Emily Lewis
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2024-0634
All 10 responses received
· Deadline: 10 Jan 2025
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Response Status
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10 of 10
56-Day Deadline
10 Jan 2025
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coroner’s Concerns
In the course of the inquest I heard evidence of multiple issues in relation to in particular (a) the high workload of piloting a RIB at high speed, particularly in the vicinity of buoys and vessels (b) loss of situational awareness (c) the improvement in safety of having a second crew member thereby providing an additional lookout and reducing the skipper’s workload (d) forward visibility issues in RIBs complying with existing requite safety standards when passengers are being carried (e) issues as to safe seating and the need to mitigate the effects of collisions, noting in particular the injuries suffered by Emily Lewis (f) the need for risk assessments and safety management systems to be meaningful (g) limitations in applying the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280 (M)(Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) to high speed passenger craft operation (h) the potential benefits of an automatic identification system (AIS). There was also evidence concerning the way in which the revision of the codes of practice appears to have slipped back: the Maritime & Coastguard Agency now plan to go to consultation next year, then the RYA will respond. The MAIB describes current requirements and guidance for the operators of small craft as “confusing and inconsistent” and observe that there does not appear to be uniform approach to managing the risks associated with high speed rides. In the foreword to the MAIB report into the index collision it is stated: “… passengers in small high speed craft are very vulnerable to impact and vibration injuries. In the last 15 years the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high speed craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury and occasionally death.” My concerns relate to:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved”
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved”
Responses
British Marine outlined its previous actions in developing and revising the HSPV code and making its use a membership requirement. The organisation stated it is involved in the development of the new sport and pleasure code and offers to collaborate with authorities on licensing frameworks if requested.
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British Marine Federation Limited Head & Registered Office Tagus House, 9 Ocean Way, Southampton, Hampshire, SO14 3TJ. Telephone: +44(0)1784 473377 Email: info@britishmarine.co.uk
09/01/2025
British Marine response to the coroners Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS After Inquest LEWIS E J 22082020 (1) (1). We as an industry association take the safety of all the activities carried out by the industry and our members as a primary concern. This is why prior to the Seadogz accident, in 2010 as part of an industry collaboration, and on the evidence outlined by previous MAIB reports, we helped produce and publish the HSPV code which was made available to industry. Due to further concerns and developments in the type of craft used and activities being carried out this was further revised and republished in 2019. As stated in the MAIB report, one contributing factor to this tragic accident is that the operator was found not to be implementing either the HSPV code or the PCA’s (not British Marine affiliated) code of conduct. Further to the development of the HSPV code we made the use of the code a requirement of our membership for any operator carrying out his type of activity, this has been done through the British Marine constitution. I have provided responses below to each of the concerns outlined in the report:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments This would be down to the individual licencing and port authorities to establish, British Marine are happy to collaborate if requested to help set the framework up. Industry is currently waiting for the new sport and pleasure code to be bought into legislation, (this is currently in an industry consultation and is expected that the legislation will be passed later this year) which will go a long way to addressing many of the concerns although it recognised there will be an implementation period of the new code. In the meantime British Marine’s suggested interim step would be for the HSPV to become a licencing requirement, but this would be down to the licencing authorities to implement.
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides We are now expecting the new Sport and pleasure code to come into legislation later this year. We have taken interim measures by reminding our members of all the current available guidance through our Marine Talk articles. We have also sent direct emails to the appropriate members as well as mandated our members to use the HSPV code.
Some port and licencing authorities have also implemented further licencing requirements.
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft BSi are providing a full response to this concern which British Marine has seen and agrees with. Since the construction of the Seadogz vessel there have been further amendments to ISO 11591 which go some way to addressing this issue, however it could be argued that the wording could be improved to add further clarity. If believed necessary we are happy to support this proposal through the ISO small craft committee, this can be bought up at this year’s ISO plenary in May for discussion with all the relevant industry experts and national bodies.
c. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats We agree consideration of seat and handrail design should be undertaken. The new sport and pleasure code under section 25.7 of the draft has a requirement for a risk assessment which includes – “The availability, suitability and effectiveness of handholds provided on board the vessel.” The HSPV code also has a section which states: Handholds - all seats should have handholds located in front of the passenger allowing them to hold on with both hands. These should be roughly at chest height and shoulder width apart. Consideration should be given to the potential loss of firm hand grip during cold conditions. Further consideration may need to be given to padding the rear facing back of a seat and associated handholds to avoid risk of facial injury to the passenger behind in the event of rapid deceleration.
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified Some port authorities are starting to implement this already such as ABP Southampton
- SOU-LNtM-2025-022 Commercial Craft Operators.pdf. It is our opinion that carriage requirements should be based on the licencing authorities and operators risk assessments taking into consideration the type of craft, operations being carried out, operational area including navigational risks, traffic density etc and resources of the licencing authority to monitor and make us of the AIS data.
British Marine Federation Limited Head & Registered Office Tagus House, 9 Ocean Way, Southampton, Hampshire, SO14 3TJ. Telephone: +44(0)1784 473377 Email: info@britishmarine.co.uk
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved” As an industry association we aim to implement all MIAB recommendations that we have been given as quickly as possible and have acted on each MAIB report, either helping produce guidance (and revising said guidance where necessary) such as the HSPV code or ensuring that industry is aware of new guidance such as MGN 436. It is recognised throughout industry that the new sport and pleasure code is long overdue with the first MAIB recommendation to update it being back in 2011.
09/01/2025
British Marine response to the coroners Regulation 28: REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS After Inquest LEWIS E J 22082020 (1) (1). We as an industry association take the safety of all the activities carried out by the industry and our members as a primary concern. This is why prior to the Seadogz accident, in 2010 as part of an industry collaboration, and on the evidence outlined by previous MAIB reports, we helped produce and publish the HSPV code which was made available to industry. Due to further concerns and developments in the type of craft used and activities being carried out this was further revised and republished in 2019. As stated in the MAIB report, one contributing factor to this tragic accident is that the operator was found not to be implementing either the HSPV code or the PCA’s (not British Marine affiliated) code of conduct. Further to the development of the HSPV code we made the use of the code a requirement of our membership for any operator carrying out his type of activity, this has been done through the British Marine constitution. I have provided responses below to each of the concerns outlined in the report:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments This would be down to the individual licencing and port authorities to establish, British Marine are happy to collaborate if requested to help set the framework up. Industry is currently waiting for the new sport and pleasure code to be bought into legislation, (this is currently in an industry consultation and is expected that the legislation will be passed later this year) which will go a long way to addressing many of the concerns although it recognised there will be an implementation period of the new code. In the meantime British Marine’s suggested interim step would be for the HSPV to become a licencing requirement, but this would be down to the licencing authorities to implement.
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides We are now expecting the new Sport and pleasure code to come into legislation later this year. We have taken interim measures by reminding our members of all the current available guidance through our Marine Talk articles. We have also sent direct emails to the appropriate members as well as mandated our members to use the HSPV code.
Some port and licencing authorities have also implemented further licencing requirements.
c. Whether the existing BS EWN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft BSi are providing a full response to this concern which British Marine has seen and agrees with. Since the construction of the Seadogz vessel there have been further amendments to ISO 11591 which go some way to addressing this issue, however it could be argued that the wording could be improved to add further clarity. If believed necessary we are happy to support this proposal through the ISO small craft committee, this can be bought up at this year’s ISO plenary in May for discussion with all the relevant industry experts and national bodies.
c. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design : as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats We agree consideration of seat and handrail design should be undertaken. The new sport and pleasure code under section 25.7 of the draft has a requirement for a risk assessment which includes – “The availability, suitability and effectiveness of handholds provided on board the vessel.” The HSPV code also has a section which states: Handholds - all seats should have handholds located in front of the passenger allowing them to hold on with both hands. These should be roughly at chest height and shoulder width apart. Consideration should be given to the potential loss of firm hand grip during cold conditions. Further consideration may need to be given to padding the rear facing back of a seat and associated handholds to avoid risk of facial injury to the passenger behind in the event of rapid deceleration.
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified Some port authorities are starting to implement this already such as ABP Southampton
- SOU-LNtM-2025-022 Commercial Craft Operators.pdf. It is our opinion that carriage requirements should be based on the licencing authorities and operators risk assessments taking into consideration the type of craft, operations being carried out, operational area including navigational risks, traffic density etc and resources of the licencing authority to monitor and make us of the AIS data.
British Marine Federation Limited Head & Registered Office Tagus House, 9 Ocean Way, Southampton, Hampshire, SO14 3TJ. Telephone: +44(0)1784 473377 Email: info@britishmarine.co.uk
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved” As an industry association we aim to implement all MIAB recommendations that we have been given as quickly as possible and have acted on each MAIB report, either helping produce guidance (and revising said guidance where necessary) such as the HSPV code or ensuring that industry is aware of new guidance such as MGN 436. It is recognised throughout industry that the new sport and pleasure code is long overdue with the first MAIB recommendation to update it being back in 2011.
The Royal Yachting Association plans to release a revised edition of its "Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice" after the finalised MCA Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code is published. The current review of the code is delayed pending MCA legislation to avoid conflicts.
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Dear Mr Charles, Thank you for your communication of 18th November 2024. I am writing in response to your various points raised. However, prior to doing so, it may be worthwhile providing some context about the RYA and, in particular, the extent of our authority. The RYA is the national governing body for sailing and multiple other forms of boating in the UK. We provide training courses for both recreational boaters and masters of small commercial vessels, with RYA qualifications for the latter being formally recognised for commercial use by the UK’s maritime regulator, the Maritime & Coastguard Agency (MCA). RYA Training Schemes were first started in 1970, and now extend to 58 countries, with our training delivered through a network of 2,300 independently owned and operated “RYA Training Centres.” Whilst the RYA has the authority to determine the standards for its courses and for the conditions under which RYA Recognised Training Centres operate, it does not have the authority to determine or enforce standards for operations within the small commercial vessel sector (and indeed the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector). This responsibility falls of course to the MCA as the UK maritime regulator, or in some circumstances to the relevant local port or local authority. That said, the RYA has always had a primary focus on safety and for that reason we take a proactive approach to influencing change where we can, either through behaviour of the boating public and commercial operators, or through work with organisations such as the MAIB and MCA, and others. This can be seen for example in our creation of the “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” 15 years ago, now in its 3rd edition. I have consulted with colleagues in both the RYA’s Training and Technical departments with regards the concerns you have expressed. Their responses are as follows:
a) Each port or local authority has the ability to regulate the use of small commercial vessels within their jurisdiction. Whilst there are some port and local authorities which will no doubt have the expertise and resource to deal with such matters, there are others who may not, and therefore regulating on a port by port basis may lead to inconsistencies between the standards adopted.
The MCA regulates commercial vessels used “at sea”, i.e outside of categorised waters which are often within the jurisdiction of port or local authorities, however this can result in uncertainty when an MCA coded vessel (such as Seadogz) is used within categorised waters.
The RYA notes the issue of inconsistent regulation applies to all commercial vessel operations, and not just to those used for high-speed experience rides.
