The National Security Strategy
National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Open
Inquiry
Opened: 17 Jun 2025
Parliament page
The Government published a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on 24 June 2025. The NSS reviews the risks facing the UK and sets out plans to address them, structured under three themes: security at home, strength abroad, and sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. The Committee is seeking views on how well …
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21
Recommendations
16
Conclusions
1
Report
7
Oral sessions
6
Letters
7
Events
Activity timeline 15 events
24 Jun
2026
2026
24 Jun
2026
2026
27 Mar
2026
2026
Report published
16 Mar
2026
2026
26 Jan
2026
2026
Oral evidence
26 Jan
2026
2026
17 Nov
2025
2025
Oral evidence
3 Nov
2025
2025
Oral evidence
28 Oct
2025
2025
20 Oct
2025
2025
Oral evidence
13 Oct
2025
2025
Oral evidence
Oral evidence sessions 7 sessions
26 Jan 2026
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Dan Jarvis · Home Office
Matthew Collins · Cabinet Office
Rt Hon Darren Jones MP · Cabinet Office
17 Nov 2025
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Pillar 3
Air Commodore (retd) Blythe Crawford CBE · Tiberius Aerospace
Lieutenant Colonel (retd) Haydn Gaukroger OBE · Syos Aerospace
Professor Sir Anthony Finkelstein CBE · City St George’s, University of London
Professor Sir Nigel Shadbolt · Jesus College, University of Oxford
Sophia Gaston · AUKUS Industry Forum
3 Nov 2025
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China
Isabel Hilton OBE
Jonathan Hall KC · Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Lord Sumption OBE PC, FSA, FRHistS
Nigel Inkster CMG · MI6
The Rt Hon. the Lord Patten of Barnes KG CH
20 Oct 2025
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Asoke Mukerji
Dr Marion Messmer
Rose Gottemoeller · North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Will Todman · Middle East Program, CSIS
13 Oct 2025
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The NSS - Pillar 1 (Security at home)
Brigadier General Eero Rebo · Embassy of Estonia
Captain (Navy) Juha Ravanti · Embassy of Finland
Lisa Hollins · Voluntary & Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (VCSEP)
Lord Toby Harris · National Preparedness Commission
Steve Vincent · West Midlands Local Resilience Forum
14 Jul 2025
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The National Security Strategy
Matthew Collins · Cabinet Office
Rt Hon Pat McFadden MP · Cabinet Office
23 Jun 2025
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The National Security Strategy
Grace Cassy · CyLon Ventures
Lord Peter Ricketts GCMG GCVO · Lords European Affairs Committee
Professor Michael Clarke · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Rachel Ellehuus · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Reports 1 report · click to expand
| Title | HC No. | Published | Items | Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Report – The National Security Strategy | HC 1045 | 27 Mar 2026 | 37 | Responded |
Recommendations & Conclusions
37 results
1
Conclusion
Accepted in Part
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK...
The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK faces with not causing alarm and making sensitive information unnecessarily accessible to adversaries. However, there is a sense among industry stakeholders and civil society organisations …
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Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They also commit to publishing annual public survey findings on risk perception and continuing annual statements to Parliament on resilience.
Cabinet Office
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2
Recommendation
Accepted in Part
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque.
The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque. The Government should provide annual progress updates to this Committee on commitments in the National Security Strategy and in other related strategies such as the Resilience …
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Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through broad stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They commit to making an annual statement to Parliament on resilience but do not specifically agree to provide annual progress updates to the Committee.
Cabinet Office
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3
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society...
The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of engagement and describes its existing comprehensive approach, which includes extensive stakeholder engagement during the National Security Strategy development, various audits, public surveys, and forthcoming strategies like the Defence Industrial Strategy.
Cabinet Office
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4
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad.
Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad. Its erosion would have direct security consequences, most clearly in Africa, where Russia and China are increasingly filling the space left by the withdrawal of the soft power …
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Government Response
The government agreed on the vital role of soft power and described its ongoing efforts, including the establishment of the UK Soft Power Council and a refined ODA approach focused on stability and conflict prevention, while ensuring stable grant funding for key institutions.
Cabinet Office
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5
Recommendation
Accepted in Part
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security...
The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security risks of reducing the Official Development Assistance budget, resisting further cuts that could have a damaging effect for UK strategic interests. We note the International …
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Government Response
The government defends ODA budget reductions but commits to engaging constructively with the International Development Committee's inquiry. They agree on the importance of stable funding for key soft power institutions, will continue to draw on the Soft Power Council's advice, and will ensure soft power is considered in national risk assessments.
Cabinet Office
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6
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security...
The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security policy hampers the possibility for external scrutiny and challenge of national security policy delivery. Our opinion was further solidified when the Department for Science, Innovation …
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Government Response
The government described its internal approach for accountability, assigning lead departments and offering to update the committee on progress. It supported the principle of ministerial accountability but reserved the right to determine which minister is best placed to attend.
Cabinet Office
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7
Recommendation
Accepted in Part
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering...
