental health assessment on the 28th February 2023 following the morning referral from custodial staff and the subsequent CSU review. A mental health review was booked in for the following day which was inadequate.
POSSIBLE CAUSATIVE MATTERS The following are matters which we have found possibly occurred and more than merely speculatively made a material contribution towards Haydar’s death but we have not found on the balance of probabilities:
Such records as were made were across multiple systems with different levels of access, no set expectation of cross referencing and reliant on individual initiative and curiosity to be found. The clinical staff at HMP Coldingley were lacking this initiative and curiosity and thereby missed a pattern of behaviour that they could have identified and used to drive better-informed clinical decisions at point such as the brief CSU rounds and reviews.
When the allegation that led to Haydar’s recall was no longer being pursued, there was an opportunity for the Secretary of State to consider an executive release, which was not taken. The IPP parole decision could have been made on “on papers” without the need for a meeting, and this too was declined.
The training for custodial staff at HMP Coldingley is inconsistent and inadequate with regard to mental health presentation. The ACCT document and process is unsuitable for a mental health crisis of this kind.
NEGLECT The death was contributed to by Neglect. This is in relation to a failure to share risk relevant information with clinical staff and procure mental health intervention for Haydar between the 18th and the 27th February 2023 and a failure to procure medical attention for Haydar after he suffered acute mental health deterioration on the evening of the 28th February 2023.
SYSTEM FAILURE The death was caused or more than minimally contributed to by the failure on the part of the Ministry of Justice to ensure there was a system in place for the recording of the family concerns raised in telephone calls to the prison.
ADMITTED FAILURES It is admitted that HMP Coldingley ought to have automatically conducted five observations per hour because an ACCT was opened for Mr Jefferies whilst he was on the CSU. It is accepted that only two observations were conducted per hour.
They concluded with a narrative conclusion and found that: MATERIAL CAUSES
Haydar died as a result of tying a ligature around his neck. It is not possible to determine his intention.
The following are facts that, on the balance of probabilities, have been found to have happened and have made a material contribution to Haydar Jefferies’ death:
Between the 18th February 2023 and the 1st of March 2023, Haydar was suffering from psychosis as referenced by the expert psychiatrist. The fact that Haydar was an IPP prisoner and that his parole hearing was delayed more than minimally contributed to the development of this psychosis, due to the psychological stress.
In February 2023, during Haydar’s detainment at HMP Coldingley, there was a serious failure by the custodial staff to record risk relevant information in regard to his presentation. Specifically, concerns raised by his family through numerous telephone calls and concerning comments made by Haydar to custodial staff. There was an additional failure to ensure that risk relevant information was shared with prison officers and clinical staff.
Between the 18th and 27th February 2023, there was a serious failure to refer Haydar to the Mental Health team. This was despite evidence showing acknowledgement and intent to make a mental health referral on more than one occasion. By 17.30 on the 28th of February 2023, Haydar was floridly psychotic as evidenced by the expert psychiatrist. The proper response would have been to ensure his immediate safety by putting him on constant supervision and taken him to an external place of safety due to Coldingley’s unsuitable provision of safer cells. That none of this was done represents a serious failure by HMP Coldingley custodial staff.
There was a failure to undertake a substantive mental health assessment on the 28th February 2023 following the morning referral from custodial staff and the subsequent CSU review. A mental health review was booked in for the following day which was inadequate.
POSSIBLE CAUSATIVE MATTERS The following are matters which we have found possibly occurred and more than merely speculatively made a material contribution towards Haydar’s death but we have not found on the balance of probabilities:
Such records as were made were across multiple systems with different levels of access, no set expectation of cross referencing and reliant on individual initiative and curiosity to be found. The clinical staff at HMP Coldingley were lacking this initiative and curiosity and thereby missed a pattern of behaviour that they could have identified and used to drive better-informed clinical decisions at point such as the brief CSU rounds and reviews.
When the allegation that led to Haydar’s recall was no longer being pursued, there was an opportunity for the Secretary of State to consider an executive release, which was not taken. The IPP parole decision could have been made on “on papers” without the need for a meeting, and this too was declined.