Accordingly, the RYA believes there is an opportunity to review the position and either align the requirements of various harbour or local authorities in their treatment of commercial craft, or for the MCA to consider the issue on a national basis, however the RYA does not believe that it would be appropriate for the MCA’s “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code” which is currently out for public consultation, to be applied on a blanket basis to all small commercial vessels only used within categorised waters. The RYA recommends that any uniform standard must be proportionate and take into account the nature of vessels and risk profile of operating within categorised waters.
b) The RYA notes that a draft “Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code” was recently released for consultation, and it is our understanding that the finalised version of the code will follow in
2025. Whilst there is certainly benefit in promoting safety and key messages within the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector (direct to the operators of those craft) in the interim, we do not believe it is feasible to develop and implement temporary measures without the risk of causing confusion for operators.
c) The RYA would support a revision to the ISO Standard. However, this should not be seen as a solution for existing craft. Retrospective steps for existing craft would undoubtedly be unworkable, unviable and are likely to have unintended consequences. Operators of existing craft should instead be educated to have safety management systems, conduct appropriate risk assessments and take the necessary steps to mitigate against any identified risks.
d) The RYA supports the notion of a review of seat and handrail design for new craft within the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector. However, we believe that addressing this issue with existing craft is best done through better education of operators and skippers on safety management systems, and the implementation of effective risk assessments, supported by appropriate steps to mitigate against identified risks. Examples would include measures such as limiting speeds when passengers occupy certain seats, or perhaps limiting operations to
certain sea states. The RYA is aware of an outstanding recommendation from the MAIB to the MCA to “Conduct an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety to develop a framework for assuring the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact.”. The RYA believes this study, and its subsequent implementation into the codes of practice by the MCA, will address your concerns in this area, however, as highlighted in point a) further consideration is needed around the applicability of the current and any future code requirement to vessels operating exclusively in categorised waters.
e) Technology such as AIS is likely to increase the visibility of commercial vessels and may allow vessel tracks to be analysed more clearly after an incident, however while remote oversight may have some deterrent effect, the RYA questions the benefit of such technology for proactive monitoring on the basis that few harbour authorities will have the resource to proactively monitor all movements of Small Commercial High Speed Passenger vessels, while identifying speed and course may not allow an informed decision to be made remotely as to the safety implication of that behaviour in respect of a particular vessel, or enable intervention unless the vessel is operating in breach of legislation. Accordingly, the RYA does not believe that the use of technology is a substitute for appropriate training and safety management systems. The RYA does not believe that AIS is suitable for all vessels on a blanket basis.
f) The RYA fully supports the timely implementation of MAIB recommendations. We achieve this ourselves by maintaining a close working relationship with the MAIB and, where possible, by being involved in the recommendations consultation process. I note that the current MAIB recommendation for a review by the RYA of the existing “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” has been delayed due to the need to await the outcome of the MCA legislation for this sector of the industry. We felt, and the MAIB agreed, that releasing an amended version of the Voluntary Code of Practice at this point, where there was real risk of it either conflicting with or leaving unintended gaps, ran the risk of creating confusion within the sector and potentially undermining the “revised “Sport and Pleasure Code,” which we anticipate will address the majority of these issues. We envisage releasing a revised edition of the Voluntary Code of Practice soon after we have sight of the finalised MCA Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code. As an aside, it is noted that throughout your communication to us you reference “RIB craft” in relation to high-speed experience rides. It is respectfully suggested that it may be more appropriate to refer to these vessels as “small high speed passenger vessels”. Whilst it is true that many such experience rides do indeed utilise craft with an inflatable collar, not all of them do. Further, with the rapid evolution vessel design, it is entirely possible that this sector may move towards craft which do not have inflatable collars in the future. Indeed, in many parts of the world that is already the case. In order to ensure that any positive steps to come from your recommendations can be applied universally across the relevant craft, it will be important to ensure that appropriate terminology and definitions of craft
are used. This will avoid inadvertently ruling certain craft “out of scope”, simply for their lack of an inflatable collar. The risks on small high speed passenger vessels remain the same, whether they happen to be a RIB or not. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further clarification.
a) Each port or local authority has the ability to regulate the use of small commercial vessels within their jurisdiction. Whilst there are some port and local authorities which will no doubt have the expertise and resource to deal with such matters, there are others who may not, and therefore regulating on a port by port basis may lead to inconsistencies between the standards adopted.
The MCA regulates commercial vessels used “at sea”, i.e outside of categorised waters which are often within the jurisdiction of port or local authorities, however this can result in uncertainty when an MCA coded vessel (such as Seadogz) is used within categorised waters.
The RYA notes the issue of inconsistent regulation applies to all commercial vessel operations, and not just to those used for high-speed experience rides.
Accordingly, the RYA believes there is an opportunity to review the position and either align the requirements of various harbour or local authorities in their treatment of commercial craft, or for the MCA to consider the issue on a national basis, however the RYA does not believe that it would be appropriate for the MCA’s “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code” which is currently out for public consultation, to be applied on a blanket basis to all small commercial vessels only used within categorised waters. The RYA recommends that any uniform standard must be proportionate and take into account the nature of vessels and risk profile of operating within categorised waters.
b) The RYA notes that a draft “Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code” was recently released for consultation, and it is our understanding that the finalised version of the code will follow in
2025. Whilst there is certainly benefit in promoting safety and key messages within the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector (direct to the operators of those craft) in the interim, we do not believe it is feasible to develop and implement temporary measures without the risk of causing confusion for operators.
c) The RYA would support a revision to the ISO Standard. However, this should not be seen as a solution for existing craft. Retrospective steps for existing craft would undoubtedly be unworkable, unviable and are likely to have unintended consequences. Operators of existing craft should instead be educated to have safety management systems, conduct appropriate risk assessments and take the necessary steps to mitigate against any identified risks.
d) The RYA supports the notion of a review of seat and handrail design for new craft within the Small High Speed Passenger Vessel sector. However, we believe that addressing this issue with existing craft is best done through better education of operators and skippers on safety management systems, and the implementation of effective risk assessments, supported by appropriate steps to mitigate against identified risks. Examples would include measures such as limiting speeds when passengers occupy certain seats, or perhaps limiting operations to
certain sea states. The RYA is aware of an outstanding recommendation from the MAIB to the MCA to “Conduct an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety to develop a framework for assuring the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact.”. The RYA believes this study, and its subsequent implementation into the codes of practice by the MCA, will address your concerns in this area, however, as highlighted in point a) further consideration is needed around the applicability of the current and any future code requirement to vessels operating exclusively in categorised waters.
e) Technology such as AIS is likely to increase the visibility of commercial vessels and may allow vessel tracks to be analysed more clearly after an incident, however while remote oversight may have some deterrent effect, the RYA questions the benefit of such technology for proactive monitoring on the basis that few harbour authorities will have the resource to proactively monitor all movements of Small Commercial High Speed Passenger vessels, while identifying speed and course may not allow an informed decision to be made remotely as to the safety implication of that behaviour in respect of a particular vessel, or enable intervention unless the vessel is operating in breach of legislation. Accordingly, the RYA does not believe that the use of technology is a substitute for appropriate training and safety management systems. The RYA does not believe that AIS is suitable for all vessels on a blanket basis.
f) The RYA fully supports the timely implementation of MAIB recommendations. We achieve this ourselves by maintaining a close working relationship with the MAIB and, where possible, by being involved in the recommendations consultation process. I note that the current MAIB recommendation for a review by the RYA of the existing “Small High Speed Passenger Vessel Voluntary Code of Practice” has been delayed due to the need to await the outcome of the MCA legislation for this sector of the industry. We felt, and the MAIB agreed, that releasing an amended version of the Voluntary Code of Practice at this point, where there was real risk of it either conflicting with or leaving unintended gaps, ran the risk of creating confusion within the sector and potentially undermining the “revised “Sport and Pleasure Code,” which we anticipate will address the majority of these issues. We envisage releasing a revised edition of the Voluntary Code of Practice soon after we have sight of the finalised MCA Sport and Pleasure Vessel Code. As an aside, it is noted that throughout your communication to us you reference “RIB craft” in relation to high-speed experience rides. It is respectfully suggested that it may be more appropriate to refer to these vessels as “small high speed passenger vessels”. Whilst it is true that many such experience rides do indeed utilise craft with an inflatable collar, not all of them do. Further, with the rapid evolution vessel design, it is entirely possible that this sector may move towards craft which do not have inflatable collars in the future. Indeed, in many parts of the world that is already the case. In order to ensure that any positive steps to come from your recommendations can be applied universally across the relevant craft, it will be important to ensure that appropriate terminology and definitions of craft
are used. This will avoid inadvertently ruling certain craft “out of scope”, simply for their lack of an inflatable collar. The risks on small high speed passenger vessels remain the same, whether they happen to be a RIB or not. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further clarification.
The British Ports Association clarified its role as a trade body, stating it is not insured to set safety guidelines and that the MCA is the suitable body to prepare guidance. It offered to assist by promoting and amplifying guidance from other bodies.
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Dear Mr Charles
Inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis – British Ports Association Prevention of Future Deaths response to HM Assistant Coroner
I can confirm that the British Ports Association (the ‘BPA’) is in receipt of the Prevention of Future Deaths report dated 15 November 2024 which was issued to a number of organisations following the conclusion of the Inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis. I am providing this response on behalf of the BPA in my capacity as its Chief Executive.
In the first instance the BPA extends its sincere condolences to the family of Ms Lewis. The BPA and the ports industry was extremely saddened to hear about the tragic incident on 22 August 2020 and the circumstances which resulted in her death.
By way of background the BPA is a trade and membership body for ports in the UK. We represent the interests of operators that handle 86% of all UK port traffic, to Westminster, the devolved Governments, and other national and international bodies. We are an inclusive and progressive association,
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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open to all and committed to the fair treatment of ports up and down the country.
As our membership comprises many ports, terminal operators and port facilities, all of varying size, location and nature, we are able to draw upon a wide range of experience and knowledge to represent our members’ interests.
We promote good port management and governance and membership is considered by many in the sector as an indication of a safe and respectable port operation. The BPA’s secretariat facilitates a range of services and is the go-to body for the dissemination of ports policy, industry news and information.
We also have a strong network of non-port ‘Associate Members’, who add much to the value of membership.
The BPA’s objects and purposes are:
a. To promote, further and protect the general interests of port authorities and conservancy authorities;
b. To afford opportunities for the discussion and consideration of general questions affecting all Members or groups of Members; and to disseminate information on matters relating thereto;
c. To take common action on any Bill, whether public general or local, or any proposed subordinate legislation or other matters that may in any way affect the common interest of Members;
d. To take action with other bodies having similar objects and port authorities abroad on matters of common interest.;
e. Generally to consult and co-operate on all matters of common interest to Members;
f. To assist Members in the exercise and performance of their functions in relation to ports and conservancies by the direct or indirect provision of services and advice for Members; and
g. The Association shall have power to guarantee the obligations of any other person firm or body corporate.
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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The BPA recognises its roles in contributing to safe operational activities within ports and as set out in our latest Annual Report, in 2023 we were closely involved in the reviews of the Port Marine Safety Code (the ‘PMSC’) and the associated Guide to Good Practice by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). These are important guidance resources produced by HM Government and we have continued to promote the principles of the Code and worked with government to increase its awareness. Indeed the BPA is an active member of the MCA’s PMSC Steering Group and separate MCA navigational safety committees. The BPA understands the revised PMSC and Guide are due to be published imminently and the next MCA compliance review is to be undertaken in
2025.
Further, we continue to organise online PMSC duty holder workshops, which we provide free to BPA member ports but encourage non-members to join for a small fee. We also introduced a new introductory course version in conjunction with specialist consultants in 2023 and organised more workshops in 2024. These will continue in 2025.
The BPA follows wider issues across the maritime community including reports and recommendations promulgated by the Marine Accident and Investigation Branch (the ‘MAIB’). The BPA has also raised safety matters directly with the MAIB, for example, concerns relating to pilot ladder deficiencies and the lack of national regulations on alcohol use on recreational vessels.
Importantly, the BPA is one of two joint quasi-shareholders of Port Skills and Safety (‘PSS’), the UK’s professional safety and skills membership organisation for ports, and the BPA has representatives on the PSS board, ensuring that it remains an active stakeholder. We recommend PSS membership to our members, and over 130 ports and companies are PSS members.
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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In terms of our structure the BPA is an unincorporated organisation and it has no regulatory functions or statutory powers. We exist as a representative body for ports. We are therefore unable to compel any person or organisation to take action but we can advocate and promote safety issues within the industry, which we do, primarily through the promotion of PSS, who we consider is doing a good job of driving positive change in skills and safety in the port sector.
Following the incident involving the vessel ‘Seadogz’ on 22 August 2020 and the tragic loss of life, the BPA was active in its engagement with industry stakeholders.
