PEEL Force Inspection
PEEL Assessment 2023-25: Lincolnshire Police
PEEL 2023-25 inspection findings for Lincolnshire Police
0
Recommendations
8
Causes for Concern
20
Areas for Improvement
Applicable Forces
Lincolnshire Police
Causes for Concern (8)
The force needs to make sure that it has the capacity and capability to manage the risks posed to the public by registered sex offenders
All police, probation and prison services use the Violent and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR) database to manage the risk posed to the public by convicted sexual and violent offenders. The police create a record on the active risk management system (ARMS) that sets out the potential risk that an offender poses. This should be followed by a risk management plan (RMP) detailing how the risk will be actively managed by the police and partner agencies, such as the Probation Service. At the time of our inspection, we found that personnel in the force’s management of sexual and violent offenders (MOSOVO) team didn’t have capacity to manage and reduce the backlog of ARMS and RMPs. This had resulted in an overdue workload backlog that the force had been unable to reduce over a four-month period. We found that there weren’t enough offender managers and supervisors to address the backlog and that they had already raised these resourcing gaps with senior leaders. We found that offender managers in the MOSOVO team had high caseloads, with a ratio of 1 offender manager to 65 offenders in the community. These managers also had a further caseload of offenders in custody or living abroad, which increased the ratio to 1 manager to 86 offenders. Nationally, forces are working towards a ratio of 1 manager to 50 offenders in the community. During our inspection, we found that not all personnel in the MOSOVO team had the appropriate level of training and accreditation to carry out their roles. They should be accredited under the College of Policing professionalising investigations programme level , which covers priority and volume crime investigations. At the time of our inspection, the force accepted this gap around capability but had no definite timescales in place to provide the necessary training. The national guideline on target completion rates for ARMS and RMPs is 95 percent. We found that the force completion rate was below this level, at 88.9 percent for ARMS and 93 percent for RMPs. However, to achieve this level the force suspended some visits on convicted sex offenders. Again, this indicates a lack of capacity in the MOSOVO team. During our inspection, we found a large backlog of over 3,000 supervisory reviews on the ViSOR database. After we told the force about this, it made significant efforts to reduce the backlog. But it still had 843 overdue reviews after a three-month period. Supervisors need a manageable number of reviews so that they can provide meaningful reviews and oversight of ongoing offender management. It is vital that the force has the capacity and capability to manage the ViSOR database so it can understand the threat, harm and risk posed by offenders who are in the community. Offender managers and supervisors told us backlogs meant visits to offenders involving the Probation Service as the lead agency had been suspended. We were told that this would be a temporary measure until backlogs were reduced and that some degree of risk assessment would be carried out to determine which offenders would only receive phone calls rather than personal visits. The police must visit all offenders regardless of whether the force is the lead agency. The police have the powers to enter homes and carry out checks in accordance with court orders that restrict an offender’s activity, such as Sexual Harm Prevention Orders. So, by not visiting offenders, the force could potentially miss an escalation or concern and put the public at risk.
Open
The force needs to improve its understanding of demand
This was an area for improvement we identified in our 2021/22 PEEL inspection. But it has not improved, so it is now a cause of concern. The force doesn’t have enough capacity in the right places, which is affecting force performance. For example, it isn’t meeting response time frames, there are delays in investigations and some specialist services lack capacity. During our inspection, we also found that the force was extensively using overtime to meet demand. The force told us the overtime budget was nearly exhausted mid-year. This isn’t a sustainable approach to meeting demand in key areas such as response and crime investigations. It also places more financial pressure on the force and additional pressure on those officers and staff who are working extra hours. The force should continue to review its operating model and implement any changes efficiently. It should make sure it has effective governance processes and enough resources to oversee its change programme. If the force has the right people in the right places, it will help it to make sustainable and cost-effective improvements in performance. The failure to plan effectively could prevent the force from providing its community, including its most vulnerable people, with the expected standard of service.
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Our recommendations
Within six months from the date of publication of this letter, Lincolnshire Police should make sure: • senior leaders can access accurate data and analysis so they can identify demand pressures and address current challenges related to capacity; and • project teams have effective governance in place to oversee change programmes and have enough capacity to complete their work efficiently and effectively, including the operating model review.