The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering the commitments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) will be sustained over time. This should involve accountability mechanisms at fixed points, for example through regular …
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Government Response
The government describes its internal implementation approach for accountability and periodic reporting on National Security Strategy objectives and commits to updating the Committee on progress. However, it does not agree to publish an addendum assigning delivery responsibilities to named ministers, affirming departmental and ministerial accountability more broadly.
Cabinet Office
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8
Recommendation
Accepted in Part
4th Report – The National Security…
All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make...
All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make themselves available for scrutiny by this Committee at regular intervals, and as requested, to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)
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Government Response
The government accepted the principle of ministerial accountability and that ministers should attend when called upon, but stated that the government should be able to confirm which minister is best placed to represent the issue.
Cabinet Office
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9
Conclusion
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will...
Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending …
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Government Response
The government explains that NATO has agreed on the definition of the 1.5% spending target for resilience and security, addressing the lack of clarity. They expect to meet the target by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly.
Cabinet Office
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10
Recommendation
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond...
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to …
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Government Response
The government acknowledges the 1.5% NATO target for security and resilience spending, stating it expects to reach it by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly. However, it does not provide specific clarity on plans for developing additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027 or by the next NATO summit.
Cabinet Office
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11
Conclusion
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI),...
We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what …
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Government Response
The government accepts the need for clarity, committing to mapping resilience standards and developing guidance for CNI owners and operators. It also mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act and an upcoming National Cyber Action Plan to strengthen resilience, including for CNI.
Cabinet Office
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12
Recommendation
Not Addressed
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves,...
The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves, and provide more detail for its plans to involve the reserves in the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. This should include planning for their use …
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Government Response
The government's response largely discusses cyber resilience for Critical National Infrastructure. While it mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act in 2026, it provides no detail on accelerating plans for improving the size and state of the reserves or their specific involvement in CNI protection as requested.
Cabinet Office
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13
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as...
The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators …
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Government Response
The government commits to supporting CNI operators in meeting new Cyber Bill requirements by issuing implementation guidance for regulators and a code of practice to clarify expectations. They are also mapping resilience standards and developing NPSA guidance to identify and address gaps in support and clarity.
Cabinet Office
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14
Conclusion
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is...
While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans …
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Government Response
The government addresses the committee's questions about the UK Resilience Academy's effectiveness and remit by stating it is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness for whole-system civil emergencies and is developing a national exercising hub linked to risk monitoring.
Cabinet Office
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15
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in...
The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to …
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Government Response
The government agrees, stating the UK Resilience Academy is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness plans for whole-system civil emergencies, including through document reviews and interviews. The UKRA is also developing a national exercising hub.
Cabinet Office
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16
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen...
The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh …
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Government Response
The government accepts the recommendations, stating the UKRA will convene expert panels to scrutinise plans and preparedness, and is a key partner in developing a national exercising hub to link exercising with risk monitoring.
Cabinet Office
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17
Conclusion
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through...
The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to …
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Government Response
The government acknowledges that the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort already underway, citing high-level speeches and ongoing public surveys. It confirms commitments made in the Resilience Action Plan and Strategic Defence Review and will publish updated information in due course.
Cabinet Office
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18
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience...
The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part …
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Government Response
The government states the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort, with various senior figures already contributing to raise public awareness. They committed to communicating actions through the Resilience Action Plan, publishing public survey findings on risk perception, and will publish the public version of the Joint Concept Note in due course.
Cabinet Office
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19
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great...
Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great power competition between the United States and China. If this process continues to accelerate, the economic shock costs of military confrontation will go down, making …
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Government Response
The government agrees with the committee's conclusion that global security is challenged by increasing tensions, stating that it aligns with the National Security Strategy's acknowledgement of radical uncertainty and the need for statecraft to adapt.
Cabinet Office
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20
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and...
The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great …
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Government Response
The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it largely summarises what is already set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, which acknowledges radical uncertainty and adapts statecraft to a more competitive global environment.
Cabinet Office
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21
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and...
The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and continues to do good work to deter further Russian aggression. The Committee commends the Government for its continued military and financial assistance for Ukraine and …
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Government Response
The government welcomes the committee's support for its work against the Russian threat and in aiding Ukraine. It reaffirms its commitment to working with NATO allies, taking a leadership role in European security, and mentions forthcoming plans like the Defence Investment Plan and Defence Readiness Bill.
Cabinet Office
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22
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against...
As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue …
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Government Response
The government accepts the importance of maintaining momentum against Russia and a leadership role. It commits to publishing the Defence Investment Plan shortly, responding to the Rycroft report in coming months with immediate implementation steps, and describes the purpose of the Defence Readiness Bill.
Cabinet Office
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23
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious...
China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious targeting of UK interests, and indirectly through its support to Russia over the Ukraine conflict. We have concerns that the Government is not striking the …
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Government Response
The government acknowledges China's long-term national security threat and states it is taking a strategic approach that balances economic engagement with robust challenge, citing existing measures like the NSI Act and ongoing diplomatic engagement with China regarding Russia.
Cabinet Office
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24
Recommendation
Not Addressed
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain...
