Undersea cables

National Security Strategy (Joint Committee) Open Inquiry
Opened: 23 Jan 2025 Parliament page
Undersea cables form the backbone of the world’s internet. The UK has around 60 cables which connect us to the outside world, carrying 99% of our data. Concern has been growing about the risk of these cables being sabotaged by foreign states. The consequences would be extensive. This inquiry will … Read more
21 Recommendations
7 Conclusions
1 Report
4 Oral sessions
2 Letters
4 Events
Activity timeline 8 events
18 Dec
2025
Report published
19 Sep
2025
Report published
8 Sep
2025
Correspondence
14 Jul
2025
Correspondence
30 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
9 Jun
2025
Oral evidence
19 May
2025
Oral evidence
12 May
2025
Oral evidence
Oral evidence sessions 4 sessions
30 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 4th session - ministerial
Kevin Adams · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology Luke Pollard MP · Ministry of Defence Paul Wyatt · Ministry of Defence Sir Chris Bryant MP · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
9 Jun 2025
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Undersea cables - 3rd session
Alasdair Wilkie · Atlantic Cable Maintenance & Repair Agreement (ACMA) Alex Towers · BT Group Chief Constable Gavin Stephens · National Police Chiefs' Council Dr Fenella Wrigley MBE · London Ambulance Service John Wrottesley · European Subsea Cables Association Laura Catterick · UK Finance Mick McGovern · Alcatel Submarine Networks
19 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 2nd session
Captain Niels Markussen · NATO Commodore (Rtd) John Aitken OBE · Thales Dr Marie Jacobsson · Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs Professor Aurel Sari · University of Exeter
12 May 2025
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Undersea cables - 1st session
Dr Sidharth Kaushal · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Elisabeth Braw · Atlantic Council Matthew Bowden · Red Penguin Marine Professor Kevin Rowlands · Kings College London
Recommendations & Conclusions
28 results
1 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK’s strategic reliance on subsea cables will likely continue for the foreseeable future.
The UK’s strategic reliance on subsea cables will likely continue for the foreseeable future. The cable industry provides a commendable and commercially efficient repair service, which ensures good resilience against moderate damage. We do not believe there is an imminent … Read more
Cabinet Office
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2 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the...
The Government’s resilience assessments must take greater account of the worsening security environment over the next 5–10 years. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review set out serious preparations for future crises. However, the Minister for Data Protection and … Read more
Cabinet Office
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3 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks...
We also found sceptical views in some parts of the cable industry about the risks of co-ordinated attacks. We agree that resilience across the sector is generally robust, major disruption is unlikely, and hype is unhelpful. But we caution against … Read more
Cabinet Office
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4 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage...
The Government should update its public and private risk scenarios to cover extensive co-ordinated sabotage to subsea and terrestrial internet infrastructure, including onward connections to Europe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 39) System vulnerabilities Read more
Cabinet Office
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5 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack.
Many cable landing stations are vulnerable to attack. The Government and operators must take the risk of state-backed sabotage seriously, including against targets in Europe. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)
Cabinet Office
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6 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and National Cyber Security Centre should require all UK...
The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) and National Cyber Security Centre should require all UK landing stations to be target-hardened to sufficient levels to deter state-backed sabotage. They should require landing station operators to develop within 12 months an emergency … Read more
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7 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage...
To help mitigate risks around the clustering of high value targets, the Government should encourage subsea cable providers to connect to landing stations, terrestrial routes and data centres outside high-concentration points. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49) Read more
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8 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’.
The Government’s resilience concept focuses too much on ‘having lots of cables’. This pays insufficient attention to the network’s actual capacity to absorb shocks and does not account for onshore vulnerabilities and long-term trends towards a more brittle system. There … Read more
Cabinet Office
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9 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available...
The Government’s resilience plans should focus in more detail on the level of immediately available capacity in the cable system during a security crisis. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should request operators to provide regular updates on the … Read more
Cabinet Office
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10 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is...
The UK needs more confidence in access to cable repair vessels: the current fleet is ageing, and erstwhile UK businesses have been acquired by foreign entities. (Conclusion, Paragraph 71)
Cabinet Office
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11 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030.
The Government should acquire a genuinely sovereign cable repair ship by 2030. This could be leased to industry on favourable terms during peacetime and made available for Government use in a crisis. The Government should set out a timetable for … Read more
Cabinet Office
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12 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable...
The Royal Navy should establish a cadre of reservists and serving personnel to learn cable repair skills on commercial repair vessels. These could be called on in periods of heightened tension. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Moderate and catastrophic impacts Read more
Cabinet Office
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13 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables.
