Recommendations - Cleveland police, April 2020

Cleveland Police · Ref: 2019/125893

Recommendation date: 17 June 2020

Response due: 12 August 2020

Published: 5 November 2020

Custody and detention Death and serious injury

In September 2019, a police officer arrested a man for a breach of court and community order and transported him to Middlehaven Custody Suite. The Custody Sergeant assessed his risk as medium upon detention and placed him on 30-minute cell visits and assigned a CCTV monitored cell. A detention officer (DO) searched the man and escorted him to a cell. A DO saw the man in his cell drawing on the walls with his own blood. DOs entered the cell where they found the man to be agitated and to have a deep laceration to his left wrist. Upon further search, a piece of plastic razor blade was found. A medical professional treated the man's injury in the cell before officers transported him to hospital.

View on IOPC website

Recommendations (3)

Recommendation 1 Accepted

Recommendation

The IOPC recommends that Cleveland Police review the working practices used in custody, specifically in relation to CCTV observations, to ensure that the principles set out in the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) are followed. This could be reinforced by additional … Read moreThe IOPC recommends that Cleveland Police review the working practices used in custody, specifically in relation to CCTV observations, to ensure that the principles set out in the Authorised Professional Practice (APP) are followed. This could be reinforced by additional local guidance, training and oversight. APP Level 3 constant observation outlines ‘If the detainee’s risk assessment indicates a heightened level of risk to the detainee (e.g., self-harm, suicide risk or other significant mental or physical vulnerability) they should be observed at this level.’ Level 3 requires 30 minute checks, and CCTV to be constantly monitored. The custody sergeant who completed a risk assessment said in his statement ‘based on [the detainee’s] demeanour that day alone, I did not feel there was a high risk. However, the information he disclosed about his mental health, self-harm and his warning markers heightened the risk’, therefore he placed the detainee on 30 minute observations and supplemented this with CCTV observation. The evidence suggests that the custody sergeant’s risk assessment of the detainee matched the criteria for APP level 3 observations, as a heightened risk due to self-harm and mental health. The custody sergeant clarified that the CCTV observation used was not constant and a detention officer (DO) may be monitoring up to 12 CCTV feeds ‘when they can’ while simultaneously carrying out other back office duties. He added ‘constant observation is only done for extreme risk of self-harm, epilepsy, withdrawal from alcohol or concealed drugs.’ Other Middlesbrough custody staff, including detention officers and a different custody sergeant, confirmed the same practice in their statements. There has also been another similar DSI in the same custody suite where CCTV observations were raised as an issue. On that basis the evidence suggests this deviation from APP levels of observation is a normal working practice in Middlesbrough custody. The CCTV shows that the detainee was drawing on the walls of his cell in blood for 6 minutes before a DO became aware during a regular 30 minute cell check. The evidence suggests the CCTV was not closely monitored and the level of CCTV observation used was not in line with APP level 3. Do you accept the recommendation? Yes Show less

Force Response

Accepted action: Cleveland Police have taken steps to resolve this and remove the multi tasking function from the Detention Officer conducting level 3 constant observation by monitoring CCTV. A review of resourcing and procedures will be carried out to to … Read more

Recommendation 2 Accepted

Recommendation

The IOPC recommends that Cleveland Police consider a review of the suitability and effectiveness of metal detectors used in their custody suites. It should be clarified what types of item the metal detectors currently being used can/cannot identify and ensure … Read more

Force Response

Accepted action: Cleveland Police will conduct a review of the current metal detectors. This review will incorporate the points raised in the recommendation. On completion of this review a business case will be submitted for procurement of a more suitable … Read more

Recommendation 3 Accepted

Recommendation

The IOPC recommends that Cleveland Police consider updating force policy to robustly cover checking cells specifically for the purpose of detainee safety. Force policy should be clearly communicated to custody staff with training and oversight to ensure that cell checking … Read moreThe IOPC recommends that Cleveland Police consider updating force policy to robustly cover checking cells specifically for the purpose of detainee safety. Force policy should be clearly communicated to custody staff with training and oversight to ensure that cell checking and recording procedures are being consistently practiced in line with policy. The detainee alleged in interview that he found the razor wrapped in clingfilm inside a hole in the mattress in cell 44. After reviewing CCTV footage, it was not possible to conclusively establish where he obtained the razor from, as it could not clearly be seen on the footage, therefore we cannot conclusively confirm whether he brought it in or found it inside a mattress. Other evidence to suggest that the detainee may have brought the razor in on his person was insufficient. We attempted multiple times to contact the detainee to obtain his account but did not receive a response. The officer who interviewed the detainee later inspected the mattress and saw damage which he described as a recent and deliberate cut. The checks of cell 44 were not captured on the CCTV footage Cleveland Police provided, and at the start of the footage the mattress was on its side (cleaners place mattresses on their side to indicate a cell is clean). There was no evidence of recording the check of cell 44 on the custody record prior to the detainee being placed in there, which was not in line with Cleveland Police Standard Operating Procedure 18 - Searching of cells. At the time of the incident there was no auditable record of cells being checked. The policy focuses more closely on checking cells for the purpose of attributing any damage caused by detainees, rather than for the purpose of detainee safety. CCTV shows the detention officer did not appear to enter the cell with the detainee to point out damage, again this is not in line with the policy. The impact of not recording the cell check meant we could not conclusively rule out the detainee’s claim that he found the razor blade inside the mattress. Based on CCTV, custody record and witness statements of custody staff, the evidence suggests that general working practice in Middlesbrough custody is not consistently in line with Cleveland Police policy, and that there was confusion or miscommunication among custody staff in relation to what was expected. Custody staff told us that processes had changed since the incident, citing spot checks by highly trained search officers in which drugs had been recovered from cells, and a new process for recording cell checks. It is possible the force may have already implemented changes prior to receiving our learning recommendations. Do you accept the recommendation? Yes Show less

Force Response

Accepted action: This recommendation has already been addressed. Cleveland Police now have a more structured and recorded process for cell checks before and after a detainee uses it.