The Security of 5G

Defence Committee Closed Inquiry
Opened: 6 Mar 2020 Closed: 9 Jul 2021 Parliament page
The UK Government wants to be a global leader in 5G and the rollout has already begun in many areas. However, there are concerns about the security of 5G, including the use of equipment in networks supplied by foreign companies. This inquiry looks at these security issues. The Government announced … Read more
16 Recommendations
14 Conclusions
1 Report
3 Letters
1 Event
Activity timeline 6 events
16 Dec
2020
Report published
8 Oct
2020
Report published
22 Sep
2020
Formal meeting (private meeting) · Room 13, Palace of Westminster
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
9 Jun
2020
Correspondence
6 May
2020
Correspondence
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Second Report - The Security of 5G HC 201 8 Oct 2020 30 Responded
Recommendations & Conclusions
30 results
2 Conclusion Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G...
We share the Government’s objective that the UK remains at the forefront of the 5G rollout as we move into the next technological era. It is imperative that the UK is amongst the first countries to benefit from the technological … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the objective for the UK to be a global leader in 5G, stating security is paramount, and highlights ongoing 5G testbeds and trials leveraging UK cybersecurity expertise to achieve secure networks and economic benefits.
Ministry of Defence
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3 Conclusion Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough.
It is clear that the UK vendor market for 5G kit is not diverse enough. Even with the inclusion of Huawei the market was “sub-optimal” and the Government’s decision to remove Huawei completely from 5G by 2027 poses a risk … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees the UK vendor market is insufficiently diverse and has published a multifaceted 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy to address this, aiming to maintain network resilience while growing the market and building UK capability.
Ministry of Defence
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4 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of...
This inquiry was launched in the context of a lively debate on the security of the UK’s 5G network in Parliament and across the country from late 2019 and through 2020 with a focus on the presence in our network … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's observation that it has balanced technical and geopolitical considerations when formulating its 5G policy, stating its approach was evidence-based and informed by comprehensive security assessments.
Ministry of Defence
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5 Conclusion Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both...
There is evidence that the UK, and our allies, face many malicious cyber- attacks both from rogue individuals and state-sponsored attacks from states such as Russia and China. These attacks are diverse in their nature and in their aims. Some … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the prevalence of malicious cyber-attacks and states its commitment to making hostile actors understand there are consequences, by exposing them, using existing and new tools like sanctions, and coordinating with international partners.
Ministry of Defence
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6 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the...
It is important that the Government continues to call out cyber-attacks from adversaries on the international stage and works to find a deterrent to counter them. There is currently a lack of global rules regulating international cyber-attacks and the Government … Read more
Government Response
The government states it is committed to promoting stability in cyberspace through international cooperation with allies. It clarifies that it does employ offensive cyber capabilities as part of its deterrence strategy, delivered by the National Cyber Force, addressing the committee's underlying question.
Ministry of Defence
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7 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified.
There is no doubt that Huawei’s designation as a high-risk vendor is justified. The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has consistently reported on its low-quality products and concerning approach to software development, which has resulted in increased risk to UK … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's findings on Huawei's risks, stating that its unique insight and technical analysis have informed its risk mitigation position. It adds that it will continue working with alternative vendors like Nokia and Ericsson.
Ministry of Defence
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8 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has resulted in the UK leading...
The establishment of the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has resulted in the UK leading the world in understanding Huawei’s equipment. Despite the planned withdrawal of Huawei from our 5G networks, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre should continue to … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees to maintain HCSEC for Huawei equipment for as long as it remains in UK networks. For other vendors, it will introduce a new security framework via the Telecommunications (Security) Bill and create a national facility for research and testing, but an HCSEC-like model may not be appropriate.
Ministry of Defence
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9 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was...
Advice to Government was clear, that the presence of Huawei in the UK’s networks was a manageable risk. The UK has one of the most active and effective cyber-security regimes in the world, and, from our public and private conversations … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the committee's confidence in GCHQ and NCSC, stating it appreciates the recognition and has carefully risk-managed Huawei's presence since 2003 through robust oversight mechanisms like HCSEC.
Ministry of Defence
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10 Conclusion Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having...
Furthermore, whilst the risk remained manageable, it is important to remember the benefits in having a greater number of vendors involved in 5G network provision, despite the designation as high-risk, as this improves overall network resilience should a single vendor … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that a greater number of 5G vendors benefits the UK market and has launched a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, including an initial £250 million investment, exploring R&D incentives, and working with international partners to diversify the supply chain.
Ministry of Defence
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11 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in...
Prior to the US sanctions announced in May, the risk of Huawei products remaining in the UK’s 5G networks was, according to the Government, significant but manageable through monitoring and regulation. The situation changed when Huawei was deprived of reliable … Read more
Government Response
The government welcomes the committee’s conclusions and recognition of its response to the changed context, confirming that US sanctions altered the risk associated with Huawei's presence, making an updated government position necessary.
