Response to Assistant Coroner HHJ Cutler’s ‘Report to Prevent Future Deaths’ (the Report) following the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan

IPCC response to Assistant Coroner HHJ Cutler’s ‘Report to Prevent Future Deaths’ 2

Introduction
1. The Independent Police Complaints Commission (the IPCC) received a copy of the Report on 29 May 2014 and further to Regulation 29(4) of the Coroner (Investigations) Regulations 2013 the IPCC is obliged to provide a response to the Coroner within 56 days.
2. The IPCC began its own investigation into the circumstances leading to the death of Mark Duggan (further to its statutory obligations under the Police Reform Act 2002 (the PRA)) on 4 August 2011 (the day of the shooting). The IPCC was an Interested Person at the inquest and has continued with its own investigation after the conclusion of the inquest.
3. The Coroner’s Report includes 8 ‘concerns’ and these concerns are directed at a number of different parties. Concerns 3, 4, 5 and 7 are addressed to the IPCC, as well as to other parties.
4. This response addresses each IPCC-related concern and also addresses concerns 2 and 8. Concern 2 is directed to the MPS and ACPO and relates to the taking of accounts from police officers at the first opportunity. The IPCC has recently released draft statutory guidance which touches upon this issue and therefore, the IPCC has commented on this concern. Concern 8, which is directed at the Home Office alone, relates to access to intelligence by the IPCC and inquest counsel and therefore the IPCC has commented on this issue.

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Concern 2: Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity
5. This concern was addressed to the MPS and ACPO. In paragraphs 60–72 of his Report, the Coroner gives the background in relation to this concern. He lists a number of aspects of the process for taking accounts from police officers as it applied in this case that caused him concern, including:  There was considerable scope for conferring before any account was given.  The delay in taking statements created a real risk of evidence being lost.  The fact of officers gathering in a room together for many hours to compile statements created a perception of collusion.  Not all witnesses to a fatal shooting are asked to give full statements as soon as possible after the event, giving a detailed account of what they saw.
6. The Coroner acknowledges that what the MPS did, “[65]…was in accordance with national practice, much of it sanctioned or encouraged by ACPO. I believe it may not be the best possible practice. Indeed, I understand that the MPS has already strengthened the non-conferring warning, and a senior officer would now be present in the Post Incident Management Suite with a view to ensuring that the process is open and transparent.” The Coroner also goes on to state that, “[71] The issue whether opportunities for police officers conferring after a fatal shooting should be minimised is controversial. I am also conscious that the IPCC has issued a consultation document which touches on some of these issues.”
7. The Coroner makes reference to the IPCC consultation on post incident procedures. On 5 March 2014 the IPCC issued for consultation draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in death or serious injury matters (the draft statutory guidance is enclosed with this response). Paragraphs 21-24 of the draft statutory guidance set out the IPCC’s preliminary position on acquiring ‘detailed individual factual accounts’ and addresses a number of the concerns raised by the Coroner in his Report.
8. The consultation period for the draft statutory guidance closed on 27 May 2014 and the IPCC is reviewing the many consultation responses received. The IPCC will then, taking account of the consultation responses, produce a revised document that will require the approval of the Secretary of State before being issued. Police officers will then be under a duty to have regard to

IPCC response to Assistant Coroner HHJ Cutler’s ‘Report to Prevent Future Deaths’ 4

the issued guidance in exercising or performing the powers and duties to which the guidance relates.
9. However, bearing in mind that the IPCC has not issued the final version of this statutory guidance, the IPCC does not consider it appropriate to comment further on this issue until it has completed the consultation exercise and submitted its final position to the Secretary of State.

Concern 3: The IPCC had primacy at the scene but did not have the resources to conduct all relevant activities there
10. The Coroner addressed this concern to the IPCC, the Home Secretary and the MPS.
11. The Coroner provided background to this concern in paragraphs 73-80 of the Report. He detailed a number of areas of evidence gathering at the scene which he described as being “less than ideal.” He went on to state: “[75]……I was left with an impression of some uncertainty about precisely what was being investigated, on whose behalf, for what purpose, and by what means.” “[78] I am concerned that no scene of a fatal shooting should be the subject of any confusion about the purpose of the investigation, or about what should be done to further that investigation. There is a tension, in a case such as this, between the duty of the MPS to obtain and secure evidence at the scene, its position as being under investigation, and the IPCC’s obligation to investigate independently. The pragmatic approach adopted of the MPS consulting the IPCC about what should happen may not always resolve that tension. My primary concern is whether that position should persist. If it does then I am concerned that the police service has the practical control of many aspects of the scene and what happens there despite being under investigation, without the public realising that the investigation does not have full independence which the IPCC’s role appears to safeguard.” “[79] If the position is to remain, I think it may be helpful to consider whether there should be a formal transfer of responsibility from police to IPCC at the scene of a death only once the police duty to obtain and preserve evidence there has been discharged.”
12. The Report seems to highlight:
a. the tension between the police service under investigation having a practical role in evidence gathering at the scene; and

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b. the fact that the IPCC does not have the resources itself to gather all the evidence from the scene.
13. In relation to resources, the Report correctly identifies that the IPCC is heavily reliant on the local police force to provide sufficiently experienced specialist scene managers, forensic staff, exhibits officers, search officers etc, to conduct the majority of the work at the scene, because the IPCC does not have these resources itself. The IPCC does not have the resources to deploy a significant number of investigators and specialist staff to a scene soon after an incident is referred to it for investigation. While the Home Office has given the IPCC additional funding in 2014/5, this is specifically to conduct a number of additional independent investigations. The Home Office has asked that the money be separately accounted for and not used to provide additional resources for its existing caseload which includes death and serious injury matters such as police shootings. The IPCC indicated in its recent ‘Review of the IPCC’s work in investigating deaths’ (a copy of the Review can be found at www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/review-ipccs-work-relation-cases-involving-death) that, as the IPCC expands, it is looking to recruit people from a variety of disciplines, including people with experience and expertise in a number of areas of scene management and forensics. However, to be able to deploy all necessary scene management and forensic staff at any time throughout England and Wales would require the recruitment of a very significant number of additional specialist staff. This is not provided for by the Home Office additional funding or envisaged by the IPCC Review.
14. Furthermore, when someone dies during contact with the police, the police will always be on the scene before the IPCC and therefore, in practice, best placed to begin obtaining and preserving evidence. This reality is recognised in law through paragraph 14B of Schedule 3 of the PRA which places a duty on chief officers to ensure that all appropriate steps are taken for obtaining and preserving evidence relating to a death or serious injury matter. The tension between the police service under investigation having a practical role in evidence gathering at the scene is partially addressed by paragraph 14B(6) which places an obligation on chief officers to take all such specific steps for obtaining or preserving evidence as he may be directed to take by the IPCC. This duty recognises that the IPCC has a directive role in obtaining and preserving evidence from a scene for the purposes of advancing its investigation. When a death or serious injury matter is referred to the IPCC by a police service and the IPCC decides that it will independently investigate the matter, IPCC investigators may give specific directions by phone to police officers at the scene in relation to how they wish the scene to be preserved and evidence obtained. Further directions may be given after IPCC investigators have arrived at the scene.

