First Report - The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice

Select Committee

Science, Innovation and Technology Committee HC 136 8 January 2021

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 27 items (12 recs)

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Recommendations

12 results

1

Para 33

The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making...

Recommendation

The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making structures in living memory. As such, it is important that lessons are drawn throughout and applied so that the Government and future Governments may be … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

5

Para 45

We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely.

Recommendation

We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely. We have heard from some sectors of the science community that the community was not consulted appropriately. The Government should set out in response to this Report how in … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

6

SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, which brings to...

Recommendation

SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, which brings to question how sustainably the group can maintain its current level of high activity. We acknowledge senior scientists’ comments of frequent working round the clock, and … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

8

Para 57

Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, we agree with the redaction of...

Recommendation

Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, we agree with the redaction of information to protect the personal data of individuals including junior officials at the time of the emergency. In the interests of transparency, and to have … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

10

Para 69

Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media— particularly where...

Recommendation

Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media— particularly where these have diverged from decisions taken by the Government— and the continued public interest in the evidence base underlying decisions made, we are satisfied for … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

12

Para 87

It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus pandemic have...

Recommendation

It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus pandemic have not been based solely on medical and epidemiological science, but rather have been developed with a wide range of inputs that include scientific research and … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

13

Para 88

The public has shown a strong appetite for more information.

Recommendation

The public has shown a strong appetite for more information. The Government should attempt to quantify the four forms of health impacts identified by Professor Whitty. Further, it should consider whether it is possible to provide an analysis of—either consistently … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

16

Para 100

We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given...

Recommendation

We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given to the Government, outside of the auspices of SAGE, particularly on the topic of non- medical impacts of the pandemic and related Government interventions. While … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

17

Para 109

Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable that poor...

Recommendation

Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable that poor data flows, delays in data-sharing agreements and a general lack of structuring and data integration across both the health and social care sectors have throttled … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

23

Para 141

The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively centralised approach to test,...

Recommendation

The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively centralised approach to test, trace and isolate; set out its assessment of the impact of the system on the spread of the virus since the outset, including on health … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

24

Para 149

Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of science advice...

Recommendation

Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of science advice and guidance on non-pharmaceutical interventions, while at the same time global-level guidance has been issued regularly by the World Health Organisation (WHO). There have also … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

25

Para 150

Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public health and economic...

Recommendation

Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public health and economic recovery, a review of social distancing measures came quite late. While the scientific approach quite rightly waits for the evidence before making a definitive recommendation, … Read more

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

Conclusions (15) Observations and findings — click to expand

2 Conclusion

The Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science should update SAGE guidance to set out the role that SAGE will play in advising the Government’s long-term management of emergency scenarios. (Paragraph 34) Activation and operation of SAGE

3 Conclusion

Para 43

We are satisfied that the SAGE mechanism responded to the advent of the novel coronavirus in a timely manner and that the most up-to-date scientific research and understanding was readily available to inform the Government from the outset. Nevertheless, we note that submissions presented to us raised concerns that during …

4 Conclusion

Para 44

It is disappointing that the details of SAGE’s preliminary meetings were not made public for over two months, leading to unnecessary concern and confusion over what advice the Government had been receiving. Indeed, were it not for our early enquiries, this confusion may have continued until the details of SAGE’s …

7 Conclusion

Para 56

Whilst we welcome the eventual disclosure of SAGE participants, the fact that the delay was attributed to advice from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) gives us cause for concern. As suggested by Professor Chris Whitty, the advice relates to emergencies relevant to national security rather than …

9 Conclusion

Para 64

It is regrettable that full transparency was not achieved in time for the JBC’s inauguration on 1 June. We welcome the disclosure of the expert advisory boards supporting the JBC. Nevertheless, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has yet to commit to publish the outputs, including meeting papers …

11 Conclusion

Para 86

Transparency in the evidence behind Government decisions enables higher quality decision-making through scrutiny, and better understanding of the reasons for those decisions. While calls for the publication of SAGE evidence from this Committee and many others were eventually heeded, it is regrettable that a significant amount of time passed before …

14 Conclusion

Para 89

As indicated by the Chief Medical Officer for England, the SAGE secretariat faced “huge pressure” in managing the monumental task of organising SAGE whilst adhering to the principles of transparent and scrutable scientific advice. We commend the efforts of officials in the Government Office for Science, the SAGE secretariat and …

15 Conclusion

We applaud the dedication with which the scientific community within the UK and globally have directly engaged with the public, in addition to their intensive studies of the coronavirus itself. We are also grateful to those within universities and research institutes for their efforts in supporting the clear and direct …

18 Conclusion

We are satisfied that the science advice informing the Government has drawn upon some of the best expertise that the UK—and indeed the world—has to offer. We acknowledge the initial dominance of modelling expertise on SAGE and believe this is a fair reflection of the lack of data at the …

19 Conclusion

Para 137

The Government was too slow to increase testing capacity to the levels required to help contain the spread of the coronavirus. We have previously suggested that strategy was driven by the capacity available, rather than strategy driving the necessary increase in capacity. It was clear early in the year that …

20 Conclusion

The Government was slow to move once it realised that coronavirus testing required a rapid expansion and did not engage sufficiently with the wide array of scientific expertise available within the UK—particularly within our universities and research institutes. While we appreciate the complexities of such a feat, including the need …

21 Conclusion

Para 139

The Committee will report separately and more fully on the test, trace and isolate system and the mass testing programme in due course. But in considering the role of science advice, and its influence on Government decisions, we are concerned by the continued lack of justification provided to the Committee …

22 Conclusion

Para 140

The creation of NHS Test and Trace involves a budget of £22 billion for financial year 2020–21 and the justification for most of its spending being on the central part of the system, rather than through local public health teams, has not been clearly made. Concerns have also been raised …

26 Conclusion

Para 158

The development of vaccines and therapeutics is a policy area in which it is right that science must lead the way, so that there may be a high level of confidence that a rigorous approach has been taken towards safety and efficacy. From the beginning of the pandemic, the clear …

27 Conclusion

We acknowledge that a large part of the success to date into the development of covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics can be credited to lessons learned from previous outbreaks and efforts made to prepare for future crises. As further promising vaccine candidates and treatments come to light, other aspects of the …