Reports & recommendations
16 recommendations, each with the government response on the record. Filter by government response or delivery status.
Reports (1)
| Title | Volume | Publication Date | Recommendations | Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windscale Inquiry — Final Report | - | 26 Jan 1978 | 16 |
Recommendations (16)
Independent vetting of security precautions
Consideration should be given to charging some independent person or body with the task of (a) vetting security precautions both at Windscale and during transit of plutonium from Windscale and (b) reviewing the adequacy of such precautions from time to time (para 7.18).
Krypton 85 removal plant development
BNFL should devote effort to the development of plant for the safe removal and retention of krypton 85 and, if development proves successful, should incorporate it in the proposed plant (para 10.52).
Permanent whole body monitoring of local people
More permanent arrangements for whole body monitoring of local people should be instituted. Subject to certain general principles, the details should be agreed by those directly concerned. They would not be appropriate to planning conditions (paras 10.93, 10.94 and 10.126).
Whole body monitoring as authorisation condition
The authorising departments should however consider whether provision of such facilities should be made a condition of authorisations to discharge (para 10.95).
Independent person on radiological standards advice
Consideration should be given to the inclusion of some wholly independent person or body with environmental interests in the system for advising central government on the fixing of radiological protection standards. That person or body should probably be changed from time to time (para 10.111).
Single Inspectorate for radioactive discharges
A single Inspectorate, as recommended by the Royal Commission, should be responsible for determining and controlling all radioactive discharges (para 10.113).
Specific discharge limits per radionuclide
There should be specific discharge limits for each significant radionuclide. The onus should be placed clearly on the operator to show that a discharge cannot practicably be avoided before the limits are fixed (paras 10.115–10.116).
Re-examine Radioactive Substances Act inquiry powers
The provisions of the Radioactive Substances Act 1960 relating to the powers to hold inquiries into proposed authorisations to discharge should be re-examined (para 10.122).
More monitoring of atmospheric discharges
The relevant authorities should carry out more monitoring of atmospheric discharges (para 10.126).
Faster discharge reports and annual survey
FRL should publish their annual reports more rapidly in future. There should, as recommended by the Royal Commission, be one comprehensive annual survey published of all discharges and at intervals, reports by NRPB on radiation exposure (para 10.126).
BNFL safety precautions and procedures
BNFL should do more, in future, to ensure that safety precautions and operating procedures at Windscale are sufficient for all eventualities, are strictly observed and are continually rehearsed. (para 11.11.)
Inspectorate scientific expertise review
The current review of NII should examine whether they are sufficiently equipped with scientific expertise to check the designs for the proposed plant (para 11.24).
Awareness of emergency plan responsibilities
It is essential that those who would be required to take action under the Windscale emergency plan are fully aware of the responsibilities the plan places on them (para 11.30).
Reorganise local liaison committee
The local liaison committee should be re-organised and its functions re-defined. (para 11.34).
Fuel flasks to continue by rail
Fuel flasks should, as far as possible, continue to be delivered to Windscale by rail, but this is not a matter appropriate to planning conditions (paras 14.28 and 14.45).
Grant outline planning permission for THORP
Outline planning permission for THORP should be granted without delay, subject to conditions (paras 14.39–14.41, 14.45 and 16.1).