Twentieth Report - Monitoring and responding to companies in distress
Select Committee
Public Accounts Committee
HC 425
13 March 2024
No response data available yet.
Government response
Treasury minutes: Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twentieth report from Session 2023-24 · published 28 May 2024
Recommendations & Conclusions
27 results
2
Recommendation
Set out how HM Treasury and Cabinet Office will support departments to maintain risk knowledge.
Recommendation
We are concerned that departments are not maintaining institutional knowledge relating to ‘at risk’ companies and sectors. HM Treasury monitors the health and resilience of the corporate sector as a whole and the Department for Business and Trade oversees industry …
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3
Recommendation
Set out how HM Treasury will ensure accounting officers address supplier commercial model risks.
Recommendation
We are not convinced that accounting officers give sufficient consideration to the commercial models of those they contract with, which means they do not understand the potential risks (including supplier failure). HM Treasury suggests accounting officers should produce a formal …
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4
Recommendation
Set out HM Treasury support for accounting officers making decisions in company distress situations.
Recommendation
We are concerned that accounting officers may not always be equipped to protect taxpayers’ money when making decisions on intervention in these fast-paced, high-pressure situations. This Committee and previous committees have reported many times over the past two decades on …
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5
Conclusion
Set functional standards for monitoring and responding to companies in distress across government.
Conclusion
The Cabinet Office has not assessed or coherently identified the skills and expertise needed for monitoring and responding to companies in distress. We have previously raised concerns about the level of commercial, risk management and corporate finance expertise in government …
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6
Recommendation
Set out updated approach to evaluating company distress cases and sharing lessons learned.
Recommendation
It is vital that the government evaluates and shares the lessons from these cases on a timely and consistent basis, regardless of whether the case resulted in government intervention. We have previously found that much of government activity and spending …
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1
Conclusion
Committee examined evidence from key departments on government's corporate distress monitoring.
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from HM Treasury (the Treasury), the Department for Business and Trade, the Cabinet Office, and UK Government Investments (UKGI).1
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7
Conclusion
Departments have varied approaches to understanding supply chains and informal distress monitoring.
Conclusion
Departments are at different stages and have different approaches to understanding their sectors’ supply chain dependencies and exposure.13 The Treasury told us that individual departments lead on their sectors and it is for each of them to monitor the health …
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8
Recommendation
Lack of integrated departmental oversight creates blind spots for distressed companies.
Recommendation
Companies and markets can cut across several departments’ policy responsibilities or provide services to multiple departments. This meant that in the cases of Carillion, CF Fertilisers and UKCloud, no single department had a complete picture of the government’s exposure to …
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9
Recommendation
Mapping multi-tiered public service supply chains presents significant complexity and cost challenges.
Recommendation
The National Audit Office (NAO) reported that the Cabinet Office’s markets, sourcing and suppliers team were in the early stages of exploring how departments map their supply chains, and whether a similar approach could be taken for public service supply …
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10
Recommendation
Treasury relies on departments for specific sectoral monitoring despite central oversight.
Recommendation
The Treasury told us that some of its staff work on monitoring the health of the UK corporate sector overall, by looking at a series of indicators.25 It told us that actively monitoring the corporate sector is an important and …
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11
Recommendation
High civil service turnover undermines corporate knowledge and institutional memory on distress.
Recommendation
The government’s corporate knowledge about the health of key sectors and companies may be vulnerable because of the high turnover of civil servants in this field, who may have 17 Correspondence from HM Treasury to Committee, 30 January 2024 18 …
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12
Conclusion
Departments have improved sectoral understanding post-pandemic, though construction remains fragile.
Conclusion
We asked the witnesses what lessons they had learned about companies’ resilience across the economy from supporting them during the pandemic. The Treasury told us that it had learned the “importance of departments having a good sectoral understanding, understanding the …
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13
Recommendation
Departments underutilise and produce inconsistent Accounting Officer Assessments for public funds.
Recommendation
This Committee has continually advocated for the use of Accounting Officer (AO) Assessments to support high quality decision-making and enhance transparency. The Treasury’s guidance suggests that it is good practice for an AO Assessment to be produced for each significant …
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14
Conclusion
Government remains vulnerable to provider failure in outsourced public services, despite measures.