Open
The force doesn’t have adequate strategic plans in place
Senior leaders in the force haven’t had enough control over strategic planning and oversight since our 2021/22 inspection. The lack of effective governance and management of force performance has negatively affected almost all areas of the force. Although the force has a strategic savings and efficiency plan, we have limited confidence that the plan will lead to an efficient and effective service. We found that the force had been frequently using its reserves to support its expenditure for some time, which isn’t sustainable. This lack of effective planning is reflected in its operating costs. In the year ending 31 March 2024, the force spent £74,000 per member of the workforce, which is higher than most other police forces. Despite the financial pressures we found several areas of inefficiency, including the force’s vehicle fleet and estates strategy. The force told us it had closed of its underused buildings to save costs, but it hasn’t sold any of these buildings. Some of the remaining 37 operational buildings are underused and have few people working from them. The police and crime commissioner is responsible for the estate, but senior leaders are responsible for operational efficiency and value for money. The force should review how it uses its estate and its management strategy so that it can better meet current and future needs. Senior leaders in the force lack oversight of some areas of expenditure, such as the vehicle fleet. The arrangements, at the time of our inspection, for managing fleet size and allocation were ineffective. At the time of our inspection, the force had 462 vehicles, but these were only used 5.7 percent of the time on average. The force should review its fleet management plans to make sure its investments provide value for money and the workforce has what it needs to be efficient and productive. Lincolnshire Police receives one of the lowest levels of funding per 1,000 population among forces in England and Wales. But its financial plans aren’t aligned with other corporate plans such as workforce, IT, fleet and estates strategies. It isn’t clear how the force can continue to provide the current level of policing within its anticipated budgets. And it also doesn’t fully understand its demand and operating costs. This means that the force can’t be sure that its current operating model will help it to meet future demand. The failure to plan effectively means the force isn’t helping to provide its community, including its most vulnerable members, with the expected standard of service.
Open
Our recommendations
Within six months from the date of publication of this letter, Lincolnshire Police should: • develop clear and aligned finance, savings, and efficiency plans to show what is required to provide a service that meets the policing needs of the community, both now and in the future; and • develop departmental operational and strategic plans that are aligned and informed by accurate information and a detailed performance framework.
Open
The force needs to attend calls for service in line with its published target attendance times
This was an area we identified in our 2021/22 police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) inspection as requiring improvement. But in this inspection, we found the force’s performance has deteriorated further. The force has a graded response policy, which is clearly defined. But in our victim service assessment, we found that the force attended calls within the required time in only 49 out of 93 cases. This means it had met its graded response targets in only 52.6 percent of these cases. We found that the force wasn’t managing its response deployment well enough. In our victim service assessment, we found effective and appropriate supervision for response deployment in only 14 out of 52 cases. The force isn’t updating callers about delays in the police attending. In our victim service assessment, we found that callers were updated about delays in only 29 of 48 cases. Not attending calls promptly increases the likelihood of evidence being lost, which can have a negative effect on victims and reduce confidence in the police. In June 2024, the force identified it had response time problems and set up a strategic management group to address them. This group focused on changes to the force graded response policy. Non-priority calls are now dealt with by an incident resolution team in the force control room, instead of being allocated to response patrols. The force also introduced Operation Resource over the summer months, using overtime so that additional officers could work on reducing the backlog of calls requiring police attendance.
