The Department acknowledged that its voluntary approach to working with industry had caused inconsistencies for victims and explained that it was beginning to introduce some mandatory measures. For example, it told us that only about 50% of victims of authorised push payment fraud are reimbursed by their banks because reimbursement was on a voluntary basis.41 In May 2022, Government recognised that in recent years, authorised push payment scams, where someone is deceived or defrauded into authorising a payment to a criminal, have increased both in value and volume, with many individuals suffering significant financial and emotional harm. In response, HM Treasury announced that the Financial Services and Markets Bill will include provision to make reimbursement mandatory.42 However, not all stakeholders support this approach. In written evidence, UK Finance warned that focusing on reimbursement was “too little too late” and asserted that greater efforts were needed upstream to stop fraud at its source.43 The NCA told us that provisions in the draft Online Safety Bill will also be mandatory and will have significant penalties attached. But the NCA said it would welcome a ‘failure to prevent’ offence to go 37 Public Accounts Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2017–19, The growing threat from online fraud, HC 399 38 Q 87; C&AG’s Report, para 2.19 39 Q 106; C&AG’s Report, para 2.19 40 Written evidence submitted by UK Finance dated November 2022 41 Q 62 42 HM Treasury Policy Paper, Government approach to authorised push payment scam reimbursement, 10 May 2022 43 Written evidence submitted by UK Finance dated November 2022 16 Progress combatting fraud even further in changing industry behaviour. Our sister Committee also recommended that ‘a failure to prevent fraud’ offence should be introduced to hold companies to account for fraud occurring on their systems and encourage better corporate behaviours.’44 Working with international partners