7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK

Select Committee

Human Rights (Joint Committee) HC 681 30 July 2025

Report Status Government responded

Conclusions & Recommendations 37 items (20 recs)

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Recommendations

20 results

3

We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression. This should be developed in consultation with law enforcement, civil society and affected communities. It should include, as core elements, the ‘involvement’ of a foreign state, and the … Read more

Ministry of Justice

4

Without clear data on the scale and nature of TNR events in the UK, it...

Recommendation

Without clear data on the scale and nature of TNR events in the UK, it is difficult both to create effective policy responses and to judge the effectiveness of the Government’s new TNR strategy. The Government should ask police forces … Read more

Ministry of Justice

6

However, we recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies and the increasing sophistication of...

Recommendation

However, we recognise the rapidly evolving nature of digital technologies and the increasing sophistication of methods used to conduct TNR. It is therefore essential that the legal framework remains agile and responsive to evolving threats. We recommend that the Government … Read more

Ministry of Justice

8

The Government should ensure that TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries...

Recommendation

The Government should ensure that TNR is a high priority consideration when deciding which countries should be specified under the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. Decisions on which countries to specify under the enhanced tier of FIRS … Read more

Ministry of Justice

11

In response to this report, the Government should provide this Committee with a clear timeline...

Recommendation

In response to this report, the Government should provide this Committee with a clear timeline in which it plans to review the effectiveness of the SLAPPs provisions in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. The Government should also … Read more

Ministry of Justice

12

We recommend that the Government develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy aimed at individuals...

Recommendation

We recommend that the Government develop and implement a proactive outreach strategy aimed at individuals and communities likely to be at high risk of TNR. This strategy should be developed within 12 months and include clear timelines for how engagement … Read more

Ministry of Justice

14

We recommend that the content of this guidance be reviewed regularly, with input from victims,...

Recommendation

We recommend that the content of this guidance be reviewed regularly, with input from victims, to ensure it is genuinely effective and helpful for victims and that it remains responsive to evolving TNR tactics. The Government should ensure that this … Read more

Ministry of Justice

16

The Government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression.

Recommendation

The Government should regularly evaluate the uptake of the new police training on transnational repression. Updates on participation rates should be provided to the Committee every six months. If uptake remains limited, serious consideration should be given to making this … Read more

Ministry of Justice

19

We recommend that the Government establish a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience...

Recommendation

We recommend that the Government establish a dedicated national reporting hotline for individuals who experience TNR to enhance victim support, improve data collection, and facilitate timely referrals to the appropriate personnel. The reporting hotline should be established within one year … Read more

Ministry of Justice

20

We further recommend that data collected through the hotline be anonymised and recorded to inform...

Recommendation

We further recommend that data collected through the hotline be anonymised and recorded to inform policy development and threat assessments. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) INTERPOL and visa applications

Ministry of Justice

22

We recommend the Government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose...

Recommendation

We recommend the Government works with ‘Five Eyes’ and other partners to track and expose malicious, vexatious, and politically motivated use of Red Notices by member states. In doing so, the Government should advocate for greater transparency and accountability within … Read more

Ministry of Justice

24

While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data...

Recommendation

While the option exists for individuals to request access to or removal of their data via INTERPOL’s independent oversight body, the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files, this process is often significantly delayed and may not offer timely protection … Read more

Ministry of Justice

25

In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk...

Recommendation

In addition, the Government should take proactive steps to protect individuals facing an extradition risk due to a politically motivated Red Notice. A voluntary mechanism should be introduced to allow targeted British Nationals to notify the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development … Read more

Ministry of Justice

27

The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed...

Recommendation

The Home Office should ensure that all relevant immigration staff are adequately trained and informed about the potential misuse of Red Notices. In addition, the Country Policy and Information Notes used in assessing asylum claims should be revised to explicitly … Read more

Ministry of Justice

29

We recommend that the Government explicitly incorporate transnational repression into the UK’s human rights reporting...

Recommendation

We recommend that the Government explicitly incorporate transnational repression into the UK’s human rights reporting frameworks. In particular, references to TNR should be included in the next iterations of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s annual Human Rights and Democracy … Read more

Ministry of Justice

32

Due to the national security sensitivities and the need for swift action, there are limited...

Recommendation

Due to the national security sensitivities and the need for swift action, there are limited opportunities for Parliament to scrutinise sanctions policy. We recommend that the Government provide regular confidential updates to the Intelligence and Security Committee, outlining the rationale … Read more

Ministry of Justice

33

The UK should support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda...

Recommendation

The UK should support efforts to elevate TNR as a priority on the UN agenda and promote coordinated international action against its use by authoritarian regimes. The Government should also ensure that information and data on TNR is shared with … Read more

Ministry of Justice

34

We recommend that the Government work closely with Canada to strengthen international collaboration on countering...