Open
The force needs to improve how it allocates, supervises and carries out investigations to make sure victims get the support they need
We found that the force hadn’t made enough progress in improving the standard of investigations since our 2021/22 PEEL inspection. As a result, not enough offenders are being brought to justice. Although the force does have governance arrangements and processes in place, we found crime investigations weren’t managed as effectively as they could be. We found that some processes were missing or ineffective or weren’t clearly defined. We found that the force wasn’t always applying its crime allocation policy consistently. This means that some investigations are being allocated to officers who don’t have the appropriate level of training and accreditation for investigating more serious and complex crimes. We acknowledge that the force does a good job of investigating many of the most serious crimes. But in our victim service assessment, we found only 68 out of 100 cases were effective investigations. We also found only 40 out of 61 cases had an investigation plan. Investigation plans, outlined in the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice, support investigators to make sure they make the most of all available opportunities to gather evidence. We found cases that had significant failings and in which victims had been let down. In our victim service assessment, we found effective supervision in only out of cases. During our inspection, supervisors told us they didn’t have time to complete all the supervisory tasks that they should. As a result, the force isn’t always achieving acceptable outcomes for victims of crime. The number of crimes that the force solves following investigations is low. In our victim service assessment, we found the force had only applied the correct outcome in 56 out of 80 cases and supervision of the outcome took place in 62 out of 79 cases. We found supervisors sometimes applied incorrect outcome codes for crimes, applying outcome 15 (Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim supports action) instead of outcome 16 (Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support further action). Supervisors considered the force’s crime management bureau criteria for an outcome 16 too rigid and difficult to meet and instead selected an easier but unsuitable outcome when finalising crimes. The force has the highest rate for outcome 15 of all forces in England and Wales. Senior leaders in the force acknowledge that this is likely to be a result of the difficulties recording outcome 16. Lincolnshire Police is also failing to support victims. Under the revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, all victims are entitled to a needs assessment. The police should carry out an assessment early in a case to establish whether victims need any extra support during the investigation or later in court. Of the 69 relevant cases we reviewed, only 5 had clearly recorded needs assessments. For victims entitled to an enhanced level of service because of their age or vulnerability, only 7 out of 42 relevant cases had needs assessments recorded.
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Our recommendations
Within six months from the date of publication of this letter, Lincolnshire Police should make sure: • investigations are allocated in a timely way to officers and teams that have enough skills and experience to carry out quality investigations; • it creates investigation plans when applicable, with supervisory oversight so that it takes all investigative opportunities; • it is using outcomes that comply with force and national policies; and • a victim needs assessment is carried out and a victim contract is completed where appropriate.
Open
Areas for Improvement (20)
The force needs to improve its oversight and governance of coercive powers
We found that there were gaps in how the force monitored and managed aspects of its use of stop and search and use of force. Making sure that officers are properly trained in stop and search and the use of force is critical in maintaining public confidence that powers are used legitimately and proportionately. Maintaining proper oversight of standards and levels of training provides reassurance that only appropriately trained officers and staff can exercise such powers over the public. We found that the force couldn’t provide clear evidence of its understanding of the levels of training among officers and staff. And it couldn’t provide evidence of the safeguards it had to intervene when training hadn’t been provided or had lapsed. The College of Policing national curriculum requires forces to make sure that operationally deployed officers receive public and personal safety training every 12 months. This training includes material on conflict management and stop and search. Senior leaders told us Lincolnshire Police removed from operational deployment any officers who were no longer validated to use force until they had attended training. However, data that the force provided to us disclosed that it had a high proportion of officers who weren’t validated to use force as they had not received their annual training refresher but had been deployed (outside national guidance) and had used force. This data showed that 194 officers had used force in the year 2023/24 when their last refresher training was 13–18 months previously. Some officers were even further out of required validation timescales. Force data for the same period showed that 50 officers had used force a full 19–24 months since their last refresher training. A further 229 officers used force between 2 and 5 years since their last training. Most surprisingly, 24 officers had used force more than 5 years since their last recorded training. The force told us that it had data quality issues around these figures. It stated that it was reviewing all officers that were out of validation. It should have addressed this much earlier. The force told us that it had given unconscious bias training to 1,316 of its 2,470 total workforce, which is 53 