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15. The IPCC’s draft statutory guidance referred to above includes a number of paragraphs on identifying and preserving all potentially relevant evidence at scenes and outlines the principles that should be followed by the police service when preserving a scene (see paragraphs 9-12). The emphasis in the draft statutory guidance is on the police service acting to preserve and prevent any evidential loss, but not to take any actions in respect of its recovery, removal or analysis without the express agreement of the IPCC (see paragraph 10). However, the draft guidance does recognise that there may be circumstances where it may be preferable to act immediately and without awaiting IPCC approval, for example: where the immediate removal or seizure of evidence is necessary to prevent its loss or deterioration (e.g. where weather conditions may impair forensic evidence) (see paragraph 11).
16. Whilst the IPCC recognises the importance of its directive role in preserving and obtaining evidence from the scene relevant to its investigation, the IPCC also acknowledges that the evidence retrieved from a scene will also have relevance for the inquest and for any on-going criminal investigation progressed by the relevant police service. In relation to the latter, an example is the incident in Woolwich in May 2013 in which Fusilier Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale and then both these men were shot by MPS CO19 officers. The police shooting was referred to, and independently investigated by, the IPCC. Evidence acquired from the scene was relevant to both the IPCC investigation and also the MPS SO15 investigation into the actions of Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. It was important that both investigations could acquire from the scene necessary evidence. This inevitably required the involvement of SO15 officers to ensure that evidence necessary for its investigation was preserved and obtained.
17. Therefore, taking into account the practical issues identified above1 and that the evidence acquired from a scene may well be relevant to both the IPCC investigation and also on-going criminal investigations, the IPCC is not of the view that the Coroner’s suggestion of a formal transfer of responsibility from the police to the IPCC at the scene of a death once the police duty to obtain and preserve evidence has been discharged, is entirely practical or the best overall solution in the current circumstances.
18. The IPCC must be able to seek to secure and retrieve the forensic evidence it requires to advance its investigations and must inject into this process as much independence as practically possible in the circumstances, but the IPCC also recognises the importance of this evidence to other on-going

1 For example, the fact that the police are first on the scene, that IPCC investigators may well give directions as to preservation of evidence before any IPCC investigators are on-scene

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investigations. Therefore, even if the IPCC had the resources to manage a scene without any reliance on police service resources, the IPCC may need to allow police service involvement in scene management to ensure these other investigations are not compromised.

Concern 4: The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded
19. The Coroner addressed this concern to the MPS, the IPCC and ACPO.
20. In outlining the background to this concern (paragraphs 81-82), the Coroner made reference to the significant issue of how and when the gun found some distance from Mark Duggan’s body got to that location and about how and when it was found there. The Coroner also refers to the failure to record where Mark Duggan’s mobile phone was found. The Coroner states that the distrust that this fostered could have been avoided had the scene been video recorded in the period between the shooting and the arrival of the police helicopter (which recorded aerial footage of the scene). He notes that armed officers were in possession of a video camera and recorded the first-aid given to Mark Duggan and therefore both the availability of a camera and the manpower to operate it “…was not a problem.”
21. The IPCC can see the benefit of early video recording a scene as part of the process of evidencing where items have been found. Therefore, the IPCC will be considering whether reference to video recording scenes should be included in the statutory guidance. The IPCC anticipates being able to submit finalised statutory guidance to the Secretary of State for her approval by the end of March 2015.

Concern 5: The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired
22. The Coroner addressed this concern to the MPS, the IPCC and ACPO.
23. The background to this concern is whether there were further illegally-held firearms held by Mr Hutchinson-Foster (the man convicted of transferring the firearm to Mark Duggan on 4 August 2011) at premises occupied by a girlfriend in Burchell Road. The Coroner states that he does not know whether, “[86]…fully-developed intelligence would have permitted the Burchell Road address to have been identified on 4 August with sufficient precision for it to be raided or in sufficient time for a search warrant to be obtained. My

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concern is that no consideration appears to have been given to the prospect. A starting point should have been that one of the Trident officers saw the minicab turn into Burchell Road for the handover, and that was a short cul-de- sac.”
24. The IPCC agrees that on-going police investigations should continue even after a police shooting has taken place, especially if illegally-held firearms are capable of seizure. However, the IPCC would be concerned to ensure that its own investigation of the shooting itself was not compromised by any on-going police investigation and would need the police service to liaise with the IPCC to ensure that this did not occur.

Concern 7: The IPCC does not have a protocol agreed with the Chief Coroner, ACPO and the CPS
25. The Coroner addressed this concern to the IPCC. He explained that with the objective of coroners holding effective inquests as soon as practicable, the Coroner asked the IPCC to consider approaching the CPS, ACPO, the Chief Coroner and the Coroner’s Society with a view to integrating their memorandum with the Memorandum of Understanding that already exists between the IPCC and the Coroners’ Society.
26. The background to this concern is the interplay between the IPCC’s investigation into the police shooting which may lead to an investigation being referred to the CPS to consider prosecution and the coroner who is under a duty to investigate the death. The Coroner notes that the, “[93]…IPCC report may precede the inquest, or may not. It may be necessary for the inquest to be adjourned pending criminal proceedings. It is obviously important that everyone concerned in those exercises should liaise.”
27. The Coroner makes reference to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the CPS, ACPO, the Chief Coroner and the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales dated June 2013 “[94]…which deals with the interplay between inquests and potential criminal proceedings. The IPCC is not a party to it. The statutory provisions…for adjourning the inquest to give priority to a prosecution make no reference to the IPCC. There is, however, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Coroners Society of England and Wales and the IPCC dated 1 April 2010 which deals with the interplay of inquests and IPCC investigations and which touches on the interplay between inquests and prosecutions.”

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28. The IPCC will certainly consider carefully whether it should make this approach bearing in mind the need identified by the Coroner for proper liaison between parties involved in investigating these types of incidents and potentially prosecuting thereafter, coupled with the need for coroners to hold effective inquests as soon as practicable. The IPCC is also mindful that its MoU with the Coroners’ Society is in need of up-dating to reflect changing working practices at the IPCC and also implementation of parts of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 and Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 which change the way coroners investigate deaths.
29. However, the IPCC notes that the purpose of the MoU between the CPS, ACPO, Chief Coroner and Coroners’ Society is to, “…establish a common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the CPS, police and coroners where an investigation gives rise to a suspicion that a serious criminal offence (other than a health and safety or other regulatory offence) may have caused a death.” Therefore, this MoU understandably focuses on the interplay between an inquest and in particular, a prosecution.
30. By contrast, the purpose of the MoU between the IPCC and the Coroners’ Society is to give clarity to the working relationship between the IPCC and coroners in circumstances where the IPCC is involved in an investigation into a death of a person which involved contact with the police and this investigation may, or may not, involve the suspicion that a serious criminal offence may have caused the death. Therefore, the IPCC investigation may not be criminal in nature2 and thus, the focus of this MoU is different from the MoU referred to above. However, the IPCC recognises that there is an overlap and will carefully consider whether these MoUs can be appropriately amalgamated. This will occur before the end of 2014.

Concern 8: The IPCC and Counsel to an inquest do not have access to all intelligence
31. The Coroner addressed this concern to the Home Secretary alone, however, the concern relates to access to intelligence by both the IPCC investigation as well as access by inquest counsel. It is therefore appropriate that the IPCC comments on this concern.
32. In the background to this concern the Coroner states that there was intelligence relevant to Mark Duggan’s death which the jury could not see. He

2 The investigation may remain an investigation into a death or serious injury matter (as defined by section 12 of the PRA)

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states that exceptionally the IPCC lead investigator was permitted to see it but that a senior police officer in an independent police service (i.e. not the MPS), from whom the IPCC had sought an expert opinion, was not so permitted and “[96]…[t]hat prevented her from forming a fully-informed view about the planning of the operation. I would have liked to put her report before the jury and to call her to give evidence but did not do so because she had not seen the intelligence picture. Furthermore, the IPCC is plainly being hampered in its task by not having the benefit of her expertise.”
33. The Coroner goes on to state that whilst he was allowed to see the intelligence, his leading counsel was not, despite holding the highest security clearance. The Coroner makes reference to these limitations giving rise to understandable suspicions in the minds of those not party to the intelligence but also “[98]…plainly create a risk that an intelligence-led operation which results in death will not be fully investigated so that lessons may be learned.”
34. The IPCC shares the Coroner’s concern. The IPCC is best placed to determine who from within the IPCC investigation (including appropriately security cleared external advisors) should have access to the intelligence. This is necessary both to ensure that intelligence-led operations which result in death are investigated as fully and independently as possible and to maintain public confidence in the police complaints system which is the IPCC’s statutory function.
35. The IPCC considers that there should be a clear legal right of access by IPCC investigations to all relevant intelligence material, to ensure that IPCC investigations can consider all information which has influenced police operations under investigation.

