Reports & recommendations

44 recommendations, each with the government response on the record. Filter by government response or delivery status.

Title Volume Publication Date Recommendations Links
Report of the Morecambe Bay Investigation Final 03 Mar 2015 44

Recommendations (44)

1
Not Applicable

Admit problems and apologise to affected families

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should formally admit the extent and nature of the problems that have previously occurred, and should apologise to those patients and relatives affected, not only for the avoidable damage caused but …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary provided in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, noting that action had been taken and that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust entered the Maternity Safety Support Programme in 2021 (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found evidence of implementation, citing the department's July 2015 report stating that the trust had formally admitted the problems and apologised individually to families (Department of Health response, Jul 2015; The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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2
Not Applicable

Review clinical staff competencies

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should review the skills, knowledge, competencies and professional duties of care of all obstetric, paediatric, midwifery and neonatal nursing staff, and other staff caring for critically ill patients in anaesthetics and …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024 published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed, stating that action taken in response had been noted (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in February 2026 that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had established an education, learning and development project following the investigation (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026). It reported that this project set explicit training expectations across women's and children's services and related teams, created a central training management system, and introduced preceptorship and leadership programmes (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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3
Not Applicable

Deliver staff training and development plans

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should draw up plans to deliver the training and development of staff identified as a result of the review of maternity, neonatal and other staff, and should identify opportunities to broaden …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024 published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to the recommendation (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In its February 2026 review, the inquiry legal team found that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had put in place an education, learning, and development project by April 2016, establishing explicit training expectations, a central training management system, and leadership and preceptorship programmes (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
Read full response to 3 (opens in a new tab)
University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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4
Not Applicable

Establish continuing professional development requirements

Recommendation
Following completion of additional training or experience where necessary, the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify requirements for continuing professional development of staff and link this explicitly with professional requirements including revalidation. This should be completed …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary submitted in September 2024, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the recommendation was complete, recording that action taken had been noted (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In a review published in February 2026, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had put in place the Kirkup Education Learning and Development Project by April 2016 (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026). It found that this project agreed explicit training expectations, developed a central training management system to monitor compliance, and introduced preceptorship and leadership development programmes (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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5
Not Applicable

Promote effective multidisciplinary team-working

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify and develop measures that will promote effective multidisciplinary team-working, in particular between paediatricians, obstetricians, midwives and neonatal staff. These measures should include, but not be limited to, joint training …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary provided in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England classified the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to it (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the Trust had taken action to address the recommendation, noting the establishment of a Clinical Quality Project overseen by an Executive Nurse Director (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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6
Not Applicable

Draw up maternity risk assessment protocol

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should draw up a protocol for risk assessment in maternity services, setting out clearly: who should be offered the option of delivery at Furness General Hospital and who should not; who …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, DHSC and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the inquiry's legal team found that the Trust had refreshed and standardised clinical guidance on antenatal and intrapartum risk assessments across its maternity units (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024). Previously, in June 2021, University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust reported that a review panel considered the recommendation would be fully met once a dedicated electronic patient record for maternity was introduced (University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, Jun 2021).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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7
Not Applicable

Audit maternity and paediatric services

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should audit the operation of maternity and paediatric services, to ensure that they follow risk assessment protocols on place of delivery, transfers and management of care, and that effective multidisciplinary care …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary submitted in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing earlier work by University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust to refresh and standardise risk assessment guidance across maternity units (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024). Previously, the Trust had reported in June 2021 that an internal review panel considered the recommendation would be fully met once a dedicated electronic patient record for maternity was introduced (University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, Jun 2021).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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8
Not Applicable

Develop recruitment and retention strategy

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify a recruitment and retention strategy aimed at achieving a balanced and sustainable workforce with the requisite skills and experience. This should include, but not be limited to, seeking links …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to it (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, that inquiry's legal team found that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had developed a recruitment and retention strategy across partner organisations and reviewed employment contracts to provide flexible working (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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9
Not Applicable

Improve joint working between hospital sites

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify an approach to developing better joint working between its main hospital sites, including the development and operation of common policies, systems and standards. Whilst we do not believe that …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024 published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the recommendation was implemented and closed, recording that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing the Trust's development of cross-bay obstetric and midwifery guidelines and Bay-wide procedural documents (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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10
Not Applicable