The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain risks with its desire for closer economic ties with China. It should, for example, be more proactive in raising the issue of Beijing’s ongoing support …
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Government Response
The government outlined its existing strategic approach to China, balancing threats and opportunities, and described current actions to challenge risks and engage on issues like Russia's war. However, it did not commit to articulating its balancing act more clearly or publishing detailed national security statements with new treaties/agreements.
Cabinet Office
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25
Conclusion
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence...
The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United …
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Government Response
The government affirmed its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and new investments in sovereign capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
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26
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government...
As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ …
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Government Response
The government stated its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and investments in capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
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27
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO...
The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from …
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Government Response
The government stated its commitment to diversifying relationships beyond NATO, citing programmes like AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme, and partnerships with India and Indonesia as examples of how it is already developing strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies to reduce dependencies.
Cabinet Office
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28
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration...
We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration with India and engagements with Gulf countries. This work is crucial both to ensuring the UK can draw on breadth and depth in its partnerships …
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Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of pursuing strategic relationships and highlights its ongoing efforts, including new partnerships with Japan, Indonesia, and India, and the use of instruments like the National Security and Investment Act.
Cabinet Office
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29
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and...
The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. …
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Government Response
The government agrees with the principle of pursuing strategic relationships and outlines existing partnerships and instruments like the National Security and Investment Act, without committing to specific new or accelerated actions as requested.
Cabinet Office
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30
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
A credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is integral to UK national security, and...
A credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is integral to UK national security, and as a buffer against allied proliferation in an era of fast-changing nuclear risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 135)
Government Response
The government agrees with the conclusion, highlighting existing measures such as the NSS and SDR outlining the threat, £6bn investment in nuclear submarine facilities, and deepened nuclear cooperation with France.
Cabinet Office
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31
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending...
The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar …
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Government Response
The government states it has already outlined the threat publicly via the NSS and SDR, and announced £6bn for submarine production facilities. It also noted deepened nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration.
Cabinet Office
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32
Conclusion
Rejected
4th Report – The National Security…
The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear,...
The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear, emerging technologies, shipbuilding and steelmaking, is important. However, beyond this, there is no clear definition of how the Government defines what it considers to be …
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Government Response
The government rejects providing a strict definition or published list of sovereign capabilities, citing risks. It states clarity is instead provided through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and the National Security and Investment Act, with further details coming in the Defence Investment Plan.
Cabinet Office
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33
Conclusion
Acknowledged
4th Report – The National Security…
We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree.
We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree. However, the general lack of clarity on definitions and objectives complicates research and development planning and investment. The UK has a strong base of talent and …
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Government Response
The government acknowledges the need for clarity but states they will not provide a strict definition of sovereignty, opting instead for a flexible approach through strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and National Security and Investment Act. They believe these existing mechanisms, alongside the forthcoming DIP, provide sufficient certainty and signalling for industry.
Cabinet Office
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34
Recommendation
Rejected
4th Report – The National Security…
The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including...
The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including different levels of sovereignty. The Government should also outline which specific existing and emerging technologies it is seeking to develop, and to what level of …
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Government Response
The government rejected the need for a strict written definition of sovereign capability or a restrictive list of technologies, arguing a flexible approach through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and NSIA provides clarity while avoiding risks of obsolescence or revealing vulnerabilities.
Cabinet Office
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35
Recommendation
Accepted
4th Report – The National Security…
Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities...
Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)
Government Response
The government committed to setting out the UK’s capability priorities for the next ten years within the Defence Investment Plan, providing a clear signal to industry, while explaining its preference for a dynamic rather than restrictive approach.
Cabinet Office
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36
Conclusion
Deferred
4th Report – The National Security…
Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence,...
Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence, security and resilience sectors. This impacts the ability to plan research and development spending in a way that aligns with Government objectives, and prioritises the …
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Government Response
The government commits to addressing the issue of inadequate signals by publishing a forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy and an SME action plan with a direct spending target, once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
Cabinet Office
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37
Recommendation
Deferred
4th Report – The National Security…
The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible.
The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible. Within the Plan, the Government should provide further detail on the funding mechanisms it will use to support firms as it seeks to revitalise 67 the UK’s …
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Government Response
The government stated that the MOD’s forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy will detail measures to improve SME access to finance, and an SME action plan and direct spending target will be published once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
Cabinet Office
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Correspondence 6 letters
24 Jun 2026
From committee
Letter to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, relating to the Government's response to the Committee's report on The National Security Strategy, dated 23 June 2026
Parliament page
16 Mar 2026
To committee
Response from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster relating to the NSS inquiry and NSC agendas, dated 11 February 2026
Parliament page
26 Jan 2026
To committee
Letter from the Chair to the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster relating to funding commitments in the National Security Strategy, and the response, dated 14 January 2026
Parliament page
28 Oct 2025
To committee
Letter from Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government relating to the planning application for the Chinese Embassy, dated 21 October 2025
Parliament page
8 Sep 2025
Correspondence from Matt Collins, Deputy National Security Adviser following the oral evidence session on 14 July on The National Security Strategy, dated 15 August 2025
Parliament page
23 Jun 2025
Correspondence from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster relating to the forthcoming National Security Strategy, dated 19 June 2025
Parliament page