Katie Locke
PFD Report
Historic (No Identified Response)
Ref: 2021-0222
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Knowledge and understanding of the Potentially Dangerous Persons (PDP) process were sporadic among police and partner agencies. This lack of dissemination and training hinders the multi-agency process from effectively protecting the public.
View full coroner's concerns
MAPPA (or multiagency public protection arrangements) is a partnership process established under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 whose aim is to protect the public by assessing and managing the risks of serious harm by sexual and violent offenders. MAPPA requires the local criminal justice agencies and other bodies dealing with offenders to work together in partnership. MAPPA is not a statutory body in itself, but is a mechanism through which agencies can better discharge their statutory responsibilities and protect the public in a co-ordinated manner
Sitting alongside MAPPA is a non-statutory process known as the PDP (or potentially dangerous persons) procedure. The PDP process is outlined in guidance from the College of Policing1 and relates to those who are not currently managed under one of the three MAPPA categories, but where reasonable grounds exist for believing that there is a present likelihood of the person committing an offence or offences that will cause serious harm. Although there is no statutory multi-agency framework to govern PDPs, a multi-agency approach is considered good practice. The PDP process will include developing risk management strategies between the relevant police force and partner agencies, who work closely to share information regarding the PDP. Evidence in the Inquest revealed that, whilst the two police forces who dealt with the murderer both had a PDP process in place, however, the existence of the process and its operation was not known and understood by everyone working at all levels in the police. Furthermore, whilst all other relevant public agencies should have had an awareness of the PDP process and how to make contact via the Police, it seems that knowledge of the PDP process amongst those staff of the
1 https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/managing-sexual-offenders-and-violent-offenders/potentially-dangerous-persons/
Hertfordshire Coroner’s Office
Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and Hertfordshire Probation Service who gave evidence at the inquest was sporadic. It is not possible for me to know whether this is a fair reflection of the broader understanding and engagement in the PDP process by the respective organisations. Nevertheless, it gives rise to the concern that information about the PDP process is not sufficiently well disseminated throughout all of the agencies who need to work together within the PDP process to make it work and that further training and/or exchange of information may be helpful.
I consider that unless some action is taken there is a continuing risk that the PDP process will not be properly used to achieve its purpose and provide protection to the public from potentially dangerous people.
Sitting alongside MAPPA is a non-statutory process known as the PDP (or potentially dangerous persons) procedure. The PDP process is outlined in guidance from the College of Policing1 and relates to those who are not currently managed under one of the three MAPPA categories, but where reasonable grounds exist for believing that there is a present likelihood of the person committing an offence or offences that will cause serious harm. Although there is no statutory multi-agency framework to govern PDPs, a multi-agency approach is considered good practice. The PDP process will include developing risk management strategies between the relevant police force and partner agencies, who work closely to share information regarding the PDP. Evidence in the Inquest revealed that, whilst the two police forces who dealt with the murderer both had a PDP process in place, however, the existence of the process and its operation was not known and understood by everyone working at all levels in the police. Furthermore, whilst all other relevant public agencies should have had an awareness of the PDP process and how to make contact via the Police, it seems that knowledge of the PDP process amongst those staff of the
1 https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-protection/managing-sexual-offenders-and-violent-offenders/potentially-dangerous-persons/
Hertfordshire Coroner’s Office
Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust and Hertfordshire Probation Service who gave evidence at the inquest was sporadic. It is not possible for me to know whether this is a fair reflection of the broader understanding and engagement in the PDP process by the respective organisations. Nevertheless, it gives rise to the concern that information about the PDP process is not sufficiently well disseminated throughout all of the agencies who need to work together within the PDP process to make it work and that further training and/or exchange of information may be helpful.
I consider that unless some action is taken there is a continuing risk that the PDP process will not be properly used to achieve its purpose and provide protection to the public from potentially dangerous people.