The BPA supported the MAIB investigation into the incident and received a briefing on the investigation. The MAIB’s report made a recommendation to industry (which was issued jointly to the BPA, UK Major Ports Group and UK Harbour Masters Association) to “contribute to the development of guidance for their members clarifying the requirements and best practices for the oversight of small commercial craft operating in their areas of responsibility”.
Prior to its final report publication I responded to the MAIB on behalf of the BPA on 1 January 2024. In summary, the BPA responded as follows:-
• That this was a tragic case and our sympathies were with the victim’s family and others affected;
• That in general terms the BPA was not opposed to guidance and confirmed that it can participate in the process of developing a common resource. The BPA’s view was that it is clear that there is not a consistent approach across all areas and so the focus and/or expectations should not be on any individual harbour authority;
• That as a starting point any guidance needed to be largely government written and owned and queried the MAIB’s request for the BPA to ‘contribute’. The BPA requested clarification that, for example, the MCA would lead;
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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• That the BPA was not insured to set safety critical guidelines or give advice itself but could instead assist by promoting and amplifying guidance and would look forward to being constructively engaged;
• Finally, that if the government was adamant that industry should own any guidance the BPA could seek to encourage PSS to lead this, but this would be subject to discussion with PSS and their agreement.
Following the provision of the BPA’s response I have corresponded further with the MAIB in relation to progress following the recommendation, in which the BPA reiterated its preparedness to contribute to guidance and again explained that the BPA had set out in its response to the MAIB’s recommendation that it considered the MCA to be the suitable body to prepare the guidance. In this correspondence I also updated the MAIB that PSS had been consulted and did not consider it had the suitable resources or skills to prepare any such guidance at present.
I hope that the above is a helpful summary of the BPA’s involvement in matters relevant to the issues identified within the Prevention of Future Deaths Report.
I can confirm that the BPA will continue to work with other the UK government, as well as with industry bodies and to participate in the industry’s efforts to ensure that the issues which contributed to the tragic events of 22 August 2020 are suitably addressed with a view to avoiding any future incidents.
Inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis – British Ports Association Prevention of Future Deaths response to HM Assistant Coroner
I can confirm that the British Ports Association (the ‘BPA’) is in receipt of the Prevention of Future Deaths report dated 15 November 2024 which was issued to a number of organisations following the conclusion of the Inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis. I am providing this response on behalf of the BPA in my capacity as its Chief Executive.
In the first instance the BPA extends its sincere condolences to the family of Ms Lewis. The BPA and the ports industry was extremely saddened to hear about the tragic incident on 22 August 2020 and the circumstances which resulted in her death.
By way of background the BPA is a trade and membership body for ports in the UK. We represent the interests of operators that handle 86% of all UK port traffic, to Westminster, the devolved Governments, and other national and international bodies. We are an inclusive and progressive association,
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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open to all and committed to the fair treatment of ports up and down the country.
As our membership comprises many ports, terminal operators and port facilities, all of varying size, location and nature, we are able to draw upon a wide range of experience and knowledge to represent our members’ interests.
We promote good port management and governance and membership is considered by many in the sector as an indication of a safe and respectable port operation. The BPA’s secretariat facilitates a range of services and is the go-to body for the dissemination of ports policy, industry news and information.
We also have a strong network of non-port ‘Associate Members’, who add much to the value of membership.
The BPA’s objects and purposes are:
a. To promote, further and protect the general interests of port authorities and conservancy authorities;
b. To afford opportunities for the discussion and consideration of general questions affecting all Members or groups of Members; and to disseminate information on matters relating thereto;
c. To take common action on any Bill, whether public general or local, or any proposed subordinate legislation or other matters that may in any way affect the common interest of Members;
d. To take action with other bodies having similar objects and port authorities abroad on matters of common interest.;
e. Generally to consult and co-operate on all matters of common interest to Members;
f. To assist Members in the exercise and performance of their functions in relation to ports and conservancies by the direct or indirect provision of services and advice for Members; and
g. The Association shall have power to guarantee the obligations of any other person firm or body corporate.
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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The BPA recognises its roles in contributing to safe operational activities within ports and as set out in our latest Annual Report, in 2023 we were closely involved in the reviews of the Port Marine Safety Code (the ‘PMSC’) and the associated Guide to Good Practice by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). These are important guidance resources produced by HM Government and we have continued to promote the principles of the Code and worked with government to increase its awareness. Indeed the BPA is an active member of the MCA’s PMSC Steering Group and separate MCA navigational safety committees. The BPA understands the revised PMSC and Guide are due to be published imminently and the next MCA compliance review is to be undertaken in
2025.
Further, we continue to organise online PMSC duty holder workshops, which we provide free to BPA member ports but encourage non-members to join for a small fee. We also introduced a new introductory course version in conjunction with specialist consultants in 2023 and organised more workshops in 2024. These will continue in 2025.
The BPA follows wider issues across the maritime community including reports and recommendations promulgated by the Marine Accident and Investigation Branch (the ‘MAIB’). The BPA has also raised safety matters directly with the MAIB, for example, concerns relating to pilot ladder deficiencies and the lack of national regulations on alcohol use on recreational vessels.
Importantly, the BPA is one of two joint quasi-shareholders of Port Skills and Safety (‘PSS’), the UK’s professional safety and skills membership organisation for ports, and the BPA has representatives on the PSS board, ensuring that it remains an active stakeholder. We recommend PSS membership to our members, and over 130 ports and companies are PSS members.
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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In terms of our structure the BPA is an unincorporated organisation and it has no regulatory functions or statutory powers. We exist as a representative body for ports. We are therefore unable to compel any person or organisation to take action but we can advocate and promote safety issues within the industry, which we do, primarily through the promotion of PSS, who we consider is doing a good job of driving positive change in skills and safety in the port sector.
Following the incident involving the vessel ‘Seadogz’ on 22 August 2020 and the tragic loss of life, the BPA was active in its engagement with industry stakeholders.
The BPA supported the MAIB investigation into the incident and received a briefing on the investigation. The MAIB’s report made a recommendation to industry (which was issued jointly to the BPA, UK Major Ports Group and UK Harbour Masters Association) to “contribute to the development of guidance for their members clarifying the requirements and best practices for the oversight of small commercial craft operating in their areas of responsibility”.
Prior to its final report publication I responded to the MAIB on behalf of the BPA on 1 January 2024. In summary, the BPA responded as follows:-
• That this was a tragic case and our sympathies were with the victim’s family and others affected;
• That in general terms the BPA was not opposed to guidance and confirmed that it can participate in the process of developing a common resource. The BPA’s view was that it is clear that there is not a consistent approach across all areas and so the focus and/or expectations should not be on any individual harbour authority;
• That as a starting point any guidance needed to be largely government written and owned and queried the MAIB’s request for the BPA to ‘contribute’. The BPA requested clarification that, for example, the MCA would lead;
British Ports Association Speaking for UK Ports a: 30 Park Street, London, SE1 9EQ t: +44 20 7260 1780 e: info@britishports.org.uk w: www.britishports.org.uk
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• That the BPA was not insured to set safety critical guidelines or give advice itself but could instead assist by promoting and amplifying guidance and would look forward to being constructively engaged;
• Finally, that if the government was adamant that industry should own any guidance the BPA could seek to encourage PSS to lead this, but this would be subject to discussion with PSS and their agreement.
Following the provision of the BPA’s response I have corresponded further with the MAIB in relation to progress following the recommendation, in which the BPA reiterated its preparedness to contribute to guidance and again explained that the BPA had set out in its response to the MAIB’s recommendation that it considered the MCA to be the suitable body to prepare the guidance. In this correspondence I also updated the MAIB that PSS had been consulted and did not consider it had the suitable resources or skills to prepare any such guidance at present.
I hope that the above is a helpful summary of the BPA’s involvement in matters relevant to the issues identified within the Prevention of Future Deaths Report.
I can confirm that the BPA will continue to work with other the UK government, as well as with industry bodies and to participate in the industry’s efforts to ensure that the issues which contributed to the tragic events of 22 August 2020 are suitably addressed with a view to avoiding any future incidents.
The Department for Transport has published a public consultation on a new Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code, which includes improved seating requirements, greater use of AIS, and mandatory safety management systems. They have also tasked the MCA to begin procurement for an anthropometric assessment of high-speed passenger craft design and operational requirements.
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Dear Henry,
Subject: Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths
I am grateful for your careful consideration of the circumstances of the tragic accident involving Emily Jane Lewis and highlighting the opportunities for improvement in safety in your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths of 15 November.
I would like to take this opportunity to reassure you that the work currently being undertaken by the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) to replace the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280(M) (Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) is a priority of mine and we are working hard to bring forward new legislation and an updated Code of Practice for Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure (the “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code”) as soon as practical, in line with the required consultation and Parliamentary processes.
To this end, a draft new Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code was published for a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.
There have been significant developments in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code to address concerns you have raised, such as improved requirements for seating in vessels undertaking this type of operation, greater use of vessel Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and a new mandatory requirement for owners and operators to implement a safety management system.
In response to the MAIB recommendations raised, I have tasked the MCA to begin the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact.
This assessment will also consider, among other things; the full anthropometric range of passengers and crew, the operational profile of the vessels, including the range of speeds, as well as crash protection and general protection of the seating arrangements including the design and use of handholds and restraints.
The outputs from this assessment are expected in late spring/early summer 2026 and will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. The MCA will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information.
As well as the proactive steps to improve small commercial vessel safety with the amendments made in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code, the MCA will continue to work to ensure that owners and operators take seriously their responsibilities for ensuring the safety of those onboard their vessels.
Subject: Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths
I am grateful for your careful consideration of the circumstances of the tragic accident involving Emily Jane Lewis and highlighting the opportunities for improvement in safety in your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths of 15 November.
I would like to take this opportunity to reassure you that the work currently being undertaken by the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) to replace the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280(M) (Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards) is a priority of mine and we are working hard to bring forward new legislation and an updated Code of Practice for Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure (the “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code”) as soon as practical, in line with the required consultation and Parliamentary processes.
To this end, a draft new Statutory Instrument and draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code was published for a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect.
There have been significant developments in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code to address concerns you have raised, such as improved requirements for seating in vessels undertaking this type of operation, greater use of vessel Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and a new mandatory requirement for owners and operators to implement a safety management system.
In response to the MAIB recommendations raised, I have tasked the MCA to begin the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact.
This assessment will also consider, among other things; the full anthropometric range of passengers and crew, the operational profile of the vessels, including the range of speeds, as well as crash protection and general protection of the seating arrangements including the design and use of handholds and restraints.
The outputs from this assessment are expected in late spring/early summer 2026 and will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. The MCA will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information.
As well as the proactive steps to improve small commercial vessel safety with the amendments made in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code, the MCA will continue to work to ensure that owners and operators take seriously their responsibilities for ensuring the safety of those onboard their vessels.
BSI clarifies its role as the National Standards Body, stating it facilitates expert committees to achieve consensus on standards but does not interpret standards or retain in-house expertise. They explain that responsibility for technical content and interpretation rests with the relevant committee and users, respectively.
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Dear Sir, Emily Jane Lewis: Prevention of future deaths report Introduction
1. We write in response to your regulation 28 report arising out of the death of Emily Jane Lewis (“the Report”). BSI would like at the outset to express its deepest sympathy and condolences for the family of Miss Lewis.
2. We are responding in particular to No.5 (Coroner’s Concerns) Item c in the Report: “c. Whether the existing BS EN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft.” BSI’s role
3. BSI’s role as the National Standards Body is to facilitate expert committees to achieve consensus on industry standards and best practice and to act as the publisher of standards.
4. BSI itself does not interpret standards, nor does it retain in-house expertise on the subject matter of standards. Further, BSI is not a regulatory body and is therefore unable to advise
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 2 on regulatory matters, which are a matter for HM Government. Further information about BSI’s role as the National Standards Body is given in the Appendix below. Background
5. Each individual standard is the responsibility of one technical committee. It is the committee who is responsible for the technical content of the standard, not BSI. In this case the relevant standard (BS EN ISO 11591) is an international standard, developed by an international committee managed by the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”)) to which BSI contributes through a local (British) ‘mirror committee’. Such mirror committees consist primarily of experts who are independent of BSI, and who are often nominated by trade associations, professional bodies, research/scientific institutions, government or other entities. They have an independent chair and BSI provides a committee manager and other support including an editorial project manager for national standards.