percent. Officers and staff must complete a mandatory training package and the force told us it monitored this. But the force couldn’t confirm timescales for completion of this package by all those who it requires to take the training. Some of the force’s internal auditing processes for the use of powers are incomplete. They don’t provide enough data for the force to assure itself that officers are adhering to policy relating to stop and search and the use of force. The force has two tactical leads at inspector rank for both stop and search and the use of force. However, neither individual is dedicated to the role and they perform it on a part-time basis. We heard that due to the other demands of their duties, the tactical leads didn’t have the capacity to scrutinise all the data that they would like to review. Four sergeants from various departments in the force help the tactical leads. They act as deputies on a part-time basis. These officers are part of an internal audit process and are expected to review body-worn video (BWV) for quality assurance purposes. The force told us that these officers were expected to review 20 items of BWV footage a month collectively. But this isn’t happening. We found that they had done 118 reviews over the 9 months between June 2023 to March 2024. This equates to only 13 reviews a month across the whole force. The force has gaps in its governance of the guidance it gives to officers around stop and search. It also has gaps in how it records searches of minority cultural groups and in how it uses this data to inform senior leaders about performance. The force’s stop and search policy and standard operating procedure give detailed guidance to officers. But they don’t stipulate appropriate locations for searches, nor when a search could be made without an appropriate adult. Nor does the guidance include advice about the examination of body orifices. During our inspection we were told that the force didn’t currently include data about such searches within its performance packs. We found that the force didn’t analyse its linked find rate for stop and search, although it did collate this data. The linked find rate shows when the officer finds the stolen or prohibited article/object they were looking for when carrying out a search. This indicates that the powers are used effectively and are helping to reduce crime. In the year ending 31 March 2023, the linked find rate for stolen and prohibited articles within Lincolnshire Police was 18.5 percent. This is lower than expected for forces in England and Wales, for which the average linked find rate was 24.6 percent. The force told us that in the 5 months between April and August 2024 its linked find rate was 16.9 percent. This would indicate that its lower-than-average performance in this area is sustained. During our inspection, we asked the force why its linked find rate was lower than other forces but it couldn’t explain this. Although the force does include linked find rates in its performance packs, it hasn’t reviewed or assessed this divergence from the average rate for all forces to understand possible causes. As a result, the force can’t be assured that it is using stop and search powers effectively to reduce crime.
Lincolnshire Police
The force doesn’t consistently achieve appropriate outcomes for victims
The force isn’t always achieving acceptable outcomes for victims of crime. It has low numbers of crimes that are solved following investigations. The force needs to understand the issue and work to achieve better outcomes for victims. In the year ending 30 June 2024, Lincolnshire Police recorded 47,004 victim-based crimes. Of these recorded offences, 9.5 percent were assigned an ‘offences brought to justice’ outcome. This is within the normal range compared to other forces in England and Wales. been revised since. British Transport Police and City of London data are excluded from the England and Wales rate. Total police-recorded crime includes all crime (except fraud). For a full commentary and explanation of crime and outcome types please see the Home Office statistics. been revised since. Victim-based crimes are defined as all police-recorded crimes where there is a direct victim, such as an individual, an organisation or corporate body. Between the year ending 30 June 2023 and the year ending 30 June 2024, the proportion of victim-based crimes assigned an Outcome : ‘Evidential difficulties: suspect not identified; victim does not support further action’ by Lincolnshire Police decreased from 2.0 percent to 1.7 percent. Both of these values are lower than expected for forces in England and Wales. Between the year ending 30 June 2023 and the year ending 30 June 2024, the proportion of victim-based crimes assigned an Outcome : ‘Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim supports action’ by Lincolnshire Police decreased from 27.2 percent to 24.2 percent. Both of these values are higher than expected for forces in England and Wales. Between the year ending 30 June 2023 and the year ending 30 June 2024, the proportion of victim-based crimes assigned an Outcome : ‘Evidential difficulties: suspect identified; victim does not support further action’ by Lincolnshire Police decreased from 16.7 percent to 13.1 percent. Both of these values are lower than expected for forces in England and Wales. Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar un Sep Dec Mar
Lincolnshire Police
The force should effectively co-ordinate victim feedback to improve its services
The force gets a limited amount of victim feedback directly from victims. The force told us it considered around 55 samples a month, which may include a small number of vulnerable victims. This limits the ability of vulnerable people to positively influence the future service provided by the force. The force should make sure it collates feedback from a range of sources, analyses it, and uses it to guide the direction of service improvements. It should also consider promoting how it has used this feedback. This could further improve victim satisfaction and confidence of partner agencies.