Conclusion
For several decades, successive governments have contracted out public services to private providers. Where providers or suppliers fail, the government is often the fall-back owner of risks. This was demonstrated when Carillion failed and the government had to step in …
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15
Conclusion
Ensuring taxpayer gains from contracts remains challenging, requiring improved market testing.
Conclusion
We asked the government specifically about how it ensures the taxpayer gains when a company does well partly as a result of having a government contract. The Cabinet Office told us that it publishes key performance indicators (KPIs) for its …
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16
Conclusion
Government previously lacked a structured framework for providing financial support to distressed companies.
Conclusion
In 2020, the government set out publicly some broad principles which it uses to underpin decisions on providing last-resort bespoke financial support to financially distressed companies. The government has publicly stated that there is an “extremely high bar for putting …
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17
Recommendation
Require departments to rigorously adhere to public money principles for all company interventions.
Recommendation
As with any activity involving public money, a department must adhere to the principles of regularity, feasibility, propriety and value for money set out in the Treasury’s Managing Public Money. A department will likely be required to carry out a …
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18
Conclusion
Maintaining propriety during rapid, imperfect decision-making in company distress situations is challenging.
Conclusion
Propriety is concerned with meeting high standards of public conduct and parliamentary expectations, and cannot be dispensed with even when making difficult judgements on competing issues in an emergency.46 Responding in these situations often requires rapid decision-making by officials and …
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19
Conclusion
Government employs stringent due diligence and asset security to mitigate moral hazard risks.
Conclusion
We asked the witnesses how they manage the risks of moral hazard (where support for one company creates an incentive for other companies to take risks with the expectation they will also be supported) and free riders (where the company’s …
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20
Recommendation
Government interventions often lead to prolonged involvement and unforeseen costs without clear exit strategies.
Recommendation
The NAO report has shown how intervening in companies can lead to unforeseen costs and government involvement over a period much longer than expected. Ensuring value for money requires careful consideration not just of short-term objectives but also of longer-term …
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21
Recommendation
Ensure departments possess or access essential specialist skills for company distress interventions throughout their lifecycle.
Recommendation
Departments must have, or be able to access, the skills, expertise and capacity needed through the whole lifecycle of any intervention in a company, including to prepare for and respond to company distress scenarios.56 We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues …
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22
Recommendation
Specialist skills for company distress are concentrated centrally, resulting in patchy government capabilities.
Recommendation
The Treasury told us that having the right skills and capabilities in place is “a really critical lesson” highlighted by the NAO’s report. It acknowledged that these skills are currently “patchy across government”.61 The relevant specialist skills for responding to …
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23
Recommendation
Departments and regulators face ongoing challenges in securing high-demand commercial and financial skills.
Recommendation
Nonetheless, the Treasury reiterated that it is up to departments and regulators to ensure they have the capability and capacity to discharge their duties, including understanding what financial expertise they need.66 The Department for Business and Trade explained how the …
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24
Recommendation
Government company interventions are not consistently or robustly evaluated, hindering learning and accountability.
Recommendation
Evaluation is a systematic assessment of the design, implementation, and outcomes of an intervention.69 It is important for learning what works and why, and to demonstrate accountability for the use of public money.70 Our work on the use of evaluation …
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25
Recommendation
Treasury acknowledges government's current lack of systematic evaluation for company interventions and non-interventions.
Recommendation
We asked the witnesses about how robustly government collates and shares evaluation findings and lessons on this topic. The Treasury suggested that this was something they “can probably be a bit more systematic on”. It provided the example of the …
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26
Conclusion
Challenges persist in recovering costs from third parties after airline insolvencies.
Conclusion
We asked the witnesses whether there had been any learning from the experiences of airline collapses about industry insurance schemes and also how government manages the risks around recuperating money from private insurers. UKGI suggested that there was some work …
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27
Recommendation
Value in exploring international frameworks for company intervention and non-intervention approaches.
Recommendation
We also asked the witnesses whether they looked to different international regimes to learn any lessons about how to deal with companies and sectors that might be in trouble. The Treasury and the Cabinet Office said that each country is …
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