Winbourne Charles
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2023-0143
All 2 responses received
· Deadline: 23 Jun 2023
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Failures in adequately assessing self-harm risk, unsupported reduction in observations, and suspension of observations prior to death. The emergency response was chaotic and staff records were found to be dishonest, indicating severe governance and care failures.
View full coroner's concerns
1. A failure to adequately assess risk of harm - Poor record keeping and a failure to read electronic records meant that important information was not considered at a Multi-Disciplinary Team ("MDT") ward round on 6th April 2021 . The MDT arrived at a conclusion that Mr Charles' risk of self-harm was "no risk". A psychologist's assessment on the clinical record that assessed Mr Charles risk of self-harm as high on 31/3/21 was neither read nor incorporated into the MDT discussion.
2. A decision to reduce observation frequency made by the MDT on 6/4/21 was not supported by the Trust Policy guidance which indicated that enhanced observations were appropriate.
3. A failure to ensure that a treatment plan was followed - observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles' death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.
4. Failures to respond to an emergency adequately - The Trust described the emergency response as chaotic . Staff agreed that they "panicked" and did not follow policy, specific issues include;
a. A ward emergency bell was not sounded,
b. An anti-barricade key was not used to open Mr Charles' door, instead the door was forced open causing a risk of harm to Mr Charles. C. A ligature cutter could not be used promptly as it was secured in a box with a combination lock - staff did not know the combination,
d. Duty doctors were not called promptly,
e. Oxygen administration was delayed,
f. An on-site defibrillator was not used by staff
g. Staff could or would not provide a clear and relevant history to paramedics.
5. The credibility of evidence provided by Trust staff.
a. Two Trust witnesses declined to answer questions put to them regarding whether their observation records were truthful.
b. Observation records appeared to have been created utilising a "cut and paste" function. C. Records often inaccurately recorded the prescribed frequency of observation.
d. Factually inaccurate entries were made in the record following Mr Charles' death. On 11th April 2021 an entry stated that Mr Charles was, "Awake in his bedroom sitting on his bede (sic)" at 07.21 . On 12th April two entries made at 9.48 and 11 .40 recorded that Mr Charles' was alive and well. Senior Trust witnesses characterised these entries as dishonest.
6. Governance process failings.
a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10th April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not.
b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. C. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021 .
d. The Trust SI report presented to the inquest failed to address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports.
2. A decision to reduce observation frequency made by the MDT on 6/4/21 was not supported by the Trust Policy guidance which indicated that enhanced observations were appropriate.
3. A failure to ensure that a treatment plan was followed - observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles' death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.
4. Failures to respond to an emergency adequately - The Trust described the emergency response as chaotic . Staff agreed that they "panicked" and did not follow policy, specific issues include;
a. A ward emergency bell was not sounded,
b. An anti-barricade key was not used to open Mr Charles' door, instead the door was forced open causing a risk of harm to Mr Charles. C. A ligature cutter could not be used promptly as it was secured in a box with a combination lock - staff did not know the combination,
d. Duty doctors were not called promptly,
e. Oxygen administration was delayed,
f. An on-site defibrillator was not used by staff
g. Staff could or would not provide a clear and relevant history to paramedics.
5. The credibility of evidence provided by Trust staff.
a. Two Trust witnesses declined to answer questions put to them regarding whether their observation records were truthful.
b. Observation records appeared to have been created utilising a "cut and paste" function. C. Records often inaccurately recorded the prescribed frequency of observation.
d. Factually inaccurate entries were made in the record following Mr Charles' death. On 11th April 2021 an entry stated that Mr Charles was, "Awake in his bedroom sitting on his bede (sic)" at 07.21 . On 12th April two entries made at 9.48 and 11 .40 recorded that Mr Charles' was alive and well. Senior Trust witnesses characterised these entries as dishonest.
6. Governance process failings.
a. A datix incident report created on the evening of 10th April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not.
b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action. C. The Trust 72 hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15th April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of the suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10th April 2021 .
d. The Trust SI report presented to the inquest failed to address the poor risk assessment or inadequate datix & 72 hr reports.
Responses
Action Planned
The Trust has attached a detailed action plan addressing the concerns raised in the report. (AI summary)
The Trust has attached a detailed action plan addressing the concerns raised in the report. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Sir
Re: Inquest touching upon the death of Winbourne CHARLES
I refer to your Regulation 28 report dated 28 April 2023, issued in respect of your concerns regarding the risk of future deaths.