Establish partner Trust buddying arrangement

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should seek to forge links with a partner Trust, so that both can benefit from opportunities for learning, mentoring, secondment, staff development and sharing approaches to problems. This arrangement is promoted …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the inquiry's legal team found that the measure had been clearly implemented, citing an April 2016 report in which the Trust confirmed strategic partnerships with Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Lancashire Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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11
Not Applicable

Raise awareness of incident reporting and duty of candour

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify and implement a programme to raise awareness of incident reporting, including requirements, benefits and processes. The Trust should also review its policy of openness and honesty in line with …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024, in commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the recommendation was implemented and closed, noting that the Thirlwall Inquiry had recorded action taken (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, in May 2024, the inquiry legal team found that the measure had been clearly implemented, citing a July 2015 report in which the department noted that the Trust had begun an awareness programme with maternity staff (Department of Health response, Jul 2015; The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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12
Not Applicable

Review incident investigation structures

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should review the structures, processes and staff involved in investigating incidents, carrying out root cause analyses, reporting results and disseminating learning from incidents, identifying any residual conflicts of interest and requirements …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary submitted in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the inquiry's legal team noted that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had begun reviewing incident investigation procedures with maternity staff (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024). The Trust had previously stated in June 2021 that a review panel would consider the recommendation fully met once action plans were complete and audits showed sustained improvement, which was due by June 2022 (University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, Jun 2021).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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13
Not Applicable

Improve complaints handling

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should review the structures, processes and staff involved in responding to complaints, and introduce measures to promote the use of complaints as a source of improvement and reduce defensive 'closed' responses …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary provided in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to it (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been implemented, citing a 2016 Trust report that confirmed complaints procedures had been aligned with ombudsman guidelines, case officers had been assigned to liaise with complainants, and regular audits had been introduced (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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14
Not Applicable

Review clinical leadership arrangements

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should review arrangements for clinical leadership in obstetrics, paediatrics and midwifery, to ensure that the right people are in place with appropriate skills and support. The Trust has implemented change at …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as completed, stating that action taken had been noted (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found evidence that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing earlier reporting (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024). The department had previously reported in July 2015 that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had reviewed clinical leadership across obstetrics, paediatrics and midwifery (Department of Health response, Jul 2015).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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15
Not Applicable

Continue governance systems work

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should continue to prioritise the work commenced in response to the review of governance systems already carried out, including clinical governance, so that the Board has adequate assurance of the quality …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, noting that the Thirlwall Inquiry had recognized action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The inquiry's legal team found in May 2024 that University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust had standardized its audit process and that an internal audit programme had reviewed governance processes during 2014 and 2015 (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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16
Not Applicable

Clarify manager quality responsibilities

Recommendation
As part of the governance systems work, we consider that the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should ensure that middle managers, senior managers and non-executives have the requisite clarity over roles and responsibilities in relation to quality, …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024 commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the inquiry legal team found that the recommendation was implemented, citing an April 2016 trust update showing that non-executive directors chaired sub-board assurance committees and annual mandatory risk management training had been established (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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17
Not Applicable

Improve Furness General Hospital delivery suite

Recommendation
The University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust should identify options, with a view to implementation as soon as practicable, to improve the physical environment of the delivery suite at Furness General Hospital, including particularly access to operating theatres, …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, that inquiry's legal team found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust's 2016 plans for a new build with handover scheduled for November 2017 (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust (Primary)
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18
Not Applicable

Ensure external oversight of implementation

Recommendation
All of the previous recommendations should be implemented with the involvement of Clinical Commissioning Groups, and where necessary, the Care Quality Commission and Monitor. In the particular circumstances surrounding the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, NHS England …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024 commentary published in February 2026, NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to it (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, that inquiry's legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing the department's July 2015 response which confirmed that the hospital trust was working closely with the Care Quality Commission and Monitor (Department of Health response, Jul 2015; The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Not applicable
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
[A] Recommendations for the Trust Recommendations for the Trust: 1-18 1. The Morecambe Bay Investigation found that there were serious failures in clinical care at University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, causing avoidable harm to mothers and babies including unnecessary deaths, and found that there was a pattern of Trust failure to recognise the severity and nature of the problem, compounded by denial. The Trust failed to look into serious incidents and sought to diminish the seriousness of the situation to others. At the Trust level there were failures in risk assessment and care planning; a deficient response to …
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NHS England (Primary)
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19
Accepted

Professional bodies review conduct of registrants

Recommendation
In light of the evidence we have heard during the Investigation, we consider that the professional regulatory bodies should review the findings of this Report in detail with a view to investigating further the conduct of registrants involved in the …
In brief (written by this site)

