Samiyo Farah
PFD Report
Partially Responded
Ref: 2014-0202
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Critical concerns include the absence of national observation guidelines for children in mental health units, poor communication protocols for inter-sector patient transfers, and inconsistent psychiatric referrals from A&E.
View full coroner's concerns
_ _ 1) Observation protocol there no national guidancelpolicy on the observation of children and adolescents within specialist mental health units. At present;, clinicians are forced to adoptladapt policies applied to adults with mental health issues. The care needs of young people are quite different to those of adults
2) Communicationlcontact between transferring establishments there is no formal policylprotocol in uselbetween the private sector and the NHS detailing steps that should be taken (and by whom) upon transfer of patients between sectors, thus risking that not all information (both verbal and written) is properly communicated before, during and after transfer. Whilst progress is being made in this regard at local level following the death of Miss Farah (and may well be the basis upon which any national policylprotocol might be formulated) there is currently no communication/transfer protocol in existence_ This also potentially impacts upon all other healthcare sector providers eg. the acute sector, hospital to care home, acute to rehabilitation/community services etc
3) There appears to have been an inconsistency of approach following Miss Farah's admissions to A & E_ She was referred directly to a Psychiatrist on the second attendance when she was clearly unwell but had not managed to self-harm but was not on the first attendance when she had taken an overdose_ This also raises the question as to whether she ought to have been referred (to a Psychiatrist) on the 31st October 2012_ they days the the bag Key the from her bag: key
2) Communicationlcontact between transferring establishments there is no formal policylprotocol in uselbetween the private sector and the NHS detailing steps that should be taken (and by whom) upon transfer of patients between sectors, thus risking that not all information (both verbal and written) is properly communicated before, during and after transfer. Whilst progress is being made in this regard at local level following the death of Miss Farah (and may well be the basis upon which any national policylprotocol might be formulated) there is currently no communication/transfer protocol in existence_ This also potentially impacts upon all other healthcare sector providers eg. the acute sector, hospital to care home, acute to rehabilitation/community services etc
3) There appears to have been an inconsistency of approach following Miss Farah's admissions to A & E_ She was referred directly to a Psychiatrist on the second attendance when she was clearly unwell but had not managed to self-harm but was not on the first attendance when she had taken an overdose_ This also raises the question as to whether she ought to have been referred (to a Psychiatrist) on the 31st October 2012_ they days the the bag Key the from her bag: key
Responses
Noted
The Department of Health acknowledges the concerns raised and highlights existing NICE guidance on self-harm and a government suicide prevention strategy. They note that Trusts develop their own transfer protocols with the private sector and refer to existing guidance from the Royal Pharmaceutical Society on patient transfer. (AI summary)
The Department of Health acknowledges the concerns raised and highlights existing NICE guidance on self-harm and a government suicide prevention strategy. They note that Trusts develop their own transfer protocols with the private sector and refer to existing guidance from the Royal Pharmaceutical Society on patient transfer. (AI summary)
View full response
c From Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP Minister of State for Care and Support Department Department of Health of Health Richmond House 79 Whitehall London SW1A 2NS Ms L Hashmi HM Assistant Coroner for the County of Greater Manchester (North District) The Phoenix Centre L/Cpl Stephen Shaw Way (Formerly Church St) i FEB 201 Heywood OL1O 1LR Oec V, Thank you for your letter to Jeremy Hunt about the death of Samiyo Farah. As minister with responsibility for mental health policy I have been asked to respond on his behalf. Please accept my apologies for the delay in replying, which has been caused by an administrative error. Thank you for your comprehensive account of this case in which you described events leading to Miss Farah’s suicide with a homemade ligature on 30 December
2012. In your report, you drew attention to two issues with relevance for this Department. The first was that there are no observation protocols specifically tailored to young people with mental health issues; and the second that there appears to be a lack of communication between transferring establishments and a lack of national protocol, particularly between the NHS and private sector. Young people are one of the groups receiving special attention in the Department’s suicide prevention strategy for England, published on 10 September2012. In addition, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has already produced detailed guidance on the management and support of children, young people and adults who self-harm, including a quality standard published in June 2013 which covers many of the issues you raise including moving between services. A copy of the quality standard can be found on the following link: http:Ilwww. nice.orcj . uk/ciuidance/QS34/chapter/introd uction-and-overview In September 2014, the Government also asked NICE to produce guidance and a quality standard on suicide prevention.