Concerns
At the conclusion of the hearing into the death of Winbourne Charles, you expressed concern regarding the following matters:
1. A failure to adequately asses risk of harm - Poor record keeping and a failure to read electronic records meant that important information was not considered at a Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) ward round on 06 April 2021. The MDT arrived at a conclusion that Mr Charles’ risk of self-harm was “no risk”. A psychologist’s assessment on the clinical record that assessed Mr Charles’ risk of the self-hard as high on 31 March 2021 was neither read nor incorporated into the MDT discussion
2. A decision to reduce observation frequency made by the MDT on 6 April 2021 was not supported by the Trust Policy guidance which indicated that enhanced observations were appropriate.
3. A failure to ensure that a treatment plan was followed - observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles’ death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.
4. Failure to respond to an emergency adequately - The Trust described the emergency response as chaotic, that Trust staff agreed that they “panicked” and did not follow policy, specific issues include;
a. A ward emergency bell was not sounded.
b. An anti-barricade key was not used to open Mr Charles’ door, instead the door was forced open causing risk of harm to Mr Charles.
c. A ligature cutter could not be used promptly as it was secured in a box with a combination lock – staff did not know the combination.
d. Duty doctors were not called promptly.
e. Oxygen administration was delayed.
f. An on-site defibrillator was not used by staff.
g. Staff could or would not provide a clear and relevant history to paramedics.
5. The credibility of evidence provided by Trust staff.
a. Two Trust witnesses declined to answer questions put to them regarding whether their observation records were truthful.
b. Observation records appeared to have been created utilising a “cut and paste” function.
c. Records often inaccurately recorded the prescribed frequency of observation.
d. Factually inaccurate entries were made in the record following Mr Charles’ death. On 11 April 2021 an entry stated that Mr Charles was “Awake in his bedroom sitting on his bede (sic)” at 07.21. On 12 April 2021 two entries made at 09.48 and 11.40 recorded that Mr Charles was alive and well. Senior Trust witnesses characterised these entries as dishonest.
6. Governance process failings.
a. A Datix incident report created on the evening of 10 April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not.
b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action.
c. The Trust 72-hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15 April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10 April 2021.
d. The Trust SI report presented to the inquest failed to address the poor risk assessment or inadequate Datix & 72-hour reports.
We have carefully considered your Regulation 28 report and by way of response, we attach a detailed action plan addressing the concerns raised by you.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for raising your concerns as part of this inquest. We find learning from inquests extremely valuable and are very grateful for your comprehensive investigation, which benefits not only the families of the deceased, but also the Trust and its service users.
I trust that the attached action plan reassures you that the Trust has taken this tragic death very seriously indeed, and that it reflects our commitment to improve care quality and patient safety.
If I can further assist, please do contact my office on
Re: Inquest touching upon the death of Winbourne CHARLES
I refer to your Regulation 28 report dated 28 April 2023, issued in respect of your concerns regarding the risk of future deaths.
Concerns
At the conclusion of the hearing into the death of Winbourne Charles, you expressed concern regarding the following matters:
1. A failure to adequately asses risk of harm - Poor record keeping and a failure to read electronic records meant that important information was not considered at a Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) ward round on 06 April 2021. The MDT arrived at a conclusion that Mr Charles’ risk of self-harm was “no risk”. A psychologist’s assessment on the clinical record that assessed Mr Charles’ risk of the self-hard as high on 31 March 2021 was neither read nor incorporated into the MDT discussion
2. A decision to reduce observation frequency made by the MDT on 6 April 2021 was not supported by the Trust Policy guidance which indicated that enhanced observations were appropriate.
3. A failure to ensure that a treatment plan was followed - observations between 16.00 and 17.00 on the day of Mr Charles’ death were suspended by the ward shift co-ordinator. The decision meant all patients subject to general observation on the ward were ignored.
4. Failure to respond to an emergency adequately - The Trust described the emergency response as chaotic, that Trust staff agreed that they “panicked” and did not follow policy, specific issues include;
a. A ward emergency bell was not sounded.
b. An anti-barricade key was not used to open Mr Charles’ door, instead the door was forced open causing risk of harm to Mr Charles.
c. A ligature cutter could not be used promptly as it was secured in a box with a combination lock – staff did not know the combination.
d. Duty doctors were not called promptly.
e. Oxygen administration was delayed.
f. An on-site defibrillator was not used by staff.
g. Staff could or would not provide a clear and relevant history to paramedics.