The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported in February 2026 that the General Medical Council and the Nursing and Midwifery Council had completed their investigations into the conduct of the registrants involved (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, pointing to the regulators' review of the investigation findings and commitment to take appropriate action (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
5. We accept this recommendation. Action is under way. 6. The General Medical Council and the Nursing and Midwifery Council have emphasised that they have reviewed the findings of the Morecambe Bay Investigation Report and are acting on relevant recommendations. They have both met with Dr Kirkup to discuss his findings. The Department understands these organisations have paid particular attention to findings concerning the professional conduct of registrants involved in the care of patients at the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, so that they can take appropriate action against anyone who they suspect has broken their professional …
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GMC (Primary)
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20
Accepted

National review of maternity care in challenging circumstances

Recommendation
There should be a national review of the provision of maternity care and paediatrics in challenging circumstances, including areas that are rural, difficult to recruit to, or isolated. This should identify the requirements to sustain safe services under these conditions. …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that because the 2016 Better Births review showed a single model was unfeasible for rural units, reviewing requirements as proposed was not appropriate (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They noted that work had instead progressed through a neonatal care review and the 2023 Three Year Delivery Plan for Maternity and Neonatal Services (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found evidence that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
7. We accept this recommendation. A review of maternity care, which will also consider neonatal care and paediatrics in the context of maternity care, is underway. 8. In its report to Cumbria Clinical Commissioning Group, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists highlighted the association between frequent exposure to complex cases and more favourable outcomes for patients across all aspects of clinical care. The report suggests that some units, particularly rural and isolated units, need to develop innovative models of care that enable clinicians to maintain their skills and competencies and staffing structures to ensure safe levels of expert clinical …
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NHS England (Primary)
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21
Accepted in part

Consider extending review to other rural services

Recommendation
The challenge of providing healthcare in areas that are rural, difficult to recruit to or isolated is not restricted to maternity care and paediatrics. We recommend that NHS England consider the wisdom of extending the review of requirements to sustain …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024 commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that it had concluded "it would not be appropriate to review requirements in the way proposed" because local variations made a single service model unfeasible (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). It noted that work remained underway within pilot integrated care systems on rural workforce transformation, alongside funding formula adjustments to support remote providers (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been completed based on care models and support regimes established by the government (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
11. We accept this recommendation in principle. NHS England are establishing Vanguard sites to explore how new models of care can address the challenges faced by services that are rural, geographically isolated or difficult to recruit to. 12. The Investigation highlighted some of the problems that can affect services provided in remote or isolated areas, where poor practice becomes entrenched and low staff turnover and low numbers of procedures can lead to a lack of clinical experience and reduced opportunities for learning. 13. The NHS Five Year Forward View11 set out a way forward for the NHS that includes new …
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NHS England (Primary)
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22
Accepted in part

Recognise educational opportunities in smaller units

Recommendation
We believe that the educational opportunities afforded by smaller units, particularly in delivering a broad range of care with a high personal level of responsibility, have been insufficiently recognised and exploited. We recommend that a review be carried out of …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England recorded the recommendation as implemented and closed, stating that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in its February 2026 review that Health Education England published the findings of its review in spring 2016, which recommended that all trusts and learning education providers continue to support clinical education and training (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
19. We accept this recommendation in principle. Work already underway by Health Education England addresses this recommendation. Health Education England is committed to supporting efforts to improve the quality of patient care by ensuring that its quality management infrastructure ensures the delivery of high quality training in sites where safe services are provided. 20. Health Education England recognises that there are particular challenges in attracting and retaining students, trainees and learners to work in smaller and/or isolated hospitals and that this can exacerbate problems such as those described at Furness General Hospital. 21. They have established a Working Group to …
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NHS England (Primary)
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23
Accepted in part

Clear standards for incident reporting in maternity

Recommendation
Clear standards should be drawn up for incident reporting and investigation in maternity services. These should include the mandatory reporting and investigation as serious incidents of maternal deaths, late and intrapartum stillbirths and unexpected neonatal deaths. We believe that there …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed, citing the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework, the Maternity and Newborn Safety Investigations Programme, and the national Perinatal Mortality Review Tool (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In a review published in February 2026, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team likewise found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, noting the creation of the Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch and the introduction of the perinatal review tool (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
23. We accept this recommendation in principle. A new national, Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service will supplement existing practice. 24. The Investigation found that there were a substantial number of missed opportunities to uncover and address the problems at Morecambe Bay. The quality of investigations carried out into serious incidents was found to be poor, and this contributed to the ongoing failures to learn and improve, and also resulted in the system having an overly optimistic view of performance in the midwifery unit. 25. On mandatory reporting and standardised reviews of perinatal deaths, the Department is working with NHS England, …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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24
Accepted