Lincolnshire Police
The force should have reliable processes to monitor protective orders and make sure that it prioritises breaches to safeguard the victim
In our last inspection report, we said the force should consider protective powers and orders in all appropriate cases. Data shows that the force considers Domestic Violence Protection Notices and seeks Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPOs) at court for cases of domestic abuse. In the year ending 31 March 2024, Lincolnshire Police applied for 131 DVPOs at court. This means that the force made DVPO applications for 3.7 percent of the domestic abuse related crimes it recorded. This was higher than expected compared to the average for forces in England and Wales. However, while the force has an ancillary orders unit, which has a very good awareness of all active civil orders across the force, our inspectors didn’t find the same level of awareness in the wider workforce. The ancillary orders unit co-ordinates the force’s response to all protective orders, but we found there was an overreliance on this team. During reality testing, police officers and staff told us that responsibility for monitoring a perpetrator’s compliance with a protection order rested with the original officer, usually a response officer who routinely deals with other calls for service. A dip sample of live orders found there had been little police activity to check the compliance of offenders with the orders. The force would benefit from clear expectations across the organisation in the use of civil orders, to manage a perpetrator’s behaviour and bring offenders to justice. Our reality testing also indicated that the force relies too much on victims reporting breaches. It doesn’t give clear direction to officers to carry out proactive checks for enforcement opportunities. Failure to effectively monitor orders could lead to missed opportunities to protect vulnerable victims. This could lead to a decline in confidence in the police’s ability to safeguard victims.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to improve how it meets the national standards in relation to the use of the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme
Data shows that the force considers and uses its powers under the Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme (also known as lare’s Law). This allows police to disclose information to a victim or potential victim of domestic abuse about their partner’s previous abusive or violent offending. The scheme gives a victim the right to ask for information. The police in specific circumstances can also proactively share this information under the right to know. In the year ending 31 March 2024, the force recorded 610 right to know applications and 360 such disclosures, which equated to 78 applications and 46 disclosures per 100,000 population. This was higher than expected compared to the average for forces in England and Wales. Standards set out the expectations for all forces when processing Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme requests, with particular reference to the timescales associated with the disclosure of information. The force currently has a backlog of requests to consider, which means victims may not be in timely receipt of critical information. As part of our inspection, we found the force had live lare’s Law applications. Of these, 193 were awaiting allocation for research to be completed and 71 of these were outside the 28-day notice period for responding to these requests. The force should make sure it follows the national standards and timeliness for making disclosures. This is so that individuals are appropriately safeguarded, risk is reduced and further offences are prevented. We will continue to monitor how the force makes proper and consistent use of this scheme to protect vulnerable people. Innovative practice
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to improve its management of perpetrators in multi-agency risk assessment conferences to safeguard vulnerable people
The police representative at multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACs) isn’t empowered to make decisions on behalf of the force. We also found there was little proactivity in actions being offered and set to manage a perpetrator’s risk of harm. MARA is the opportunity for police and partners to take measures to reduce risk of harm to victims. And it is an opportunity to robustly manage a perpetrator’s offending behaviour. This usually rests with the police as one of only two enforcement agencies in attendance. Therefore, the person attending MARAC on behalf of the police needs to have the requisite knowledge and be of sufficient seniority to make these decisions on behalf of the force. The force has developed a policy called Operation Komoran to support high-risk victims of domestic abuse in MARAC. The aims of Operation Komoran include more timely sharing of information between partner agencies, better compliance with Home Office crime recording standards, and a more holistic understanding of risks to victims. However, the force needs to make sure that it appropriately risk assesses these referrals and that it considers key lines of enquiry to support an evidence-led prosecution. It also needs to make sure there is a clearly recorded supervisor review. Without this, victims are at risk of further harm and police are missing opportunities to intervene to safeguard victims and manage perpetrators’ risky behaviour.
Lincolnshire Police
The force has developed a document to help manage the risk posed by a perpetrator who is subject of a Stalking Protection Order
The force has developed a subject profile management plan (SPMP) to help with the identification and management of risk of perpetrators subject to a Stalking Protection Order. The SPMP has a section to include a summary of the offending behaviour that led to the Stalking Protection Order and details several options to consider for safeguarding. It also includes sections for details that may be useful to subsequent police investigations or offender management. The final sections require a current assessment of risk and consideration of tactical options to minimise any risk identified. This includes a suggested visits regime and frequency of review of the SPMP.