5. The credibility of evidence provided by Trust staff.
a. Two Trust witnesses declined to answer questions put to them regarding whether their observation records were truthful.
b. Observation records appeared to have been created utilising a “cut and paste” function.
c. Records often inaccurately recorded the prescribed frequency of observation.
d. Factually inaccurate entries were made in the record following Mr Charles’ death. On 11 April 2021 an entry stated that Mr Charles was “Awake in his bedroom sitting on his bede (sic)” at 07.21. On 12 April 2021 two entries made at 09.48 and 11.40 recorded that Mr Charles was alive and well. Senior Trust witnesses characterised these entries as dishonest.
6. Governance process failings.
a. A Datix incident report created on the evening of 10 April 2021 by a senior nurse and Modern Matron contained misleading information that suggested that emergency response policies were followed when in fact they were not.
b. The Datix failed to mention that observations had been suspended by the shift coordinator, a fact that was understood at that time. This obvious and significant piece of information that should have been escalated through the Trust governance team for action.
c. The Trust 72-hour report was written by the Modern Matron and was signed-off by an integrated care director on 15 April 2021. This document also failed to identify or escalate the significant issue of suspension of observation at 16.00 on 10 April 2021.
d. The Trust SI report presented to the inquest failed to address the poor risk assessment or inadequate Datix & 72-hour reports.
We have carefully considered your Regulation 28 report and by way of response, we attach a detailed action plan addressing the concerns raised by you.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for raising your concerns as part of this inquest. We find learning from inquests extremely valuable and are very grateful for your comprehensive investigation, which benefits not only the families of the deceased, but also the Trust and its service users.
I trust that the attached action plan reassures you that the Trust has taken this tragic death very seriously indeed, and that it reflects our commitment to improve care quality and patient safety.
If I can further assist, please do contact my office on
Action Taken
The Department of Health and Social Care mentions the publication of a new 5-year Suicide Prevention Strategy for England with over 130 actions. (AI summary)
The Department of Health and Social Care mentions the publication of a new 5-year Suicide Prevention Strategy for England with over 130 actions. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mr Irvine,
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths dated 28 April 2023 about the death of Winbourne Gregory Charles. I am replying as the Minister with responsibility for mental health and patient safety.
Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Winbourne’s death and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones. The circumstances your report describes are concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to my attention. Please accept my sincere apologies for the significant delay in responding to this matter.
Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.
From a national perspective, I would add that we published a new 5-year Suicide Prevention Strategy for England on 11 September with over 130 actions that we believe will make progress towards our ambition to reduce the suicide rate within two and a half years. The strategy is a call to action for national and local government, the health service, the VCSE sector, employers and individuals to work together to help prevent suicides.
I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.
Thank you for your Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths dated 28 April 2023 about the death of Winbourne Gregory Charles. I am replying as the Minister with responsibility for mental health and patient safety.
Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Winbourne’s death and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones. The circumstances your report describes are concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to my attention. Please accept my sincere apologies for the significant delay in responding to this matter.
Your report raises concerns over the provision and coordination of care that Winbourne received at North East London NHS Foundation Trust, which are mainly for the Trust to address. I understand that the Trust has already carefully considered the matters of concern in your report and has provided you with a comprehensive response as well as a copy of its action plan setting out the actions to be taken to improve care quality and patient safety.
From a national perspective, I would add that we published a new 5-year Suicide Prevention Strategy for England on 11 September with over 130 actions that we believe will make progress towards our ambition to reduce the suicide rate within two and a half years. The strategy is a call to action for national and local government, the health service, the VCSE sector, employers and individuals to work together to help prevent suicides.
I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.
Sent To
- Department of Health and Social Care
- North East London Foundation Trust
Response Status
Linked responses
2 of 2
56-Day Deadline
23 Jun 2023
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 11th April 2021 this Court commenced an investigation into the death of Winbourne Gregory Charles, aged 58. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest held before a jury between the 17th and 21 st April 2023. The Court returned a conclusion of: "Suicide, contributed to by neglect, to which failures in medical intervention contributed and to which failures to respond to an obvious risk of self-harm contributed." Mr Charles' medical cause of death was determined as;
1a Suspension
1a Suspension
Circumstances of the Death
Winbourne Gregory Charles was a admitted into hospital under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983 in November 2020 following an attempt to take his own life. In December 2020 on a diagnosis of depressive illness incorporating psychotic symptoms, Mr Charles was made subject to an order under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. On 10111 April 2021 Mr Charles was found unresponsive, suspended on the mental health ward.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.