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The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making...

Recommendation
The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making structures in living memory. As such, it is important that lessons are drawn throughout and applied so that the Government and future Governments may be better placed to respond to future crises. This has been the purpose of our inquiry—to capture those early lessons in the course of the pandemic. The machinery of science advice and decision-making has evolved throughout the Government’s management of the covid-19 pandemic, however there is an open question regarding the long-term sustainable and efficient provision of science advice to Government. Further, it remains unclear—in the long term—what role the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) will play, and—as alluded to by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser—how organisations such as the Joint Biosecurity Centre will provide a solution to the provision of science advice to Government in the coronavirus pandemic and beyond. We are concerned that at the present time the operation of the Joint Biosecurity Centre and the advice that it gives is not fully transparent. The Government, whatever organisational structures it decides upon, should commit to publishing the scientific advice it receives unless there are matters of national security (see paragraphs 59 to 64). The Government should outline in response to this Report how it intends for science advice on the novel coronavirus to operate in the longer-term management of the pandemic and what roles will be played by new bodies including the National Institute for Health Protection and the Joint Biosecurity Centre, alongside SAGE.
Paragraph Reference
33
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government Acknowledged
The Government is committed to working in a way that is open and transparent about the relevant data and scientific advice used to inform the response to the pandemic. The Government will publish scientific advice in a timely fashion subject, always, to the well-established principles of protecting national security, respecting commercial confidentiality when necessary, allowing space for policy development, and the need to protect the rights of individuals. Therefore, decisions around the release of scientific advice will continue to be made as circumstances dictate but with the default position being that data and advice should be released. The Joint Biosecurity Centre (JBC), as a Directorate of NHS Test and Trace within the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), gathers, interprets and analyses a range of data. The Government has always sought to be as clear and transparent as possible during the pandemic about how data has been used to inform decisions regarding national and local restrictions designed to limit the spread of the virus. The vast majority of the data used by the JBC to advise Ministers is already publicly available, including testing data, the information that Public Health England (PHE) publishes, and data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The Government Office for Science (GO-Science) is committed to being as transparent as possible with regards to the science advice that informs decisions. Due to the nature of the Covid-19 emergency, its duration, and the intensity of the public’s interest GO-Science has, while the pandemic has been in progress, released 684 papers and minutes (as at 30.04.2021) tabled to Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). However, the right balance must continue to be achieved between the requirement and ambition for transparency, the need to maintain the trust of scientists who provide advice, protecting personal information and national security information. Space also needs to be protected, as part of the policy-making process, for the due consideration of the advice by Ministers and officials. On 18 August 2020, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care announced the Government’s intention to create a new body bringing together NHS Test and Trace (including the JBC) and PHE’s health protection functions into a single organisation focused wholly on protecting people from external threats to health. The UK Health Security Agency, previously named the National Institute for Health Protection, will boost the UK’s ability to deal with and recover from Covid-19 and any future pandemics, and will provide permanent, standing capacity to prepare for, prevent and respond to threats to health. The name UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) reflects the importance of meeting health hazards actively and determinedly, in bad times and in good. It captures how critical this unified and strengthened capability will be in securing our future health in the context of a growing panoply of global infectious disease and other health hazards, and in forming a permanent part of our national defences. The UK element of the name reflects the reserved functions the Agency will hold for example the UK Rapid Support Team as well as respecting the existing collaborative arrangements with the Devolved Administrations. The UKHSA will continue to work across the United Kingdom, and with the public health agencies of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, to build collaborative capability and ways of working that benefit the whole of the UK.
Addressee Bodies
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Timeline
Recommendation age 5.4 yrs
Report published 08 Jan 2021