The UK has particular vulnerabilities around outlying islands, the financial sector and military communications cables. These should be a key focus for contingency planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 81)
Cabinet Office
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14 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly...
The impacts of catastrophic disruption from a co-ordinated attack remain speculative, but are almost certainly highly damaging. We estimate they would include payment and supply chain failures, some degraded communications, overstretched emergency responses, and unexpected cascading issues—all at a time … Read more
Cabinet Office
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15 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector...
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should ensure all lead departments have detailed sector-by-sector technical impact studies on areas most likely to be affected and response plans—notably finance, maritime and air traffic, communications, defence and supply chains including food … Read more
Cabinet Office
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16 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on...
Emergency services should ensure their business continuity plans highlight any areas of critical reliance on foreign internet servers, and account for temporary internet disruption in the event of a security crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 100) Legal Responses Read more
Cabinet Office
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17 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak.
The legal provisions for responding to malicious cable damage are weak. It is encouraging that the Government has identified the forthcoming Defence Readiness Bill as a potential legislative vehicle to implement changes. We would like to emphasise the urgency of … Read more
Cabinet Office
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18 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government’s review of legislation must pay particular attention to strong deterrents, such as major...
The Government’s review of legislation must pay particular attention to strong deterrents, such as major fines and criminal liability, that can be applied to private actors suspected of working for or on behalf of foreign states. (Recommendation, Paragraph 114) Read more
Cabinet Office
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19 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should explore new options for taking a more robust approach to interdicting suspicious...
The Government should explore new options for taking a more robust approach to interdicting suspicious vessels—for example applying piracy provisions to cables that land in the UK or seeking a limited extension of domestic criminal law jurisdiction. It should commission … Read more
Cabinet Office
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20 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply...
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Business and Trade should apply diplomatic and economic pressure to press for adequate investigations from flag states and states where vessels suspected of cable damage enter port. The Government should … Read more
Cabinet Office
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21 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring...
The Government should support the subsea cable industry in rolling out more extensive cable monitoring technology and should explore incentives to encourage such investment. This could include Government commitments to make better use of existing measures and data—for example more … Read more
Cabinet Office
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22 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid.
The UK’s military deterrence concepts are too timid. They need to place greater emphasis on prevention and punitive consequences that go beyond private or public attribution. Otherwise, aggressors that are content with ‘implausible deniability’ can cause damage with minimal risk … Read more
Cabinet Office
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23 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
In a heightened threat scenario, we are uncertain about the Royal Navy’s ability to protect...
In a heightened threat scenario, we are uncertain about the Royal Navy’s ability to protect vulnerable cable regions and escort repair ships without undermining commitments to other NATO tasks. We admire the Minister for Armed Forces’ optimism that the problem … Read more
Cabinet Office
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24 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans...
The Ministry of Defence should work with international partners to ensure there are viable plans to escort cable ships without degrading wider NATO taskings. This plan could usefully include heightened surveillance of suspicious vessel activity, rules of engagement enabling a … Read more
Cabinet Office
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25 Conclusion
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
We commend the Government’s efforts to improve co-ordination, particularly the establishment of the Subsea Infrastructure...
We commend the Government’s efforts to improve co-ordination, particularly the establishment of the Subsea Infrastructure Response Group and Subsea Communications Cables Industry Group. We accept that changing governance structures for the sake of it is not helpful. Equally, however, there … Read more
Cabinet Office
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26 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point...
The Government should seek to provide a joined-up subsea cables function providing a centralised point of contact for industry and international partners. This body should co-ordinate, not duplicate, cross-government work—bringing together departments and agencies covering subsea infrastructure operations, policy, security, … Read more
Cabinet Office
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27 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
We support the Crown Estate’s ambitions to improve long-term spatial planning via the Marine Delivery...
We support the Crown Estate’s ambitions to improve long-term spatial planning via the Marine Delivery Route Map. We urge those involved to ensure that plans prioritise a diversity of cable routes to avoid creating areas of concentrated targets. (Conclusion, Paragraph … Read more
Cabinet Office
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28 Recommendation
1st Report - Subsea telecommunicat…
The Government should further explore cable protection zones for critical areas of cable concentration, policed...
The Government should further explore cable protection zones for critical areas of cable concentration, policed by early warning indicators and heightened monitoring and response capabilities. This would require close co-operation with European partners, given the need to manage other maritime … Read more
Cabinet Office
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Correspondence 2 letters
8 Sep 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology regarding the oral evidence held on 14 July concerning the Undersea cables inquiry, dated 15 August 2025
Parliament page
14 Jul 2025 Correspondence from Sir Chris Bryant MP, Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation & Technology following oral evidence held on 30 June on Undersea cables, dated 10 July 2025
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