V V Department of Health In January 2014, the Department also published an annual report summarising the developments on the suicide prevention strategy at national level. The report sets out the key actions that local areas can take to prevent suicides. It also highlights the importance of responsive and high quality care for people who self-harm. With regard to transfer protocols between the NHS and the private sector, each Trust currently develops their own. This is because the private sector is not uniform in its approach and it is necessary to take account of this variance as well as relevant patient factors. In general, Trusts would be expected to establish good working relationships and transfer arrangements with those private sector providers with whom they regularly deal. However NHS England has adopted a number of interim generic policies which underpin its direct commissioning responsibilities. These interim policies have been in place since 1 April 2013 and set the overall parameters within which care is evaluated, planned and delivered. The policy document
- ‘Commissioning Policy: Defining the boundaries between NHS and Private Healthcare’- defines the boundaries between privately funded treatment and entitlement to NHS funding under a range of circumstances and can be found at http://www.enqland .nhs.uklwp-contenUuploads/201 3/04/cp-12.pdf. A copy is also enclosed for your convenience. In addition, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society has produced guidance about safety and the transfer of patients. ‘Keeping patients safe when they transfer between care providers’ can be found at httrx//www.nhs.uklnews/201 1/O7july/documents/transfer%2Oof%20care%20professio nal%20g uidance%20-%20final. pdf I hope that this response is helpful and I am grateful to you for bringing the circumstances of Ms Farah’s death to our attention. / ///I NORMAN LAMB
2012. In your report, you drew attention to two issues with relevance for this Department. The first was that there are no observation protocols specifically tailored to young people with mental health issues; and the second that there appears to be a lack of communication between transferring establishments and a lack of national protocol, particularly between the NHS and private sector. Young people are one of the groups receiving special attention in the Department’s suicide prevention strategy for England, published on 10 September2012. In addition, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) has already produced detailed guidance on the management and support of children, young people and adults who self-harm, including a quality standard published in June 2013 which covers many of the issues you raise including moving between services. A copy of the quality standard can be found on the following link: http:Ilwww. nice.orcj . uk/ciuidance/QS34/chapter/introd uction-and-overview In September 2014, the Government also asked NICE to produce guidance and a quality standard on suicide prevention.
V V Department of Health In January 2014, the Department also published an annual report summarising the developments on the suicide prevention strategy at national level. The report sets out the key actions that local areas can take to prevent suicides. It also highlights the importance of responsive and high quality care for people who self-harm. With regard to transfer protocols between the NHS and the private sector, each Trust currently develops their own. This is because the private sector is not uniform in its approach and it is necessary to take account of this variance as well as relevant patient factors. In general, Trusts would be expected to establish good working relationships and transfer arrangements with those private sector providers with whom they regularly deal. However NHS England has adopted a number of interim generic policies which underpin its direct commissioning responsibilities. These interim policies have been in place since 1 April 2013 and set the overall parameters within which care is evaluated, planned and delivered. The policy document
- ‘Commissioning Policy: Defining the boundaries between NHS and Private Healthcare’- defines the boundaries between privately funded treatment and entitlement to NHS funding under a range of circumstances and can be found at http://www.enqland .nhs.uklwp-contenUuploads/201 3/04/cp-12.pdf. A copy is also enclosed for your convenience. In addition, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society has produced guidance about safety and the transfer of patients. ‘Keeping patients safe when they transfer between care providers’ can be found at httrx//www.nhs.uklnews/201 1/O7july/documents/transfer%2Oof%20care%20professio nal%20g uidance%20-%20final. pdf I hope that this response is helpful and I am grateful to you for bringing the circumstances of Ms Farah’s death to our attention. / ///I NORMAN LAMB
Sent To
- Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust
- Department of Health and Social Care
- Greater Manchester West Mental Health NHS Foundation Trust
- Manchester Mental Health and Social Care Trust
- Royal College of Psychiatrists
Response Status
Linked responses
1 of 6
56-Day Deadline
25 Jun 2014
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On the 8th January 2013 | commenced an investigation into the death of Miss Samiyo Sahra Shiih Farah then aged 17 years of 1 Outringham Drive, Openshaw, Manchester The investigation was concluded at the end of the inquest on the 16h April 2014_ The conclusion f the jury at inquest was that the deceased killed herself whilst suffering from depression and was combined with a brief narrative_ The medical cause of death was Ia) Pressure to the Neck
Circumstances of the Death