Involve patients and relatives in incident investigation

Recommendation
We commend the introduction of the duty of candour for all NHS professionals. This should be extended to include the involvement of patients and relatives in the investigation of serious incidents, both to provide evidence that may otherwise be lacking …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that work remained ongoing, highlighting national guidance on patient involvement and the rollout of the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team recorded in the same review that the recommendation had been met, citing the statutory duty of candour and the new incident framework (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, Feb 2026). The department noted that a government review of the statutory duty of candour was still underway, alongside planned legislation to establish a duty of candour for public servants (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
37. We accept this recommendation. A duty of candour has been introduced. 38. A lack of openness and honesty at Morecambe Bay was a fundamental cause of both the distress of the families, and of the inability of the Trust to learn from serious incidents. At a regulatory, provider and professional level action is being taken to increase the involvement of patients/relatives in investigation of serious incidents. 39. All providers must now comply with a new legal requirement for openness – the duty of candour – as a condition of their registration with the Care Quality Commission and hence a …
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CQC (Primary)
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25
Accepted

Duty to report external investigation findings

Recommendation
We recommend that a duty should be placed on all NHS Boards to report openly the findings of any external investigation into clinical services, governance or other aspects of the operation of the Trust, including prompt notification of relevant external …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary submitted in September 2024 and published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that an updated 2022 review framework strengthened information sharing with regulators regarding patient safety risks (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team noted existing trust reporting requirements and national safety investigation functions (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024). The department had previously reported in March 2020 that the Care Quality Commission did not have a system for disseminating learning to other trusts, although local networks helped share findings (Nadine Dorries, Mar 2020).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
43. We accept these recommendations. A new national, Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service will improve local standards of investigation and openness. 44. During the 10-year period in which serious incidents were occurring at Morecambe Bay, the Investigation found that there had been external reviews conducted into operational aspects of the Trust, that were not brought to light in a timely or transparent way and that had regulators been sighted on the Fielding report earlier, action might have been taken sooner to address concerns. 45. NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts are already required to notify the Care Quality Commission and Monitor …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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26
Accepted

Clear national whistleblowing policy

Recommendation
We commend the introduction of a clear national policy on whistleblowing. As well as protecting the interests of whistleblowers, we recommend that this is implemented in a way that ensures that a systematic and proportionate response is made by Trusts …
In brief (written by this site)

The Investigation recommended introducing a clear national whistleblowing policy for trusts responding to concerns. In commentary of September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and National Health Service (NHS) England stated that the Thirlwall Inquiry had noted action taken in response to this recommendation (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In September 2026, the Inquiry reported that "the move towards less national oversight, with the abolition of the NGO, is worrying in this context" (The Rt Hon. Lady Justice Thirlwall DBE, Sep 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
50. We accept this recommendation. The Department has accepted in principle the recommendations made by Sir Robert Francis QC in his Freedom to Speak Up report; and has consulted on a package of measures to support implementation of the principles and actions that he set out in that report. 51. The consultation, which closed on 4 June 2015, focused on how measures can be implemented locally, the role of national bodies, the role and title of the Freedom to Speak Up Guardian, and standards for professionals on how to raise concerns. The Department's response to the consultation, including measures to …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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27
Accepted

Professional duty to report concerns

Recommendation
Professional regulatory bodies should clarify and reinforce the duty of professional staff to report concerns about clinical services, particularly where these relate to patient safety, and the mechanism to do so. Failure to report concerns should be regarded as a …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that implementation was ongoing, noting that joint duty of candour guidance was updated in 2019 and the General Medical Council updated its Good Medical Practice standards in January 2024 to require doctors to report concerns promptly (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that although online records showed an update letter sent to the Secretary of State, a complete report of Sir Bruce Keogh's review of professional codes could not be found (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
53. We accept this recommendation. A review of professional codes is under way. 54. Dr Kirkup found that many staff did not raise any concerns about standards of care in the maternity units across Morecambe Bay, but perhaps even more troubling is that where concerns were raised there was no evidence that they were properly addressed or followed up. 55. The Professional codes of conduct for both the General Medical Council13 and the Nursing and Midwifery Council14 require registrants to raise concerns and take action where patient safety is at risk. 56. In addition, Professor Sir Bruce Keogh has been …
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GMC (Primary)
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28
Accepted in part