6. Draft international standards go through public consultation in all participating member countries including the UK, and the decision to publish is achieved through voting by the various committees.
7. The international committee responsible for BS EN ISO 11591 is known as ISO/TC 188. The responsible UK committee in this instance is known as GME/33 - Small craft. Its scope is: “Under the direction of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee, is responsible for the UK input to ISO/TC 188, CEN/TC 464 and CEN (CEN/SS T01: Shipbuilding & maritime structures) under the Recreational Craft Directive (94/25/EC, 2003/44/EC) and British standards relating to small craft” (see https://standardsdevelopment.bsigroup.com/committees/50000770).
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 3 Committee’s Response
8. In order to assist the Coroner, BSI has referred the Report to GME/33. The committee has explained: a) BS EN ISO 11591 has recently been amended to improve the assessment for vertical field of vision following a request from the Norwegian Maritime Authorities. That amendment (ISO 11591 Amd 1 2023) includes a new requirement:
4.2.2.3 Annex A sets the procedure and methods to determine the level reference line and to verify the field of vision in the vertical field for power-driven craft with steering wheel or equivalent fixed installed direct control, which shall be followed. b) In the earlier version of the standard, the obligation to ensure sufficient field of vision did include the requirement: A forward field of vision shall be provided directly in front of the operator's eye position throughout the vertical field of vision and extending to at least 15° on either side of a line forward from the eye position (see Figure 1) to the obstructed vision distance as specified in 4.2.2. This may be achieved with normal movement of the operator’s head while maintaining control of the craft. c) The amendment was intended to incorporate a requirement for the effect of the full loading of persons to be included in the evaluation of the operator’s field of vision with the craft at its maximum running trim angle value to ensure that the actual operational forward visibility is adequate and compliant with the standard.
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 4
9. The committee asks the coroner: a) Whether the amendment already published meets the recommendation as set out by the MAIB in this case? b) Alternatively, does the Coroner or MAIB consider that there is a need for an additional amendment aimed at ensuring temporary obstructions (passengers for example) are more clearly identified as a restriction to vision and used within the calculations? Given the existing text it could be considered that they are already, but it is not as clear as it may be able to be.
10. If the answer to paragraph 9 (b) is yes, GME/33 could propose an amendment to the ISO TC188 chair and raise it at the next plenary meeting of ISO TC188, scheduled for May 2025.
11. The committee also believes that it would be useful to talk to the investigator to clearly understand the objectives of any amendment proposal. Therefore, BSI on behalf of the committee asks the Coroner whether there would be any objection to it contacting the investigator of this particular accident to understand further the proposed amendment to the standard.
12. We look forward to your response accordingly.
1. We write in response to your regulation 28 report arising out of the death of Emily Jane Lewis (“the Report”). BSI would like at the outset to express its deepest sympathy and condolences for the family of Miss Lewis.
2. We are responding in particular to No.5 (Coroner’s Concerns) Item c in the Report: “c. Whether the existing BS EN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft.” BSI’s role
3. BSI’s role as the National Standards Body is to facilitate expert committees to achieve consensus on industry standards and best practice and to act as the publisher of standards.
4. BSI itself does not interpret standards, nor does it retain in-house expertise on the subject matter of standards. Further, BSI is not a regulatory body and is therefore unable to advise
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 2 on regulatory matters, which are a matter for HM Government. Further information about BSI’s role as the National Standards Body is given in the Appendix below. Background
5. Each individual standard is the responsibility of one technical committee. It is the committee who is responsible for the technical content of the standard, not BSI. In this case the relevant standard (BS EN ISO 11591) is an international standard, developed by an international committee managed by the International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”)) to which BSI contributes through a local (British) ‘mirror committee’. Such mirror committees consist primarily of experts who are independent of BSI, and who are often nominated by trade associations, professional bodies, research/scientific institutions, government or other entities. They have an independent chair and BSI provides a committee manager and other support including an editorial project manager for national standards.
6. Draft international standards go through public consultation in all participating member countries including the UK, and the decision to publish is achieved through voting by the various committees.
7. The international committee responsible for BS EN ISO 11591 is known as ISO/TC 188. The responsible UK committee in this instance is known as GME/33 - Small craft. Its scope is: “Under the direction of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee, is responsible for the UK input to ISO/TC 188, CEN/TC 464 and CEN (CEN/SS T01: Shipbuilding & maritime structures) under the Recreational Craft Directive (94/25/EC, 2003/44/EC) and British standards relating to small craft” (see https://standardsdevelopment.bsigroup.com/committees/50000770).
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 3 Committee’s Response
8. In order to assist the Coroner, BSI has referred the Report to GME/33. The committee has explained: a) BS EN ISO 11591 has recently been amended to improve the assessment for vertical field of vision following a request from the Norwegian Maritime Authorities. That amendment (ISO 11591 Amd 1 2023) includes a new requirement:
4.2.2.3 Annex A sets the procedure and methods to determine the level reference line and to verify the field of vision in the vertical field for power-driven craft with steering wheel or equivalent fixed installed direct control, which shall be followed. b) In the earlier version of the standard, the obligation to ensure sufficient field of vision did include the requirement: A forward field of vision shall be provided directly in front of the operator's eye position throughout the vertical field of vision and extending to at least 15° on either side of a line forward from the eye position (see Figure 1) to the obstructed vision distance as specified in 4.2.2. This may be achieved with normal movement of the operator’s head while maintaining control of the craft. c) The amendment was intended to incorporate a requirement for the effect of the full loading of persons to be included in the evaluation of the operator’s field of vision with the craft at its maximum running trim angle value to ensure that the actual operational forward visibility is adequate and compliant with the standard.
© 2024 BSI. All rights reserved. 4
9. The committee asks the coroner: a) Whether the amendment already published meets the recommendation as set out by the MAIB in this case? b) Alternatively, does the Coroner or MAIB consider that there is a need for an additional amendment aimed at ensuring temporary obstructions (passengers for example) are more clearly identified as a restriction to vision and used within the calculations? Given the existing text it could be considered that they are already, but it is not as clear as it may be able to be.
10. If the answer to paragraph 9 (b) is yes, GME/33 could propose an amendment to the ISO TC188 chair and raise it at the next plenary meeting of ISO TC188, scheduled for May 2025.
11. The committee also believes that it would be useful to talk to the investigator to clearly understand the objectives of any amendment proposal. Therefore, BSI on behalf of the committee asks the Coroner whether there would be any objection to it contacting the investigator of this particular accident to understand further the proposed amendment to the standard.
12. We look forward to your response accordingly.
Associated British Ports (ABP) recently reviewed RIB safety in Southampton and issued a new Notice to Mariners (21 Jan 2025) setting out requirements for high-speed commercial passenger vessels, including demonstrating compliance with the Voluntary Code of Practice. ABP noted that general AIS monitoring of all vessels for unsafe practices is challenging and beyond its current remit.
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Dear Mr Charles, Concerns raised in the Regulation 28: report to prevent future deaths dated 15 November 2024 (the “Report”) following the inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis on 22 August 2020 Further to our letter of 10 January 2025, this letter is Associated British Ports’ (“ABP”) response to those concerns raised in section 5 of the Report that ABP may have the ability to take action in relation to, in particular the matters relating to the use of its Southampton statutory harbour area (“SHA”) by small high-speed craft being operated for commercial purposes, and the action that ABP has taken, or proposes to take in relation to these concerns. It is made pursuant to our duty to give a written response to the Report in accordance with paragraph 7(2) of schedule 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and regulation 29 of the Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 (the “Regulations”). The death of Emily Lewis on 22 August 2020 was a tragic event that has been subject to prolonged scrutiny, as befits the death of any young person; ABP responded to the Marine Accident Investigation Branch’s (“MAIB”) investigation into the incident and its recommendations and, while ABP was not an interested party in the inquest proceedings, we welcome the opportunity to respond to your concerns with the aim of improving the safety of all harbour users. We note that the Report has been issued to a number of parties and that these are predominantly government, trade and industry bodies. It is the case that ABP is the only commercial party not involved with the inquest to receive the Report, showing the general and regulatory nature of the concerns identified, and their potential application to all harbour areas in the UK, and all port users. Our response is set out in detail below, however, in summary we:
- respectfully wish to clarify the position regarding the risk assessments that were in place at the time of the SEADOGZ incident;
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- favour a national, sector-wide approach led by the MCA, as the appropriate regulatory body, to the regulation of RIB craft being used for high-speed experience rides;
- set out the interim measures that have been put in place in the Southampton SHA regarding commercial vessels; and
- have issued a notice to mariners stating that AIS transponders are required for all vessels being used commercially in the Southampton SHA from 1 January 2025. Clarification regarding ABP’s risk assessments Before addressing the concerns that you have raised, we would like to clarify a potential misunderstanding in the Report regarding the risk-assessments that ABP had in place at the time of the SEADOGZ incident. In section 4 of the Report, you state that “ABP (the harbour authority) had not assessed the risks of high-speed commercial passenger craft operations in its area”. That is not correct. There are a number of high-speed commercial passenger craft that operate on a regular basis in the Southampton SHA, ranging from vessels similar to SEADOGZ to the Red Jet high-speed ferries between Southampton and West Cowes. The passage quoted above suggests that ABP has not considered the risks such vessels pose, which is not, and was not, the case and could lead to readers of the Report coming to the wrong conclusion. ABP keeps its risk assessments under continuous review and updates them as necessary to reflect developments in relevant risks, changes in regulation and lessons learned from incidents and events that occur across the sector. Since May 2020, before the SEADOGZ incident, ABP has had a risk assessment in place for the Southampton SHA that relates to the risks associated with a high-speed vessel colliding with navigational marks (SOT – 133-4) and another regarding the risks associated with a high-speed vessel colliding with floating objects (SOT – 149-6). Following a review of the risk assessments in place after the SEADOGZ incident, we amended SOT – 133-4 to specifically apply to vessels of less than twenty metres in length and introduced a new risk assessment, SOT – 153-3, which applies to vessels greater than twenty metres in length. The size of vessels is considered to be the appropriate determining factor as it is a suitable analogue for passenger capacity. The risk profile, and therefore the control measures, for large and small high- speed passenger vessels are materially different. ABP considers the navigational risk posed by commercial and non-commercial high-speed passenger vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to be substantially the same and therefore does not have separate risk assessments for them as it would not materially improve navigational safety in the SHA. Coroner’s concerns We have reviewed the concerns in the Report and consider a, b, and e in Row 5 to be those that ABP may have the ability to take action in relation to. As such we set out our responses to these concerns below. For ease of reference we have followed the numbering in the Report.
a. Whether consideration should be given to the licensing arrangements for ports authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework of the use of RIB craft on high-speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments The licencing of all small high-speed commercial vessels operating in the UK, including RIB craft on high-speed experience rides, is complex and it would be appropriate for changes to be dealt with at a national level to ensure a consistent approach.
3 At the local level for Southampton, Southampton City Council (“SCC”) is the licencing authority of pleasure vessels used for carrying passengers for hire pursuant to section 94(1) of the Public Health Acts Amendments Act 1907, as amended (the “1907 Act”), with ABP acting as its appointed agent for inspecting vessels to be licenced. However, under section 94(4) of the 1907 Act, a licence is not required for vessels otherwise licenced by the Secretary of State, such as where vessels are certified to the Small Commercial Vessel Code (“SCV Code”). As such, if vessels certified to the SCV Code (as was the case with SEADOGZ) were required to enter into an additional agreement with SCC as a condition of a licence, SCC and, by extension, ABP as its agent, would be open to challenge for acting outside of their statutory powers. As was identified in the MAIB’s report into the SEADOGZ incident, local authorities and statutory harbour authorities have different approaches and powers to regulate small, high-speed passenger craft, even in a limited geographical area such as the Solent. Given this variation, were one local authority or statutory harbour authority to implement a local regime to regulate high-speed experience ride operators, the operators could move their vessels to another SHA rather than complying with that authority’s requirements, undermining local regulation attempts. As such, any changes to the regulatory regime would be best implemented through a consistent national approach, led by the MCA, as the national marine regulator, to ensure that there is a uniform, consistent and comprehensible framework in all UK waters that is properly communicated to the relevant commercial vessel operators. ABP is in favour of an appropriate national, sector-wide approach for the regulation of RIB craft being used for high-speed experience rides, led by the MCA, as the appropriate regulatory body, with support from the relevant industry bodies that HM Assistant Coroner has identified in the Report (the BPA, UKMPG, RYA, and UKHMA). This would ensure that any requirements or additional safety measures that are considered appropriate are consistently applied across the UK and that they are properly communicated to all relevant port users and commercial operators.
