15
Accepted
The Department acknowledged that there were significant challenges inherent in its franchising model used prior...
Conclusion
The Department acknowledged that there were significant challenges inherent in its franchising model used prior to the pandemic. It told us that the previous surplus in franchising costs had become a deficit prior to the pandemic.37 During the final four years of Control Period 5 (2015–16 to 2018–19), net government funding for franchised operators increased from a surplus of £1 billion to a deficit of £2 million. In 2019–20, the first year of Control Period 6, net government funding was a deficit of £533 million, including £300 million of COVID-19 support.38
Government Response Summary
The government agrees and is implementing National Rail Contracts (NRCs) that require operators to deliver against annual business plans and performance targets, shifting revenue and cost risk to the department and incentivising performance through fees.
Government Response
Accepted
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
4.1 The government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation. Target implementation date: Summer 2021 4.2 National Rail Contracts (NRCs) require train operators to deliver against annually-agreed business plans (ABPs) and performance targets. This allows these contracts to evolve as the industry recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic and reforms are implemented. Each year, the department will specify its objectives and negotiate updated business plans to help deliver those. 4.3 Revenue and cost risk sit with the department, subject to stringent tests of the efficiency of costs and revenue collection. Having limited financial risk allows operators to focus on operational areas within their control to drive improvements. The government will benefit from post-COVID-19 pandemic revenue recovery and cost savings from efficiency improvements. Annual budgets set caps for cost reimbursement to operators – NRCs require evidence and mitigating action before those caps can be increased. 4.4 The performance-based fee directly incentivises improved performance, with flexibility to switch from qualitative to quantified measures as circumstances permit. Fees are reduced if performance is poor; the department can require operators to develop and implement improvement plans. 4.5 ABPs will include commitments to specific activities, outputs and timescales, with operators contractually obliged to meet those commitments and the department can require remedial plans where they are not met. Where appropriate, the department can agree ‘Industry Change Projects’ with operators to further incentivise delivery of reforms that expose the operator to significant additional risk. 4.6 NRC rollout is ongoing, with three now in place (South Western, TransPenine Express and c2c). Before NRCs are agreed, a full business case is approved to ensure the contract is designed to incentivise improved performance, including Williams/Shapps Plan for Rail reforms.
Source
Committee
Public Accounts Committee
Report
Tenth Report - Overview of the English rail system
07 Jul 2021
HC 170
Addressee Bodies
HM Treasury
Timeline
Recommendation age
5.1 yrs
Report published
07 Jul 2021