3
We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression.
Recommendation
We recommend that the Government adopt a formal definition of transnational repression. This should be developed in consultation with law enforcement, civil society and affected communities. It should include, as core elements, the ‘involvement’ of a foreign state, and the targeting of individuals located outside that state’s jurisdiction. The definition should be sufficiently broad to encompass victims of TNR regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. In addition to adopting a legal definition, authorities should be equipped with clear guidance and explanatory materials outlining the various forms transnational repression can take. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)
Government Response
Acknowledged
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
1. We are pleased that the Committee recognises the effectiveness of the National Security Act 2023 in relation to TNR. This new legislation was designed with modern day state threats in mind and constructed to be future proofed as well as having extraterritorial reach. In Part 3 of the Act, there is a statutory requirement for the operation of Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, which include the provisions relevant to TNR, to remain under review by the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation. As part of this requirement, the Home Secretary must lay before Parliament a report from the Independent Reviewer detailing the outcome of their annual review. As such, any inadequacies in the legislation to deal with threats such as those posed by digital forms of TNR are expected to be identified through this existing reporting function. 2. Whilst the heart of the UK’s legislative framework for deterring and combatting activity that amounts to, or is akin to, transnational repression, is the National Security Act 2023, there is other domestic legislation complementary to these aims. This includes the Online Safety Act, which enhances the regulation of online platforms, ensuring the safety of users. The Act imposes duties on platforms to tackle the spread of illegal content, particularly content amounting to one of the priority offences in the Act. This includes the Foreign Interference Offence, requiring platforms to take proactive measures to tackle illegal attempts by (or on behalf of) foreign powers to interfere in UK interests on their services. The Government is closely monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of the Act and remains committed to strengthening our laws if it does not deliver the necessary protection to ensure a safer online environment. 3. The Defending Democracy Taskforce’s Review highlighted the evolving nature of the threat, including the increasing use of digital platforms and emerging technologies. It also emphasised the importance of identifying methodologies and patterns of behaviour to ensure that our response remains robust, and that sufficient safeguards and mitigations are in place to prevent TNR. 4. Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, present both risks and opportunities in this context. Malign actors may use these tools to scale harassment or disinformation campaigns, but they also offer new capabilities to detect and disrupt such activity. The UK is actively exploring these opportunities through initiatives such as the Common Good Cyber Fund, which supports specialist nonprofit cybersecurity organisations to deliver defensive solutions to high-risk individuals and groups. 5. Ultimately, legislation alone will not address the full spectrum of TNR threats. The Government is committed to a whole-of-system response, combining legal powers with operational tools, international collaboration, and targeted engagement with civil society and affected communities.
Source
Committee
Human Rights (Joint Committee)
Report
7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK
30 Jul 2025
HC 681
Addressee Bodies
Ministry of Justice
Timeline
Recommendation age
0.9 yr
Report published
30 Jul 2025