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However, we are concerned by the Government’s decision not to adopt a formal definition of...

Conclusion
However, we are concerned by the Government’s decision not to adopt a formal definition of TNR. Whilst we acknowledge the difficulties in adopting a single globally accepted definition, we are not persuaded that the existence of differing national definitions would hinder international cooperation on this issue. Adopting a formal UK definition of TNR would significantly enhance the UK’s ability to collect reliable data, monitor trends, and develop effective policy responses. (Conclusion, Paragraph 20)
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government Acknowledged
1. The Government recognises the importance of robust data and evidence in shaping an effective response to transnational repression (TNR). We are taking active steps to strengthen our understanding of the threat, improve data collection, and ensure that our systems are responsive and proportionate. 2. A key focus of the Defending Democracy Taskforce’s Review was to understand the scale and nature of TNR in the UK. This included identifying methodologies and patterns of behaviour associated with TNR to ensure that our response is robust and that sufficient safeguards and mitigations are in place to prevent such activity from occurring. 3. The Review found that TNR tends to be targeted and specific, with perpetrating states focusing on individuals they perceive as threats - such as vocal critics, dissidents or activists. While TNR does not therefore affect large numbers of people across the UK, its impacts can be severe, both for the individuals directly targeted but also for wider communities, where fear and concern may spread. This can create a “chilling effect,” which can lead individuals to self-censor and the gradual curtailment of democratic freedoms, such as attending protests or political/cultural events. It is therefore essential that our response remains proportionate, protective and adaptable, regardless of the scale of the problem. 4. We continually assess potential threats in the UK and draw on a multisource model to build a comprehensive picture of that threat. This includes intelligence assessments, engagement with international partners, and insights from civil society and affected individuals. 5. This Government works closely with law enforcement and other partners to continue to strengthen our understanding of reporting trends and methodologies. This includes identifying patterns of behaviour and ensuring that sufficient safeguards and mitigations are in place to prevent TNR from occurring. A dedicated team has now been established within the Home Office to coordinate this work and act as a focal point across HMG. 6. To further support data collection, policing has established a system for the reporting of crimes that includes reference to foreign interference, where these should be logged, then reviewed and actioned by specialist teams accordingly. The collection and aggregation of data is part of this developing process and will assist policing and the Government in developing a more detailed understanding of reported activity across the country, including activities and reporting countries of concern. This will assist in the development and review of strategy and interventions. This evolving approach aligns with the Committee’s recommendation to strengthen data collection and analysis. 7. The Government recognises that external sources, including academic and NGO reporting, can provide valuable insights. However, attribution to foreign states – who often deploy sophisticated tradecraft to avoid detection- is inherently complex, and care must be taken to ensure that policy is informed by robust, verifiable data. Our approach is to build a clear and accurate picture of the threat landscape, while avoiding the risks of spurious or misattributed claims shaping operational or strategic decisions. 8. The Government will continue to develop its understanding of TNR and ensure that the systems in place to detect, deter and counter this activity remain effective and proportionate.
Addressee Bodies
Ministry of Justice
Timeline
Recommendation age 0.9 yr
Report published 30 Jul 2025