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides As stated above, ABP keeps its risk assessments under continuous review and updates them as and when necessary to reflect developments in relevant risks, changes in regulations, and lessons learned from incidents and events that occur across the sector. Following the SEADOGZ incident ABP reviewed its risk assessments and safety management system to assess whether they should be updated or whether any measures should be put in place, resulting in updates to its risk assessments for high-speed passenger craft. In addition, ABP, in consultation with the MAIB, issued notice to mariners no.52 of 2024, which has been reissued as no. 22 of 2025 (the “NtMs”) to implement a register of commercial vessel operators in the Southampton SHA. The NtMs require all operators of small craft, boats or vessels undertaking paid work, training or carrying fare-paying customers in the Southampton SHA to provide certain vessel details to ABP. The NtMs also specify that the Port of Southampton may, if appropriate, inspect vessels in line with existing national standards (such as the SCV Code), agreed codes of practice, OEM handbooks and similar specifications. The NtMs have been necessary as an interim measure due to the substantial length of time it has taken for ABP’s application for a harbour revision order to be processed by the UK Government. The application was originally submitted in June 2020, before the SEADOGZ incident, and once granted will give ABP a broader power of general direction, thus giving it greater flexibility to regulate users of the SHA and support safe navigation.
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e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified ABP supports the use of AIS transponders by all commercial vessels and has taken steps to promote their use by vessels operating in the Southampton SHA through issuing the NtMs, which require all commercial vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to have an operational AIS transponder fitted unless they have been granted an exemption. It is ABP’s intention to issue a general direction to support this requirement once its harbour revision order application has concluded. While AIS is an important aid to navigational safety, monitoring the AIS tracks of vessels (or a specific class of them), identifying whether they are operating safely or not, and potentially intervening in their operation in the Southampton SHA would be very challenging for ABP, require dedicated resources (with associated costs), and may not materially increase the safety of harbour users. Statutory harbour authorities do not have the powers, expertise or resources to generally police all vessels in their SHA and bring enforcement action in the event of non-compliance. The Southampton vessel traffic service (“VTS”) area covers 274mi2 and is responsible for co-ordinating the movements of large commercial vessels in Southampton Water, the SHA of the King’s Harbour Master Portsmouth and the area within 7NM of the Nab Tower. On a weekend in the summer there are likely to be several thousand vessels of all classes, engaged in a variety of activities, operating in the Southampton SHA. Many of them will have active AIS transmitters and in most circumstances it is unlikely to be possible to distinguish between a vessel being operated safely and unsafely from its AIS track alone. While ABP does have an on-the-water presence in its SHA and its pilot vessels and harbour patrol craft may intervene on an ad hoc basis if they witness harbour users acting unsafely while they are carrying out their other duties, this is secondary to their general function. ABP is committed to improving the safety of all harbour users and, as set out above, we keep our risk management systems under continuous review and update them as necessary to ensure that they reflect changes in regulation and relevant risks, and developments in best practice learned from across all of ABP’s ports and the wider port sector. Should you require any clarification on any of the above, please let us know.
- respectfully wish to clarify the position regarding the risk assessments that were in place at the time of the SEADOGZ incident;
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- favour a national, sector-wide approach led by the MCA, as the appropriate regulatory body, to the regulation of RIB craft being used for high-speed experience rides;
- set out the interim measures that have been put in place in the Southampton SHA regarding commercial vessels; and
- have issued a notice to mariners stating that AIS transponders are required for all vessels being used commercially in the Southampton SHA from 1 January 2025. Clarification regarding ABP’s risk assessments Before addressing the concerns that you have raised, we would like to clarify a potential misunderstanding in the Report regarding the risk-assessments that ABP had in place at the time of the SEADOGZ incident. In section 4 of the Report, you state that “ABP (the harbour authority) had not assessed the risks of high-speed commercial passenger craft operations in its area”. That is not correct. There are a number of high-speed commercial passenger craft that operate on a regular basis in the Southampton SHA, ranging from vessels similar to SEADOGZ to the Red Jet high-speed ferries between Southampton and West Cowes. The passage quoted above suggests that ABP has not considered the risks such vessels pose, which is not, and was not, the case and could lead to readers of the Report coming to the wrong conclusion. ABP keeps its risk assessments under continuous review and updates them as necessary to reflect developments in relevant risks, changes in regulation and lessons learned from incidents and events that occur across the sector. Since May 2020, before the SEADOGZ incident, ABP has had a risk assessment in place for the Southampton SHA that relates to the risks associated with a high-speed vessel colliding with navigational marks (SOT – 133-4) and another regarding the risks associated with a high-speed vessel colliding with floating objects (SOT – 149-6). Following a review of the risk assessments in place after the SEADOGZ incident, we amended SOT – 133-4 to specifically apply to vessels of less than twenty metres in length and introduced a new risk assessment, SOT – 153-3, which applies to vessels greater than twenty metres in length. The size of vessels is considered to be the appropriate determining factor as it is a suitable analogue for passenger capacity. The risk profile, and therefore the control measures, for large and small high- speed passenger vessels are materially different. ABP considers the navigational risk posed by commercial and non-commercial high-speed passenger vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to be substantially the same and therefore does not have separate risk assessments for them as it would not materially improve navigational safety in the SHA. Coroner’s concerns We have reviewed the concerns in the Report and consider a, b, and e in Row 5 to be those that ABP may have the ability to take action in relation to. As such we set out our responses to these concerns below. For ease of reference we have followed the numbering in the Report.
a. Whether consideration should be given to the licensing arrangements for ports authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework of the use of RIB craft on high-speed experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments The licencing of all small high-speed commercial vessels operating in the UK, including RIB craft on high-speed experience rides, is complex and it would be appropriate for changes to be dealt with at a national level to ensure a consistent approach.
3 At the local level for Southampton, Southampton City Council (“SCC”) is the licencing authority of pleasure vessels used for carrying passengers for hire pursuant to section 94(1) of the Public Health Acts Amendments Act 1907, as amended (the “1907 Act”), with ABP acting as its appointed agent for inspecting vessels to be licenced. However, under section 94(4) of the 1907 Act, a licence is not required for vessels otherwise licenced by the Secretary of State, such as where vessels are certified to the Small Commercial Vessel Code (“SCV Code”). As such, if vessels certified to the SCV Code (as was the case with SEADOGZ) were required to enter into an additional agreement with SCC as a condition of a licence, SCC and, by extension, ABP as its agent, would be open to challenge for acting outside of their statutory powers. As was identified in the MAIB’s report into the SEADOGZ incident, local authorities and statutory harbour authorities have different approaches and powers to regulate small, high-speed passenger craft, even in a limited geographical area such as the Solent. Given this variation, were one local authority or statutory harbour authority to implement a local regime to regulate high-speed experience ride operators, the operators could move their vessels to another SHA rather than complying with that authority’s requirements, undermining local regulation attempts. As such, any changes to the regulatory regime would be best implemented through a consistent national approach, led by the MCA, as the national marine regulator, to ensure that there is a uniform, consistent and comprehensible framework in all UK waters that is properly communicated to the relevant commercial vessel operators. ABP is in favour of an appropriate national, sector-wide approach for the regulation of RIB craft being used for high-speed experience rides, led by the MCA, as the appropriate regulatory body, with support from the relevant industry bodies that HM Assistant Coroner has identified in the Report (the BPA, UKMPG, RYA, and UKHMA). This would ensure that any requirements or additional safety measures that are considered appropriate are consistently applied across the UK and that they are properly communicated to all relevant port users and commercial operators.
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides As stated above, ABP keeps its risk assessments under continuous review and updates them as and when necessary to reflect developments in relevant risks, changes in regulations, and lessons learned from incidents and events that occur across the sector. Following the SEADOGZ incident ABP reviewed its risk assessments and safety management system to assess whether they should be updated or whether any measures should be put in place, resulting in updates to its risk assessments for high-speed passenger craft. In addition, ABP, in consultation with the MAIB, issued notice to mariners no.52 of 2024, which has been reissued as no. 22 of 2025 (the “NtMs”) to implement a register of commercial vessel operators in the Southampton SHA. The NtMs require all operators of small craft, boats or vessels undertaking paid work, training or carrying fare-paying customers in the Southampton SHA to provide certain vessel details to ABP. The NtMs also specify that the Port of Southampton may, if appropriate, inspect vessels in line with existing national standards (such as the SCV Code), agreed codes of practice, OEM handbooks and similar specifications. The NtMs have been necessary as an interim measure due to the substantial length of time it has taken for ABP’s application for a harbour revision order to be processed by the UK Government. The application was originally submitted in June 2020, before the SEADOGZ incident, and once granted will give ABP a broader power of general direction, thus giving it greater flexibility to regulate users of the SHA and support safe navigation.
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e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified ABP supports the use of AIS transponders by all commercial vessels and has taken steps to promote their use by vessels operating in the Southampton SHA through issuing the NtMs, which require all commercial vessels operating in the Southampton SHA to have an operational AIS transponder fitted unless they have been granted an exemption. It is ABP’s intention to issue a general direction to support this requirement once its harbour revision order application has concluded. While AIS is an important aid to navigational safety, monitoring the AIS tracks of vessels (or a specific class of them), identifying whether they are operating safely or not, and potentially intervening in their operation in the Southampton SHA would be very challenging for ABP, require dedicated resources (with associated costs), and may not materially increase the safety of harbour users. Statutory harbour authorities do not have the powers, expertise or resources to generally police all vessels in their SHA and bring enforcement action in the event of non-compliance. The Southampton vessel traffic service (“VTS”) area covers 274mi2 and is responsible for co-ordinating the movements of large commercial vessels in Southampton Water, the SHA of the King’s Harbour Master Portsmouth and the area within 7NM of the Nab Tower. On a weekend in the summer there are likely to be several thousand vessels of all classes, engaged in a variety of activities, operating in the Southampton SHA. Many of them will have active AIS transmitters and in most circumstances it is unlikely to be possible to distinguish between a vessel being operated safely and unsafely from its AIS track alone. While ABP does have an on-the-water presence in its SHA and its pilot vessels and harbour patrol craft may intervene on an ad hoc basis if they witness harbour users acting unsafely while they are carrying out their other duties, this is secondary to their general function. ABP is committed to improving the safety of all harbour users and, as set out above, we keep our risk management systems under continuous review and update them as necessary to ensure that they reflect changes in regulation and relevant risks, and developments in best practice learned from across all of ABP’s ports and the wider port sector. Should you require any clarification on any of the above, please let us know.
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is prioritising new legislation and an updated Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code, currently midway through a public consultation (Dec 2024-Feb 2025), to address concerns including seating, AIS, and safety management systems. MCA has also begun procurement for an anthropometric assessment of high-speed passenger craft safety, with a project start by April 2025 and report due late spring/early summer 2026.
