Mark Parry
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2019-0094
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 14 May 2019
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
A critical lack of published Health and Safety Executive guidelines for mechanics working with Heavy Goods Vehicle air suspensions exists. This absence means workers lack essential guidance on risks and safety strategies.
View full coroner's concerns
That there are no published guidelines by the Health and Safety Executive to mechanics and those companies that employ mechanics on how to work with or approach working with Air Suspensions on Heavy Goods Vehicles. The value of such guidance is that it would signpost strategies and risks attached to such work.
Responses
Action Planned
HSE plans to issue a safety alert identifying control measures for air suspension systems on all vehicle types, aiming to finalise it by August 2019. Longer term, HSE will amend PM85 and review HSG261 to address control measures in relation to ejection. (AI summary)
HSE plans to issue a safety alert identifying control measures for air suspension systems on all vehicle types, aiming to finalise it by August 2019. Longer term, HSE will amend PM85 and review HSG261 to address control measures in relation to ejection. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mr Westerman REGULATION 28 REPORT FOLLOWING INQUEST OF MARK PARRY Your letter of 20 March 2019 to Dr David Snowball, HSE's Acting Chief Executive, has been passed to me to reply as the sector lead for the motor vehicle repair industry Your Regulation 28 report raises a concern that there are no published guidelines on how to approach work on air suspension systems on heavy goods vehicles have reviewed our current guidance and identified that we have two documents relating to work on air suspensions systems, however these refer specifically to buses and coaches are PM85 Safe recovery (and repair) of buses and coaches fitted with air suspension http JwwW_hse gov uklpubnslpm85pdf and paragraphs 75-178 and 212-213 of HSG261 Health and Safety in motor vehicle repair and associated industries http JIwwwhse gov uklpubnslpriced/hsg26Lpdi The guidance highlights the risk from the collapse of vehicles supported using air suspension and of fragments being ejected from the bellows at high speed. However; it does not identify control measures in relation to ejection or relate to vehicles other than buses and coaches. HSE therefore plan to issue a safety alert, identifying the required control measures and emphasising the risks are present on all vehicle types with air suspension systems. As you can appreciate , this will take some time, as it will require consultation with industry; | hope this will be finalised by August 2019 The safety alert will be published on the HSE website and publicised through trade associations and e- bulletins: Longer term, will amend PM85 to address control measures in relation to ejection; and will review whether this guidance can be renamed to relate to all large vehicles with air suspension systems _ hope to complete this by the end of March 2020. HSG261 is also updated and revised the content relating to air suspension systems will be reviewed, though this a longer term project: Policy They and being
Sent To
- Health and Safety Executive
Response Status
Linked responses
1 of 1
56-Day Deadline
14 May 2019
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 8th March 2017 an investigation was commenced into the death of Mark Keith PARRY dob 14th March 1980. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 18th March 2019. The conclusion of the inquest jury was that the deceased had died whilst undertaking repairs on a heavy goods vehicle when he was struck on the head by a piston from an exploding airspring which led to brainstem (duret) haemorrhage. The jury determined that the deceased had died by accident.
Circumstances of the Death
Mark Keith Parry was a specialist heavy goods vehicle mechanic. On 21st February 2017 he was called out to a broken down heavy goods vehicle in Nantwich. He identified the cause of the breakdown as a broken trailing arm on axle 3, the rear most axle on the trailer unit. He crawled underneath the trailer unit in order to strap the trailing arm on axle 3 to axle 2 so that the HGV could be driven to a yard for repair. He exhausted the air supply out of the airbag to axle 3 but had not done so with the air supply to the airbag on axle 2. Whilst the strap was attached to axle 3 and axle 2 it was not secured tight as the ratchet clasp used to do that was open leaving the strap lose and baggy. Mr Parry was getting out from underneath the trailer unit using his legs first, his upper body and head being raised between axle 3 and axle 2, when an explosion occurred and the bellow from axle 2 was ejected and struck Mr Parry on the back of his head. He was transferred by air ambulance to the Royal Stoke University Hospital where he died on 2nd March 2017 from the unsurvivable head injuries received.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.