Third Report - Sovereignty for sale: the FCDO’s role in protecting strategic British assets

The government notes the recommendation, states it prioritises national security, and confirms the National Security Adviser is currently conducting a review into the acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab by Nexperia. Further comment is deferred until the review concludes.

The government notes the recommendation and states that the National Security Adviser is currently conducting a review into the acquisition of Newport Wafer Fab by Nexperia, and it would be inappropriate to comment further until this review concludes.

The government agrees that regular market monitoring to identify national security concerns should be a key part of the new regime but does not detail specific additional monitoring mechanisms or multi-departmental inputs.

The government noted the recommendation, stating FCDO will be involved in future revisions of mandatory notification regulations to keep pace with technological changes but did not commit to FCDO's ongoing monitoring proactively informing changes or reporting on it in the annual report.

The government agrees that the FCDO has a key role and states a dedicated FCDO team has been established to support the ISU, raise awareness, and build capability. They are actively identifying and securing necessary short and long-term capabilities.

The government agrees with the FCDO's leadership role in foreign investment decisions and has established a dedicated FCDO team to support the ISU, raise awareness, and build FCDO capability in this area, both in the UK and overseas.

The government accepted the recommendation, stating that FCDO will contribute its expertise and assessment of foreign governments' strategic intent to inform NSI screening and assessment processes.

The government rejects the specific recommendation to mandate 10% FCDO secondees, stating it is not necessary as the ISU already draws on relevant expertise across government and FCDO has a dedicated team for coordination.

The government states that the FCDO already works closely with several like-minded countries, promotes its work internationally, and cooperates with Five Eyes and G7 partners on investment security.

The government states the BEIS Select Committee should primarily oversee the ISU and commits to providing information and publishing a MoU for their scrutiny. It will continue to inform other relevant committees but does not grant them the same level of direct oversight.

The government rejects the Foreign Affairs Committee's implicit request for necessary information for its direct monitoring of the ISU's effectiveness, stating that the BEIS Select Committee is the appropriate body for primary oversight and will be furnished with the required information.

The government believes the BEIS Select Committee is the primary body for ISU oversight and will ensure other relevant committees are appropriately informed, but does not accept the recommendation for specific private bi-annual briefings for the named committee chairs.