Paul Keating
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2023-0279
All 2 responses received
· Deadline: 19 Sep 2023
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
The local authority lacked statutory power to install sprinkler systems in private flats without consent, leading to one resident's flat remaining unconnected, which likely contributed to his fire-related death.
View full coroner's concerns
[BRIEF SUMMARY OF MATTERS OF CONCERN] (1) Mr Keating lived on the eleventh floor of a 17-storey tower block. His landlord was the local authority. In 2017, following the Grenfell Tower disaster, the local authority undertook a programme of installing sprinkler systems in all the residential tower blocks for which they were responsible, including Mr Keating’s.
(2) Being a single private dwelling, albeit in a tower block, Mr Keating’s flat was not covered by the provisions of The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The local authority had no statutory power to enter Mr Keating’s flat for the purposes of installing a sprinkler system without his consent.
(3) Over a period of six months during which the sprinkler system was installed in the tower block where Mr Keating lived, he did not respond to letters informing him of the planned installation of the sprinkler system and inviting his agreement to contractors entering his flat as part of that work. He additionally refused to open his door to the tenant liaison officer. (Further, it was discovered after his death that Mr Keating had disabled the hard-wired smoke detector and a battery-operated smoke detector within his flat.) (4) The necessary work was done in the common parts of the building to connect Mr Keating’s flat to the sprinkler system, but the work done could not cross the threshold of his flat without his consent. Of the 98 flats in the building, Mr Keating’s was the only flat not connected to the sprinkler system.
(5) If the local authority had had the statutory power to enter Mr Keating’s flat for the purposes of installing the sprinkler system, it would have exercised that power and Mr Keating’s flat would have been connected to that system.
(6) Had Mr Keating’s flat been connected to the sprinkler system, it is likely that the system would have been activated by the smouldering soft furnishings in his bedroom and the fire would have been extinguished before he was overwhelmed by carbon monoxide.
(2) Being a single private dwelling, albeit in a tower block, Mr Keating’s flat was not covered by the provisions of The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. The local authority had no statutory power to enter Mr Keating’s flat for the purposes of installing a sprinkler system without his consent.
(3) Over a period of six months during which the sprinkler system was installed in the tower block where Mr Keating lived, he did not respond to letters informing him of the planned installation of the sprinkler system and inviting his agreement to contractors entering his flat as part of that work. He additionally refused to open his door to the tenant liaison officer. (Further, it was discovered after his death that Mr Keating had disabled the hard-wired smoke detector and a battery-operated smoke detector within his flat.) (4) The necessary work was done in the common parts of the building to connect Mr Keating’s flat to the sprinkler system, but the work done could not cross the threshold of his flat without his consent. Of the 98 flats in the building, Mr Keating’s was the only flat not connected to the sprinkler system.
(5) If the local authority had had the statutory power to enter Mr Keating’s flat for the purposes of installing the sprinkler system, it would have exercised that power and Mr Keating’s flat would have been connected to that system.
(6) Had Mr Keating’s flat been connected to the sprinkler system, it is likely that the system would have been activated by the smouldering soft furnishings in his bedroom and the fire would have been extinguished before he was overwhelmed by carbon monoxide.
Responses
Noted
Leeds City Council acknowledges the coroner's concerns regarding a lack of legal powers to access properties for safety works without tenant consent. The council states that granting additional legal powers to landlords is a matter for central government. (AI summary)
Leeds City Council acknowledges the coroner's concerns regarding a lack of legal powers to access properties for safety works without tenant consent. The council states that granting additional legal powers to landlords is a matter for central government. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mr Longstaff Inquest into the death of Paul Keating Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths Thank you for your report dated 25 July 2023 in respect of concerns arising out of the inquest into the sad death of Mr Keating on 15 April 2023. I write to respond to that report on behalf of the Council. I would firstly wish to say that I was very sad to hear of the fact and circumstances of Mr Keating’s death and would wish to pass on my condolences to his family and all those affected by these events. As your report recognises, since 2017 Leeds City Council has adopted a proactive approach to improving fire safety within its tower blocks, following the Grenfell tragedy. This included installing sprinkler systems in those tower blocks. These sprinklers are intended to cover not only the common parts of the buildings, which fall within the scope of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (as amended by the Fire Safety Act 2021), but also individual flats within the blocks, which are outside the scope of the 2005 order. Regrettably despite the Council’s extensive efforts to obtain access for the installation of sprinklers into Mr Keating’s flat, no such access was given, as your report outlines. Because the works to install sprinklers would be deemed to be improvement works rather than repair or emergency works, and because sprinklers are not currently a legal requirement inside individual flats, the Council did not have legal powers to gain entry against Mr Keating’s wishes to carry out these works. This is the main area of concern raised in your report.
