22. Before we decide if we should conduct a detailed investigation of a complaint, we look at whether there are signs the organisation has got something wrong. We do this by comparing what should have happened with what did happen. We have done this and have not found any indications that something has gone wrong.
Failure to send court orders
23. Mr B says HMCTS failed to send out two court orders relating to an application for an IPO on 17 January and 3 February 2025.
24. As a result, Mr B says he felt he had to submit and pay for a second IPO application at an additional cost. He told us this was because there was no information available for the first hearing, despite being advised a court order would be sent out detailing what documents were required. This must have been very frustrating for Mr B.
25. To assist us with our consideration of the complaint, we obtained copies of the complaint and responses. HMCTS also provided us with copies of the court orders dated 17 January and 3 February 2025.
26. We asked HMCTS whether there are any timeframes for processing court orders. HMCTS told us it aims to respond to court users and draw the orders made in a case within seven working days. However, this may not always be possible if the court is experiencing high volumes of work.
27. In the absence of any specific communication policies, we consider our principles to be most relevant to this complaint. Our principles say public bodies should behave helpfully, dealing with people promptly, within reasonable timescales and within any published time limits.
28. We also consider our UK government complaint standards to be relevant. Our standards say colleagues should give a clear and balanced account of what happened, based on established facts.
29. In this case, HMCTS says the court order dated 17 January 2025 was processed and sent to parties on 7 February. We acknowledge HMCTS has an aim to process court orders within seven working days. This means the court order could have been processed by 28 January; however, this aim is subject to change if the Court is experiencing high volumes of work. We understand this was the case at the time of Mr B’s complaint. We are aware there are backlogs at many Courts across the country.
30. Our Principles say public bodies should deal with people within reasonable timescales. We consider delays in processing the court order dated 17 January 2025 was reasonable given the backlogs of work at the Court. We cannot go so far as to say these backlogs constitute a service failure, but we appreciate the associated delays were frustrating for Mr B and other court users.
31. In any event, we cannot say this led to Mr B having no option but to make a second application. As we have said, the usual timescale for sending the Order was seven working days which meant it could be sent at any date up to and, importantly, including 28 January. However, the evidence suggests Mr B had made his second application within this period (on 27 January). This means we cannot rule out the possibility that, even if HMCTS had acted within its usual timeframes, Mr B would not have received the Order before he decided to submit his second application.
32. We should add that, even we had decided the delays were unreasonable, this would still not have led us to recommend that HMCTS reimburse Mr B for the cost of his second application. As we have said elsewhere, an application must be made within 28 days of the landlord becoming aware of the unauthorised occupation of the property. However, we have seen nothing to suggest there is a time-limit placed on when a decision should be made on that application.
33. In this case, the evidence appears to show that Mr B submitted his first application within the required period. This meant that, administratively at least, his application appeared valid and would remain so until or unless he was advised otherwise. Because of this, he did not have to make a second application while awaiting the outcome of the first one but instead chose to do so. We accept this may have been the result of understandable confusion on Mr B’s part about how the time-limit works but we could not hold HMCTS responsible for that. If he had been unclear about whether a new application was necessary, he should have sought independent legal advice on the matter. Neither HMCTS, nor our office, could have helped him with that.
34. Nor can we say that any delay in providing Mr B with the Order of 17 January caused an overall delay in Mr B’s ability to obtain a possession order. We can see from the Order that, although Mr B was required to take specific actions (and provide specific documents) prior to a re-arranged hearing, it set no specific date for when that hearing should take place. The Order said the hearing should be arranged for ‘the first available date’. We cannot be certain when that ‘date’ would, or should, have been.
35. We also cannot say that, if heard earlier, Mr B’s application for an IPO would have been successful. Although he was later granted legal possession of the property, this does not mean his application for an IPO (which, as we have explained, was a separate legal process and had a different purpose) would also have been successful.
36. For these reasons, we cannot say the hearing on 26 March 2025 (when the full possession order was made) would, or should, have taken place any earlier.
37. Overall, we do not consider there are any indications of failings in HMCTS’ actions regarding the court orders dated 17 January and 3 February 2025. Based on this, we will take no further action on this part of the complaint.
Communication
38. Before we decide if we should conduct a detailed investigation of a complaint, we look at whether there are signs the event(s) complained about had a negative effect which the organisation has not put right. Having done so we have found HMCTS has already done enough to put right the impact of these events.
39. Mr B says HMCTS failed to respond to his requests for updates between January and March 2025. He says that, had it done so, he would not have spent time chasing up the County Court and would likely not have made an ultimately unnecessary second application.
40. In its complaint responses, HMCTS acknowledged and apologised for not responding to Mr B as often or as quickly as he may have liked or expected. It explained this was due to backlogs of work within the Court. It explained it had put in place additional resources to address this. It offered assurance his emails were available to the judge who considered his case on 27 February.
41. HMCTS also apologised for incorrectly stating a reply had sent to one Mr B’s emails when this had not been the case.
42. We consider these actions are indications of failings. Our UK government complaint standards organisations should be open and honest when things have gone wrong or where improvements can be made. Wherever possible, colleagues should explain why things went wrong and identify suitable ways to put things right for service users.
43. For the reasons we have explained earlier, we cannot say HMCTS’s failure to update Mr B led to him making the second application. As we have said, HMCTS gave him no reason to believe his original application was invalid or not under consideration. Instead, this appears to be the result of his misunderstanding of the 28-day IPO timeframe. Having said this, we can understand why Mr B may have been frustrated by the failures to respond.
44. In this case, HMCTS has apologised for not responding to Mr B’s emails. It offered an explanation as to why it had not responded. It offered reassurance it had put in place additional resources to address the communication failings. As per our complaint standards, we consider these actions to be proportionate to the injustice faced.
45. Mr B has told us one of his desired outcomes would be service improvements around communication. As HMCTS has already offered this, we consider it has taken appropriate actions regarding this issue.
46. Mr B also told us his other desired outcomes would be a financial remedy.
47. We use our SOI scale to make consistent, fair and transparent recommendations. The scale has six bands ranging from level one injustices, including worry, pain and annoyance of relative short durations, up to level six injustices, which are life changing events often with profound consequences.
48. Our SOI scale puts Mr B’s injustice at level one. A level one injustice typically arises from a single incidence of service failure, where the effect on the individual is of short duration, and where there are no other adverse effects or wider ongoing impact. According to the complaint file, the longest delay in communication was one week and five days.
49. We would not recommend a financial remedy for a level one injustice. We generally consider an apology to be an appropriate remedy. As HMCTS has already provided an apology, we are satisfied it has taken appropriate action to put things right. We do not consider there are any indications it needs to do more to remedy this part of the complaint.
50. We were sorry to hear of the background to Mr B’s complaint and can understand his frustration that property he owned had been unlawfully occupied. We realise this is likely not the outcome Mr B was looking for when he approached our office, but we hope he is reassured by the thorough consideration we have given to his complaint. We thank Mr B for bringing his concerns to our attention.