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Dear Mr Charles Subject: Regulation 28: Report to Prevent Future Deaths I am writing to you in response to your Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths following the tragic accident involving Emily Jane Lewis. We received the MAIB recommendations on 17 November 2023 ahead of the final report being published on 14 December 2023. By that time, there had already been significant developments in the draft of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code to address concerns you have raised, such as improved requirements for seating in vessels undertaking this type of operation, greater use of vessel Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and a new mandatory requirement for owners and operators to implement a safety management system. Staff at MCA have prioritised work to replace the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code as annexed to MGN 280(M) (Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards). We are focussing on bringing forward new legislation and an updated Code of Practice for Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure (the “Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code”) as soon as practical, in line with the required consultation and Parliamentary processes. The findings and recommendations of the MAIB Investigation Report have informed the development of this draft Code, and we can report that the Parliamentary process of that legislation
is currently at the midpoint of a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted however, that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect. Furthermore, the MCA has begun the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact. This will require, among other things; assessment of the full anthropometric range of passengers and crew, the operational profile of the vessels, including the range of speeds, as well as crash protection and general protection of the seating arrangements including the design and use of handholds and restraints This research project will commence by April 2025, and then the final report is likely to be available in late spring/early summer 2026. The outputs of this report will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. We will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information. As well as the proactive steps to improve small commercial vessel safety with the amendments made in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code we will continue to work to ensure that owners and operators take seriously their responsibilities for ensuring the safety of those onboard their vessels. I remain at your disposal.
is currently at the midpoint of a 12-week public consultation running from 4 December 2024 until 25 February 2025. It should be noted however, that any interim measures that could be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides would not be able to be implemented any sooner than the revised Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code would come into effect. Furthermore, the MCA has begun the procurement process to commission an anthropometric assessment of the design and operational requirements for small high-speed passenger craft safety and the protection of passengers and crew provided by the craft with respect to whole-body vibration and sudden decelerations in the event of a horizontal impact. This will require, among other things; assessment of the full anthropometric range of passengers and crew, the operational profile of the vessels, including the range of speeds, as well as crash protection and general protection of the seating arrangements including the design and use of handholds and restraints This research project will commence by April 2025, and then the final report is likely to be available in late spring/early summer 2026. The outputs of this report will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the next version of the Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code. We will also use the information and data gathered to provide updated guidance to the wider pleasure vessel sector on passenger safety information. As well as the proactive steps to improve small commercial vessel safety with the amendments made in the draft Sport or Pleasure Vessel Code we will continue to work to ensure that owners and operators take seriously their responsibilities for ensuring the safety of those onboard their vessels. I remain at your disposal.
Red Bay Boats Limited has decided to no longer accept commissions in the thrill-seeking market. The company has instructed a specialist to test its seats in early 2025 and will recommend Scot Seats for improved safety and comfort, or ensure their own seats are rigorously tested if customers cannot afford suspension seats.
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INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF EMILY JANE LEWIS ________________________________________________
I , Director of Red Bay Boats Limited, write this statement, in response to the Prevention of Future Deaths Report, made by the Coroner of Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton, following an inquest which took place on 31 October 2024.
Background
1. On 31 October 2024, the inquest into the death of Ms Lewis concluded and the Coroner gave the following narrative conclusion:
a. On 22 August 2020 the Deceased died at Southampton General Hospital, Temona Road, Southampton, Hampshire.
b. On the morning of 22 August 2022, Ms Lewis had sustained upper abdominal injuries when the RIB Seadogz, on which she was a passenger, collided with a buoy, projecting her forward into the extended handhold in front of her, causing fatal injuries: the Deceased’s liver was compressed against her spinal column leading to transection, along with contusion of the pancreas.
2. We also received a Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) Report, which we understand was sent to several parties following the inquest. The Report related to the following concerns raised by the Coroner:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed
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2 experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments;
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides;
c. Whether the existing BS EN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft;
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design: as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis, I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats;
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified;
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved.
3. Firstly, everyone at Red Bay Boats Limited, the owners and employees, extend our heartfelt condolences to the friends and family of Ms Emily Jane Lewis during this difficult time.
4. We would like to extend our gratitude to the Coroner for reaching out to us with the concerns raised and affording us with the opportunity to respond. We greatly appreciate the chance to address these matters.
5. Red Bay Boats Limited has been a trusted leader in the boat building industry for 47 years. Throughout this extensive history, we are proud to report that we have not been aware of any injuries or fatalities caused by our vessels. Our
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3 commitment to safety, quality craftsmanship, and innovation continues to guide every aspect of our operations.
6. Safety at sea is at the core of our ethos in boat building. Many of our employees are also proud volunteers for the RNLI, further demonstrating our commitment to maritime safety.
7. At the time that the Seadogz vessel was built in 2012, it was designed and constructed for commercial use and was approved in accordance with the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 280 (M) Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure, Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards and its annex the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code (‘SCV Code’) and was built to comply with the requirements laid down in the Recreational Craft Directive (‘RCD’) design category B. At all times, the Seadogz was built with the expectation that it would be operated by two persons, a helmsman and a navigator.
8. We acknowledge the concerns raised by the MAIB Report that the SCV Code does not make any reference to the number of seats required on a RIB, what constitutes suitable seating, nor any specific considerations relating to crash protection characteristics of the seating arrangement in the event of a high- speed impact and gives no generic requirements for forward visibility. We also note that there appears to be inconsistency between the ‘Passenger Safety On Small Commercial High-Speed Craft & Experience Rides: A Voluntary Code of Practice’ and the MAIB Report on whether or not a RIB should have an aft helm.
9. The Company is also concerned that the design of Seadogz is a design replicated by a number of those in the boat building industry and that Marine Guidance Note 436 does not provide any guidance on load factors on the design of the seating. That is, to what ‘crash’ or load standard should seats be tested to?
10. Sadly, the Operations Manager for Red Bay Boats Limited, who was responsible for design, engineering, finance, and human resources, passed
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4 away unexpectedly in Febuary 2024. However, action had already been taken before his untimely death, and these efforts have continued since. The following steps have been implemented:
a. Review and Update of Owner’s Manuals:
i. All owner’s manuals for vessels built by Red Bay have been reviewed and updated to confirm compliance with ISO 10240:2022. The manuals are now fully customised and tailored to the individual customer and vessel.
b. External Naval Architect Audit:
i. McCollum Marine, an external naval architect, has been instructed to conduct a comprehensive audit of all Red Bay-built vessels. The final report is expected by the end of January 2025. The audit will cover, but is not limited to, drawings, sketches, calculations, scantlings, and stability tests. Any recommendations from the external architects will be acted upon as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. Seating and Handhold Testing:
i. A testing company has been commissioned to assess the designs of the seating and handholds on Red Bay vessels. The loads on the pod seats will be tested to determine their endurance in the event of a collision. Test results are expected by the end of February 2025. These results will help set load factor and stress conditions on future vessels, influencing the design of new seating, which will be commissioned by the end of May 2025 and re-tested thereafter.
d. Compliance with Marine Guidance Note 436:
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i. All Red Bay vessels are in compliance with Marine Guidance Note 436.
e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:
i. Red Bay has not accepted any commissions for thrill-seeking passenger RIBs in the past three years and is unlikely to do so until the Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) updates its regulations in this area.
f. Monitoring Legislation Changes:
i. Red Bay is closely monitoring the MCA’s anthropometric study and any review of ‘The Sport & Pleasure Vessel Code’ to ensure full compliance with future legislative changes.
g. Recruitment of Compliance Officer:
i. Red Bay is in the process of recruiting a compliance officer to maintain management systems for all policies related to the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), MCA, and to keep abreast of any information or guidance from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).
h. Request for MAIB Report:
i. Red Bay has requested the STC report from the MAIB, including its raw data, to assist its experts in understanding the concerns raised in the report and to inform Red Bay's response. These results are yet to be received.
Actions
11. We have taken the Coroner’s concerns as an opportunity for Red Bay to
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6 systematically work through the range of boats to ensure accuracy and compliance and improve quality standards.
12. During the time of the MAIB investigation, the late Operations Manager became aware that the owner’s manual was not as specific as it could be. In response, he immediately assigned the task to oversee a project to bring all manuals up to the required standard.
13. To ensure thoroughness, and as stated above, we have appointed external naval architects, McCollum Marine, to review all of our documentation to aid in ensuring our Owner’s Manuals are fully compliant. This process is expected to be completed by the end of January 2025.
14. The general aim is to implement a detailed report for each vessel that clearly demonstrates compliance to standards and conformity. From this basis, we then intend to review our owner’s manuals, and indeed, update and recertify our business to the quality standard ISO90001.
15. We are keen to meet the WorkBoat Code 3.
16. To enhance our compliance and documentation efforts for this project, ensuring full regulatory and safety adherence, the following actions have been suggested:
a. ISO Scantling Requirements:
i. This will include analysing all current hulls against ISO scantling requirements in preparation for Workboat 3 certification.
ii. Implementing detailed drawings of layups, structural elements and bonding materials.
b. Superstructure Requirements for Cabin RIBs:
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i. Specifying layup requirements for structures
ii. Perform self-righting calculations for all cabin RIBs.
c. Stability and Flotation Compliance:
i. Assess compliance with the following standards:
1. ISO 6185-3:2024 (boats <8m, motor power ≥15 kW).
2. ISO 6185-4 (boats with hull lengths between 8m and 24m, motor power ≥15 kW).
3. ISO 12217-1: Stability and buoyancy assessments for small craft with hull lengths ≥6m (non-sailing boats).
d. Transom Analysis:
i. Ensure compliance with ISO 12215-5 and ISO 12215-6, verifying transoms can withstand:
ii. Maximum stresses from engine power and torque .
iii. Engine mass under normal operational conditions.
e. Maximum Power Determination:
i. Establish the maximum allowable power for each model according to ISO 11592.
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f. Manoeuvring Speed Testing:
i. We will test and verify the maximum manoeuvring speed for each model as per ISO 6185-4.
g. Field of Vision Compliance:
i. We will include field of vision assessments as per ISO 11591.
Seating design improvements
17. Our objective is to test our existing pod seating against the International Maritime Organisation HSC 2000 Standards and to seek recommendations for any improvements.
18. We intend to model the current pod seat (000-0051) in accordance with the load cases prescribed in the HSC 2000 Standards Annex 10. Then, to separately assess handhold strength as per the requirements outlined in ISO 15085, Section 9.3.
19. We have instructed Scot Seats, a sector specialist, who have confirmed they have received our seats at their premises in Scotland and will be testing them early in 2025. A copy of the testing protocol provided by Scot Seats which is currently being used to carry out tests on their own range of Shock Mitigation Jockey Seats to meet the HSC 2000 Standards, is enclosed at Exhibit RB/1.
20. Should a customer approach us now, we would recommend the installation of Scot Seats, as they provide better safety and comfort for both passengers and crew. This recommendation aligns with the voluntary guidance currently in place. If customers are unable to afford suspension seats, we will ensure that the seats we provide have been rigorously tested to meet safety standards. Our seats will be presented as the next best option, with a clear proviso that they
are to be used under certain conditions and within specific provisions. Conclusion
21. We would like to again acknowledge the tragic loss of Emily Jane Lewis, and extend our heartfelt condolences to her friends and family. Red Bay Boats remains committed to working alongside regulators and industry experts to enhance the safety of passenger vessels.
22. The law currently allows individuals with minimal experience to operate sea safari craft, but we firmly believe that such operations should be more regulated. Specifically, we feel that sea safari craft should not need to exceed 25 knots.
23. We have made a decision to not accept any commissions in the thrill-seeking market at this time.
24. At Red Bay Boats Limited, our priority is to ensure that our vessels are as safe as possible. We strongly believe that the industry should be better regulated, and that there should always be two people in command of a craft to enhance safety and reduce risks. 9 Mr Thomas McLaughlin Director of R imited Signed: Dated: r, I o,/2o2.s-'
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________________________________________________
INQUEST INTO THE DEATH OF EMILY JANE LEWIS ________________________________________________
I , Director of Red Bay Boats Limited, write this statement, in response to the Prevention of Future Deaths Report, made by the Coroner of Hampshire, Portsmouth and Southampton, following an inquest which took place on 31 October 2024.
