Reports & recommendations
73 recommendations, each with the government response on the record. Filter by government response or delivery status.
Reports (4)
| Title | Volume | Publication Date | Recommendations | Links |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry | Final Report | 08 Sep 2011 | 0 73 published | |
| The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry - Volume I | Volume I | 08 Sep 2011 | 0 73 published | |
| The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry - Volume II | Volume II | 08 Sep 2011 | 0 | |
| The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry - Volume III | Volume III | 08 Sep 2011 | 73 |
Recommendations (2)
Ban Harsh Approach in Tactical Questioning
The harsh approach should no longer have a place in tactical questioning. The MoD should forbid tactical questioners from using what is currently known as the harsh approach and this should be made clear in the tactical questioning policy and in all relevant training materials.
In September 2011, Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox stated that the Ministry of Defence could not accept a blanket ban on the harsh approach in tactical questioning, though he had asked for the practice to be restricted to defined personnel in defined circumstances (Dr Liam Fox response, Sep 2011; Dr Liam Fox, Sep 2011). In December 2014, Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, reported that the department had confirmed in March 2014 that the recommendation was not adopted for operational reasons, but found that it had withdrawn the technique and replaced it with an approach entitled "Challenging Direct" (Sir Thayne Forbes, Dec 2014).
External Inspection by HMIP
In the ongoing deliberations as to what arrangements should be made for external inspection of main operational detention facilities, the fullest consideration should be given to:
(1) the significant benefit that Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons (HMIP) involvement in the inspection process would bring; and
(2) the fact that while inspecting operational detention facilities may involve compromises to, and divergence from, HMIP’s normal practice, certain practical realities (e.g. inspection only with a warning; CPERS who may very well be distrustful of any inspector from the UK; and limitations on visiting some areas in theatre) would apply to anybody that undertook the inspection role.
Were it to be the case that HMIP did not feel able to fulfil the inspection role for the main theatre detention facilities, the MoD should urgently consider other routes to achieving independent inspection/validation of those facilities by the best means that can be achieved short of full HMIP involvement.
The Inquiry asked the Ministry of Defence to consider external inspection of detention facilities. Answering for the department in October 2014, Mark Francois MP stated that it had considered independent inspection by Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons, but maintained that an existing regime involving the Provost Marshal (Army), the Army Inspector, and the International Committee of the Red Cross was "already fit for purpose and does not require further amendment" (Mr Mark Francois, Oct 2014). Sir Thayne Forbes, Chairman of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, found in December 2014 that the recommendation might well have formed part of the recommendations at the conclusion of his inquiry's report (Sir Thayne Forbes, Dec 2014).