The training for custodial staff at HMP Coldingley is inconsistent and inadequate with regard to mental health presentation. The ACCT document and process is unsuitable for a mental health crisis of this kind.
NEGLECT The death was contributed to by Neglect. This is in relation to a failure to share risk relevant information with clinical staff and procure mental health intervention for Haydar between the 18th and the 27th February 2023 and a failure to procure medical attention for Haydar after he suffered acute mental health deterioration on the evening of the 28th February 2023.
SYSTEM FAILURE The death was caused or more than minimally contributed to by the failure on the part of the Ministry of Justice to ensure there was a system in place for the recording of the family concerns raised in telephone calls to the prison.
ADMITTED FAILURES It is admitted that HMP Coldingley ought to have automatically conducted five observations per hour because an ACCT was opened for Mr Jefferies whilst he was on the CSU. It is accepted that only two observations were conducted per hour.
Circumstances of the Death
Haydar Jefferies was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection (“IPP”) in 2006. He was released in 2013. Haydar then integrated into the community, married and was working as a publican. Following the death of his spouse and his father in 2021 Haydar attempted suicide. In January 2022 allegations were made against him and he was recalled to prison under the terms of the IPP. By April 2022 the allegations were not being pursued. An Executive Release order request was made and declined. ln order to be released from prison Haydar had to attend a parole board hearing. The parole board decided that a hearing in person was required. In May 2022 Haydar disclosed he had made a ligature. A parole board hearing was fixed on the 13th October 2022.The parole board hearing was vacated owing to the unavailability of the chair person. The next parole hearing was listed for the 2nd March 2023. The extended period of detention was detrimental to Haydar's health and he stated to clinical staff he felt hopeless and helpless after his cancelled parole hearing. On the 28th December 2022 Haydar was transferred to HMP Coldingley from HPM Bullingdon. Haydar travelled with prisoners who were aware Haydar had come from the vulnerable prisoners wing and made inaccurate assumptions about reasons for being on the wing.
On arrival at HMP Coldingley Haydar’s mental health was reviewed and appeared stable. On 10th February 2023 the Government rejected IPP resentencing. On the 12th February 2023 Haydar asked to be segregated for his own safety in the care and separation unit (CSU). This move was supported by a call from Haydar's mother concerned about his safety. On the 14th February Haydar reported low mood and was unwilling to restart previously prescribed medication for depression. The Independent Monitoring Board (lMB) visited Haydar on February 15th 2023 following the Government rejection of the proposed IPP resentencing. Haydar reported that he had lost hope'. From the 18th February 2023 Haydar developed severe depression with psychosis. Haydar's family made several calls to the prison from 18th February 2023 onwards raising concerns about his safety and deteriorating mental health. These calls were not recorded in any prison records. Haydar made various statements to individual prison staff from 18th February 2023 onwards, which were symptomatic of deteriorating mental health and development of psychosis, including many which were not recorded in any prison records. A number of statements about Haydar's presentation were recorded across a disparate landscape of on and offline recording systems. On the 19th February custodial staff acknowledged the need to refer Haydar to mental health. This referral was never made despite being recorded as having been completed in prison records. On the 26th February 2023 custodial staff identified the need to request a mental health review following Haydar's delusional allegations towards staff. Haydar then experienced auditory and visual hallucinations and reported them to his family and custodial staff. This further evidence of psychosis was not recorded. At this time, Haydar was also not taking part in the CSU regime, remaining in his cell at all times. Prior to the 28th February 2023 neither the information in the family calls nor the concerning statements made to individual prison officers were shared with clinical staff or other prison staff and no referrals were made to the mental health team in relation to Haydar. On the morning of the 28th February 2023, Haydar told custodial staff he had made peace and was ready for staff to kill him. An email referral, followed up by a phone call, was made to the mental health team for Haydar to be seen as soon as possible on the morning of the 28th February 2023. No mental health assessment was conducted that day. ln the afternoon of the 28th February 2023 Haydar attended a CSU review. During the review Haydar requested a mental health assessment. As part of the review documentation, the CSU algorithm was completed as 'no psychosis'. Evidence provided by an expert witness determined that in fact Haydar was psychotic from 18th February 2023, and on the morning of the 28th had demonstrated red flag behaviour. The CSU review document was not fully completed. The box relating to mental health concerns was left blank. At around 16.30 on the 28th February 2023 Haydar was observed in his cell, flushing his head down the toilet, naked, on all fours, barking like a dog and he said a female officer had told him to behave like this. At this stage Haydar was floridly psychotic. An ACCT was opened at 17.30. The ACCT was not fully completed with a justification for Haydar to remain in CSU. No Defensible Decision log was completed. No medical advice was sought and no medical treatment obtained for Haydar on the evening of the 28th February 2023. The medical team were still on site at the time the ACCT was opened. Observations were incorrectly set at 2 per hour and only constant observations would have been sufficient to ensure safety. Haydar remained on the CSU. This was not appropriate, outside provision should have been sought. During CSU observation, Haydar was found to be slumped over the toilet in his cell. At 2.40 on the 1st March 2023 Haydar was found in cardiac arrest having self -ligatured in his cell. Paramedics attended within minutes and resuscitated Haydar and transported him to Frimley Park Hospital where he was admitted at 04.45 on 1st March 2023. Haydar had sustained a hypoxic brain injury. Haydar was pronounced dead at 15.11 on the 5th March 2023 at Frimley Park Hospital. His death was caused by hypoxic brain injury and pneumonia.
CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:
Evidence was provided by HMP Coldingley and Central North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“CNWL”) in relation to the matters found by the jury. The organisations have taken the matters that led to Haydar’s death seriously.
CNWL are putting in place protocols and training to ensure that staff are better informed before assessing and reviewing prisoners on CSU.
HMP Coldingley are in the process of amending their safer custody policy but to date this has not been produced.
I therefore remain concerned as follows:
In relation to HMP Coldingley:
1. There is no system in place to ensure that information provided in telephone calls in relation to a prisoner’s welfare is recorded.
2. Matters of concern in relation to prisoners are recorded across a number of different records and there is a risk that the information is missed and not disseminated in daily briefing sheets.
3. There is no composite document for clinicians to review to see all relevant information recorded by custodial staff about a CSU prisoner for the proceeding 24 hour period.
4. There is no system in place to check that referrals to the mental health teams requested by senior members of the prison staff have in fact been made.
5. Custody staff are not trained in mental health presentations and are unable to recognise red flag indicators of declining mental health.
In relation to HMP Coldingley and NHS England:
6. Outside of weekday office hours there is no clinical mental health provision. Overnight staffing levels are such that it is difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result:
a.) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions.
b.) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30 pm and 7am the following morning.
7. The ACCT process is not designed nor effective to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
In relation to the Parole Board:
8. Imprisonment under an IPP is a recognised suicide risk. The delay in dealing with the IPP parole hearing exacerbated the risk. There is currently no process in place to expedite face to face parole hearings for IPP prisoners when allegations leading to their recall have been withdrawn and no criminal action is being considered.
On arrival at HMP Coldingley Haydar’s mental health was reviewed and appeared stable. On 10th February 2023 the Government rejected IPP resentencing. On the 12th February 2023 Haydar asked to be segregated for his own safety in the care and separation unit (CSU). This move was supported by a call from Haydar's mother concerned about his safety. On the 14th February Haydar reported low mood and was unwilling to restart previously prescribed medication for depression. The Independent Monitoring Board (lMB) visited Haydar on February 15th 2023 following the Government rejection of the proposed IPP resentencing. Haydar reported that he had lost hope'. From the 18th February 2023 Haydar developed severe depression with psychosis. Haydar's family made several calls to the prison from 18th February 2023 onwards raising concerns about his safety and deteriorating mental health. These calls were not recorded in any prison records. Haydar made various statements to individual prison staff from 18th February 2023 onwards, which were symptomatic of deteriorating mental health and development of psychosis, including many which were not recorded in any prison records. A number of statements about Haydar's presentation were recorded across a disparate landscape of on and offline recording systems. On the 19th February custodial staff acknowledged the need to refer Haydar to mental health. This referral was never made despite being recorded as having been completed in prison records. On the 26th February 2023 custodial staff identified the need to request a mental health review following Haydar's delusional allegations towards staff. Haydar then experienced auditory and visual hallucinations and reported them to his family and custodial staff. This further evidence of psychosis was not recorded. At this time, Haydar was also not taking part in the CSU regime, remaining in his cell at all times. Prior to the 28th February 2023 neither the information in the family calls nor the concerning statements made to individual prison officers were shared with clinical staff or other prison staff and no referrals were made to the mental health team in relation to Haydar. On the morning of the 28th February 2023, Haydar told custodial staff he had made peace and was ready for staff to kill him. An email referral, followed up by a phone call, was made to the mental health