Acting Chief Executive Independent Police Complaints Commission 24 July 2014

Home Office HOME SECRETARY 2 Marsham Street, London SWIP 4DF wwwhomeoffice gov.uk Judge Keith Cutler Inquest into the death of Mark Duggan Taylor House Fourth Floor 88 Roseberry Avenue 2 4 JUL 2014 London ECIR 4QU Firstly would like to take the opportunity to thank you for the work you have carried out in the course of the Mark Duggan Inquest: Your Schedule 5 report has provided valuable analysis of the circumstances around Mark Duggan's death and subsequent post-incident procedures_ have now had time to consider your Report and am in a position to be able to write to you with my substantive response to the concerns which you have raised. Concern 3: The IPCC had primacy at the scene but did not have the resources to conduct all relevant activities there. (Home Secretary, IPCC & MPS) understand that you made this because of concerns that there was period after the shooting when no crime manager was present at the scene and the management of the scene was unsatisfactory As you pointed out in your report; the fact that the box said to have contained the gun, the mini cab furniture and the mini cab were all moved risked compromising evidence_ As you will be aware, the Police Reform Act 2002 makes clear that the duty to preserve evidence at the scene of death or serious injury (DSI) is the responsibility of the Chief Officer: In paragraph 73 you refer to the IPCC obligation to investigate independently. The overarching duty to investigate under Article 2 is a duty on the state and it arises (in broad terms) where a person has died as result of actions or omissions by state actors (e.g. the police): The IPCC framework in schedule 3, part 2A, para 14B of the Police Reform Act 2002 was established to ensure that there is an independent means of investigating deaths resulting from police action, and is intended to satisfy the state's Article 2 obligations in relation to the police. Therefore, the ECHR does ~ point

not necessarily require the IPCC to investigate each and every death provided it determines the mode of the investigation and has oversight over it. In the report you suggested that there should be a formal handover of responsibility from police to the IPCC once the police duty to preserve evidence and secure the scene has been discharged. This is a question of practicality rather than resources The IPCC does not have its own crime scene managers and therefore relies on police forces to supply trained staff to attend the scene and conduct much of the searching; seizure and exhibiting of evidence_ If the IPCC were to take primacy in the crucial minutes and hours after such an incident (which occurs rarely) its staff would need the capability to deploy with the necessary expertise to any location within minutes of being notified: The Home Office has committed to increasing the resources of the IPCC to enable it to deal with all serious and sensitive cases involving the police. However it is clear that; for practical reasons, the IPCC will continue to require at times the support of police forces, given their specialist skills and coverage. A formal transfer of responsibility may not be a solution as there is a need to take account of the fact that IPCC investigators will often be remotely directing the manner in which the police at the scene obtain and preserve evidence to the physical arrival of IPCC investigators. Beside this; the police and_the IPCC are likely to continue to work alongside each other at the crime scene There may not be a clear divide between securing the scene and gathering the relevant evidence and, in complex investigations, there is a possibility of evidence being relevant to linked criminal trials or inquests_ The College of Policing is responsible for managing the Code of Conduct for the Authorised Professionai Practice (APP) which deals with post-incident procedure The APP is kept under continual review by the College and Home Office firearms leads will work with them and the IPCC to incorporate any necessary changes regarding firearms policy_ As you are aware , the IPCC has consulted on its draft statutory guidance on achieving best evidence in death serious injury incidents. The draft guidance sets out that; whilst the police must act to preserve and control evidence , must not take other actions without the express agreement of the IPCC. It also says that the police may act without approval where there is an immediate danger that the evidence may be lost or deteriorate or there is a need to protect the public (for example to remove a firearm) When finalised, this should add clarity to incident procedures_ Concern 8: The IPCC and Counsel to an Inquest do not have access to all intelligence (Home Secretary): Sensitive Information and the IPCC Section 137 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing (ASB C&P) Act 2014 contains additional powers for the IPCC that it has requested in order to strengthen its ability to improve public confidence in the police complaints system. prior and they prior post-

The ASB C&P Act 2014 has strengthened the IPCC's power to obtain data from third parties. The new third party data provision provides the IPCC with the power to serve an information notice on person where it reasonably requires information for the purposes of an investigation it is carrying out. These information notices are subject to restrictions on onward disclosure that would have to be agreed with the Security and Intelligence Agencies, Cabinet Office and FCO. The Act contains a framework under which the IPCC may not disclose intelligence service information, intercept information or information received from government department which in the opinion of the relevant Secretary of State would damage national security or the economic interests of the United Kingdom , or any part of it, to a third party without consent of the authority that provided the information. Neither can it disclose that it has received the information without such consent. These additional safeguards are intended to enable the IPCC to continue to exercise its statutory functions whilst at the same time safeguarding matters such as national security where this is necessary. Sensitive Information and Inquests The Government is committed to ensuring the effectiveness of the coronial system and allowing as much information as possible to be made available to the public, where it is appropriate to do so. However; there is a statutory duty on Government to protect sensitive national security information in circumstances where it may be against the law, or the public interest; to make such information available publicly. The 2011 Justice and Security Green Paper considered the introduction of Closed Material Proceedings for inquests, and the Government; in response to the public consultation which was firmly against such an extension, decided not to propose the mechanism for inquests_ In inquests where intelligence evidence cannot be disclosed without risk to national security and public safety, the Government is able to apply for Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates to exempt that material from proceedings, or in extremis to convert inquests into inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005. Finally would like to assure you that, although risks cannot be altogether eliminated from firearms operations, we will continue to work with the police and IPCC to ensure that those risks are mitigated as far as possible. fsf (ase The Rt Hon Theresa May MP

Security classification Not Protectively Marked Disclosable under FOIA 2000 Yes AcPO ASSOCIATION OF Author Chief Police officers Force/organisation Derbyshire Constabulary Telephone number 0300 122 5555 National Policing Business Area Workforce Development Date created 21 July 2014 HHJ Keith Cutler CBE HM Assistant Coroner The Mark Duggan Inquest Taylor House Fourth Floor 88 Rosebery Avenue London ECIR 4QU Monday 21 July 2014 National Policing (ACPO) response to your report to prevent future deaths arising out of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan Your Honour In accordance with paragraph 7(2) of Schedule 5 of Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and
s.29 (4) of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 we set out here the response of the National Armed Policing and the National Policing Professional Standards Portfolios to your report to prevent future deaths arising out of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan. We should perhaps at the outset point out that national policing work through ACPO is now conducted through a number of national policing business areas, each of which takes lead responsibility for a broad area of policing and is headed by a serving chief officer. There has been high degree of collaborative working in recent years between the work of the respective portfolios for armed policing and professional standards in managing the service's response to incidents involving death or serious injury (DSI) . More particularly, and of relevance to this response, is that in May this year these two portfolios collaborated to submit the national policing response to the IPCC's consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in death or serious injury matters. Ist Floor, 10 Victoria Street, London SWIH ONN T 020 7084 8950 F 020 7084 8951 Registered in England and Wales as private company limited by guarantee_ Registered number 3344583. Registered office 10 Victoria Street; London SWIH ONN the police

In paragraph 72 of your report; you invited ACPO to send you a copy of its response to this IPCC consultation_ We are pleased to do and append to this correspondence copy of that response dated 27 May 2014, (Appendix A): can confirm that upon reviewing this response in light of the matters you set out in your report under Concern 2: (Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity), as you anticipated, the earlier response to the IPCC of 27 May 2014 does indeed deal in some detail with the concerns you articulate. We set out here some additional explanatory context to deal with the specific matters raised under Concern 2 and also under Concern 4: (The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded) , Concern 5: (The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired) , and Concern 6 (The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called) and upon which you required response from National (ACPO): Concern 2: Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity Paragraphs 64 and 65 In paragraph 64 of your report, you summarise the reasons for your over-arching concern that fatal shootings are not as rigorously examined as they should be and that doubts about the accuracy of police accounts are not minimised. In paragraph 65 you make clear your belief that the national best practice as sanctioned or encouraged by ACPO may not be the best possible practice_ For some considerable time the Armed Policing Portfolio has been at the forefront of police service's handling of post incident procedures. Indeed, the formal post incident procedures that have evolved over the last decade or so and which continue to evolve are direct result of the service's own desire to secure and preserve the best available evidence , and to bring structure and control to critical incident management in events where there is understandable public concern over the legitimacy of police action or omission to act. These procedures are designed to serve the best interests of an IPCC's independent investigation and the accountability of officers to the law: SO, Policing police the police

