1. As noted in the response to Recommendation 2, TNR in the UK tends to be targeted and specific. While TNR does not affect large numbers of people across the UK, its impacts can be severe - not only for those directly targeted but also for wider communities, where fear and concern may spread. 2. It is therefore critical that the Government’s response is proportionate and effective - reassuring individuals that they can exercise their democratic rights freely and with confidence, without inadvertently creating a climate of fear. Our approach is guided by the principle of “be alert but not afraid”. We do not refer to entire communities as “high risk”, nor do we seek to profile or expose groups to unnecessary scrutiny. Doing so risks alienating individuals, dividing communities, and inadvertently achieving the objectives of authoritarian states. 3. Nuanced threats, such as TNR, are inherently difficult to communicate and can be misinterpreted or manipulated. We are mindful of the risks posed by misinformation and false accusations, and we take care to ensure that our public messaging does not contribute to panic or confusion. Furthermore, as noted in our written evidence, communities are not monolithic – they are made up of a range of individuals with differing experiences and backgrounds, so it is essential to qualify the use of these terms with nuance and context. For these reasons, community engagement initiatives - run by local authorities and central government departments - focus on integration and resilience, helping individuals feel part of UK society and confident in their rights and freedoms. 4. The Government recognises the importance of proactive engagement and continues to undertake targeted outreach with civil society organisations, think tanks, and NGOs, including those advocating on behalf of individuals affected by TNR. Officials engaged with victims, community leaders and academics during the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s TNR Review, and this engagement has and will continue at both Ministerial and official levels. We will factor the Committee’s recommendation into the development of future engagement activity. 5. The Government has also published practical guidance on GOV.UK for individuals who believe they may be at risk of TNR. This guidance offers advice on both physical and online safety, signposts reporting mechanisms, and links to wider protective security resources. It is designed to be accessible and proportionate - providing reassurance without exacerbating fear. 6. In addition, as mentioned in the response to Recommendation 1, law enforcement agencies are receiving training on state threats and foreign interference, including how to identify and respond to activity that may amount to TNR. This training is available to all police forces and is being rolled out alongside a programme of briefings and awareness-raising. This ensures that frontline officers are equipped to respond appropriately and sensitively to reports from individuals who may be at risk. 7. Overall, the UK Government has developed a range of support and security assistance mechanisms to protect individuals who may be at risk of TNR. This assistance is based on threat and varies in scope and approach, but can include tailored protective advice, cybersecurity measures, and access to broader public resources. For security reasons, it would not be appropriate to comment on the specifics of these arrangements. We remain committed to refining our approach and will take the Committee’s recommendation into account as part of ongoing work to strengthen outreach and support.