National standards for clinical leads

Recommendation
Clear national standards should be drawn up setting out the professional duties and expectations of clinical leads at all levels, including, but not limited to, clinical directors, clinical leads, heads of service, medical directors, nurse directors. Trusts should provide evidence …
In brief (written by this site)

In September 2024, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that clinical leadership duties were addressed through professional regulatory guidance, trust inspections, and a February 2024 board competency framework (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In that same update, they stated that the Care Quality Commission was developing a new assessment framework, while initiatives to widen leadership development across all career stages remained underway (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
57. We accept these recommendations in principle. 58. Following the tragedies at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust there has been a renewed focus on leadership and quality across the NHS, particularly for those in senior and executive clinical and management positions. It is helpful to see these two elements as equally important, and the most significant changes are likely to be made where these staff are brought together to provide input and challenge to each other's perceptions and roles. 59. Discussions are underway between the Department of Health, NHS England, the …
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NHS England (Primary)
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29
Accepted in part

Standards for manager quality responsibilities

Recommendation
Clear national standards should be drawn up setting out the responsibilities for clinical quality of other managers, including executive directors, middle managers and non-executives. All Trusts should provide evidence to the Care Quality Commission, as part of their processes, of …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the Board Leadership Competency Framework and Our Leadership Way outline standards for leaders, with the Care Quality Commission assessing these areas during inspections (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They noted that initiatives to widen leadership development for managers at all career stages and work responding to the Messenger Review were still underway (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that although Sir Bruce Keogh had sent an update letter regarding his review of professional codes, a complete report of his assessment could not be found (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
57. We accept these recommendations in principle. 58. Following the tragedies at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust there has been a renewed focus on leadership and quality across the NHS, particularly for those in senior and executive clinical and management positions. It is helpful to see these two elements as equally important, and the most significant changes are likely to be made where these staff are brought together to provide input and challenge to each other's perceptions and roles. 59. Discussions are underway between the Department of Health, NHS England, the …
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NHS England (Primary)
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30
Accepted in part

National protocol on duties relating to inquests

Recommendation
A national protocol should be drawn up setting out the duties of all Trusts and their staff in relation to inquests. This should include, but not be limited to, the avoidance of attempts to 'fend off' inquests, a mandatory requirement …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the government has not introduced a national protocol, explaining that existing legislation and professional codes remove the need for one (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They reported that inquest duties were instead addressed through provider reminders, regulator guidance, and the rollout of medical examiners in September 2024 (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that it could identify no follow-up to the department's initial commitment to consider an additional protocol (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
67. We accept this recommendation in principle. We will give further thought, with the Ministry of Justice and Chief Coroner's Office, to whether an additional protocol would be helpful in guiding appropriate behaviour in relation to coroner investigations and inquests. In the meantime, we will ask Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority to remind Foundation Trusts and NHS Trusts of the existing legislation and guidance setting out their duties in relation to inquests. 68. Dr Kirkup's assessment of the behaviour of certain staff in relation to the inquest process is particularly concerning. There is existing legislation in relation to …
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NHS England (Primary)
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31
Accepted in part

Fundamental review of NHS complaints system

Recommendation
The NHS complaints system in the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust failed relatives at almost every turn. Although it was not within our remit to examine the operation of the NHS complaints system nationally, both the nature …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024 published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the department did not take forward a fundamental review and "therefore this recommendation was not implemented", noting that the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman had instead issued complaint standards in 2022 (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team recorded in May 2024 that the department had accepted the recommendation in principle in 2015 but maintained that another review would not help (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
72. We accept this recommendation in principle and recognise that there are still challenges to overcome if we are to see improvements in the way complaints are handled in the NHS. However, we do not believe that another fundamental review will help. The issues are already well documented. 73. Complaints handling has been an important part of the Government's programme of work, particularly following the Inquiries into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. We are working to put in place a more open and transparent culture in which all forms of feedback – comments, concerns, compliments and complaints – are welcomed …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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32
Accepted

