It is unclear why the Secretary of State has decided to follow the appointment model for public inquiry chairs rather than the appointment model for coroners. Although it is not possible to say in the abstract whether the Secretary of State’s appointment of a JPM would make them insufficiently independent for the purposes of Article 2 in a particular case, we are concerned by the perceptions of executive control this power could create. We are particularly concerned that the Secretary of State will have the power not just of appointment, but of reappointment, as this could create a perception that JPMs have an incentive to please the government with their findings. The Legacy Commission will succeed or fail not just on the basis of strict adherence to legal independence, but also on the basis of the perception of its independence in the minds of the communities it will have to serve. The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission already makes independent appointments of coroners. There are very good historical reasons for such appointments being made independent of the government in Westminster. We do not understand why the Secretary of State has declined to use NIJAC to appoint the JPMs who will be replacing coroners. (Conclusion, Paragraph 77)