team for Haydar to be seen as soon as possible on the morning of the 28th February 2023. No mental health assessment was conducted that day. ln the afternoon of the 28th February 2023 Haydar attended a CSU review. During the review Haydar requested a mental health assessment. As part of the review documentation, the CSU algorithm was completed as 'no psychosis'. Evidence provided by an expert witness determined that in fact Haydar was psychotic from 18th February 2023, and on the morning of the 28th had demonstrated red flag behaviour. The CSU review document was not fully completed. The box relating to mental health concerns was left blank. At around 16.30 on the 28th February 2023 Haydar was observed in his cell, flushing his head down the toilet, naked, on all fours, barking like a dog and he said a female officer had told him to behave like this. At this stage Haydar was floridly psychotic. An ACCT was opened at 17.30. The ACCT was not fully completed with a justification for Haydar to remain in CSU. No Defensible Decision log was completed. No medical advice was sought and no medical treatment obtained for Haydar on the evening of the 28th February 2023. The medical team were still on site at the time the ACCT was opened. Observations were incorrectly set at 2 per hour and only constant observations would have been sufficient to ensure safety. Haydar remained on the CSU. This was not appropriate, outside provision should have been sought. During CSU observation, Haydar was found to be slumped over the toilet in his cell. At 2.40 on the 1st March 2023 Haydar was found in cardiac arrest having self -ligatured in his cell. Paramedics attended within minutes and resuscitated Haydar and transported him to Frimley Park Hospital where he was admitted at 04.45 on 1st March 2023. Haydar had sustained a hypoxic brain injury. Haydar was pronounced dead at 15.11 on the 5th March 2023 at Frimley Park Hospital. His death was caused by hypoxic brain injury and pneumonia.
CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths could occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you.
The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows:
Evidence was provided by HMP Coldingley and Central North West London NHS Foundation Trust (“CNWL”) in relation to the matters found by the jury. The organisations have taken the matters that led to Haydar’s death seriously.
CNWL are putting in place protocols and training to ensure that staff are better informed before assessing and reviewing prisoners on CSU.
HMP Coldingley are in the process of amending their safer custody policy but to date this has not been produced.
I therefore remain concerned as follows:
In relation to HMP Coldingley:
1. There is no system in place to ensure that information provided in telephone calls in relation to a prisoner’s welfare is recorded.
2. Matters of concern in relation to prisoners are recorded across a number of different records and there is a risk that the information is missed and not disseminated in daily briefing sheets.
3. There is no composite document for clinicians to review to see all relevant information recorded by custodial staff about a CSU prisoner for the proceeding 24 hour period.
4. There is no system in place to check that referrals to the mental health teams requested by senior members of the prison staff have in fact been made.
5. Custody staff are not trained in mental health presentations and are unable to recognise red flag indicators of declining mental health.
In relation to HMP Coldingley and NHS England:
6. Outside of weekday office hours there is no clinical mental health provision. Overnight staffing levels are such that it is difficult for prisoners in mental health crisis to be taken to hospital. As a result:
a.) custodial staff take decisions about how to keep prisoners safe overnight without the necessary clinical knowledge to assess the risks presented by their mental health conditions.
b.) it is not possible for medication to be obtained to alleviate any acute mental health symptoms between 6.30 pm and 7am the following morning.
7. The ACCT process is not designed nor effective to protect prisoners in acute mental health crisis who do not appear to be suicidal.
In relation to the Parole Board:
8. Imprisonment under an IPP is a recognised suicide risk. The delay in dealing with the IPP parole hearing exacerbated the risk. There is currently no process in place to expedite face to face parole hearings for IPP prisoners when allegations leading to their recall have been withdrawn and no criminal action is being considered.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.