Reform Local Supervising Authority for midwives

Recommendation
The Local Supervising Authority system for midwives was ineffectual at detecting manifest problems at the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust, not only in individual failures of care but also with the systems to investigate them. As with …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the recommendation was implemented and closed, explaining that the Nursing and Midwifery (Amendment) Order 2017 separated supervision from regulation and that a new non-statutory supervision model, A-EQUIP, had been rolled out across the UK (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
83. We accept this recommendation. We will therefore modernise the regulatory regime for midwifery. 84. The statutory supervision of midwives was designed in 1902 to protect the public. It no longer meets the needs of current midwifery practice. Reports and recommendations by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman and Kings Fund found that midwifery regulation was structurally flawed as a framework for public protection, and highlighted that statutory supervisory structures encourage confidentiality in a way that does not always contribute to improving practice or systems and can be perceived as protecting the midwife rather than women or babies. This is …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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33
Accepted

CQC and Monitor coordination

Recommendation
We considered carefully the effectiveness of separating organisationally the regulation of quality by the Care Quality Commission from the regulation of finance and performance by Monitor, given the close inter-relationship between Trust decisions in each area. However, we were persuaded …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated that the recommendation was implemented and closed, confirming that the February 2015 memorandum of understanding between Monitor and the Care Quality Commission still stood and that an information sharing agreement was planned (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found evidence that the measure had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
87. We accept this recommendation. Closer working links have been established and will be developed further. 88. An updated Memorandum of Understanding between Monitor and the Care Quality Commission was published on 26 February 2015. It describes what they intend to achieve and their continued commitment to working together. Both organisations have improved how they work together in areas including: Monitor's assessment process and significant transaction reviews, management of Care Quality Commission registration requirements, management of risk, and joint escalation and enforcement of the new licensing regime. The Care Quality Commission and Monitor have clarified their roles in the Single …
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CQC (Primary)
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34
Accepted

CQC and PHSO memorandum of understanding

Recommendation
The relationship between the investigation of individual complaints and the investigation of the systemic problems that they exemplify gave us cause for concern, in particular the breakdown in communication between the Care Quality Commission and the Parliamentary and Health Service …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary of September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed, stating that arrangements, including a memorandum of understanding, are in place between the Care Quality Commission and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
90. We accept this recommendation. The Investigation found that the lack of co- ordination between the Care Quality Commission and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman was a contributory factor to the ongoing inability of the wider system to identify and act on failings at the Trust. A new Memorandum of Understanding between the Care Quality Commission and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman was signed in September 2013 which outlined how the two organisations will collaborate, co-operate and share information relating to their respective roles. 91. We have asked the Care Quality Commission and the Ombudsman to keep this …
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CQC (Primary)
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35
Accepted in part

Clarify oversight responsibilities

Recommendation
The division of responsibilities between the Care Quality Commission and other parts of the NHS for oversight of service quality and the implementation of measures to correct patient safety failures was not clear, and we are concerned that potential ambiguity …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary of September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They stated that the National Quality Board framework clarifies governance arrangements and brings partners, including the Care Quality Commission, together in System Quality Groups to share intelligence on quality and risk (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team recorded that the department had accepted the proposal in principle, citing its commitments to improve oversight through the board and consolidate patient safety leadership (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
92. We accept this recommendation in principle. Patient safety is a critical element of an effective, patient-focused health system and we agree that it is important to be clear about who is responsible for patient safety. The onus on ensuring quality sits primarily with provider Trusts themselves; although commissioners and regulators also have an important role. 93. In "Culture Change in the NHS"21 the Government agreed that it would be sensible to concentrate and consolidate national expertise and capability on safety within a single organisation that can provide strategic leadership across the whole healthcare system. The Government intend to bring …
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NHS England (Primary)
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36
Accepted in part

Impact assessment of policy changes

Recommendation
The cumulative impact of new policies and processes, particularly the perceived pressure to achieve Foundation Trust status, together with organisational reconfiguration, placed significant pressure on the management capacity of the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust to deliver …
In brief (written by this site)

The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated in September 2024 commentary published in February 2026 that the recommendation had been implemented, explaining that an internal Senior Review Committee evaluates all potential policy impacts, including risks of perverse incentives, alongside extensive quality assurance (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, in May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented, citing reforms to the Foundation Trust application process and regulatory oversight (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
97. We accept this recommendation in principle. We acknowledge the Investigation's findings that the pursuit of Foundation Trust status distorted management capacity and priorities at Morecambe Bay. 98. In response to the failings at both Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust: • the Foundation Trust application process has now been significantly improved, requiring a strong focus on quality of care as well as on governance and good financial control. • The Care Quality Commission now works closely with Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority to share intelligence about the Trusts' performance …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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37
Accepted

Protocol for organisational change transitions

Recommendation
Organisational change that alters or transfers responsibilities and accountability carries significant risk, which can be mitigated only if well managed. We recommend that an explicit protocol be drawn up setting out how such processes will be managed in future. This …
In brief (written by this site)