Background
1. On 31 October 2024, the inquest into the death of Ms Lewis concluded and the Coroner gave the following narrative conclusion:
a. On 22 August 2020 the Deceased died at Southampton General Hospital, Temona Road, Southampton, Hampshire.
b. On the morning of 22 August 2022, Ms Lewis had sustained upper abdominal injuries when the RIB Seadogz, on which she was a passenger, collided with a buoy, projecting her forward into the extended handhold in front of her, causing fatal injuries: the Deceased’s liver was compressed against her spinal column leading to transection, along with contusion of the pancreas.
2. We also received a Regulation 28: Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) Report, which we understand was sent to several parties following the inquest. The Report related to the following concerns raised by the Coroner:
a. Whether consideration should be given to licensing arrangements for port authorities and local authorities to achieve an early, uniform and comprehensible framework for the use of RIB craft on high speed
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2 experience rides, including crewing levels, manoeuvres, craft standards and risk assessments;
b. Whether interim measures should be considered to manage risks of high-speed RIB experience rides;
c. Whether the existing BS EN ISO 11591 needs revision (or supplementing) to take into account the effect on forward visibility of passengers about RIB craft and whether any practicable retrospective steps can be identified to improve forward visibility on RIB craft;
d. The need for consideration of seat and handrail design: as well as the injuries sustained by Emily Lewis, I note the MAIB’s concerns about handholds for jockey seats;
e. The need to consider whether there should be provision of AIS for RIB craft to facilitate monitoring of RIB craft operations and intervention in the event of unsafe practices being identified;
f. The need to consider how timely and comprehensive review of MAIB recommendations can be achieved.
3. Firstly, everyone at Red Bay Boats Limited, the owners and employees, extend our heartfelt condolences to the friends and family of Ms Emily Jane Lewis during this difficult time.
4. We would like to extend our gratitude to the Coroner for reaching out to us with the concerns raised and affording us with the opportunity to respond. We greatly appreciate the chance to address these matters.
5. Red Bay Boats Limited has been a trusted leader in the boat building industry for 47 years. Throughout this extensive history, we are proud to report that we have not been aware of any injuries or fatalities caused by our vessels. Our
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3 commitment to safety, quality craftsmanship, and innovation continues to guide every aspect of our operations.
6. Safety at sea is at the core of our ethos in boat building. Many of our employees are also proud volunteers for the RNLI, further demonstrating our commitment to maritime safety.
7. At the time that the Seadogz vessel was built in 2012, it was designed and constructed for commercial use and was approved in accordance with the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 280 (M) Small Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure, Workboats and Pilot Boats – Alternative Construction Standards and its annex the Small Commercial Vessel and Pilot Boat Code (‘SCV Code’) and was built to comply with the requirements laid down in the Recreational Craft Directive (‘RCD’) design category B. At all times, the Seadogz was built with the expectation that it would be operated by two persons, a helmsman and a navigator.
8. We acknowledge the concerns raised by the MAIB Report that the SCV Code does not make any reference to the number of seats required on a RIB, what constitutes suitable seating, nor any specific considerations relating to crash protection characteristics of the seating arrangement in the event of a high- speed impact and gives no generic requirements for forward visibility. We also note that there appears to be inconsistency between the ‘Passenger Safety On Small Commercial High-Speed Craft & Experience Rides: A Voluntary Code of Practice’ and the MAIB Report on whether or not a RIB should have an aft helm.
9. The Company is also concerned that the design of Seadogz is a design replicated by a number of those in the boat building industry and that Marine Guidance Note 436 does not provide any guidance on load factors on the design of the seating. That is, to what ‘crash’ or load standard should seats be tested to?
10. Sadly, the Operations Manager for Red Bay Boats Limited, who was responsible for design, engineering, finance, and human resources, passed
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4 away unexpectedly in Febuary 2024. However, action had already been taken before his untimely death, and these efforts have continued since. The following steps have been implemented:
a. Review and Update of Owner’s Manuals:
i. All owner’s manuals for vessels built by Red Bay have been reviewed and updated to confirm compliance with ISO 10240:2022. The manuals are now fully customised and tailored to the individual customer and vessel.
b. External Naval Architect Audit:
i. McCollum Marine, an external naval architect, has been instructed to conduct a comprehensive audit of all Red Bay-built vessels. The final report is expected by the end of January 2025. The audit will cover, but is not limited to, drawings, sketches, calculations, scantlings, and stability tests. Any recommendations from the external architects will be acted upon as soon as reasonably practicable.
c. Seating and Handhold Testing:
i. A testing company has been commissioned to assess the designs of the seating and handholds on Red Bay vessels. The loads on the pod seats will be tested to determine their endurance in the event of a collision. Test results are expected by the end of February 2025. These results will help set load factor and stress conditions on future vessels, influencing the design of new seating, which will be commissioned by the end of May 2025 and re-tested thereafter.
d. Compliance with Marine Guidance Note 436:
N/
5
i. All Red Bay vessels are in compliance with Marine Guidance Note 436.
e. Commissioning of Passenger RIBs:
i. Red Bay has not accepted any commissions for thrill-seeking passenger RIBs in the past three years and is unlikely to do so until the Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) updates its regulations in this area.
f. Monitoring Legislation Changes:
i. Red Bay is closely monitoring the MCA’s anthropometric study and any review of ‘The Sport & Pleasure Vessel Code’ to ensure full compliance with future legislative changes.
g. Recruitment of Compliance Officer:
i. Red Bay is in the process of recruiting a compliance officer to maintain management systems for all policies related to the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), MCA, and to keep abreast of any information or guidance from the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).
h. Request for MAIB Report:
i. Red Bay has requested the STC report from the MAIB, including its raw data, to assist its experts in understanding the concerns raised in the report and to inform Red Bay's response. These results are yet to be received.
Actions
11. We have taken the Coroner’s concerns as an opportunity for Red Bay to
N/
6 systematically work through the range of boats to ensure accuracy and compliance and improve quality standards.
12. During the time of the MAIB investigation, the late Operations Manager became aware that the owner’s manual was not as specific as it could be. In response, he immediately assigned the task to oversee a project to bring all manuals up to the required standard.
13. To ensure thoroughness, and as stated above, we have appointed external naval architects, McCollum Marine, to review all of our documentation to aid in ensuring our Owner’s Manuals are fully compliant. This process is expected to be completed by the end of January 2025.
14. The general aim is to implement a detailed report for each vessel that clearly demonstrates compliance to standards and conformity. From this basis, we then intend to review our owner’s manuals, and indeed, update and recertify our business to the quality standard ISO90001.
15. We are keen to meet the WorkBoat Code 3.
16. To enhance our compliance and documentation efforts for this project, ensuring full regulatory and safety adherence, the following actions have been suggested:
a. ISO Scantling Requirements:
i. This will include analysing all current hulls against ISO scantling requirements in preparation for Workboat 3 certification.
ii. Implementing detailed drawings of layups, structural elements and bonding materials.
b. Superstructure Requirements for Cabin RIBs:
N/
7
i. Specifying layup requirements for structures
ii. Perform self-righting calculations for all cabin RIBs.
c. Stability and Flotation Compliance:
i. Assess compliance with the following standards:
1. ISO 6185-3:2024 (boats <8m, motor power ≥15 kW).
2. ISO 6185-4 (boats with hull lengths between 8m and 24m, motor power ≥15 kW).
3. ISO 12217-1: Stability and buoyancy assessments for small craft with hull lengths ≥6m (non-sailing boats).
d. Transom Analysis:
i. Ensure compliance with ISO 12215-5 and ISO 12215-6, verifying transoms can withstand:
ii. Maximum stresses from engine power and torque .
iii. Engine mass under normal operational conditions.
e. Maximum Power Determination:
i. Establish the maximum allowable power for each model according to ISO 11592.
N/
8
f. Manoeuvring Speed Testing:
i. We will test and verify the maximum manoeuvring speed for each model as per ISO 6185-4.
g. Field of Vision Compliance:
i. We will include field of vision assessments as per ISO 11591.
Seating design improvements
17. Our objective is to test our existing pod seating against the International Maritime Organisation HSC 2000 Standards and to seek recommendations for any improvements.
18. We intend to model the current pod seat (000-0051) in accordance with the load cases prescribed in the HSC 2000 Standards Annex 10. Then, to separately assess handhold strength as per the requirements outlined in ISO 15085, Section 9.3.
19. We have instructed Scot Seats, a sector specialist, who have confirmed they have received our seats at their premises in Scotland and will be testing them early in 2025. A copy of the testing protocol provided by Scot Seats which is currently being used to carry out tests on their own range of Shock Mitigation Jockey Seats to meet the HSC 2000 Standards, is enclosed at Exhibit RB/1.
20. Should a customer approach us now, we would recommend the installation of Scot Seats, as they provide better safety and comfort for both passengers and crew. This recommendation aligns with the voluntary guidance currently in place. If customers are unable to afford suspension seats, we will ensure that the seats we provide have been rigorously tested to meet safety standards. Our seats will be presented as the next best option, with a clear proviso that they
are to be used under certain conditions and within specific provisions. Conclusion
21. We would like to again acknowledge the tragic loss of Emily Jane Lewis, and extend our heartfelt condolences to her friends and family. Red Bay Boats remains committed to working alongside regulators and industry experts to enhance the safety of passenger vessels.
22. The law currently allows individuals with minimal experience to operate sea safari craft, but we firmly believe that such operations should be more regulated. Specifically, we feel that sea safari craft should not need to exceed 25 knots.
23. We have made a decision to not accept any commissions in the thrill-seeking market at this time.
24. At Red Bay Boats Limited, our priority is to ensure that our vessels are as safe as possible. We strongly believe that the industry should be better regulated, and that there should always be two people in command of a craft to enhance safety and reduce risks. 9 Mr Thomas McLaughlin Director of R imited Signed: Dated: r, I o,/2o2.s-'
The UK Major Ports Group clarifies that as a trade association, they are not a regulator and do not develop guidance or interpret requirements for their members. They state their willingness to support any guidance and actions related to RIB safety, provided these are led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
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Dear Mr Charles,
I write on behalf of the operators of the UK’s largest port operators and their trade body the UK Major Ports Group (“UKMPG”). UKMPG represents the nine largest UK port operators who, via the 40 ports they run, handle three quarters of all the port volumes entering and leaving the UK and invest more than £500m of private sector capital each year in the UK’s ports and surrounding coastal areas. These ports include 13 of the largest 15 ports in the UK and the largest ports in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and in most instances our members are also the Statutory Harbour Authority. Appendix A to this document shows the UKMPG members and puts them in the context of the UK ports sector.
UKMPG and the British Ports Association are trade associations who support their members to interface with government and respond on behalf of the sector to emerging policy. We are not a regulator of our members and we do not feel it is for our organisations to clarify requirements or develop guidance to be followed. As an organisation we do champion the sharing of information and best practice to members, but that does not extend to developing guidance or interpretation of requirements.
We will support any guidance and actions suggested, but this must be led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) with input from industry associations. We are, of course, wholly ready to work in conjunction with industry partners and government, on the basis that the MCA own the guidance and lead on this work.
I write on behalf of the operators of the UK’s largest port operators and their trade body the UK Major Ports Group (“UKMPG”). UKMPG represents the nine largest UK port operators who, via the 40 ports they run, handle three quarters of all the port volumes entering and leaving the UK and invest more than £500m of private sector capital each year in the UK’s ports and surrounding coastal areas. These ports include 13 of the largest 15 ports in the UK and the largest ports in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland and in most instances our members are also the Statutory Harbour Authority. Appendix A to this document shows the UKMPG members and puts them in the context of the UK ports sector.
UKMPG and the British Ports Association are trade associations who support their members to interface with government and respond on behalf of the sector to emerging policy. We are not a regulator of our members and we do not feel it is for our organisations to clarify requirements or develop guidance to be followed. As an organisation we do champion the sharing of information and best practice to members, but that does not extend to developing guidance or interpretation of requirements.
We will support any guidance and actions suggested, but this must be led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) with input from industry associations. We are, of course, wholly ready to work in conjunction with industry partners and government, on the basis that the MCA own the guidance and lead on this work.
