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The ICL Inquiry

Completed

ICL Inquiry

Chair Lord Gill Judge / Judiciary
Established 27 Apr 2009
Final Report 16 Jul 2009
Commissioned by Scottish Government

Inquiry into the Stockline Plastics factory explosion in Glasgow on 11 May 2004 which killed 9 workers. Found that corroded LPG pipework caused the explosion. Described as "short, sharp and hard-hitting" - completed in 13 months at £1.9m cost.

Evidence & Impact
The ICL Inquiry was established following the explosion at ICL Plastics Ltd in Glasgow on 11 May 2004, which killed nine people and injured 33. Lord Gill's inquiry identified that corrosion of underground metallic service pipes was the key factor in the explosion and made seven recommendations to improve LPG safety across the UK.

The government's response in March 2010 (Cm. 7849) accepted five recommendations fully, one in principle, and rejected one. The rejection concerned mandatory independent audits of workplace risk assessments, which the government concluded was unnecessary given 78% stakeholder opposition and the view that other proposed measures would achieve the safety objectives.

Implementation has been largely successful. The centrepiece reform - a nationwide programme to replace buried metallic LPG service pipework - was completed by the 2015 deadline, covering up to 40,000 premises. HSE worked closely with UKLPG (UK LPG Association) to prioritise higher-risk premises by 2013. Supporting reforms included enhanced installation records, supplier registers, web-based guidance for LPG users, and regular communication channels between HSE and industry bodies.

The one area of incomplete implementation concerns recommendation ICL-3 on establishing an accredited registration scheme for LPG suppliers. While the government accepted this in principle, noting 70% stakeholder support, and asked HSE to consult on options ranging from formal third-party accreditation to a charter of standards, no evidence has been identified of such a scheme being established. The HSE website references work on a supplier register, but this falls short of the formal accreditation scheme Lord Gill envisaged.

The inquiry's impact on LPG safety has been substantial, with the pipework replacement programme representing a significant infrastructure upgrade. The strengthened regulatory framework, improved guidance, and enhanced communication between regulators and industry have created lasting improvements to LPG safety management across industrial and commercial premises.
Reforms Attributed to This Inquiry
- Nationwide programme to replace buried metallic LPG service pipework at industrial and commercial premises, with higher-risk premises prioritised by 2013 and all replacements completed by 2015
- Enhanced installation records and supplier asset registers for LPG installations to improve safety oversight
- Establishment of regular meetings between senior representatives of HSE and UKLPG to strengthen communication channels
- Development of web-based guidance for LPG users on meeting their statutory safety obligations
- HSE-funded research into polyethylene piping safety with published guidance for domestic LPG customers
- Nationwide inspection initiative to verify compliance with LPG safety standards
Unfinished Business
- Formal accredited registration scheme for LPG suppliers as envisaged by Lord Gill - whilst accepted in principle with 70% stakeholder support, no evidence of implementation beyond references to work on a supplier register
Generated 10 Mar 2026 using AI. Assessment is indicative, not authoritative.
2 months Duration
£1.9m Total Cost
Government Response
Accepted 5
Accepted in Part 1
Not Accepted 1
Total Recommendations 7
Data last updated: 31 Dec 2015 · Source
Data verified: 23 Mar 2026 (import)
How to read this

Government Response tracks what the government said it would do (accepted, rejected, etc.).

Full methodology

1 question since Dec 2025
Written Question ICL Inquiry
Simon Hoare (Conservative)
02 Dec 2025
All Activity (1)
Title Volume Publication Date Recs Links
The ICL Inquiry Report: Explosion at Grovepark Mills, Maryhill, Glasgow, 11 May 2004 Final 16 Jul 2009 7
18 Dec 2008
Inquiry Announced
27 Apr 2009
Inquiry Established
17 Dec 2016
Final Report Published

Recommendations (7)

ICL-1
Accepted
Replace Buried Metallic LPG Pipes
Recommendation

An urgent programme of replacement of buried metallic LPG pipework with polyethylene piping should be implemented.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), a nationwide programme was implemented to replace buried metallic LPG service pipes with polyethylene, beginning in October 2009. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), this programme targeted higher-risk industrial and commercial premises for replacement by the end of 2015, with remaining carbon steel pipework (Priority 2) by the end of 2020, and also addressed domestic premises; and an Expert Panel was established in 2010 to review progress and revise priorities, and HSE conducted inspection campaigns to secure compliance. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-2
Accepted
New LPG Safety Regime
Recommendation

A new safety regime should be put in place governing the installation, maintenance, monitoring and replacement of all LPG systems.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the safety regime for LPG systems was strengthened by publishing new guidance, launching inspection campaigns, and providing regulatory oversight. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), this included the publication of work instructions for LPG pipework replacement inspection campaigns (OM 2011/08) and guidance document INDG428 on inspecting, maintaining, or replacing buried metallic pipework carrying LPG vapour, and HSE also funded research for domestic LPG customers and published advice for domestic premises. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-3
Accepted in Part
LPG Supplier Registration
Recommendation

A new scheme should be introduced requiring all LPG suppliers to be registered and accredited.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), registration and accreditation requirements for LPG suppliers were strengthened through regulatory reform and engagement with the UK LPG industry. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), work with the industry involved developing supplier registers and distributing industry questionnaires to identify and prioritise buried pipework for replacement, ensuring all LPG suppliers operate within a strengthened regulatory framework. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-4
Not Accepted
Independent Risk Assessment Audit
Recommendation

The current risk assessment system should be improved by the addition of an independent audit process.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), despite initial government opposition to mandatory independent audits of all risk assessments, an Expert Panel was established in 2010 to independently review the progress of the pipework replacement programme. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), this panel recommended revised priorities and timescales for pipework replacement, which the government accepted, enhancing independent oversight of the safety programme. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-5
Accepted
Polyethylene Piping Research
Recommendation

Research into the safety of polyethylene piping should be conducted to ensure long-term reliability.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), research was funded into polyethylene piping safety to ensure its long-term reliability for LPG installations. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), findings from this research informed the development of safety guidance for both commercial and domestic LPG installations, which was published as INDG428 and supporting online guidance, and HSE also provided advice for domestic premises, extending beyond the original recommendation. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-6
Accepted
LPG Safety Communications
Recommendation

There should be prompt and effective communication between all interested parties of all technical developments in matters of LPG safety.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), communication channels were established with industry bodies, LPG suppliers, and consumers to facilitate the prompt and effective sharing of technical developments in LPG safety. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), dedicated web pages were published, and coordination with the LPG industry occurred on safety improvements, including communicating programme requirements via a letter from the then HSE Chair, Judith Hackitt. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
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ICL-7
Accepted
Legal Responsibility Awareness
Recommendation

Awareness of legal responsibilities should be raised among LPG suppliers and consumers.

Published evidence summary
According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), awareness campaigns were conducted for LPG suppliers and consumers to raise understanding of their legal responsibilities for LPG safety. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), these activities included distributing survey questionnaires to known LPG installations, publishing INDG428 guidance, developing dedicated HSE web resources, and coordinating with local authority enforcement teams. According to the available evidence, no further published evidence has been identified since 2015.
Health and Safety Executive (Primary)
View Details