Lincolnshire Police
Our recommendations
Within six months from the date of publication of this letter, Lincolnshire Police should make sure: • it has enough personnel and supervisors in its management of sexual and violent offenders (MOSOVO) team to manage registered sex offenders; • all MOSOVO personnel are trained and accredited to College of Policing professionalising investigations programme level 1; • it completes active risk management system and risk management plan visits to avoid large, overdue workloads and its active risk management system and risk management plan completion rate is 95 percent or above; • MOSOVO supervisors have manageable workloads and Violent and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR) supervisor tasks are completed within 28 days of submission; and • it carries out all visits to registered sex offenders in-person, including those that are led by the Probation Service.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs effective processes to manage and monitor the use of police bail
The force doesn’t maintain sufficient performance data in respect of police bail. We found that although the force had some data on this, it was limited. So Lincolnshire Police doesn’t have a clear picture of how it uses police bail and whether its processes are effective. The force doesn’t have any officers or staff in a dedicated bail management role. During our inspection, we found that the force had provided some training and guidance to its officers and staff about the requirements of the new legislation, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. It has produced a single-page guidance document in response to these recent changes. However, the force doesn’t reinforce this document with any additional training or central communication. Instead it chooses to delegate responsibility for the interpretation and application of the bail act changes to individual teams. This approach means that the force hasn’t seen a consistent use of police bail.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to do more to promote, educate and support the workforce in relation to equality, diversity and inclusion
During our inspection, some officers and staff told us that the force didn’t have an inclusive culture. An inclusive culture is one where every member of the workforce feels valued, respected and empowered to contribute regardless of their background. However we were told that the force still had a degree of negative behaviours present and this was too often brushed aside as ‘banter’ or ‘canteen culture’. The force told us that it carried out regular surveys, known as cultural stocktakes, to try and understand prevailing issues around diversity, equality and inclusion. But we found that officers and staff from under-represented groups were sceptical about these surveys and how they actually led to any change. We noted that the force cultural stocktake for 2024 showed a deterioration from the last survey in 2023 around workforce perceptions of how differences and diversity are respected. Some officers and staff told us that the force didn’t deal effectively with behaviours such as misogyny. Other officers and staff described a degree of apathy among managers in addressing negative discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. We found a disconnect between what force leaders felt prevailing cultures were and what some officers and staff felt them to be. The force needs to work to build up confidence that it understands prevailing attitudes and behaviours that reduce the inclusivity of the workplace. And it needs to then tackle them. We are aware that the force has made some effort to address this. But our January 2025 police integrity inspection found that there was inconsistency in the training provided to police officers and to police staff. This related to the Code of Ethics and expected standards of professional behaviour. We found that new police officers and staff didn’t receive the face-to-face training provided to new officers but instead only online training packages. The force has provided some of the workforce with culture awareness sessions. It has trained some cultural advocates, who can lead discussions on culture within departments and identify any issues. Although we welcome this, we would expect that the force would educate all of its workforce in awareness and sensitivity to cultural issues.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to understand its data better so it can explain how it legitimately uses coercive powers
When a certain group of people is affected by police action in a way that is substantially different from people not of that group, this is referred to as disproportionality. An example of disproportionality is if people of certain ethnicities are stopped and searched more frequently. In the year ending 31 March 2024, Black people were 4.9 times as likely to be subject of these powers as a White person. This is above the national average for disproportionality within England and Wales. Further data from the force discloses that in quarter 4 of 2023/24, 4.1 Black people per 1,000 population of this ethnic group have been stop and searched. For White people this figure is 0.7 per 1,000 of population. The force didn’t include any explanation of the disproportionality within its data or any context. During our inspection, we reviewed a sample of 212 stop and search records from 1 June 2023 to 31 May 2024. On the basis of this sample, we estimate that 81.1 percent (with a confidence interval of +/- 5.1 percentage points) of all stop and searches carried out by the force during this period had reasonable grounds. This is broadly unchanged compared to the findings from our previous review of records from 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021, where we found 82.2 percent (with a confidence interval of +/- 5.7 percentage points) carried out by Lincolnshire Police had reasonable grounds. Of the records we reviewed for stop and