Recommendation

We recommend that the Government work closely with Canada to strengthen international collaboration on countering TNR during Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency. As part of this effort, the UK should play a leading role in the launch and development of the … Read more

Ministry of Justice

35

The UK should seek to play a leading and proactive role in shaping the Global...

Recommendation

The UK should seek to play a leading and proactive role in shaping the Global response to TNR as part of the US chaired Working Group on Transnational Repression. The Government should also raise the issue at the next Commonwealth … Read more

Ministry of Justice

37

We recommend this new unit has a central role in coordinating the UK’s response to...

Recommendation

We recommend this new unit has a central role in coordinating the UK’s response to TNR, ensuring that intelligence, law enforcement, and policy functions are aligned and responsive to emerging threats. We recommend the appointment of a dedicated lead for … Read more

Ministry of Justice

Conclusions (17) Observations and findings — click to expand

1 Conclusion

We welcome the Government’s decision to describe TNR in broad terms. This approach provides an important opportunity to ensure that all victims of TNR are recognised regardless of ethnicity, nationality or background. (Conclusion, Paragraph 19)

2 Conclusion

However, we are concerned by the Government’s decision not to adopt a formal definition of TNR. Whilst we acknowledge the difficulties in adopting a single globally accepted definition, we are not persuaded that the existence of differing national definitions would hinder international cooperation on this issue. Adopting a formal UK …

5 Conclusion

The evidence we have received indicates that existing UK criminal legislation provides an effective framework for dealing with offences related to TNR. We have not identified any significant gaps in criminal law related to TNR. We agree that the creation of additional criminal offences is not necessary at this time …

7 Conclusion

We welcome the introduction of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) as a tool to help strengthen the UK’s ability to tackle transnational repression. The designation of Iran and Russia as countries listed on the enhanced tier of FIRS is consistent with the evidence presented to us regarding the threat …

9 Conclusion

The Home Office and relevant enforcement bodies should develop clear guidance on how FIRS data can be used to support investigations into TNR, and regular reviews should be conducted to assess the scheme’s effectiveness in this regard. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)

10 Conclusion

Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used as instruments of transnational repression. These lawsuits are designed to intimidate and silence individuals who expose or criticise the actions of authoritarian regimes. The evidence we have received demonstrates that journalists are at particular risk of TNR via the use of …

13 Conclusion

We welcome the Government’s publication of online guidance for people experiencing TNR. This is a positive step towards providing easily accessible information on TNR and helping victims understand avenues of support available to them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48) 42

15 Conclusion

We welcome the development of new training materials for police forces on TNR. This represents a positive step toward improving frontline awareness and ensuring appropriate responses to TNR incidences. We welcome the decision to make this training mandatory for counter-terrorism officers. However, it is equally important that the training is …

17 Conclusion

We heard consistent evidence highlighting the absence of an effective mechanism for reporting suspected incidents of TNR. This gap not only leaves victims without adequate support but also significantly undermines the UK’s capacity to monitor, assess, and respond to such threats. There is little consistency in the way police forces …

18 Conclusion

Victims of TNR often take considerable personal risk in reporting TNR related crimes. Many choose not to come forward due to a lack of confidence in existing reporting systems, concerns that have often been shaped by previous negative experiences. Establishing a dedicated reporting mechanism could play a vital role in …

21 Conclusion

We are deeply concerned by the misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices by certain member states. Refusal by the INTERPOL secretariat to acknowledge that there is a problem and to take remedial action poses a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of individuals targeted by authoritarian regimes and sends a …

23 Conclusion

Currently there is no requirement for INTERPOL to alert people at risk of politically motivated reprisals by foreign governments of a Notice being issued against them. This lack of transparency is particularly problematic in cases where individuals face credible risk of TNR, effectively restricting their ability to travel freely. Whilst …

26 Conclusion

The presence of a politically motivated INTERPOL Red Notice can have serious implications for individuals seeking asylum or applying for visas, often resulting in automatic refusal without due consideration of the underlying political context. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)

28 Conclusion

TNR represents a growing threat to democratic values, the rule of law, and freedom of expression. We are concerned that foreign policy decisions and international trade partnerships are often made without sufficient consideration of the TNR record of perpetrator states. A failure to acknowledge and respond to instances of TNR …

30 Conclusion

The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 do not capture the full range of TNR tactics, including violence, intimidation, harassment, illegal deportations, abductions and abuse of international mechanisms such as INTERPOL. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

31 Conclusion

The Committee recommends that the Government review the scope of the UK’s sanctions framework to assess the feasibility of introducing specific TNR sanctions. The UK should also adopt a more proactive approach to sanctions, particularly in cases where UK nationals and residents are directly affected. This should include the timely …

36 Conclusion

The UK’s response to TNR would benefit significantly from more structured and consistent coordination across government departments. Currently, responsibilities related to TNR are dispersed across the Home Office, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the National Crime Agency (NCA), and the intelligence and security services. While each plays a vital …