The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported in February 2026 that the recommendation was implemented and closed, pointing to an updated Records Management Code of Practice from 2021, a revised departmental Information Management Policy from 2018, and published guidance addressing transfer risks during reorganisations (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
100. We accept this recommendation. We agree that these are important concepts, and indeed a number of protocols were drawn up and widely communicated in managing changes to the health system in 2012. The Department of Health issued guidance to NHS bodies in transition in September 2011 setting out the effective management of records during organisational change22. 101. In its report of 10 July 2013, "Managing the transition to the reformed health system"23 the National Audit Office noted the "considerable planning and preparatory work" that was done ahead of the Health and Social Care Act being passed and highlighted that …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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38
Accepted

Improve perinatal mortality recording

Recommendation
Mortality recording of perinatal deaths is not sufficiently systematic, with failures to record properly at individual unit level and to account routinely for neonatal deaths of transferred babies by place of birth. This is of added significance when maternity units …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024 published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed, noting that perinatal deaths must be reported to MBRRACE-UK within 30 days by place of birth and that a review tool had been adopted across all English trusts (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Previously, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
103. We accept this recommendation. We will explore the feasibility of publishing data about the safety and quality of maternity services at individual Trust level. 104. As recommended by the Morecambe Bay Report, MBRRACE-UK has established a system to systematically collect and report surveillance information on all stillbirths and neonatal deaths nationally. MBRRACE-UK published its first Perinatal Mortality Surveillance Report on the 10th June 2015. It provides crude and also stabilised and adjusted neonatal mortality rates in 2013 by service delivery organisation (operational delivery network in England), by place of birth, and by commissioning area (Clinical Commissioning Group in England). …
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NHS England (Primary)
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39
Accepted in part

Implement medical examiner system

Recommendation
There is no mechanism to scrutinise perinatal deaths or maternal deaths independently, to identify patient safety concerns and to provide early warning of adverse trends. This shortcoming has been clearly identified in relation to adult deaths by Dame Janet Smith …
In brief (written by this site)

The Investigation recommended the prompt, full implementation of a medical examiner system. In commentary of September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) and NHS England stated that a statutory medical examiner system rolled out across England and Wales on 9 September 2024 to review all non-coronial deaths, including neonatal deaths (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). The Thirlwall Inquiry reported in September 2026 that the full statutory scheme was operational from that date (The Rt Hon. Lady Justice Thirlwall DBE, Sep 2026). Previously, in March 2024, the Expert Panel of the House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee found the recommendation had not been fully met, observing that an extended remit for medical examiners to scrutinise perinatal and maternal deaths was not in place (House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, Mar 2024; House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, Mar 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
106. We accept these recommendations in principle. The medical examiners system has been trialled successfully in a number of areas across the country. We will soon be publishing a report from the interim National Medical Examiner setting out the lessons learned from the pilot sites. 107. The Government remain committed to the principle of these reforms. Further progress will be informed by a reconsideration of the operation of the new system in the light of other positive developments on patient safety since 2010 and by a subsequent public consultation exercise on regulations required to introduce a medical examiner system nationally …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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40
Accepted in part

Extend medical examiners to stillbirths

Recommendation
Given that the systematic review of deaths by medical examiners should be in place, as above, we recommend that this system be extended to stillbirths as well as neonatal deaths, thereby ensuring that appropriate recommendations are made to coroners concerning …
In brief (written by this site)

The Investigation recommended extending the medical examiner system to review stillbirths and neonatal deaths. The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated in commentary of September 2024, published in February 2026, that the recommendation had not been taken forward (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They explained that while the statutory medical examiner system was introduced in September 2024 for non-coronial deaths, stillbirths cannot be included because stillborn babies are not legally classified as having died (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In June 2026, Baroness Levitt for the Ministry of Justice stated that the government will consider next steps on coronial investigations of stillbirths after an independent investigation into maternity care led by Baroness Amos reports (Baroness Levitt, Jun 2026).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
106. We accept these recommendations in principle. The medical examiners system has been trialled successfully in a number of areas across the country. We will soon be publishing a report from the interim National Medical Examiner setting out the lessons learned from the pilot sites. 107. The Government remain committed to the principle of these reforms. Further progress will be informed by a reconsideration of the operation of the new system in the light of other positive developments on patient safety since 2010 and by a subsequent public consultation exercise on regulations required to introduce a medical examiner system nationally …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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41
Accepted