Briefly and by way of background, the deceased was a highly articulate and intelligent young woman who had moved to the UK with her family in around 2004_ She had a history of self-harm since the age of 14. On the 30th October 2012, Miss Farah consulted her GP who diagnosed depression. On the 31s October 2012, she was admitted to the A & E department having taken an overdose of paracetamol: She was subsequently transferred to an adult MAU under the care of Registered General Nurses for medical treatment of the overdose_ Miss Farah was seen on admission by the nurse-led Mental Health Liaison team (MHL): This was said to have been the process in place within the trust at the material time_ The deceased was not therefore referred directly to a Consultant Psychiatrist for assessment The MHL nurse appraised MAU staff regarding Miss Farah's presenting condition and advised that if had any concerns regarding the her mental health, then further contact could be made (with the MHL team): The MHL nurse did not see the deceased again until discharge on the 8th November, although she participated in a multi strategy meeting in the interim: Anti-depressant therapy was not instigated (this would necessarily have required the involvement of a member of the medical psychiatric team) on the basis that medication was only one_ofa variety of the they types of treatment During the course of her admission, the deceased made allegations against family members which triggered a safeguarding investigation: This necessitated the involvement of the multi-disciplinary team: The allegations made were unsubstantiated and the deceased was discharged home with a plan of care in the community (Child & Adolescent Mental Health Team 'CAMHs' and intensive home treatment team): A children's social worker was involved in the discharge planning process_ however it was unclear whatlhow many different discharge options were made available to the deceased at this time_ Whilst on the face of it Miss Farah appeared more settled following discharge, her family felt that she continued to demonstrate uncharacteristic behaviour. On the 26th November 2012, the deceased's mother discovered that her daughter had purchased a large number of paracetamol and cocodamol tablets_ She called for an emergency ambulance. Miss Farah was described as appearing 'happy' at the prospect of readmission: Miss Farah was seen by doctors at the same A & E department whereupon she was referred to a Psychiatrist for assessment Whilst the decision to refer directly to a physician was no doubt wholly appropriate, it was 'at odds' with the previously identified referral process (MHL) particularly bearing in mind the circumstances surrounding admission on each occasion_ Nonetheless, the deceased was diagnosed as suffering from marked depression with suicidal ideation. Arrangements were therefore made for her to be admitted directly to an adolescent mental health unit on the 27th November. The only bed available at the time was in the private sector: This bed was commissioned with the proviso that as soon as an NHS bed became available, the deceased would be repatriated_ The Child and Adolescent Mental Health team ('CAMHs') became involved and a lead practitioner was identified. Following admission; the deceased was placed on 1:5 observations _ A STAR Risk Assessment was initiated following admission and completed subsequently. A key nurse was allocated but she went on leave very soon after the deceased's arrival. There was conflicting evidence regarding whether associate nurses were usedlallocated and at what grade (the associate acting in the absence of the nurse): Between the 13th and 15th December 2012 Miss Farah self-harmed by ligature (shoe laces) twice and was found head-banging against a wall: She remained on 1.5 observations_ The STAR risk assessment tool was not updated at the time, nor was it updated to repatriation A bed became available at the NHS hospital sometime after the 17th December: Miss Farah was unhappy to transfer to another unit as she had started to form therapeutic relationships with staff and felt safe where she was, on 1.5 observations_ She made her views known to those caring for her_ On or around the 18th December; the Dr in charge of Miss Farah's care formed the view that it was clinically preferable for her to remain: He allocated the task of contacting the Commissioners to the staff nurse on the ward round_ This, it was subsequently conceded, was inappropriate and that contact with the Commissioners should have been tasked to a senior manager or have been the responsibility of the clinician himself. The ward round ended late, by which time the funding office (who held the contact details for the Commissioners) had closed The staff nurse maintained that as he was unable to contact the Commissioners, he rang the NHS unit directly in order to forward both the patient's view and the clinical preference of the Dr only to be told that the transfer was to go ahead the next day Communication between CAMHs, the private hospital and NHS provider was limited to say the least_ The CAMHs lead was not advised of Miss Farah's wish to stay at the private unit; the date of her transfer or the self-harm incidents of the 13th to 15th December. Had he been made aware of her views and the clinical preference of the Consultant, then he would have 'escalated' matters to his manager_ Miss Farah was transferred to NHS care on the 19th December: En route, the escorting Health Care Assistant (HCA) purchased shoe laces for the deceased from the shop next to the NHS unit with, he maintained, the full agreement and knowledge of the discharging staff nurse This was SO as to ensure the patient's dignity_ The escorting HCA maintained that he handed over the transfer documentation and gave a brief verbal handover to a nurse on the accepting unit: This handover included bringing the recent purchase_of shoelaces to their attention key prior put
