Parliament

The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation.

The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. It does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone, and in no circumstance will UK personnel ever be authorised to take action amounting to, unlawful killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (“CIDT”), or extraordinary rendition.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10, Captured Persons, is the capstone doctrine publication for all Captured Persons activities. It provides detailed direction and guidance to UK Armed Forces involved in planning, training for or conducting captured persons activities. Importantly, it also reflects the UK Government’s policy and guidance resulting from recent operations.

Complimenting JDP 1-10 are The Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. These follow a thorough review of existing guidance to be as clear as possible about the standards under which the intelligence agencies and our Armed Forces operate.

The use of approved verbal and non-physical techniques remains vital if we are to retain the ability to secure swiftly in appropriate circumstances intelligence that can save lives. These techniques are non-threatening and do not cause physical harm.

However, the prohibition on the ‘five techniques’, introduced in 1972, remains in force, as set out in JDP 1-10. The prohibited techniques were redefined following the 2010 Baha Mousa public inquiry as: Stress positions; Hooding; Subjection to noise; Deprivation of sleep and rest; and, Deprivation of food and water. These techniques must never be used for any purpose.

The UK takes all alleged incidents of this kind very seriously, and allegations against UK personnel are investigated. Regrettably, as previously acknowledged, for example in the Baha Mousa Inquiry published in 2011, unauthorised use of the ‘five techniques’ were used by elements of UK forces in Iraq.

With regard to compensation, as a matter of policy, when claims are received, they are investigated and considered on the basis of whether the MOD has a legal liability; and where there is such a liability, compensation is paid.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation.

The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. It does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone, and in no circumstance will UK personnel ever be authorised to take action amounting to, unlawful killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (“CIDT”), or extraordinary rendition.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10, Captured Persons, is the capstone doctrine publication for all Captured Persons activities. It provides detailed direction and guidance to UK Armed Forces involved in planning, training for or conducting captured persons activities. Importantly, it also reflects the UK Government’s policy and guidance resulting from recent operations.

Complimenting JDP 1-10 are The Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. These follow a thorough review of existing guidance to be as clear as possible about the standards under which the intelligence agencies and our Armed Forces operate.

The use of approved verbal and non-physical techniques remains vital if we are to retain the ability to secure swiftly in appropriate circumstances intelligence that can save lives. These techniques are non-threatening and do not cause physical harm.

However, the prohibition on the ‘five techniques’, introduced in 1972, remains in force, as set out in JDP 1-10. The prohibited techniques were redefined following the 2010 Baha Mousa public inquiry as: Stress positions; Hooding; Subjection to noise; Deprivation of sleep and rest; and, Deprivation of food and water. These techniques must never be used for any purpose.

The UK takes all alleged incidents of this kind very seriously, and allegations against UK personnel are investigated. Regrettably, as previously acknowledged, for example in the Baha Mousa Inquiry published in 2011, unauthorised use of the ‘five techniques’ were used by elements of UK forces in Iraq.

With regard to compensation, as a matter of policy, when claims are received, they are investigated and considered on the basis of whether the MOD has a legal liability; and where there is such a liability, compensation is paid.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)’s report entitled “Situation in Iraq/UK”, published on 9 December 2020, brings to an end its long running examination into allegations of war crimes by UK personnel in Iraq, with the finding that there is no basis on which to proceed to a full investigation.

The UK Government maintains a clear policy framework governing detention, interrogation and the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees. It does not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone, and in no circumstance will UK personnel ever be authorised to take action amounting to, unlawful killing, the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (“CIDT”), or extraordinary rendition.

Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10, Captured Persons, is the capstone doctrine publication for all Captured Persons activities. It provides detailed direction and guidance to UK Armed Forces involved in planning, training for or conducting captured persons activities. Importantly, it also reflects the UK Government’s policy and guidance resulting from recent operations.

Complimenting JDP 1-10 are The Principles Relating to the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas and the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees. These follow a thorough review of existing guidance to be as clear as possible about the standards under which the intelligence agencies and our Armed Forces operate.

The use of approved verbal and non-physical techniques remains vital if we are to retain the ability to secure swiftly in appropriate circumstances intelligence that can save lives. These techniques are non-threatening and do not cause physical harm.

However, the prohibition on the ‘five techniques’, introduced in 1972, remains in force, as set out in JDP 1-10. The prohibited techniques were redefined following the 2010 Baha Mousa public inquiry as: Stress positions; Hooding; Subjection to noise; Deprivation of sleep and rest; and, Deprivation of food and water. These techniques must never be used for any purpose.

The UK takes all alleged incidents of this kind very seriously, and allegations against UK personnel are investigated. Regrettably, as previously acknowledged, for example in the Baha Mousa Inquiry published in 2011, unauthorised use of the ‘five techniques’ were used by elements of UK forces in Iraq.

With regard to compensation, as a matter of policy, when claims are received, they are investigated and considered on the basis of whether the MOD has a legal liability; and where there is such a liability, compensation is paid.

Following the conclusion of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) were directed by the then Secretary of State to reinvestigate his death. The investigation into the death of Baha Mousa remains ongoing. This is a criminal investigation and it would be inappropriate to provide any further details.

The death of Tariq Sabri al-Fahdawi (also known as Tariq Sabri Mahmud) was not investigated by the IHAT, which forwarded the result of their review of the original Royal Air Force Police investigation to the Provost Marshal (Royal Air Force) on 8 March 2012. The further investigation initiated by the RAF Police has been completed, and the Service Prosecution Authority has decided that no-one should face charges in this case.

The undertaking made in 1977 continues to be Government policy, but it was regrettably breached on occasions during operations in Iraq in circumstances described fully in the Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry (HC1452) published on 8 September 2011. Remedial action to prevent any recurrence was taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Inquiry.

I refer the right hon. Gentleman to the Written Ministerial Statement of 27 March 2014, (Office Report,column 32WS),in which I explained that the Ministry of Defence have considered Sir William Gage’s recommendation but have not felt it necessary to modify further the existing inspection regime which already possesses the required levels of independence:

"As envisaged in recommendation 44 of the Inquiry’s report, the Department has given careful consideration to the possibility of an independent inspection of the UK’s Afghan detention facilities by Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons. However, UK detention facilities in Afghanistan continue to be inspected by the Provost Marshal (Army) every six months, and annually by the Army Inspector; they are also visited regularly by the International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law. On balance, we believe that this triple inspection regime is already fit for purpose and does not require further amendment."