Guidance for external service reviews

Recommendation
We were concerned by the ad hoc nature and variable quality of the numerous external reviews of services that were carried out at the University Hospitals of Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust. We recommend that systematic guidance be drawn up …
In brief (written by this site)

In commentary from September 2024, published in February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that the recommendation was implemented and closed, following the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges publishing an updated framework for invited reviews in March 2022 (Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Mar 2022; DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). They stated that the guidance provides operating principles for professional bodies conducting reviews across healthcare organisations and should improve the escalation of issues and disclosure to regulators (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Earlier, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
109. We accept this recommendation, and there are actions in train, which go some way to meeting it. For example, the Serious Incident Framework published by NHS England and updated in March 2015, sets out details of when and how investigations – including independent investigations - should be undertaken. 110. As noted earlier, the Government are accepting the Public Administration Select Committee's recommendation to establish an independent patient safety investigation function for the NHS, and will be taking this forward in the coming months (the Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service). One of the tasks will be to work with stakeholders …
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Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (Primary)
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42
Accepted

Register external reviews with CQC

Recommendation
We further recommend that all external reviews of suspected service failures be registered with the Care Quality Commission and Monitor, and that the Care Quality Commission develops a system to collate learning from reviews and disseminate it to other Trusts. …
In brief (written by this site)

The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England stated in February 2026 that joint oversight groups are used with the Care Quality Commission to monitor provider risks, citing a 2022 framework requiring healthcare organisations to alert regulators to concerns found in reviews (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found no record of promised government proposals to mandate notifications, noting that online guidance asking trusts to disclose external reviews as a "matter of course" left it unclear whether compliance was a statutory requirement (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
43. We accept these recommendations. A new national, Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service will improve local standards of investigation and openness. 44. During the 10-year period in which serious incidents were occurring at Morecambe Bay, the Investigation found that there had been external reviews conducted into operational aspects of the Trust, that were not brought to light in a timely or transparent way and that had regulators been sighted on the Fielding report earlier, action might have been taken sooner to address concerns. 45. NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts are already required to notify the Care Quality Commission and Monitor …
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CQC (Primary)
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43
Accepted

Maintain focus on quality

Recommendation
We strongly endorse the emphasis placed on the quality of NHS services that began with the Darzi review, High Quality Care for All, and gathered importance with the response to the events at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust. Our …
In brief (written by this site)

In February 2026, the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported that implementation remained ongoing, highlighting a portfolio of National Quality Board guidance and tools developed to support Integrated Care Systems, including transition guidance and an updated framework for System Quality Groups (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). In May 2024, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
111. We accept this recommendation, and strongly agree that the emphasis on quality of care must be maintained, and that service changes should put the safety and quality of patient care as central objectives. Indeed the recent NHS reforms to the structure and assessment of the health service, including GP-led commissioning and an expert-led inspection system have put clinical priorities and patient care at its heart. The Government will continue to prioritise the quality of care, and will hold its arms-length bodies to account on their commitments to reinforce and improve the quality of care. This will be a key …
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NHS England (Primary)
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44
Accepted in part

Establish framework for future investigations

Recommendation
This Investigation was hampered at the outset by the lack of an established framework covering such matters as access to documents, the duty of staff and former staff to cooperate, and the legal basis for handling evidence. These obstacles were …
In brief (written by this site)

The Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England reported in commentary published in February 2026 that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body was established in April 2023 with statutory processes for evidence handling and document access, alongside a national internal investigation framework (DHSC and NHS England, Feb 2026). Minister of State Karin Smyth similarly confirmed these arrangements in November 2024 (Karin Smyth, Nov 2024). Previously, the Thirlwall Inquiry legal team found in May 2024 that the recommendation had been clearly implemented (The Thirlwall Inquiry legal team, May 2024).

Department of Health and Social Care · 16 Jul 2015 Accepted in part
Words of: Department of Health, Learning not blaming (Cm 9113), government response to the Morecambe Bay Investigation and two other reports, July 2015
69. We accept this recommendation in principle. A new Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service will conduct independent, expert-led investigations into patient safety incidents. The Service will also respond to the concerns that had been previously subject to public inquiries or national investigations, such as Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation and University Hospitals Morecambe Bay NHS Foundation Trust. We intend to establish an expert advisory group who, over the coming months, will advise on the purpose and function of the new Independent Patient Safety Investigation Service. As part of this work, we will build on the useful insights that participants in this Investigation …
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Department of Health and Social Care (Primary)
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