The Security of 5G

Defence Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 6 Mar 2020 Closed: 9 Jul 2021 Parliament page
The UK Government wants to be a global leader in 5G and the rollout has already begun in many areas. However, there are concerns about the security of 5G, including the use of equipment in networks supplied by foreign companies. This inquiry looks at these security issues. The Government announced … Read more
13 Recommendations
17 Conclusions
1 Report
3 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 6 events
16 Dec
2020
Report published
8 Oct
2020
Report published
22 Sep
2020
Formal meeting (private meeting) · Room 13, Palace of Westminster
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
6 May
2020
Correspondence
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Second Report - The Security of 5G HC 201 8 Oct 2020 30 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
30 results
2 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G...
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological … Read more
Government Response
The Government’s primary aims for 5G are for the UK to become a global leader in the technology by reducing barriers to 5G deployment and realising the full benefits of … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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3 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough.
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough. Even with the inclusion of Huawei the market was “sub-optimal” and the Government’s decision to remove Huawei completely from 5G by 2027 poses a risk … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees that the UK vendor market is not diverse enough, as highlighted in the Telecoms Supply Chain Review. The Review outlines the need for further diversification in the … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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4 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of...
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network … Read more
Government Response
As the Committee notes, the Government has followed an approach that takes into account our specific national circumstances and the full range of risks. The Government made its advice on … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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5 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both...
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some … Read more
Government Response
Hostile actors must understand that irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace will carry cost. The UK and our allies will continue to expose those that aim to do us and our institutions … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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6 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the...
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the international stage and works to find a deterrent to counter them. There is currently a lack of global rules regulating international cyber-attacks and the Government … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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7 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified.
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK … Read more
Government Response
The UK has unique insight into Huawei’s presence in our networks and the Government has been quick to respond to the changing risk environment for network security. Because of the … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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8 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has resulted in the UK leading...
The establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has resulted in the UK leading the world in understanding Huawei’s equipment. Despite the planned withdrawal of Huawei from our 5G networks, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre should continue to … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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9 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was...
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations … Read more
Government Response
The Government appreciates the recognition of the excellent job that Government Communications HQ (GCHQ) and the NCSC do to manage risk in the UK telecoms network. We have always been … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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10 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having...
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having a greater number of vendors involved in 5G network provision, despite the designation as high-risk, as this improves overall network resilience should a single vendor … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees that the UK market will benefit from a greater number of vendors. We have developed the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, published on 30 November, to diversify … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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11 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in...
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable … Read more
Government Response
The Government welcomes the Committee’s conclusions and recognition of the Government’s response to the changed context. The Government’s position as set out in January related to high risk vendors generally; … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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12 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive...
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive defence and national security sites. The Defence Secretary has informed us that no Huawei 5G equipment is present on the defence estate and that sensitive … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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13 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share...
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if … Read more
Government Response
The UK’s most sensitive information and capabilities are protected independently of any public networks and their security does not rely on any public network. Our advice on high risk vendors … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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14 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such...
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the … Read more
Government Response
The Five Eyes relationship is robust. The nature of the partnership is such that whilst we share the most important, fundamental principles, there are areas where, from time to time, … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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15 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the...
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the … Read more
Government Response
The UK has a special and enduring relationship with the US on security, as well as a vast range of wider issues. That relationship goes beyond any single issue and … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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16 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from...
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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17 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese...
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness … Read more
Government Response
The UK has always been open to a range of vendors in our telecommunications network. We welcome Chinese investment, but will take the necessary measures to protect our national security—as … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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18 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and...
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese … Read more
Government Response
to satisfy our robust legal, regulatory and national security requirements. The new regime introduced under the National Security Investment Bill will be an important addition to existing tools and align … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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19 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of...
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of Huawei in its 5G infrastructure through both covert and overt threats. More recently, following the Government’s announcement for the long-term withdrawal of Huawei from its … Read more
Government Response
The UK and China have a constructive and positive relationship and are clear and direct where we disagree. We welcome Chinese investment, but will take the necessary measures to protect … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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20 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge...
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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21 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique,...
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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22 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide...
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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23 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Global standards are key to 5G and future telecommunications networks.
Global standards are key to 5G and future telecommunications networks. China has been very active in the standard setting bodies whilst the UK and allies have stood back. This is not satisfactory. The UK should take a leadership role in … Read more
Government Response
Standards are a crucial part of the Government’s work to diversify the supply chain. of stakeholder needs, and support diversification, innovation and open interfaces. This will include assessing how we … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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24 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has faced pressure to remove Huawei more quickly than by 2027.
The Government has faced pressure to remove Huawei more quickly than by 2027. The evidence we have received would suggest that a quicker timescale could result in signal blackouts, delay the 5G rollout significantly and cost both operators and the … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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25 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for...
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for a coherent long-term strategy for the UK’s technical and technological ambitions. It is not clear to us that the Government has a cohesive strategy in … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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26 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Despite being a longer timeframe than some have called for, the Government’s most recent restrictions...
Despite being a longer timeframe than some have called for, the Government’s most recent restrictions on the use of Huawei in 5G networks will delay the 5G rollout and economically damage the UK and mobile network operators. The UK Government … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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27 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory.
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory. Whilst this reflects a wider consolidated ecosystem of global 5G vendors action must now be taken to ensure that 5G is in a more secure position in the years to come.
Government Response
The Government agrees that the UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory, and we recognise that there is a need to work at pace to make early progress on … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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28 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the...
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the UK, for example Samsung or NEC and also encourage the development of industrial capacity in the UK. This will not only improve market diversity but … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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29 Conclusion
Second Report - The Security of 5G
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one...
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one in which operators no longer have to consider which vendor to source from. It will also improve network security in a number of other ways. … Read more
Government Response
The Government agrees that OpenRAN is an important part of the future diversification of telecoms networks alongside other technologies that support open and interoperable networks. Our diversification strategy is based … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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30 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory.
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory. The Telecoms Security Bill is required to bring regulations up to date and allow Government to compel operators to act in the interests of security. The current situation has … Read more
Ministry of Defence
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31 Recommendation
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess.
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess. This did not happen. There must be no further delay. The Government should introduce the Telecoms Security Bill before 31 December
Ministry of Defence
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Correspondence 3 letters
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chair to the Secretary of State for Defence in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 3 June 2020, from the Secretary of State for Defence to the Chair in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
6 May 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chairman to the Defence Secretary in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page