searches on people who self-identify as from an ethnic minority background, 15 out of 25 had reasonable grounds. This suggests there might be further disproportionality in how the force employs its stop and search powers. Lincolnshire Police doesn’t publish any data around how its officers use force. Our review of internal performance packs revealed that its use of force data wasn’t as detailed as stop and search data relating to disproportionality. We found that 2.7 percent of use of force forms related to people with Black ethnicity. Those of Black ethnicity represent only 0.6 percent of the population of Lincolnshire. We found that the force wasn’t assessing data that might provide it with the reasons for this disproportionality. This would include identifying any officers who repeatedly stop people who are Black or from ethnic minority backgrounds. Lincolnshire Police, along with other forces, issues guidance to its officers and staff about when to activate BWV during an encounter with the public. This is so that the encounter is filmed and recorded for evidential purposes. We found that the force didn’t include compliance on the activation of BWV in its force performance reports that senior leaders review. This would help the force to identify any links between non-compliance for BWV guidance and disproportionality. Lincolnshire Police is under-recording the use of force. In the year ending 31 March 2023, Lincolnshire Police recorded 5,487 use of force incidents. This was 4,301 lower than estimated. We estimate this by linking the use of force to recorded arrests. During our inspection, the force accepted that it was under-recording the use of this power. Senior leaders suggested that the force wasn’t always recording compliant handcuffing of suspects. Compliant handcuffing is a term used to describe the handcuffing of suspects who aren’t resisting police detention but are under restraint to protect the officer and other people from any potential harm.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to understand why officers and staff, and in particular new recruits, wish to leave the force
During our inspection, we found that the force only had partial processes to interview officers and staff who exited the organisation. Lincolnshire Police does have a process for exit interviews, but it only carries these out if the individual leaving specifically requests an interview. We found that relatively few people complete exit interviews. So the force doesn’t have data about why people from different groups are leaving. Senior leaders within the force accepted this was a gap and were aiming to implement stay interviews, which have been introduced in other forces. Forces use these interviews to uncover what part of an individual’s job or role keeps them within an organisation. In other forces, these interviews have reduced personnel attrition rates. Lincolnshire Police would benefit from better using these to understand personnel retention.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to make sure that its professional development reviews are effective and valued by officers and staff
Professional development reviews (PDRs) should be an effective tool for officers and staff to record their objectives and achievements. They are essential to help supervisors understand the development needs of their officers and staff. We found that Lincolnshire Police had a low completion rate for PDRs across all sections of its workforce. In the year ending 31 March 2024, the force only had a completion rate of 52 percent across its whole workforce. Some officers and staff told us that the PDR process wasn’t meaningful. In some cases, PDR completion is viewed as just a necessary process to submit to in order to receive a yearly pay increment. Officers and staff told us that PDRs weren’t referred to in promotion processes or in any other recruitment and selection procedures. Under force guidelines, officers and staff should have an interim PDR meeting, known as a pause point. This should be no less than bi-monthly, with the aim that they will be monthly wherever possible. However, we found that these meetings didn’t always happen. Some supervisors told us that they didn’t always have time to make sure PDRs truly reflected individual achievements and areas for development. We found that PDRs were inconsistent in quality and timeliness due to workloads. Supervisors often defer pause point meetings during times of high demand. So officers, staff and their supervisors don’t always consider or progress areas for development. Some officers and staff we spoke to didn’t value the PDR or pause point meetings. They referred to the meetings and PDR as a box-ticking exercise. Our workforce survey corroborates this. We found that of those who had had a PDR in the past 12 months, only 53.3 percent (171 of 321 respondents) agreed that these were an effective tool in their development. The force needs to review its PDR process so that the workforce perceives it as a genuine development tool and wants to use it.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to do more to support the development and career progression of people from under-represented groups
Police forces should make sure that their composition reflects the ethnic, racial, gender or any other demographic diversity of the population they serve. A force should therefore have programmes and initiatives that aim to support the development and progression of individuals from under-represented groups.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to improve the quality of its data so senior leaders can use it more effectively to improve performance