The National Policing portfolios quite properly maintain these post incident procedures under constant review, particularly in light of learning from the thankfully rare fatal police shootings and other deaths in or during police contact The current post incident guidance in place has been revised since the events of August 2011 and is now set out in Module of the Authorised Policing Practice (APP) for Armed Policing; guidance which is endorsed and published by College of Policing. It is important to confirm in this response that both the ACPO guidance in place in August 2011 and the existing APP expressly state that officers should not confer (i.e. speak to each other about their evidence) after any death or serious injury incident, and emphasise here that the National Policing portfolios do not approve of officers conferring, save where strictly necessary for the express purpose of a police operation: The National Policing portfolios are currently undertaking further review of these procedures , in part at least as a direct result of the issues arising from the death of Mark Duggan. We have already taken steps to ensure that as part of immediate post incident procedures_ senior officer is present when officers are preparing initial accounts_ This senior officer will be in a position to confirm and reassure that either conferring did not take place or; if it did, it was for necessary purpose as provided by the APP, which sets out in clear terms that an officer should not confer about any honestly held belief relating to the use of force. In addition, we have made clear the post incident process can and should be more transparent to both a host force's initial investigating officers and to the IPCC's investigators_ We believe it to be in the interests of the public, the service and all individual officers involved in such incident that there is both transparency and integrity in mutually dependent post incident imperatives of providing necessarily high degree of welfare support to all officers in what are often highly complex and challenging operational circumstance and the duty to facilitate thorough and impartial investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident: the firmly police any

Paragraph 66 In paragraph 66 of your report you set out your concern that not all witnesses to fatal police shooting are asked to give full statements as soon as possible after the event, and refer to the existing guidance that recommends that at least 48 hours should elapse before full accounts are taken from police officers_ There is nothing in the APP to prevent police witnesses who are not designated as principal officers from making detailed notes at the earliest practicable opportunity: Nor does the guidance seek to prevent officers from providing as detailed accounts as may be necessary: Investigators can properly seek to obtain statements of evidence from officers not designated as principal officers_ The post incident procedures are designed to ensure that the initial investig authority can identify exactly who is included as a principal officer and the rationale for such inclusion will be dependent upon the prevailing circumstances As an investigation unfolds, it may well be the case that others involved in the operation, whose actions or decisions were involved in informing or making critical decisions, may be regarded as principal officers In the initial stages all actions taken by, and in respect of, principal officers in relation to securing evidence, discussion undertaken and notes made should be documented, and there are four clear stages setting out the provision of information and accounts_ The last stage, (Stage 4) sets out that detailed accounts (including statements or interviews) should not normally be obtained immediately, but should be left until the officers involved in the shooting are better able to articulate their experience in a coherent format. This is usually after at least forty-eight hours This period of time is indicative and not prescriptive and will of course be matter for individual case circumstances, and will depend upon factors including the availability of investigators. Police officers should rightly be considered professional witnesses and should be treated as such, and in any fatal police shooting it is a matter for the senior investigating officer of the investigating authority to determine and negotiate how to secure and preserve relevant witness accounts and testimony: ating

Insofar as principal officers are concerned, you raise a question over the distinction made between the seeking of accounts from a police officer and a civilian who uses lethal force in defence of himself or another: think it right to acknowledge that firearms officers can and do face situations of risk and threat with dilemmas that should not be underestimated in the enormity of the consequence and responsibility of their actions and decisions_ Unless there are any reasonable grounds to believe the contrary may be the case, firearms officers who act in accordance with their powers, duties and responsibilities are professional witnesses who place themselves at risk of death or serious injury to protect the public, to reduce and mitigate threat and harm to others, and to bring offenders to justice, and fully deserve recognition as such: Initial investigating officers and indeed the IPCC have sufficient and robust powers to determine prospective culpability and to hold to account any officer using or being involved in the use of lethal force in the event either criminality or misconduct is considered. Where a civilian uses lethal force in defence of self or another, it is also invariably the case the attendant circumstances of the incident are fully taken into account in making a decision as to the prospective culpability for any criminality, and of course, any such person benefits from legal safeguards and guidance for achieving best evidence in securing evidence by way of account taken, statement or interview: In respect of your concern over the extent to which the academic research underpinning the practice of allowing period between a traumatic event and a statement being given can Or should be relied upon, it is beyond the scope of this response to fully place into context the relevant academic studies that provide strong evidence for the basis that best evidence is achieved by taking into account the effective recall and the impact on memory. These issues are expanded upon in detail in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) submission to the IPCC's consultation (May 2014) , and we would therefore respectfully draw your attention to this submission as am aware the MPS will be forwarding to you this response in accordance with your request at paragraph 72 of your report.

In paragraph 66 you make specific reference to the apparent inconsistences in findings between earlier Home Office Study Papers (which lends some support to the practice of allowing period between traumatic event and statement given) and more recent paper by Dr William Lewinski: As part of the National Policing response to the earlier IPCC consultation, we recently commissioned Professor Gudjonsson, Emeritus Professor of Forensic Psychology at King's College, London to conduct a review of the conclusions of Home Office Study Papers of 1986 and 1993, taking into account subsequent relevant studies. Professor Gudjonsson affirms support for the position that where an officer is to be in a state of physical and mental shock and suffering some degree of confusion, statements taken under these conditions be of limited forensic value, and that some form of delaying the formal investigative procedure should be considered in order to give the officer the time and opportunity to recover from the initial effects of his experience_ Furthermore , Professor Gudjonsson highlights his serious concerns about unwarranted assumptions and expectations regarding officers being able to produce detailed and reliable account of events immediately after major firearms incidents. Whereas the gist of what took place is likely to be reasonably clearly recalled, details may take time to recall and on many occasions may never have been properly observed and processed, making any retrieval attempts futile. Professor Gudjonsson also concluded that in view of the likely state of high emotional arousal and confusion, firearms officers involved in shooting incidents that cause serious injury or fatality should only provide an initial account of what happened and what clearly recall before going off with detailed account given later after a period of rest. Professor Gudjonsson's tends to strongly support the National Policing position and reinforces that adopted in the APP_ When providing a statement;, officers should be in a sufficiently sound mentallemotional state to provide a clear, detailed and coherent account of events_ The is to optimize their capacity to provide their 'best' and most reliable account of events_ We have appended a copy of this paper to this response (Appendix B): being likely may they duty being finding key

Paragraph 67 The APP provides that officers who were in the immediate vicinity of the discharge of firearms or other munitions should be examined by registered medical practitioner (FME) as a matter of course, subject to their consent, as may have suffered an injury of which are not aware_ We agree with your view articulated in paragraph 67 that it should be a matter for the officer concerned and the FME as to whether the officer is in a fit state to give an account Nothing in APP should preclude any officer principal or otherwise from making an account in whatever level of detail he or she thinks fit The post incident procedures are designed to accommodate and facilitate the needs of the investigation with the welfare considerations and whilst medical advice and other welfare considerations are properly made available to principal officers under these procedures, they are under no obligation to follow such advice or guidance: It is perhaps salient to point out here that in his recent review, Professor Gudjonsson remarks that forensic medical examiners are generally not trained to consider the impact of the psychological state of witness following traumatic incident, as this kind of assessment requires specialist expertise over and above those of a primary care physician. Paragraph 68 We understand the fact that some officer witnesses who perceived a threat from the person who was shot did not set that out in their statements was subject of significant scrutiny during the course of the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan The existence or otherwise of a threat, real or perceived, would appear to be matter of some critical importance to an investigator and any subsequent inquiry or proceedings to determine. From national policing perspective, it will be prudent to take steps to reinforce this issue through both National Armed Policing and through the College of Policing: they they the police

Paragraph 69 The National Policing perspective is that there does remain a very important purpose in determining the status of a 'principal officer' from that of a general policing witness_ Police officers are entrusted with unique powers of coercion over fellow citizens_ Both the public and the police service remain committed to the principles of policing by consent and largely and routinely unarmed presence in our communities_ Authorised Firearms Officers are right at the very high end of specialist policing; they are volunteers and are trained and expected to deal with situations of extreme violence and significant threat to life where the application of lethal force may be necessary to protect the public and themselves It is from this context that the term 'principal officer' has developed as a result of the police services' commitment to effective post incident procedures that meets the exacting scrutiny of independent investigations and the requirements of an Article 2 ECHR investigation. In the National Policing response to the recent IPCC consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in death or serious injury matters also set out our view that the distinction in Module 7 of the APP between 'principal officers' and other police witnesses to a death or serious injury (DSI) incident should be retained: We see some merit in subdividing the balance of the policing witnesses as policing witnesses and other policing witnesses, with the caveat that the definition of a policing witness need not be constrained to those present at the actual scene of the death or serious injury sustained: For instance, as in the inquest into the death of Mark Duggan, firearms commanders, tactical advisors and intelligence officers may be equally to any decision to use force. Paragraph 70 The National Policing portfolios appreciate the real and tangible welfare support invariably offered by representatives of the Police Federation (and indeed the Superintendents' Association) to principal officers during the course of the immediacy of post incident procedures and particularly during then later phases of post incident management; complex and thorough investigations and exacting inquires and inquests_ police key key key

