PEEL Assessment 2023-25: Metropolitan Police Service

The force isn’t safely managing risks posed by registered sex offenders in the community The force’s governance structure for the management of registered sex offenders includes a central team led by a superintendent who is responsible for the force’s policy and the production of performance data. Each of the 12 basic command units (BCUs) has its own Jigsaw team, managed by a detective inspector, which carries out the day-to-day management of registered sex offenders. However, in our inspection we identified a lack of training in both the process of managing suspects and offenders, and in use of the Violent and Sex Offender Register (ViSOR). This is the national database system for information about sexual offenders and other dangerous people, including information about visits and risk assessments. This affects the ability of detective inspectors to meaningfully oversee the work of their team. Some inspectors are also responsible for several other portfolios, which limits the amount of time they can dedicate to proper oversight of Jigsaw. While staffing levels in Jigsaw teams are good, in our inspection we identified that the structure of the teams leads to inconsistent practice across BCUs, inflexibility in using resources to manage demand, and a lack of oversight of performance. The performance data produced by the force doesn’t appear to be scrutinised in any meaningful way within BCUs. And it doesn’t include all the information needed for a full understanding of the risk held within each team. For example, it focuses on the number of outstanding visits and overdue active risk management system (ARMS) assessments and risk management plans (RMPs). But it doesn’t consider how long a piece of work has been overdue, or the level of risk within it. This affects the ability of each BCU and the force to properly prioritise its overdue work. At the time of our inspection, the force told us that 10 percent of ARMS assessments, 13 percent of RMPs and 18 percent of visits were overdue. This means that it doesn’t have an accurate understanding of the risk posed by those offenders and may not have the right activity in place to mitigate the risk. In our audit of information on ViSOR we highlighted one case where a high-risk registered sex offender hadn’t been successfully visited since 1 . As such, this individual and the risk they pose to the community wasn’t being managed. ViSOR showed that eight attempts had been made over a six-year period to contact the individual, but there had been no proactive consideration of arresting the individual or issuing a warrant. In our inspection we found evidence that too many visits to registered sex offenders are announced in advance. The force isn’t meeting the standards laid out for visits in the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice (APP), or its own policy. The APP states that visits to registered sex offenders should be unannounced so they provide a true understanding of the risk the registered sex offender poses. If visits are announced, there is greater opportunity for the registered sex offender to conceal prohibited devices such as phones and laptops or items that might indicate that they are in breach of licence or the conditions of a sexual harm prevention order. While it may sometimes be necessary to meet registered sex offenders away from their home, this prevents the offender manager from seeing the living environment of the registered sex offender and accurately assessing the risk of reoffending. At the time of our inspection, the force wasn’t recording how many announced visits it makes. As such, it can’t assure itself that either the number of or the rationale for using announced visits is appropriate. The force uses an automated intelligence review process which includes the PND. But how much and how often this is used across BCUs varies. For example, one BCU completed 50 PND checks in one month, while another completed 1,144 checks. In our ViSOR audit of cases at all risk levels we found that PND checks hadn’t been carried out in 11 of the ( percent) cases we reviewed. At the time of our inspection, the force was reviewing all low-risk cases to see if any are suitable for reactive management, as there may be registered sex offenders who are being managed at a higher level than their risk requires. The force needs to complete this review to help it to better manage risk. Officers and staff reported being regularly diverted away from their core role to carry out other duties. This limits their ability to plan and complete their work. The force doesn’t have a process in place to monitor these diversions.

The force doesn’t manage the risk posed by online child abuse offenders effectively The force has a lead responsible officer for OCSAE, who oversees a central OCSAE team and has oversight of OCSAE across the force. However, decisions regarding much of the work related to indecent images of children are made by the 12 basic command unit (BCU) commanders. As mentioned in the ‘Investigating crime’ section of this report, the force’s policy for allocating investigations is a cause of concern. OCSAE work is investigated by three teams. The central OCSAE team oversees all referrals made by the National Crime Agency that are assessed as very high and high risk. The OCSAE teams in each of the 12 BCUs oversee medium and low risk cases referred by the National Crime Agency. And most other cases that come into force by other means (such as a call from the public) are overseen by BCU officers who don’t have OCSAE training, regardless of the level of risk. These officers might be local investigations, safer schools, or uniform officers. OCSAE officers do provide advice to less experienced officers and, in cases with exceptional risk, can take the lead for other investigations not referred by the National Crime Agency. The lead responsible officer reviews the performance of central and local OCSAE cases, but cases allocated outside OCSAE ( 8 percent of all cases) don’t have this level of scrutiny. The central team produces performance reports which are available via dashboards, but we found that the data in these doesn’t reflect the actual demand faced by the force. For example, data relating to grooming and distribution of images is not included. This indicates a lack of consistency in oversight of performance across all indecent imagery of children (IIoC) offence types. Therefore, at the time of our inspection, we were unable to establish the full extent of IIoC offences being dealt with by the force. The performance report provided to our inspectors highlighted that the force has a ‘no further action’ rate of percent for IIoC investigations. The force is unable to explain this, other than to speculate that it is due to a high volume of cases involving young people sharing indecent images of themselves with other young people. While the force can commission work to investigate this, it isn’t routinely monitored and there are limitations to the analysis that it can do. Therefore, the force isn’t able to understand whether the proportion of cases closed with no further action is appropriate. In our inspection we identified an inconsistent approach to the use of warrants, arrest, and voluntary attendance across BCUs. There are currently no processes for recording and monitoring the use of these powers, either at BCU or force level. As such, the force can’t assure itself that its use of these powers is appropriate and in the best interests of child safeguarding. The force has a high-tech crime unit, whose officers and staff attend warrants if needed. We found that investigators have good access to this. However, officers and staff outside the OCSAE team don’t have access to a digital triage capability. This is needed to assess the level of offending that has taken place, the correct devices to submit to the digital forensic unit, and the risk of further offending posed by the suspect. This lack of capacity means that officers must guess which devices could have indecent images on them. They are also only allowed to submit two devices to the unit at one time. This increases the likelihood that investigative opportunities are being missed. At the time of our inspection, the force planned to allocate a digital forensic specialist to each BCU. But we have had no further update from the force on this matter. The force has a small team that is responsible for identifying victims in indecent images. We found that officers within BCUs were unaware of this team, which may suggest that the team focuses on the central OCSAE team’s work only. At the time of inspection, the victim identification team consisted of four constables and a supervisor. This may not be enough, given the size of the Metropolitan Police Service compared to other forces. We found an inconsistent approach to image grading – some teams grade all images, while others grade only as many as they need to meet the Crown Prosecution Services’ charging threshold. The force has implemented a new iew and Grade capability, which allows local OCSAE teams to grade images from their offices. But officers outside OCSAE still need to travel to a central location, which is time consuming. Positively, the force’s grading policy states that all grading must be done by trained officers and staff. However, in practice, all officers and staff seizing devices are expected to review images to identify IIoC cases before sending them for grading. This is a welfare and safety concern for officers and staff.