Sent To
- Hertfordshire Constabulary
- Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS Foundation Trust
- National Probation Service
Response Status
Linked responses
0 of 3
56-Day Deadline
24 Aug 2021
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 28th December 2015 an investigation was commenced into the death of Katie Louisa Locke, who was unlawfully killed on 24th December 2015. An Inquest into Ms Locke’s death was opened and adjourned on 16th February 2016. The investigation was suspended on 1st March 2016, pending the outcome of criminal homicide proceedings. In June 2016 Ms Locke’s murderer pleaded guilty to and was convicted of her murder. Following the conviction the Senior Coroner for Hertfordshire certified that the Inquest would not be resumed. In October 2018 Ms Locke’s family applied to the Senior Coroner for Hertfordshire to resume the investigation into her death and hold an Inquest which would examine the role of a number of public bodies who had contact with Ms Locke’s murderer in the months before her death. On 9th May 2019 the Inquest was resumed. The Inquest was heard between 8th and 22nd June 2021. A narrative conclusion was returned and a copy of the Findings of Fact, Determination and Conclusion is attached.
Circumstances of the Death
On 23rd December 2015 Katie Locke went on a date with her murderer, having met each other through an internet dating site around two weeks earlier. Following meeting at a bar in London they returned to Hertfordshire by taxi and booked into the Theobalds Park Hotel in Cheshunt, arriving there in the early hours of 24 December 2015. At some point that morning the murderer killed Ms Locke by means of forceful and prolonged compression of her neck. That fatal assault was accompanied by serious sexual violence. He wrapped her body in bedclothes and left it within the hotel grounds. Ms Locke’s father reported her missing when she failed to return home, and the murderer was traced from information provided to the police by a friend of Ms Locke. The murderer told the Hertfordshire police where he had left Ms Locke’s body and he was arrested and charged with her murder.
Hertfordshire Coroner’s Office
The murderer, who had been diagnosed with emotionally unstable personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits, was known to two police forces, two NHS Mental Health Trusts and the Probation Service, each of whom had information relevant to his risks to women. There were, however, significant gaps in the information available to each public body, and there was insufficient sharing of the available information between agencies to enable a fully informed assessment of his risks. Three weeks before the killing, the murderer had been given a suspended sentence with a Mental Health Treatment Requirement (MHTR), having been convicted of making threats to kill two other women. Whilst it is not possible to say what sentence the judge would otherwise have given, a fully informed picture had not been placed before the Crown Court. There were a number of lost opportunities for sharing information between the public bodies regarding the murderer and also lost opportunities for further or additional measures to be taken within the criminal justice system.
Hertfordshire Coroner’s Office
The murderer, who had been diagnosed with emotionally unstable personality disorder with narcissistic and antisocial traits, was known to two police forces, two NHS Mental Health Trusts and the Probation Service, each of whom had information relevant to his risks to women. There were, however, significant gaps in the information available to each public body, and there was insufficient sharing of the available information between agencies to enable a fully informed assessment of his risks. Three weeks before the killing, the murderer had been given a suspended sentence with a Mental Health Treatment Requirement (MHTR), having been convicted of making threats to kill two other women. Whilst it is not possible to say what sentence the judge would otherwise have given, a fully informed picture had not been placed before the Crown Court. There were a number of lost opportunities for sharing information between the public bodies regarding the murderer and also lost opportunities for further or additional measures to be taken within the criminal justice system.
Similar PFD Reports
Reports sharing organisations, categories, or themes
Related Inquiry Recommendations
Public inquiry recommendations addressing similar themes
Sharing information about closed Prevent referrals
Southport Inquiry
Inter-agency benefit data sharing
GMMH local structured risk assessment responsibility
Southport Inquiry
Conflicting mental health care plans
Amend GLOS to allow claimants oral submissions at panel hearings
Post Office Horizon Inquiry
Public protection planning
Post Office to engage in negotiations during HSSA appeal period
Post Office Horizon Inquiry
Public protection planning
Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.