The force isn’t currently making the most of technology and this is restricting progress. During our inspection, we found several inefficient manual processes for handling data and resolving quality issues. These were creating internal demands. For example, we found individual teams using spreadsheets to record data. The force must improve its data quality by prioritising plans to replace and upgrade its aging IT infrastructure and outdated software systems. In particular, it should upgrade those that have the greatest impact and require manual processing. These should be automated wherever possible. For example, robotics can replace some repetitive manual tasks more effectively, allowing the force to produce and present accurate, timely data more efficiently. During our 2021/22 inspection, we found the force had an ineffective human resources system. We also found it didn’t have a central database to record its workforce’s skills and capabilities. Unfortunately, during our most recent inspection, we found the force had made little progress to address this gap. It still doesn’t fully understand the skills of its workforce. This data is important as it would help to find gaps in skillsets and capability that may affect force performance. The force needs to address this gap in its data so senior leaders can make more informed decisions on training, deployments, and recruitment.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to improve its internal processes to help it provide its services more efficiently and effectively
The force needs to develop a more effective approach to managing various forms of internal demands. For example, in the year ending 30 September 2024 its control room recorded 122 incidents per 1,000 population. This is lower than expected for forces in England and Wales who recorded an average of 248. But Lincolnshire Police still faced delays in meeting its call time limits.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to improve its systems and management processes to support effective problem-solving
The force needs processes for effective problem-solving. It needs to use problem-solving more widely so it can reduce harm and demand. Although we found some good examples, these tended to reflect specific initiatives and weren’t widespread. Officers and staff who have been trained to problem-solve aren’t consistently applying the use of the scanning, analysis, response and assessment problem-solving model (SARA). During our inspection, we found that the force did little or no analysis of problems and that its interventions were reactive rather than aimed at addressing underlying causations. Similarly, the way it evaluates problem-solving is unsophisticated and lacking in evidence to support proper assessment. The force has created a central prevention hub to raise standards in problem-solving among the force’s neighbourhood policing teams. However, we found that due to capacity issues within the hub, the quality assurance of problem-solving had reverted to local supervisors. But it isn’t being done because of confusion about whose responsibility it is. We are aware the force has done some good work with its summertime initiative to deal with increased demand on its coastal resorts. But this isn’t representative of the force-wide standard of problem-solving. In our last inspection, we identified a lack of consistent problem-solving and evaluation of problem-solving as an area for improvement. The force has created a prevention hub, but we didn’t see enough improvement in this area of prevention activity. Effective problem-solving is a key element in reducing police demand and maintaining public confidence in the ability of the police to address antisocial behaviour. The force should make sure that: • it has clear and consistent management processes to support the use and supervision of problem-solving plans; and • central prevention hub and front-line supervisors continue to provide support and feedback to officers and staff, to establish improved standards of problem-solving.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs an effective way of storing and disseminating best practice for problem-solving
During our inspection, we found that the force had a problem-solving library on its force intranet site. Senior managers told us that the purpose of this library was to record good practice around problem-solving. This allows officers and staff to refer to it and replicate it. However, when we reviewed this site, we found that it didn’t always contain examples of effective problem-solving. Some of the problem-solving cases on the site hadn’t been closed or evaluated. There appeared to be no quality control of cases posted on the site, and it didn’t serve the purpose of being a corporate memory that could inform future problem-solving. We were subsequently told that the prevention hub didn’t manage this site and that neighbourhood policing teams could directly upload problem-solving cases onto it without any assessment of their outcomes. The force should properly record and assess problem-solving packages before it puts them on the intranet site. That way, it can assure itself the site provides examples of what works.
Lincolnshire Police
Our recommendations
Within six months from the date of publication of this letter, Lincolnshire Police should: • attend calls for service in line with its published attendance times; • make sure it updates callers if there are delays in attending an incident; • make sure it effectively supervises deployment decisions in the control room; • make sure that call handlers use information on the Guardian system to directly assign available response officers to incidents; and • have escalation processes in place to make sure it prioritises overdue attendance at an incident.
Lincolnshire Police
The force needs to effectively monitor potential vulnerability within its Single Online Home incident queue
Single Online Home is a web platform operated by the majority of police forces whereby the public can access a wide range of reporting services, crime prevention advice and information about local policing teams. The benefit of this service is that it reduces demand on police switchboards and allows the public to report less serious and non-emergency matters without waiting in a call queue.
Lincolnshire Police