Ministry of Defence
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12 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive...
We are content that Huawei has been, and continues to be, sufficiently distanced from sensitive defence and national security sites. The Defence Secretary has informed us that no Huawei 5G equipment is present on the defence estate and that sensitive … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees that Huawei should continue to be distanced from sensitive networks, confirming that high-risk vendors are already excluded from critical and sensitive sites, a decision enforced through the Telecommunications (Security) Bill.
Ministry of Defence
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13 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share...
Huawei’s continued presence in commercial 5G networks does not impact on our ability to share sensitive information with partners. We have been told that Huawei is not present in our sensitive networks and that, due to encryption standards, even if … Read more
Government Response
The government confirms that the UK's most sensitive information is protected independently of public networks, and GCHQ has categorically confirmed that high-risk vendor decisions do not affect intelligence sharing. It also notes that equipment from high-risk vendors is banned near particularly sensitive sites.
Ministry of Defence
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14 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such...
The Government has had to balance its own technical considerations with pressures from allies such as the United States. The UK’s closest allies, including the United States and Australia, originally embarked on a policy at odds to that of the … Read more
Government Response
The government reaffirms the robustness of the Five Eyes relationship and its ongoing cooperation with allies, stating that while approaches may differ, the partnership is strong. It indicates that decisive action was taken based on UK circumstances and expert analysis.
Ministry of Defence
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15 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the...
The framing of the issue by the United States as a technical concern about the presence of Huawei in our networks has generated disagreement between the two Governments, given the contrasting conclusions of technical experts on either side of the … Read more
Government Response
The government emphasizes the special and enduring relationship with the US, stating it has been in close touch on telecoms security and continues to work closely to increase global standards and promote diversification.
Ministry of Defence
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16 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from...
In the end, the Government decision was taken because of the technical considerations resulting from sanctions; however the Government should have considered the potential damage to key alliances enough of a risk to begin to remove Huawei from the UK’s … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of working closely with allies and sharing experiences to raise cyber security standards, stating it is already doing so and will continue to engage. It does not explicitly address the recommendation to have considered alliance damage earlier.
Ministry of Defence
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17 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese...
It is clear that Huawei is strongly linked to the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, despite its statements to the contrary. This is evidenced by its ownership model and the subsidies it has received. Additionally, Huawei’s apparent willingness … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the need to protect national security while remaining open to investment, stating that risks associated with Huawei have been carefully managed through detailed formal oversight by HCSEC since 2010.
Ministry of Defence
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18 Conclusion Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and...
Concern about Huawei is therefore based on clear evidence of collusion between the company and the Chinese Communist Party apparatus. It is important that the West does not succumb to ill-informed anti-China hysteria and recognises the mutual benefits of Chinese … Read more
Government Response
The government states that decisions are made to satisfy robust legal, regulatory, and national security requirements, highlighting the new National Security Investment Bill as an important addition to existing tools for ensuring evidence-based risk assessment.
Ministry of Defence
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19 Conclusion Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of...
Pressure has been exerted by China on the UK Government to retain the presence of Huawei in its 5G infrastructure through both covert and overt threats. More recently, following the Government’s announcement for the long-term withdrawal of Huawei from its … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the situation by affirming its balanced approach to China, welcoming investment while reiterating its commitment to protect national security and reject compromising investments, as demonstrated with 5G infrastructure.
Ministry of Defence
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20 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge...
Ending China’s involvement in the UK’s critical infrastructure would be a radical step with huge implications for the UK’s economy. If threats by the Chinese state to withdraw from the UK’s critical industries continue and worsen, the Government should carefully … Read more
Government Response
The government affirms its commitment to protect national security, stating that all critical infrastructure investments are thoroughly scrutinised, and confirms the new National Security and Investment Bill will provide important additional powers to intervene against risks.
Ministry of Defence
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21 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique,...
It is evident that the UK’s lack of industrial capacity in telecommunications is not unique, with China dominating the industry. In order to combat this dominance, we support the principle of proposals for forming a D10 alliance of democracies to … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees on the importance of working with allies on network security and industrial capacity, stating it will continue to work closely and internationally to address challenges and forge consensus on standards. However, it does not commit to specifically setting out the role of a D10 alliance or quickly formulating joint 5G policy.
Ministry of Defence
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22 Recommendation Acknowledged
Second Report - The Security of 5G
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide...
We recognise that a D10 alliance could become more than just an alliance to provide alternatives to Chinese technology. For security reasons beyond the remit of this inquiry we recommend that the Government takes steps to engage a D10 alliance … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the importance of liberal democracies working together and states it will consider how to best advance this through current or new groupings, without committing to a specific D10 alliance.