The staff at the NHS unit maintained that they were not advised of the ligaturelself-harm incidents of the 13-15 December and that had they been told, would i) have questioned the appropriateness of the deceased s transfer and ii) had the transfer been agreed, that this information would have materially altered their plan of care for the deceased A STAR risk assessment was completed by the Occupational Therapist following admission. The deceased was later seen by the junior Dr and placed on 1:15 observations following discussion with the Consultant It was subsequently conceded that a call ought to have been made to the transferring unit to enquire as to why the deceased had been on 1.5 observations for 22 prior to transfer as this was unusual. Initially; Miss Farah was placed on the 'acute corridor' (three young people were in residency at time, with two staff) After a short period, she was transferred to main ward area_ On the 23r December 2012, a search was conducted of Miss Farah's room, along with the rooms of two of her peers The deceased had allegedly been passing contraband' to others within the unit. Items found within the deceased's room included strips of material (taken from an item of her clothing), two pairs of shoelaces (one set hidden under a bed pillow), broken CDs and a plastic was found hidden upon her person (the deceased had previously researched the use of 'exit bags' as a way of self-harming): The contraband items were confiscated, The deceased was allowed to keep her clothing and was kept on 1:15 observations The STAR risk assessment was not updated until the 28th December . stafflmanagers were however notified via the 'Datix' system, save for the Consultant responsible for Miss Farah's care (he was a locum at the time and was not included within this notification process) He was told of the incident the following day and observed Miss Farah on ward (no direct patient contact): The patient observation rate remained 1:15. On the 30lh December 2012,a unit search was directed by senior managers_ At 09.30 a nurse entered Miss Farah's room but could not wake her_ He called for a female member of staff to assist before approaching the deceased_ Miss Farah was found unresponsive in her bed with a (non-suspension) ligature around her neck_ The ligature had been constructed from shreds of fabric clothing: CPR was commenced and paramedics summoned_ Life was confirmed extinct at 10.02 on the 30lh December. During a search of the deceased's room by police after her death, a serrated drink can was discovered hidden in the deceased's The SIO believed that this item may have been used to create the shreds of clothing used to form the ligature_
The staff at the NHS unit maintained that they were not advised of the ligaturelself-harm incidents of the 13-15 December and that had they been told, would i) have questioned the appropriateness of the deceased s transfer and ii) had the transfer been agreed, that this information would have materially altered their plan of care for the deceased A STAR risk assessment was completed by the Occupational Therapist following admission. The deceased was later seen by the junior Dr and placed on 1:15 observations following discussion with the Consultant It was subsequently conceded that a call ought to have been made to the transferring unit to enquire as to why the deceased had been on 1.5 observations for 22 prior to transfer as this was unusual. Initially; Miss Farah was placed on the 'acute corridor' (three young people were in residency at time, with two staff) After a short period, she was transferred to main ward area_ On the 23r December 2012, a search was conducted of Miss Farah's room, along with the rooms of two of her peers The deceased had allegedly been passing contraband' to others within the unit. Items found within the deceased's room included strips of material (taken from an item of her clothing), two pairs of shoelaces (one set hidden under a bed pillow), broken CDs and a plastic was found hidden upon her person (the deceased had previously researched the use of 'exit bags' as a way of self-harming): The contraband items were confiscated, The deceased was allowed to keep her clothing and was kept on 1:15 observations The STAR risk assessment was not updated until the 28th December . stafflmanagers were however notified via the 'Datix' system, save for the Consultant responsible for Miss Farah's care (he was a locum at the time and was not included within this notification process) He was told of the incident the following day and observed Miss Farah on ward (no direct patient contact): The patient observation rate remained 1:15. On the 30lh December 2012,a unit search was directed by senior managers_ At 09.30 a nurse entered Miss Farah's room but could not wake her_ He called for a female member of staff to assist before approaching the deceased_ Miss Farah was found unresponsive in her bed with a (non-suspension) ligature around her neck_ The ligature had been constructed from shreds of fabric clothing: CPR was commenced and paramedics summoned_ Life was confirmed extinct at 10.02 on the 30lh December. During a search of the deceased's room by police after her death, a serrated drink can was discovered hidden in the deceased's The SIO believed that this item may have been used to create the shreds of clothing used to form the ligature_
Action Should Be Taken
In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and believe you (ANDIOR your organisation) have the power to take such action.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.