Many police forces in England and Wales quite properly and responsibly ensure staff association representatives receive accredited training in post incident management: Whilst such representative play crucial part in these post incident procedures under the direction and control of the post incident manager , it is equally important that such representatives do not duplicate or intrude into the provision of legal advice It will be prudent to take steps to ensure the APP reflects and reinforces that any intervention by staff association representatives prior to an officer's full account being recorded be restricted to welfare considerations. We will take this matter forward through the National Portfolios in conjunction with the College of Policing: Paragraph 71 Paragraph 71 rightly and understandably describes the issue of opportunities for police officers to confer after police shooting as being controversial: The National Policing perspectives on this issue are set out in some detail in its earlier referred to response to this IPCC consultation of 27 May 2014. It may assist if we set out here some salient points from that response It is noted that your concerns as set out in paragraphs 64 to 72 do not include mention of a requirement to separate officers prior to the provision of a first account;, position taken by the IPCC in its draft consultation. It is unequivocally in the interests of the public, the police service and all individual officers involved in any such incident that there is both transparency and integrity in mutually dependent post incident imperatives of providing necessarily high degree of welfare support to all officers in what are often highly complex and challenging operational circumstance and the duty to facilitate thorough and impartial investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident. The National Policing portfolios contend that there are four important factors to be born in mind in considering post incident procedures: (a) the safety of the public and officers; (b) achieving best evidence; (c) transparency and public confidence; and (d) safeguarding the welfare of officers , particularly in the case of fatal police shootings (due to the traumatic effect of a fatal shooting on the firearms officers concerned): police

The IPCC's draft guidance promotes the third factor at the expense of the first; second and fourth factors_ The National Policing portfolios' view is that post incident procedures should strike an appropriate balance between all four factors, a position that Module 7 of the APP seeks to achieve_ There are certain elements of the IPCC's draft guidance that could usefully be included in the existing APP_ There are other concepts in the IPCC's draft guidance that the National Policing portfolios do not support for the reasons set in detail in that response_ Seeking to ensure the separation of officers engaged and involved in a critical incident for what may prove to be significant period of time before an opportunity to rationally collect thoughts and compose an initial account no matter how brief is of course a legitimate and laudable aim but one that has to be set into context: Where officers have been together at the time of such an incident, as is in the case of many armed policing operations, the separation of officers may prove operationally or logistically impractical, as there are often large numbers of officers who will fall into the definition of key policing witness_ Such officers may have been together for a substantial period of time before it is practical to separate them, negating the rationale for separation Where officers who may be policing witnesses or designated as principal officers have been at different locations in the events leading to the DSI matter, will of course be easier to ensure separation prior to the recording of an initial account both in the immediate aftermath and in subsequent post incident procedures. To simply state that officers identified as policing witnesses should be kept separate prior to completion of a detailed individual first account without any acknowledgement of the very real practical, resourcing and logistical problems of doing so is setting the police service and indeed the IPCC up to fail and will only serve to undermine the effectiveness of any investigation and ultimately will adversely reflect on IPCC and police service credibility. Chief officers are rightly concerned that to pay due regard to guidance that is difficult if not impossible to practically follow without detracting from operational imperatives will have undue adverse consequences for public safety and public confidence 10 out key key having

We have already taken steps to ensure that as of immediate post incident procedures , a senior officer is present when the officers are preparing their initial accounts_ This officer should be in a position to confirm that either conferring did not take place or, if it did, the APP was complied with_ In addition we have made clear the process can and should be more transparent to both host force initial investigating officers or to the IPCC's investigators. Chief officers quite properly contend that ordinarily, police officers who act in full accordance with their powers , duties and responsibilities are professional witnesses and deserve recognition as such. Many chief officers have argued in previous instances that where there are no grounds to consider any criminal conduct or any breach of any standard of professional behaviour on the part of any officer or member of staff; the explicit separation of officers is wholly disproportionate and unjustified and is both morally wrong and legally questionable. In the absence of prima facie evidence to suggest otherwise, principal officers are witnesses and should be treated accordingly: If grounds exist to suspect an officer of a criminal or misconduct offence, investigators have a wide range ofpowers available to satisfactorily deal with officers_ point we reinforced in this response was that we remain keen to engage with the IPCC to seek to establish an evidence-based approach to the issue of capturing and presenting best evidence from officers who are party to dynamically unfolding and often unanticipated traumatic events during the course of their duties. It is important to consider all the academic research on the subject of whether separation actually produces better evidence, or indeed whether the production of a detailed initial first account is a basis upon which to contend best evidence is predicated. Our concern is that the draft IPCC guidance pays no heed to the extent of the authoritative research on the to provide best evidence, and that seeking the wholesale separation of officers as a starting point without any recourse to a flexible and considered approach that takes into account the specific circumstances of the DSI matter will not achieve the best evidence sought by both the service and the IPCC_ As set out in our response, we do not believe the one size fits all' approach to separation of officers in the draft guidance is fit for purpose to deal with the complexities of an armed policing operation and other instances in operational policing where members of the public tragically lose their lives or receive serious injury during or following police contact. 11 part fully ability police

Concern 4: The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded The National Policing portfolios concur with your view that is important to minimise distrust in the police in connection with fatal shootings, and notwithstanding any development over the use of body worn video (BWV), will consider how best to reflect changes in the College of Policing's APP on incident procedures to ensure standard operational procedures encompass the benefits of the earliest possible commencement of the video recording of scenes, subject of course to ongoing operational imperatives to protect public and individual safety and to continue to mitigate any risk of harm: A distinction has of course to be drawn between the responsibilities of an ongoing firearms operation and post incident scene management and the necessity of securing and preserving relevant evidence_ Concern 5: The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired The issue you set out in paragraphs 84 to 86 is one for wider operational policing and for senior investigating officer and operational commander and the National Policing portfolios will ensure liaison with the College of to incorporate, reiterate and reflect in its operational training: Concern 6: The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called The National Armed Policing Portfolio has already commenced work to determine whether the introduction of body warn video (BWV) , recently trialled in a number of forces in England and Wales might be included in armed policing operations This work is progressing and is likely to lead to some pilot initiatives later in 2014 to assess its validity and feasibility. The Portfolio is keen to establish an evidence based approach upon which BWV might provide best evidence, and as importantly public confidence and reassurance in such operations 12 post Policing

The wider issues of data recording and tracking on covert police vehicles likely to be used in armed policing operations is currently being considered by the National Police Interoperability Working Group and at present am unable to provide any more definitive response_ will of course ensure you are appraised of any progress or developments In conclusion, we hope these responses herein provide you with reassurance that the National Policing Portfolios and the wider police service is and remains committed to ensuring that any action that can reasonably be taken to eliminate or reduce the risk of death of any person in any policing operation is properly considered and acted upon_

Dear INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF MARK DUGGAN RESPONSE TO REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS CONCERN ONE Thank you for your report dated 29 2014 under Schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The National Crime Agency (now incorporating SOCA) notes the concerns contained within it_ The National Crime Agency has undertaken a thorough internal review of its operating procedures in relation to how intelligence is gathered, how it is developed and subsequently disseminated. In the light of this review, the Agency does not consider that any more could realistically have been done to avoid this tragic incident:

Dear Judge, Re: The_Inquest into the death of Mark Duggan This is the response of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths' (PFD Report) dated 29th
2014. Introduction The MPS desires and intends to continue to learn lessons from the events of and following 4th August 2011. The MPS welcomes informed comment and assistance in achieving its aspirations, including, but not limited to, that provided by the jury' $ determinations, your subsequent investigation;, and PFD Report dated 29uh
2014. That report directs six concerns to the MPS_ The MPS responds to those concerns in accordance with the statutory 56 time frame. Given the nature and extent of the work undertaken by the MPS and by relevant bodies including the Association of Chief Police Officers [*ACPO'] in response to the events of August 2011, upon which your concerns have an important influence; it will be appreciated that this response describes the present progress rather than the final outcome of the total MPS response_ Background In the fiscal year April 2012 to March 2013 the MPS conducted 1136 pre-planned armed operations. This was 10.3% of the total for England and Wales (10996). The source of this data are the Home Office Statistics on Police Use of Firearms in England and Wales 2012-13 published by the then Policing Minister Damian Green on the 27th March 2014. During this period the MPS conducted 454 MAST operations of which there were 15 incidents where vehicle was Lexcel Practice Management Standard Law Society Accredited 24th May May day

immobilised a total of 28 Hatton rounds this twelve month period no lethal weapons were discharged by police during MAST operations. The use of pre-planned MAST operations was an important tactic in Operation Dibri. Such operations are controlled and led by & cadre of trained strategic and tactical firearms commanders within the Specialist Firearms Command and their detective colleagues of equal occupational accreditation and operational competence in Trident: involve the deployment of specialist firearms officers and both armed and unarmed surveillance officers. Such operations are extremely resource intensive. The MAST operation of 3rd-4th August 2011 was one such pre-planned, resource-heavy and intelligence led operation It was set up because of serious levels of criminality and the reliability of the available intelligence in order to recover firearms from its six named subjects, senior members of the Tottenham Man Dem, any one of whom might had a gun: The operation had to be authorised to keep the public safe_ It was authorised by one of the most experienced Strategic Firearms Commanders in the country following receipt of the requisite tactical advice, full briefing and presentation from the Tactical Firearms Commander; advice from the Tactical Advisor about the available options and whether and how those options met her working strategy, and meeting with intelligence managers on 3rd August 2011. The resultant tactical plan contained range of options designed to permit a flexible response to developing intelligence Intelligence could and did change significantly and rapidly and was acted upon as and when it became specific Concerns Given that general background, the MPS responds as follows to your six concerns Concern I: The MPS and SOCA could have reacted better to developing events and used their joint intelligence resources better The MPS acknowledges both the jury'$ response to question 1and your concern: The MPS is committed to the removal of guns from the streets of London: It has limited resources to effect this commitment;, and decisions must be made as to how to target those resources. Thus, the officers deployed actively in the MAST operation on 3rd and 4th August 2011 were due to be on from
18.O0hrs, reflecting the consistency of the intelligence that any handover of a gun would be after
21.OOhrs. In the event; on 4th August 2011,the pick-up of the gun was arranged to take place some hours earlier, This is an example of a significant change in specific intelligence which had to be and was responded to. The exhaustion of all avenues may be disproportionate; impossible; impracticable and/or unnecessary depending on the particular facts of any given case. The essential point; which governed the decisions on the deployment of MPS resources on 3rd and 4th August 2011, is that all the intelligence, which was ofhigh-grade quality, related to Mark Duggan, the intended recipient of the gun. The MPS resources were therefore directed at the recovery of the gun from Mark Duggan. Intelligence provided to the MPS by SOCA indicated Kevin Hutchinson-Foster was gun or guns for Mark Duggan The MPS did not telephone Mr Hutchinson-Foster's probation officer;, which might have confirmed his bail hostel address and telephone number. Possession of that address by the MPS might, theoretically, on application and diversion of very significant and valuable resources, have led eventually to the location of Mr Hutchinson-Foster at the bail hostel. He was not at the hostel o the night of the 3rd August 2011. The protracted and continuous During using They have duty storing

surveillance necessary to locate Mr Hutchinson-Foster in this way could not and would not have represented a justifiable application of MPS resources in light of the available intelligence. Still less would Mr Hutchinson-Foster have been subject to the continuous directed surveillance necessary to locate him at Burchell Road in advance of the handover_ Crucially, in any event; the location of the gun O guns was and would have been entirely unknown until the and time of handover of a firearm in Burchell Road. Had the whereabouts of the gun(s) had been established, or capable of established, to 17:15 on 4th August 2011,the MPS would have responded Notwithstanding this history, the MPS is anxious to ensure that the manner in which it plans such operations, responds to and develops intelligence and uses the resources available to it is of the very highest order. Following a comprehensive review of intelligence procedures and liaison conducted in response to your PFD report; the MPS has concluded that there were, and continue to be, robust, risk managed and accountable joint MPSINCA (and previously SOCA) processes to request; refuse and allow intelligence opportunities to be developed with clear lines of governance: The MPS have collaborated with the NCA on all aspects of review and learning undertaken as a result of the tragic death of Mark Duggan. These include professional development training courses for staff and managers in specialist skills and (b) reviews into safe-guarding and critical incident procedures. The MPS is adopting processes and developing training specifically designed to ensure the relevant Senior Investigating Officer [*SIO ] is fully sighted on all available intelligence: Covert Intelligence Managers will have a specific responsibility to maintain oversight of covert intelligence processes in order to ensure that the SIO is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving the his Or her strategy. Emphasis will be laid on ensuring that the oversight must include dynamic responses to changes in the SIO s strategy in light of all available intelligence Training for MPS Intelligence Officers will be reviewed to guarantee that there is sufficient emphasis o their role in ensuring the Senior Investigating Officer is aware of intelligence relevant to achieving his or her strategy in each case: Training for SIOs leading operations in which covert intelligence will play significant role will include bespoke input providing them with an understanding of the specific processes & safeguards involved in this specialist arena of policing: In addition to this, and in light of un-related changes to the Met Intelligence structure, the MPS will review the training provided to SIOs who are responsible for the management of proactive policing operations in order to ensure intelligence development activities remain accountable for decisions taken relating to the exploitation of available intelligence to ensure consistency and leamning is maintained. As these issues are of national relevance and significance; the MPS Commander for Intelligence Covert Policing will brief the ACPO Intelligence Portfolio lead on your concems, the MPS response to those concerns and the detailed learning in this case in order that consideration can be given to changes to Intelligence Management from & national policing perspective. Concern 2: Comprehensive accounts were not taken from police witnesses at the first possible opportunity The MPS believes that it is imperative that all police shootings, fatal O otherwise, are subject to the most rigorous examination: The MPS appreciates the need and is eager to work closely with the IPCC to ensure this takes place. The MPS agrees with the IPCC that achieving best evidence in the point being prior (a)

investigation of death or serious incident [*DSI ] matter; as an Article 2 ECHR compliant investigation, must ensure that the public has full confidence in the integrity of the investigation. concern is that post incident procedures adopted in August 2011 for taking accounts officers involved in such shootings which reflected national practice, which procedures were sanctioned and/or encouraged by ACPO and which were implemented by the MPS under the auspices of the IPCC in August 2011, did not amount to best practice. The MPS is grateful for your recognition that its acts in this case were in accordance with the guidance produced by the National Policing Improvement Agency ['NPIA '] on behalf of ACPO in force in August 2011, namely, the Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers 2nd edition [*the Guidance' ] . The MPS understands the need to prevent any perception that the systems employed lack integrity. The MPS can and does in striving to achieve best practice adopt and implement procedures which go beyond but are consistent which national practice and guidance. Thus, for example, a senior officer must now be present in the Post Incident Management [*PIM ] suite whilst officers produce witness statements, with a view to ensuring the openness and transparency of the process. The MPS agrees that the current Post Incident Procedure (PIP) does not attract public confidence and needs to be made more transparent The Guidance was revised in 2011. On 1st December 2012, the functions of the NPIA were assumed by the new College of Policing: The Guidance has since been decommissioned and replaced entirely by the consolidated Armed Policing Authorised Professional Practice' [*APP'] The process of improvement partially reflected in this history is an ongoing one. The MPS anticipates further modification of the APP to improve transparency and accountability and wholly supports such amendment. You refer (at paragraphs 71-72) to the extant IPCC consultation on its draft statutory guidance to the police service on achieving best evidence in DSI matters [*draft guidance ] and requests that a copy of the MPS response be sent to you. This is attached. The MPS makes the further additional comments in response to your observations: The MPS agrees that *bland and uninformative' accounts, if and whenever provided, are not acceptable. The MPS now requires a senior officer to be present in the PIM suite, whose functions include ensuring the inclusion of sufficient detail in initial and subsequent accounts. Sufficient detail includes the presence O absence of any perceived threat and the officer s response thereto. The MPS is working with law firms who represent firearms officers to ensure that its expectations are clearly understood. The success of these measures was demonstrated by the post incident processes adopted following the events of 2013 in Woolwich and the quality of the witness statements produced through those processes
b. There is and was clear ACPO guidance on the identification of Principal Officers. In August 2011, that was contained at paragraph
7.42ff of the ACPO 2010 Manual of Guidance. Identification of Principal Officer required the input of number of individual and/lor organisations, including the IPCC and the Post Incident Manager: Principal Officers are those who either used force or were involved in the decision to use force. Principal Officers are not those more likely to be cautioned; rather; Principal Officers are recognised as those particularly requiring welfare support: Your from May