The granting of additional legal powers to landlords, in order to permit them to carry out safety works without the tenant’s consent, is a matter over which the Council has no control but falls to be considered by central government, and I note that the report was also addressed to the Home Office. I would however like to endorse your concerns as expressed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Matters of Concern. A copy of this response will be provided to the Home Officer for their information. I would like to thank you again for your report raising these concerns.
The granting of additional legal powers to landlords, in order to permit them to carry out safety works without the tenant’s consent, is a matter over which the Council has no control but falls to be considered by central government, and I note that the report was also addressed to the Home Office. I would however like to endorse your concerns as expressed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Matters of Concern. A copy of this response will be provided to the Home Officer for their information. I would like to thank you again for your report raising these concerns.
Noted
The Home Office acknowledges the coroner's concerns about fire risks in social housing but explains the existing regulatory framework, including the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the Housing Health and Safety Rating System. It highlights the role of Fire and Rescue Authorities and the Home Office's Fire Kills campaign. (AI summary)
The Home Office acknowledges the coroner's concerns about fire risks in social housing but explains the existing regulatory framework, including the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 and the Housing Health and Safety Rating System. It highlights the role of Fire and Rescue Authorities and the Home Office's Fire Kills campaign. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Oliver,
Regulation 28: Report to prevent future deaths
I refer to your report dated 25 July 2023 provided in accordance with your duty under paragraph 7, Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, following your inquest into the very sad death of Mr Paul Keating. I offer my sincerest condolences to the family and friends of Mr Keating.
I understand from your report that the inquest concluded that Mr Keating died from a fire in his home, which was found to have likely been caused by the discarding of smoking materials. You have raised concern regarding the fire risks that arose as a consequence of the local authority not having the necessary powers to enter Mr Keating’s flat to install fire safety precautions when entry is denied.
In your report you refer to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO). The purpose of the FSO is to regulate fire safety in workplaces and the communal parts of multi-occupied -domestic premises (the ‘common parts’). The FSO is not intended to regulate fire safety inside individual private dwellings.
In the case of social housing such as Mr Keating’s, the Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) applies. The HHSRS, set out in secondary legislation under the Housing Act 2004 and introduced in 2006, is a technical
risk-based tool used by local authorities to assess the condition of residential premises. It can be applied to a whole building (e.g. all private dwellings and all common parts) or to part of a building (e.g. an individual private dwelling). An HHSRS assessment covers 29 potential hazards, including fire, and categorises them by seriousness.
The Decent Homes Standard sets the minimum standards that social homes are required to meet. To meet it, the standard that all social housing (including local authority-owned stock) must achieve, a dwelling must be free from hazards at the most dangerous ‘category 1’ level that is assessed using the aforementioned HHSRS. In addition, where a dwelling is privately rented or rented from a housing association, local authorities have a duty to enforce if they identify category 1 hazards, and a discretionary power to enforce where less serious category 2 hazards are assessed. The decision whether to enforce in respect of a category 2 hazard should be taken in accordance with the local authority’s enforcement policy. The actions available to the local authority include powers to require remedial works, prohibit the use of part or all of a building or carry out emergency works themselves.
Turning to the specific issue of the local authority’s ability to access the property to carry out works, the Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) for Housing Conditions Claims (England) has been published by the Ministry of Justice to promote the speedy and appropriate carrying out of any remedial works which are the landlord’s responsibility and avoid unnecessary legal action. Section
7.6 of the PAP, which relates to access, states that ‘Tenants must allow the landlord reasonable access for inspection and the carrying out of works in accordance with the tenancy agreement’.
Also relevant is the important role that Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) must play in relation to the prevention of fires and ensuring public safety. Section 6 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires FRAs to make provision to promote fire safety in its area. FRAs meet this requirement through a range of activity, including through Home Fire Safety Visits. These visits see fire service personnel visit vulnerable people in their own homes to provide them with tailored fire safety advice. Where risks are identified which cannot be addressed by the FRA, they will work closely with other local public services, such as multi-agency safeguarding hubs, to ensure appropriate action is taken.