Ministry of Defence
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23 Recommendation Deferred
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Global standards are key to 5G and future telecommunications networks.
Global standards are key to 5G and future telecommunications networks. China has been very active in the standard setting bodies whilst the UK and allies have stood back. This is not satisfactory. The UK should take a leadership role in … Read more
Government Response
The government acknowledges the crucial role of standards and commits to starting work soon to assess how best to support UK industry in standards development and position the UK for leadership in shaping global standards.
Ministry of Defence
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24 Recommendation Rejected
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government has faced pressure to remove Huawei more quickly than by 2027.
The Government has faced pressure to remove Huawei more quickly than by 2027. The evidence we have received would suggest that a quicker timescale could result in signal blackouts, delay the 5G rollout significantly and cost both operators and the … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects an earlier removal of Huawei equipment than 2027, stating that a faster timeline would incur significant costs, delay 5G rollout, and increase the risk of actual network disruption.
Ministry of Defence
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25 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for...
The issues surrounding Huawei’s removal and the UK’s consolidated vendor ecosystem illustrate the need for a coherent long-term strategy for the UK’s technical and technological ambitions. It is not clear to us that the Government has a cohesive strategy in … Read more
Government Response
The government accepts the need for a long-term plan, pointing to its published Research and Development Roadmap and commitment to develop more detailed plans, which will complement a refreshed Industrial Strategy and the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy.
Ministry of Defence
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26 Recommendation Accepted in Part
Second Report - The Security of 5G
Despite being a longer timeframe than some have called for, the Government’s most recent restrictions...
Despite being a longer timeframe than some have called for, the Government’s most recent restrictions on the use of Huawei in 5G networks will delay the 5G rollout and economically damage the UK and mobile network operators. The UK Government … Read more
Government Response
The government rejects providing compensation to operators, stating providers are responsible for security costs. However, it will consult on changes to the Electronic Communications Code for easier site access and is progressing initiatives for public sector land access to minimise deployment barriers.
Ministry of Defence
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27 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory.
The UK market for vendors is far from satisfactory. Whilst this reflects a wider consolidated ecosystem of global 5G vendors action must now be taken to ensure that 5G is in a more secure position in the years to come.
Government Response
The government agrees the vendor market is unsatisfactory and has committed £250 million, published a 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy, is engaging suppliers and exploring R&D incentives, and appointed a Telecoms Diversification Taskforce to address the issue.
Ministry of Defence
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28 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the...
The Government should work with mobile network operators to bring in new suppliers to the UK, for example Samsung or NEC and also encourage the development of industrial capacity in the UK. This will not only improve market diversity but … Read more
Government Response
The government is actively working with mobile network operators and suppliers, providing £1.6 million grant funding to NEC for a NeutrORAN testbed and highlighting SME involvement in 5G Create projects, including trials with Samsung kit.
Ministry of Defence
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29 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one...
OpenRAN presents an opportunity to move away from the current consolidated vendor environment to one in which operators no longer have to consider which vendor to source from. It will also improve network security in a number of other ways. … Read more
Government Response
The government agrees with the importance of OpenRAN and states it is already investing in the technology through its diversification strategy, citing commitment to the NEC NeurtORAN trial and industry deployments by Vodafone UK.
Ministry of Defence
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30 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory.
The current regulatory situation for network security is outdated and unsatisfactory. The Telecoms Security Bill is required to bring regulations up to date and allow Government to compel operators to act in the interests of security. The current situation has … Read more
Government Response
The government accepts the need for the Telecoms Security Bill, stating it was introduced to Parliament on 24 November 2020, to enhance regulatory powers and ensure national security is prioritised over commercial considerations.
Ministry of Defence
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31 Recommendation Accepted
Second Report - The Security of 5G
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess.
The House was promised a Telecoms Security Bill before the summer recess. This did not happen. There must be no further delay. The Government should introduce the Telecoms Security Bill before 31 December
Government Response
The government states that the Telecommunications (Security) Bill was introduced to the House of Commons on 24 November 2020, fulfilling the recommendation to introduce it before 31 December.
Ministry of Defence
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Government Response AI assessment · 30 of 16 classified
Accepted 14
Accepted in Part 2
Acknowledged 12
Deferred 1
Rejected 1
Total 16 recs + 14 conclusions
Correspondence 3 letters
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chair to the Secretary of State for Defence in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
9 Jun 2020 Letter, dated 3 June 2020, from the Secretary of State for Defence to the Chair in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page
6 May 2020 Letter, dated 6 May 2020, from the Chairman to the Defence Secretary in relation to Huawei and F35
Parliament page