Neither the 2010 ACPO Manual nor its successors contain blanket prohibition on conferring following & fatal shooting: Such prohibition would be impracticable. It may be essential for officers to confer about a range of matters connected to andlor from the operation; for example;, to ensure public safety in dealing with an ongoing threat Or crime in action; O to establish lines of enquiry that would assist the investigator in determining their forensic strategy. Both the 2010 Manual and its successors warn conferring and stress the critical importance of the individual officer'$ record of his or her individual understanding of the situation was when force was used. There is and was presumption in the guidance that officers should not confer; and must not confer on their own beliefs relating to the use of force. The MPS expressly and explicitly warns its officers, in accordance with this guidance, that officers should not confer o an incident and must not confer on their individual use of force. conferring and the rationale for that conferring must be recorded; in detail, to further ensure transparency in the process_
d. Officers involved in a fatal shooting are under intense scrutiny. A decision about criminal Or disciplinary proceedings may not be made for months or years after such shooting: Such officers are required to carry out difficult and/or dangerous tasks at, not infrequently, personal risk. witness may speak to a solicitor to giving information to police. The same is true of any suspect. A witness is entitled to provide their account in the manner of their choosing: Officers involved in fatal shooting should be entitled to no lesser protections and support than any other member of the public who is a witness. This is codified in the Ministry of Justice 2011 guidance for Achieving Best Evidence [*ABF'] regarding the timing of any interview and the provision of a full and detailed account Police officers are professional witnesses trained to make statements and give evidence and as such are legally and morally obliged to record best evidence as soon aS practicable if medically fit to do s0 and not; for example, suffering or likely to suffer from distress O extreme fatigue in accordance with ABE principles_ Welfare is the primary support provided by the Police Federation. Securing legal advice for supported officers is part of that welfare function: Failing to take welfare concerns into account and attempting to take full statements immediately from witnesses who are suffering shock; distress or extreme fatigue is likely to be counterproductive and of limited forensic value The MPS is aware that ACPO has provided you with copy of Professor Gudjonsson's 2014 review of Home Office Study Papers of 1986 and 1993 and respectfully refer you to that review and its conclusions. The MPS has a legal and moral of care to its officers and staff when are involved in traumatic events. The MPS needs officers to volunteer for high threat; high-risk roles, such as armed policing: The MPS accepts, of course; that this of care must be balanced against the need for a thorough, objective and expeditious investigation of all the circumstances to find the truth for the bereaved family and the wider public. Concern 3: The IPCC had primacy at the scene but did not have the resources to conduct all relevant activities there The MPS agrees that the scene of a fatal police shooting should be the subject of no confusion about the purpose or furtherance of investigation; and that the IPCC should be well resourced, competent; of rapid deployment and able to take control of a scene is essential to achieving this end. Parallel investigations were necessary into the events of 4th August 2011. The IPCC investigated the shooting by an MPS officer; ad the MPS investigated the criminal offences relating to the gun arising against Any great Any 'prior duty they duty capable

found on the The scene of the shooting was, clearly; evidential area for both investigations The control of the scene immediately after the shooting remained with the Tactical Firearms Commander pursuant to the 2011 Manual of Guidance pending the involvement of the IPCC. Such parallel investigations are common to most cases involving the discharge of a firearm by police officers and are likely to share some; though not all, investigative objectives. The issue of command and control at the scene of a critical incident is presently under review within the MPS. A working group led by the Directorate of Professional Standards has been formed to review and examine the issue from the Operational Firearms Commander through to Management Board in DSI incidents. The IPCC has been invited to provide input to this process_ In carrying out an investigation, the IPCC relies on the relevant police service, working t0 its direction, to conduct relevant activities, for example, forensic retrieval and scene examination. In the case of the MPS, the officers and staff charged with providing this assistance are independent to those under IPCC investigation: The Directorate of Professional Standards, Specialist Investigations maintains 24 hour on call service to respond to all incidents involving death and serious injury following police contact. Scene control and the manner in which the MPS assists the IPCC must and are being addressed by the MPS and IPCC working together to achieve clarity of responsibility and effective communication at the scene of a police shooting: You will be aware that paragraphs 7-12 of the IPCC's draft statutory guidance relate to the identification and preservation of all potentially relevant evidence and scenes_ The MPS generally supports these paragraphs. It is an area in which very considerable progress has been made in this area since 2011 in response to events of 4th August 2011 and subsequent incidents, example, the shootings in Woolwich following the murder of Lee Rigby: On 25th September 2013, a Tabletop Workshop was held by the MPS_ The IPCC, SIOs, Operational Command Unit [*OCU'] Commanders and other senior officers from all firearms OCUs and OCUs responsible for the investigation of serious crime were invited The aim of the workshop was to understand and examine the roles and interaction between the various agencies. The resultant analysis is that the essence of effective scene management not in deciding which body holds primacy over the investigation but rather in all investigators meeting at the earliest opportunity to agree o (a) where responsibility lies for each aspect of the investigations and (b) protocols for each aspect of the investigations_ It is anticipated that the MPS and the IPCC will formally record an agreed protocol detailing the commitment to hold a strategic scene co-ordination meeting between the SIOs from the IPCC, DPS and the relevant Operational Command Unit responsibility for any parallel investigation. This work is ongoing The MPS appreciates the distress that inaccurate Or uncorrected false information has caused in number of cases. In respect of Mr Duggan; inaccurate information was provided to the media, for which the IPCC later apologised. Media strategy and communications template for armed policing incidents is currently being reviewed by the MPS Directorate of Media & Communications. This provides framework for the Gold Commander and DMC to work towards and specifies the responsibilities for collecting the information and quality assuring the product: Concern 4: The scene of the fatal police shooting was not video recorded The MPS acknowledges that the recording of the scene of a fatal police shooting is desirable aspect of crime scene management and recognises the importance of securing best evidence in the immediate aftermath and ongoing investigation of police shooting: This is the ultimate responsibility of the senior investigating officer (SIO); in the case of a fatal police shooting; that key grass for lies key

