The Department has not taken responsibility for detecting child maintenance fraud, instead shifting this responsibility onto its customers. The Department asserts that it does not treat tackling child maintenance fraud, where children often suffer as the end user, with any less enthusiasm than it does tackling fraud against the taxpayer. However, its approach does not appear to reflect this sentiment. It has not assessed the risk or actual level of fraud and error within child maintenance in the way that would be required if it was public expenditure, and its approach to fraud detection relies almost entirely on receiving parents challenging the value of maintenance assessments. This last point means that if a paying parent is notified that they are under investigation for allegedly understating their income there is a risk that they will know or suspect that their ex-partner has reported them. It would therefore be understandable that many receiving parents would be reluctant to come forward with such reports, particularly if it is not clear what the outcome will be. The Department says that, in 91% of cases, it can rely legally on historical earned- income data from HMRC and its own benefits data to assess people’s earned income and benefit status, and also plans to update legislation to include unearned income information held by HMRC in the initial calculation. Nonetheless, the Department accepts that child maintenance is still vulnerable to certain types of customer fraud and error, such as misdeclaration of personal circumstances that affect the award but are not related to income, or the 9% of cases where it cannot rely on historic tax or benefit records. Whilst we welcome a proportionate, iterative approach to tackling fraud and error, the Department’s current approach risks seriously underestimating its susceptibility to fraud and ignoring the various good reasons why parents may not raise concerns about fraud. Recommendation: The Department should take res