The Home Office also funds the Fire Kills campaign to promote domestic fire safety messages to the general public, and particularly those groups we know to be most at risk should a fire in the home occur. The campaign raises awareness of the importance of installing and regularly testing smoke alarms and, crucially, the behaviours and actions they can take to reduce the risk of a domestic fire.
Taken together, these measures provide a basis for action to be taken and support residents, such as Mr Keating, with improving fire safety.
Regulation 28: Report to prevent future deaths
I refer to your report dated 25 July 2023 provided in accordance with your duty under paragraph 7, Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulations 28 and 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013, following your inquest into the very sad death of Mr Paul Keating. I offer my sincerest condolences to the family and friends of Mr Keating.
I understand from your report that the inquest concluded that Mr Keating died from a fire in his home, which was found to have likely been caused by the discarding of smoking materials. You have raised concern regarding the fire risks that arose as a consequence of the local authority not having the necessary powers to enter Mr Keating’s flat to install fire safety precautions when entry is denied.
In your report you refer to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO). The purpose of the FSO is to regulate fire safety in workplaces and the communal parts of multi-occupied -domestic premises (the ‘common parts’). The FSO is not intended to regulate fire safety inside individual private dwellings.
In the case of social housing such as Mr Keating’s, the Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) applies. The HHSRS, set out in secondary legislation under the Housing Act 2004 and introduced in 2006, is a technical
risk-based tool used by local authorities to assess the condition of residential premises. It can be applied to a whole building (e.g. all private dwellings and all common parts) or to part of a building (e.g. an individual private dwelling). An HHSRS assessment covers 29 potential hazards, including fire, and categorises them by seriousness.
The Decent Homes Standard sets the minimum standards that social homes are required to meet. To meet it, the standard that all social housing (including local authority-owned stock) must achieve, a dwelling must be free from hazards at the most dangerous ‘category 1’ level that is assessed using the aforementioned HHSRS. In addition, where a dwelling is privately rented or rented from a housing association, local authorities have a duty to enforce if they identify category 1 hazards, and a discretionary power to enforce where less serious category 2 hazards are assessed. The decision whether to enforce in respect of a category 2 hazard should be taken in accordance with the local authority’s enforcement policy. The actions available to the local authority include powers to require remedial works, prohibit the use of part or all of a building or carry out emergency works themselves.
Turning to the specific issue of the local authority’s ability to access the property to carry out works, the Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) for Housing Conditions Claims (England) has been published by the Ministry of Justice to promote the speedy and appropriate carrying out of any remedial works which are the landlord’s responsibility and avoid unnecessary legal action. Section
7.6 of the PAP, which relates to access, states that ‘Tenants must allow the landlord reasonable access for inspection and the carrying out of works in accordance with the tenancy agreement’.
Also relevant is the important role that Fire and Rescue Authorities (FRAs) must play in relation to the prevention of fires and ensuring public safety. Section 6 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires FRAs to make provision to promote fire safety in its area. FRAs meet this requirement through a range of activity, including through Home Fire Safety Visits. These visits see fire service personnel visit vulnerable people in their own homes to provide them with tailored fire safety advice. Where risks are identified which cannot be addressed by the FRA, they will work closely with other local public services, such as multi-agency safeguarding hubs, to ensure appropriate action is taken.
The Home Office also funds the Fire Kills campaign to promote domestic fire safety messages to the general public, and particularly those groups we know to be most at risk should a fire in the home occur. The campaign raises awareness of the importance of installing and regularly testing smoke alarms and, crucially, the behaviours and actions they can take to reduce the risk of a domestic fire.
Taken together, these measures provide a basis for action to be taken and support residents, such as Mr Keating, with improving fire safety.
Sent To
- Home Office
- Leeds City Council
Response Status
Linked responses
2 of 2
56-Day Deadline
19 Sep 2023
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 28/04/2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Paul Keating, aged 59 (17/12/1963). The investigation concluded at the end of the Inquest on 20/07/2023. The conclusion of the Inquest was that Mr Keating’s death was accidental, caused by the combined effects of Carbon Monoxide toxicity and Ischaemic Heart Disease.
Circumstances of the Death
Paul Keating died on 15th April 2023 from the combined effects of carbon monoxide toxicity and pre-existing heart disease in a fire at the flat where he lived alone. The likely cause of the fire was the careless discarding of smoking materials in his bedroom. As he was entitled to, he had declined to allow contractors to install a sprinkler system in his flat when his local authority landlord was seeking to install such systems in all of their high rise properties following the Grenfell Tower disaster.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.