Sixth Report - The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

The government rejects the committee's conclusion that future legislation should maintain fairness by removing the Prime Minister's discretion to call an election. It argues such a power does not provide an electoral advantage and plans to return to a system where Parliament is dissolved on the PM's advice.

The government states its draft Bill will repeal the FTPA and revive the Prime Minister's prerogative powers for dissolution, returning to a system where the PM chooses the election timing. This rejects the committee's call for careful consideration of power balance and avoidance of executive dominance.

The government plans to repeal the FTPA and revive the Prime Minister's power to call early elections at their choosing, while retaining a five-year maximum term. This rejects the committee's preferred default expectation that parliaments should normally run their full five-year term, with exceptions only for deadlock or no confidence.

The government rejected the specific recommendation to establish a system that explicitly accommodates different government types, instead favouring a return to pre-FTPA flexibility. It notes it awaits the Joint Committee's findings on the system of dissolution.

The government accepted the recommendation, stating it has already tabled and passed a motion for a Joint Committee to review the FTPA and conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, ensuring proper parliamentary consultation.

The government has accepted the recommendation, having already tabled and agreed a motion in the House of Commons to establish a Joint Committee of both Houses to review the FTPA and scrutinise the draft Bill.

The government's draft Bill makes express provision to revive the prerogative powers relating to dissolution, including an ouster clause to make their exercise non-justiciable. This rejects the committee's recommendation to set election arrangements directly in statute rather than attempting to revive the prerogative.

The government rejects the recommendation to establish a new system, instead confirming its draft Bill explicitly revives the prerogative powers for dissolution of Parliament and calling elections as they existed before the FTPA, including an ouster clause for non-justiciability.

The government agrees that the two-thirds super majority is an undesirable feature of the FTPA that hindered elections. Its draft Bill repeals the FTPA and revives prerogative powers, thereby removing the super majority requirement as advised by the committee.

The government rejects the recommendation for a review committee to consider mechanisms for the House of Commons to set the early election date. It states that the date will continue to be set by Royal Proclamation on the advice of the Prime Minister, without parliamentary approval.

The government provided no substantive response to the committee's recommendation to endorse the findings of a predecessor committee on the operation of confidence.

The government provided no substantive response to the committee's conclusion about the ideal mix of statute and convention for governance and the need for trust.

The government provided no substantive response to the committee's conclusion about the FTPA's compatibility with the confidence principle and the resulting unacceptable situations.

The government's response is boilerplate text and does not address the conclusion.

The government rejects the committee's assessment of the FTPA and its caution regarding restoring the government's ability to designate confidence votes. It asserts that restoring the link between confidence and dissolution is 'vital' for an effective democracy, but states it will also carefully consider the conclusions of the Joint Committee.

The government rejects the recommendation to include the power of prorogation in statute in the review committee's terms of reference, stating that prorogation is a separate issue from the FTPA and their Bill is narrowly focused on dissolution.