SIO will inevitably be from the IPCC, working with and through the police Professional Standards Unit. In the immediate aftermath of a police shooting, it is inevitable that only the officers on scene will be available to carry out an immediate video O photographic capture The convoy of cars on 4th August 2011 was equipped with both video and still cameras. The primary purpose for which that equipment is provided is to capture images of locations and environments to assist in tactical planning: Armed officers are not currently trained or equipped to record scenes to an evidential standard. On 4th August 2011, officers were able to and did, as an incidence of individual decision making and availability in the circumstances of the particular case of resources, use both cameras to record some parts of the scene, in particular; the provision of first aid. The priorities for armed officers at the scene of a police shooting were and will continue to be saving life, protection of the public and the security of the scene. It is difficult to anticipate with any precision the manner in which resources will fall to be best deployed in such circumstances Further; it is at best highly unlikely that it would be possible to comprehensively record every aspect of the aftermath of police shooting: It is similarly unlikely that officers would correctly select and record each aspect which the benefit ofhindsight proves to have been most significant It is the view of the MPS that firearms officers should not be responsible for recording post incident scene preservation MPS firearms officers are due to commence the piloting of Body Worn Cameras (see Concern 6, below)_ This may provide some level of recording of the actions taken to preserve the scene in the immediate aftermath but have limitations in that they will only capture a certain camera angle: In spontaneous incident; it is likely that this will be the only method of immediately recording the scene Another option that is currently being explored by the MPS in the case of pre-planned operations is to assign this role to an operations team officer_ This officer's primary responsibility would be to record the scene in the event of a police shooting until such time that either a police helicopter (if available or able to deploy), independent investigators (DPS/IPCC) or any specialist support services deployed by them (for example; Crime Scene Managers or the Computer Aided Modelling Bureau see below) arrive on scene. feasibility study is currently conducted to ensure that any issues associated with this option can be considered. The possibility of utilising the Computer Aided Modelling Bureau [*CAMB ] is also relevant in this context is considered by the Directorate of Professional Standards, Specialist Investigations at the early stages of DSI incident It is service which must be deployed, and there will be an inevitable time between incident and arrival, though arrival is typically within the initial 'golden hour' CAMB assists in the accurate surveying and mapping of the scene and other areas_ The output from CAMB allows investigators to identify the exact position and relationship between vehicles, exhibits, street furniture, officers, witnesses and suspects. The call- out of CAMB is to be standard in all DSI cases caused by the discharge of police firearms and discretionary in other Specialist Investigations incidents. Where the method of investigation is set as independent by the IPCC, it will be provided with the extant survey data and the IPCC may thereafter commission CAMB to the analysis under its control, or alternately direct that a third party do so CAMB' s data briefing document on joint working between CAMB and DPS is enclosed: Concern 5: The planned operation to seize weapons was not pursued after the fatal shot was fired they being lapse spatial key complete using

The firearm that was handed to Mark Duggan by Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on 4th August 2011 was recovered in Lane. The intended outcome of the planned operation that is, the interception of Mark Duggan and the recovery of the firearm from him was achieved_ Officers were not deployed to Burchell Road to seek to arrest Kevin Hutchinson-Foster after Mark Duggan was shot. As a matter of fact; the Burchell Road address at which one of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster girlfriends lived remained unknown to the MPS until the arrest of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster on 24h October
2011. Whilst intelligence provided to the MPS by SOCA had indicated that Kevin Hutchinson- Foster was storing a gun Or guns for Mark Duggan, the critical piece of information for the recovery of any further firearm under Hutchinson-Foster' $ control that is, its location remained wholly unknown; That an unarmed officer from Operation Trident had seen the minicab carrying Mr Duggan turning into Burchell Road did not and could not have altered the state of the MPS knowledge. The only firearm whose whereabouts was known with certainty or at all was that contained, with Mark Duggan, inside the minicab. To that piece of information were the MPS resources directed. In such circumstances, the certainty and knowledge necessary to justify the application of armed resources to the Burchell Road area or to further pursue any further firearm under the control of Kevin Hutchinson-Foster were absent The MPS is committed to the removal of guns from the streets of London: It recognises the importance of continuing and concluding planned operations in the furtherance of that commitment Where an operation in the context of which police shooting occurs remains a crime in action; for example an ongoing kidnap or a planned armed robbery, the onus is on the operational head of that investigation to decide to continue the police response to prevent harm/serious injury, to arrest offenders and retrieve evidence. Whilst the seizure of firearms from principal officers should not and would not adversely affect the MPS ability to continue the armed response to a crime in action, and there are a number of MPS armed units that could be utilised to carry out a spontaneous (rather than pre-planned) MASTS operation in this event; the decision to mount such an operation was and is dependent on the particular circumstances and the information available to the SIO. Such operations require independent population of the relevant command, control and deployed roles, that is, very significant deployment of resources. Such deployment could and would be justifiable and authorised only where & sufficient degree of certainty and knowledge is available to the SIO The MPS will continue to provide training and refresher training to these senior officers to ensure the high standards of decision making expected by the MPS are consistently Concern 6: The armed police operation was not recorded after State Red was called The MPS recognises that public confidence in the support of armed policing is essential_ Transparency in the conduct of armed policing is key to strengthening that support. Body Worn Cameras The MPS believes that the audio and visual recording of the actions of firearms officers and those with whom engage is an essential element of that transparency. The MPS has been committed to the testing (in training) and piloting (in firearms operations) of Body Worn Cameras (BWC) with a view to their introduction in London_ The processes, which began in November 2013 under the auspices of DCC Simon Chesterman (ACPO lead, Armed Policing), have established that, for overt policing, the kit is effective and functional. The trials for the use of BWC by uniformed ARV officers concluded in June 2014_ On July 2014, the of Policing produced Ferry applied. long they 21st College

guidance in respect of the overt use of body-worn video. This is enclosed. Careful attention is paid through this guidance to legal issues arising from the use of such Cameras (for example, the identification and obtaining of any requisite authorities, data retention and data protection, and human rights issues). Operational use by uniformed officers is due to commence on 4th August
2014. There are obvious additional logistical complications with both armed officers where the most appropriate camera location would be head mounted or within glasses to reflect the actual view) and covert armed and covert surveillance officers where head O overt camera systems would clearly be nonsensical. The Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) is assisting in examining the right technical solution and the MPS intends to go to training trials shortly. Incident Data Recorder (IDR) The MPS acknowledges the Coroner'$ concerns about the lack of Incident Data Recorder [ IDR '] data available in the Inquest proceedings_ By way of background, all operational MPS vehicles are fitted with IDR technology: An IDR is a permanently installed electronic device with which selected driving data relating to the vehicle can be recorded and stored in the IDR memory. The data recorded includes wheel speed, brake operation, forwards and sideways acceleration and rotations of the vehicle, passing manoeuvres, swerving, cornering and impacts collision, operation of lights and emergency warning instruments. magnetic compass records the vehicle's directions A post August 2011 equipment upgrade means that IDR devices fitted on new vehicles only also provide geographical location. Not all vehicles in the SCO19 fleet have this functionality: An IDR does and did not record conversations taking place in a vehicle. IDR alone does not permit event reconstruction_ The IDR is automatically activated by a collision, by harsh braking or by harsh steering: The IDR memory is capable of storing nine such automatic events, each of which reflects period of approximate 30 seconds before and 14 seconds after the trigger and 100 metres of post trigger movement_ The facility to manually activate the IDR using & push button in the vehicle also exists, and records the status of the vehicle 45 seconds to the event and 10Om following activation: The driver of vehicle equipped with an [DR must press the manual activation button if are involved in a collision, regardless of whether the device has activated automatically. The IDR will also create a record where the vehicle becomes stationary for more than 5 seconds 'standstill event') Three standstill events are stored in the IDRs memory; these are continually overwritten as the vehicle continues the journey_ If the IDR is either automatically or manually activated, it must not be used operationally until the IDR has been downloaded and the memory re-set and cleared_ In relation to 'standstill event' the window for downloading IDR data is narrow. Ideally, the cars should not be driven or moved (if moved three times the relevant data would be overwritten), and Garage Sergeant' or Collision Investigator as appropriate should be requested soon after the event to download and save the IDR data. during prior they they are

None of the four SCO19 vehicles that were involved in Lane on 4th August 2011 were involved in a collision: None of the vehicles had an automatic IDR activation There was no requirement for the SCO19 officers to manually activate the vehicle IDRs, and the SCO19 officers were not required to request that IDR downloads take place from any of the vehicles The four vehicles were driven from the scene of the shooting to Lambeth HQ: In the absence of either automatic O manual activation, then unless the downloading of standstill data had been carried out to this journey; there would have been no data to download by the time the vehicles arrived at Lambeth: There are no records indicating that a Garage Sergeant was called to the scene, and MPS investigations indicate that IDR downloads were neither requested nor carried out_ It is correct that the MPS has statutory duties to obtain and preserve evidence and to comply with directions given by the Commission pursuant to Schedule 3, paragraph 14B of the Police Reform Act 2002. It is correct that neither the MPS nor the IPCC considered the possibility of downloading the data prior to the SCO19 cars being driven away from Lane: The IDR data would probably have been lost at this (or soon after). In light of the Coroner'$ concerns, the MPS will adopt & procedure for all future police shootings whereby a Garage Sergeant Collision Investigator is called by the DPS to download the IDR at the scene, which will then be available to police; the IPCC and any subsequent legal proceedings