17
We heard consistent evidence highlighting the absence of an effective mechanism for reporting suspected incidents...
Conclusion
We heard consistent evidence highlighting the absence of an effective mechanism for reporting suspected incidents of TNR. This gap not only leaves victims without adequate support but also significantly undermines the UK’s capacity to monitor, assess, and respond to such threats. There is little consistency in the way police forces deal with reported TNR cases. Individuals seeking to report incidences of TNR are often referred to police departments unfamiliar with the nature and tactics of TNR, resulting in delays and inaction. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)
Government Response
Acknowledged
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
1. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA) gives the government independent powers to impose, implement, enforce and lift sanctions. SAMLA has been updated several times to strengthen the sanctions framework, close loopholes and make the system more agile to meet evolving geopolitical challenges. 2. The UK currently has 36 live sanctions regimes. These regimes are sets of sanctions measures focussed on specific countries or policy objectives, designed to achieve defined purposes and enshrined in legislation. 3. In agreement with the principles of the Committee’s recommendation, the Government keeps sanctions powers, regimes, designations and measures under review to respond to new developments and changing circumstances. The newest sanctions regime, the Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025, was laid in Parliament on 22 July. 4. In certain circumstances, the UK can impose sanctions as part of its response to state-directed crimes, including activity amounting to TNR. 5. For example, in April 2025, the UK sanctioned the Iranian-backed Foxtrot criminal network and its leader, Rawa Majid, for their role in attacks against targets across Europe. In January 2024, the UK sanctioned those responsible in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with the Zindashti Cartel, who are employed by Iran’s intelligence services to do its bidding overseas, for their involvement in plots to kill opponents of the regime in the UK and abroad.
Source
Committee
Human Rights (Joint Committee)
Report
7th Report - Transnational repression in the UK
30 Jul 2025
HC 681
Addressee Bodies
Ministry of Justice
Timeline
Recommendation age
0.9 yr
Report published
30 Jul 2025