1st Report - Policing and security in Northern Ireland
Select Committee
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee
HC 184
27 May 2026
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Recommendations
3 results
11
We recommend that one of the few unimplemented reforms suggested by Patten, namely a pilot...
Recommendation
We recommend that one of the few unimplemented reforms suggested by Patten, namely a pilot cadet-type scheme between the police and young people, be reconsidered by the PSNI. We recommend also that the PSNI commission fresh research into the barriers …
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Northern Ireland Office
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16
The Northern Ireland Executive should publish its plans for a successor to its Programme on...
Recommendation
The Northern Ireland Executive should publish its plans for a successor to its Programme on Paramilitarism and Organised Crime, setting out: • how it intends to use the match-funded UK Government funding until 2028/29; • the future role and resourcing …
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Northern Ireland Office
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18
The UK Government should publish figures for asylum applications in Northern Ireland as part of...
Recommendation
The UK Government should publish figures for asylum applications in Northern Ireland as part of its quarterly immigration system statistics. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77) 41
Northern Ireland Office
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Conclusions (15) Observations and findings — click to expand
1
Conclusion
This year’s 25th anniversary of the creation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland provides an important opportunity to reflect on the profound changes that have taken place in policing since the Patten report, and on the pivotal role the PSNI has played—in often difficult and dangerous circumstances—in supporting Northern …
2
Conclusion
The real-terms erosion of the PSNI’s budget for nearly a decade has put the service and officer numbers under immense strain. Northern Ireland Executive decision making—including the scale of health and education spending, reliance on successive one–year budgets, and periods of collapse—has also constrained the PSNI’s decision making and planning. …
3
Conclusion
The PSNI’s baseline budget for the start of the financial year should be adjusted to take into account in-year allocations from the preceding financial year. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
4
Conclusion
There has been recent cause for optimism, however, with the policing budget finally rising and the allocation of ring-fenced funding for the PSNI Workforce Recovery Plan and data breach compensation costs. A new needs-based factor of 124 per cent is also now included in the Barnett formula which calculates changes …
5
Conclusion
The confusion regarding the ownership of and responsibility for publication of the recent ‘open-book exercise’ is frustrating. The open book exercise must be published without delay. (Recommendation, Paragraph 25)
6
Conclusion
Too much of the PSNI’s already stretched budget is being diverted to resource legacy investigations and civil cases, which will only continue in the coming years. The costs of legacy to the PSNI are exceptional and should be treated as such by the UK Government. The legacy of the Troubles …
7
Conclusion
In light of which, the UK Government should create a new, recurring and ringfenced funding stream to meet legacy costs within the PSNI to prevent further funding being directed away from contemporary policing. This should be introduced as soon as possible, and no later than the current Northern Ireland Troubles …
8
Conclusion
There is a lack of clarity on the most appropriate number of police officers that should make up the PSNI today, with various analyses having been put forward in the past. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
9
Conclusion
An independent comprehensive analysis should be commissioned to determine the most appropriate officer and staff numbers for policing in Northern Ireland today. This should include consideration of factors such as: • current and projected future policing demand; • the evolving security situation; and 39 • comparison with other UK police …
10
Conclusion
In this anniversary year, it is important to reflect on and commend the PSNI for the strides it has made in becoming a more representative police service since its formation in 2001, particularly during its first decade. We are concerned, however, that progress on increasing community representativeness in the PSNI …
12
Conclusion
Vocal support for policing and careers in the PSNI from political and civil society leaders has not been consistent from all communities in Northern Ireland. Support for policing should not take away from accountability or appropriate scrutiny where required. Political support for policing has implications not only for applications and …
13
Conclusion
There is inadequate transparency around the criteria and factors used to determine the level of Additional Security Funding provided by the UK Government to the PSNI at Spending Reviews. Without the provision of 40 sufficient information to us by the Government it is almost impossible to properly scrutinise the allocation …
14
Conclusion
The UK Government should, as far as it is able to, set out the criteria considered when determining the level of Additional Security Funding provided to the PSNI and explain why Northern Ireland is not able to access the counter-terrorism funding stream provided to forces in England and Wales. (Recommendation, …
15
Conclusion
Paramilitarism is an enduring and intolerable legacy of the Troubles which continues to threaten and harm communities across Northern Ireland. We plan to consider the findings of the scoping report of the Independent Expert into paramilitary group transition when it is completed later this year. In the meantime, ongoing efforts …
17
Conclusion
We are concerned about the increase in people smuggling and commercial exploitation across the land border on the island of Ireland. We will keep under review the expanded data sharing arrangements recently announced by the UK and Irish Governments. While irregular migration into the UK may not be as significant …