The force’s investigations aren’t being allocated to officers and teams with sufficient skills and experience to carry out good quality investigations We found examples of complex crimes being allocated to officers with only basic investigative training. For example, a commercial robbery with multiple lines of enquiry was being investigated by an inexperienced officer with little supervision or guidance. We found inexperienced officers trying to manage large workloads beyond their training and knowledge. We even found crimes with obvious vulnerability, such as indecent images of children, extra-familial child abuse and sexual offences, that were being investigated by new recruits. The force’s crime allocation policy was published in April , but there is more work to do to make sure it is widely understood and consistently applied. Individual BCUs have drafted local policies, but these are based on crime types rather than an assessment of risk or victim needs. This leads to inconsistent decision-making across the force, and to arguments about who should investigate what. We witnessed discussions between supervisors from different teams about who should investigate individual crimes. These were focused on the capacity of the teams, not the capability of the investigator or the needs of the victim. These discussions, and the repeated transfer of crimes between teams, delay investigations and waste supervisors’ time, which could be spent supporting their officers and staff. In our report ‘The police response to burglary, robbery and other acquisitive crime’, we recommended that all forces should focus on making sure supervisors have the capability and capacity to meaningfully supervise investigations. In our victim service assessment audit we found evidence of effective supervision in 108 of the 154 cases we reviewed, and effective investigations in 150 out of 200 cases reviewed. We found that the quality of investigations for neighbourhood crimes was generally poor, and lines of enquiry weren’t always identified or pursued. We found that the specialist burglary and robbery teams were generally well trained and had the capacity to manage their workloads effectively. However, we were told that workloads aren’t manageable in local investigations (previously known as the criminal investigations department) and in teams responsible for investigating volume crimes (crimes that occur so frequently they have a significant effect on the community and place considerable pressure on police resources, such as street robbery and vehicle-related crime). We found inexperienced officers trying to manage more than 25 crimes at the same time. We found that appropriate investigation plans were produced by investigators or supervisors in 95 out of 122 cases we reviewed. Where there was an investigation plan, it was generally followed, and lines of enquiry were identified and more likely to be pursued. Supervisors in investigation teams have little or no training in how to manage crime workloads. It is assumed that they will have that knowledge because they were previously investigators. We found that supervisors are regularly managing large numbers of officers and staff who have high workloads. They told us of their frustration at not having enough time to supervise their officers and staff properly.

The force needs to make sure that it complies with the requirements of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime In our PEEL 2021/22 inspection we said the force needed to improve its compliance with the ictims’ Code. This sets out the minimum level of service that victims of crime should receive from the criminal justice system. We specifically said that it should complete needs assessments for victims and take personal statements from them. In our report ‘Meeting the needs of victims in the criminal justice system’, we said “ ictim needs assessments are important tools for the police to understand how best to serve victims of crime. Police should complete them for victims of all types of crime”. The College of Policing produces guidance for completing these. In this inspection we found that the force still doesn’t consistently help victims to access their rights as laid out in the ictims’ Code. Few victims’ needs assessments were completed and there was a low level of understanding about how and when to complete them. The force considered a victim’s personal statement in 9 out of 10 cases where it was applicable, but victim needs assessments were only recorded in 38 out of 92 cases. This means the force still doesn’t always recognise when a victim is entitled to an enhanced service. In addition to the assessment of vulnerability, and the need for enhanced support in giving evidence, there should be a victim contract, recording how and when an investigator contacts a victim. We found that, even in inspections where there was a victim contract, they weren’t always adhered to. These omissions meant that the force didn’t give a good enough level of service to victims in of the 1 1 cases we examined. The force has introduced victim focus desks so that victims can contact the force and receive an update on their case. The victim will receive a timely update at their request provided the investigator has updated the crime record, but we found that this hadn’t always been done. This service wouldn’t be required if the ictim’s Code was complied with, and officers were held to account for communicating with the victim. In our PEEL 2021/22 inspection we said that the force needed to correctly document a victim’s decision to withdraw their support for an investigation. The reasons for a victim not supporting an investigation at the outset were recorded in 47 of the 71 relevant cases we reviewed. The reasons for a victim withdrawing their support later in the process were documented in 46 out of 63 relevant cases. We found an auditable record of the victim’s wishes, such as a signed statement, in only 15 of the 49 relevant cases we reviewed.