The UKHMA has actively engaged with stakeholders and its membership, proposed adding specific safety guidance for high-speed passenger craft to the Guide to Good Practice for Port Marine Operations (GTGP), and contributed to discussions for its review. They also held an expert panel session at their 2024 conference to discuss RIB safety.
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UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
PO Box 312 Morpeth NE61 9GN
08/01/2025 HMAC Henry Charles Coroner’s Office Castle Hill Winchester Hampshire SO23 8UL
By email:
Response to Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths following inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis
Introduction:
1. I refer to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (the “Report”) dated 15th November 2024 concerning the death of Emily Jane Lewis who died on 22nd August 2020.
2. I am replying as the President of the UK Harbour Masters’ Association (“UKHMA”).
3. At the outset of this response, I would like to express my sincere condolences to the family of Emily Jane Lewis. The UKHMA was saddened to learn of the circumstances of the incident on 22nd August
2020. The UKHMA has engaged with a number of stakeholders following the incident and has continued to do so following the conclusion of the inquest.
The Role of UKHMA:
4. The UKHMA was formed in 1993 and is a professional body consisting of harbour masters, port marine operations officers, harbour managers, commercial bodies that serve the port sector, and other appropriate personnel and organisations. It has approximately 500 members.
5. The UKHMA consists of eight regional constituencies that cover all mainland and island ports in England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and includes the UK Crown dependencies.
6. The principal harbour master, or any person who in the normal course of their duties is expected to deputise for the principal harbour master, of any statutory port or harbour (“SHA”) in the UK, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man is eligible to become a Full Member of the UKHMA.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
7. There is provision also for other senior port marine officers, and any person interested in upholding the objectives of the Association, to become Associate or Affiliate Members. At the start of 2024, there were approximately 500 Members of the UKHMA.
8. The objectives of UKHMA are as follows:
a. to exercise and promote the safe and efficient conduct of marine operations in ports, in accordance with the Port Marine Safety Code and the Guide to Good Practice on Port Marine Operations (or any replacement thereof);
b. to promote the interests and professional competence of Harbour Masters in the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies;
c. to encourage and facilitate the qualification, certification and continuing professional development of Harbour Masters in the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies;
d. to represent by way of professional advice and support the views of Harbour Masters to the UK Government and devolved administrations, to organisations representative of port authorities, and to other persons within the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies and elsewhere concerned with marine operations, both within and near port waters;
e. to share experiences, knowledge, information and best practice among Harbour Masters;
f. to affiliate to such other bodies as the Council may think appropriate.
9. Given the UKHMA’s expertise in the shipping and port industry throughout the UK, it participates in many inter-industry forums, working groups and consultations, including those initiated by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (“MCA”), Department for Transport (“DfT”), Marine Accident Investigation Branch (“MAIB”) and regional governmental bodies, etc.
10. As the UKHMA is an unincorporated representative body, it has no statutory powers or regulatory functions. The UKHMA is principally a professional members Association and represents the views and interests of UK Harbour Masters. It does not represent the statutory harbour authority entities for which the Harbour Masters work.
The Role of Harbour Masters:
11. The Harbour Master is responsible for overseeing the safe navigation and use of the harbour among other statutory requirements such as Oil Spill prevention & response. The role will vary depending on the size of the harbour and the type of vessels using it.
12. Currently, there are no mandatory qualifications to hold the position of Harbour Master. It is a decision for the port, or more specifically the port’s Duty Holders, to satisfy themselves that the Harbour Master is suitably qualified to carry out their responsibilities under the terms of the Port Marine Safety Code (“PMSC”). In 2012 (and reviewed in 2019), National Occupational Standards for Harbour Masters (“NOS”) were published which set out the basic knowledge, understanding and experience required for Harbour Masters to comply with the PMSC. NOS is overseen by the industry body, Port Skills and Safety.
13. In 2012, UKHMA introduced the non-mandatory Harbour Master Certificate, which is recognised by the MCA , closely reflecting the content of the NOS for Harbour Masters.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
The Circumstances of the Death and Matters of Concern:
14. I have carefully read the Report and have noted in particular that you heard evidence of multiple issues which revealed matters giving risk to concern.
15. In particular, I have noted the specific concerns listed a. to f. in box 5 of the Report.
16. It is not immediately clear to me specifically which concerns resulted in the decision to issue the Report to UKHMA but it may assist to outline the involvement UKHMA has had with stakeholders in relation to issues arising from the incident on 22nd August 2020 and the action which UKHMA considers it is in a position to take.
17. MAIB reported on 14th December 2023 and its report contained a number of recommendations. UKHMA received one recommendation (recommendation 2023/14). The recommendation was issued to the British Ports Association (“BPA”), UKHMA and the UK Major Ports Group (“UKMPG”). The wording of the recommendation was to, “Contribute to the development of guidance for their members clarifying the requirements and best practices for the oversight of small commercial craft operating in their areas of responsibility”. This recommendation stemmed from the conclusion at
3.1.15 of the report which stated “The framework for the licensing and oversight of commercially operated craft can be complex and subject to interpretation and would benefit from further guidance”, which in turn was a consequence of the report’s findings at 2.9.5 relating to the framework for the licensing of commercially operated craft and the finding that harbour authorities would benefit from further guidance on how to best regulate and oversee commercial high-speed operators in their area of responsibility.
18. In considering the context of this recommendation, UKHMA considers it may be important for the Coroner to understand the following limitations in respect of the powers of Statutory Harbour Authorities (“SHAs”) and the Harbour Masters they employ:
a. Each SHA has different, bespoke, legal powers relating to their port / harbour;
b. It can be difficult / take a long time to make changes to each SHAs regulations (Harbour Orders to amend / obtain statutory powers are currently taking in the region of 4 years for the Marine Management Organisation to determine and unless an SHA has suitable powers of General Direction to utilise, byelaw applications to the Department for Transport can also take years to determine);
c. Harbour Master’s themselves (as opposed to the SHA entities they work for) usually have very limited powers to issue new regulations (the main power being the power of ‘special direction’ to issue a direction to a particular vessel in particular circumstances – i.e. to a particular vessel to move from a berth, or to proceed to a particular place within the port etc.).
19. During the period up to the issue of the MAIB’s final report and recommendations, the UKHMA contributed to the investigation as a key consultee. A number of on-line meetings between the MAIB and the Incident report consultees were held to discuss both the report’s findings and the MAIB’s recommendations.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
20. The UKHMA’s formal response to recommendation 2023/14 was sent to the MAIB on 12th January 2024 and was as follows, “The UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA) will propose to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that guidance regarding small commercial craft operating within harbour areas is developed as part of the review of the Port Marine Safety Code Guide to Good Practice (GTGP). UKHMA are participating in the current review of the GTGP and will contribute to the development of such guidance, which will be published by the MCA as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body”.
21. UKHMA’s response to the MAIB additionally said “UKHMA will make the above proposal for inclusion in the agenda for the next meeting of the GTGP working group on 31st January 2024. The completion date for the review of the GTGP is currently expected to be approximately quarter 3 of 2024”.
22. As a professional members association, the UKHMA communicated and engaged with its membership regarding the interim MAIB report, the final report and its findings via its internal email porthole and eNews letters, allowing for feedback and response to the UKHMA Officers and Council.
23. The MAIB report, and the issues and recommendations arising from it, were brought to the PMSC steering group where the UKHMA contributed to discussions around how the learnings could be considered for inclusion in the new edition of the PMSC and the GTGP.
24. There has also continued to be engagement by UKHMA with the MAIB and MCA regarding the certification, operation and enforcement of MCA Coded craft and passenger vessels within SHAs.
25. During the 2024 UKHMA Autumn conference (November 2024, London) an expert panel session was held to discuss and consider the Seadogz report outcomes and future best practice of Coded craft within SHAs. The panel included senior officers of the MCA, MAIB and the UKHMA. Conclusion:
26. On behalf of UKHMA, I am grateful for you identifying the UKHMA as an organisation who may be able to assist in relation to the matters set out within your report.
27. I hope that this response assists you in understanding the UKHMA’s role and the action it has and will continue to take in relation to the safety of marine operations in ports and harbours.
28. Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
The Harbour Masters’ Association of the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man
PO Box 312 Morpeth NE61 9GN
08/01/2025 HMAC Henry Charles Coroner’s Office Castle Hill Winchester Hampshire SO23 8UL
By email:
Response to Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths following inquest into the death of Emily Jane Lewis
Introduction:
1. I refer to your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (the “Report”) dated 15th November 2024 concerning the death of Emily Jane Lewis who died on 22nd August 2020.
2. I am replying as the President of the UK Harbour Masters’ Association (“UKHMA”).
3. At the outset of this response, I would like to express my sincere condolences to the family of Emily Jane Lewis. The UKHMA was saddened to learn of the circumstances of the incident on 22nd August
2020. The UKHMA has engaged with a number of stakeholders following the incident and has continued to do so following the conclusion of the inquest.
The Role of UKHMA:
4. The UKHMA was formed in 1993 and is a professional body consisting of harbour masters, port marine operations officers, harbour managers, commercial bodies that serve the port sector, and other appropriate personnel and organisations. It has approximately 500 members.
5. The UKHMA consists of eight regional constituencies that cover all mainland and island ports in England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man and includes the UK Crown dependencies.
6. The principal harbour master, or any person who in the normal course of their duties is expected to deputise for the principal harbour master, of any statutory port or harbour (“SHA”) in the UK, Channel Islands and the Isle of Man is eligible to become a Full Member of the UKHMA.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
7. There is provision also for other senior port marine officers, and any person interested in upholding the objectives of the Association, to become Associate or Affiliate Members. At the start of 2024, there were approximately 500 Members of the UKHMA.
8. The objectives of UKHMA are as follows:
a. to exercise and promote the safe and efficient conduct of marine operations in ports, in accordance with the Port Marine Safety Code and the Guide to Good Practice on Port Marine Operations (or any replacement thereof);
b. to promote the interests and professional competence of Harbour Masters in the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies;
c. to encourage and facilitate the qualification, certification and continuing professional development of Harbour Masters in the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies;
d. to represent by way of professional advice and support the views of Harbour Masters to the UK Government and devolved administrations, to organisations representative of port authorities, and to other persons within the United Kingdom and Crown Dependencies and elsewhere concerned with marine operations, both within and near port waters;
e. to share experiences, knowledge, information and best practice among Harbour Masters;
f. to affiliate to such other bodies as the Council may think appropriate.
9. Given the UKHMA’s expertise in the shipping and port industry throughout the UK, it participates in many inter-industry forums, working groups and consultations, including those initiated by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (“MCA”), Department for Transport (“DfT”), Marine Accident Investigation Branch (“MAIB”) and regional governmental bodies, etc.
10. As the UKHMA is an unincorporated representative body, it has no statutory powers or regulatory functions. The UKHMA is principally a professional members Association and represents the views and interests of UK Harbour Masters. It does not represent the statutory harbour authority entities for which the Harbour Masters work.
The Role of Harbour Masters:
11. The Harbour Master is responsible for overseeing the safe navigation and use of the harbour among other statutory requirements such as Oil Spill prevention & response. The role will vary depending on the size of the harbour and the type of vessels using it.
12. Currently, there are no mandatory qualifications to hold the position of Harbour Master. It is a decision for the port, or more specifically the port’s Duty Holders, to satisfy themselves that the Harbour Master is suitably qualified to carry out their responsibilities under the terms of the Port Marine Safety Code (“PMSC”). In 2012 (and reviewed in 2019), National Occupational Standards for Harbour Masters (“NOS”) were published which set out the basic knowledge, understanding and experience required for Harbour Masters to comply with the PMSC. NOS is overseen by the industry body, Port Skills and Safety.
13. In 2012, UKHMA introduced the non-mandatory Harbour Master Certificate, which is recognised by the MCA , closely reflecting the content of the NOS for Harbour Masters.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
The Circumstances of the Death and Matters of Concern:
14. I have carefully read the Report and have noted in particular that you heard evidence of multiple issues which revealed matters giving risk to concern.
15. In particular, I have noted the specific concerns listed a. to f. in box 5 of the Report.
16. It is not immediately clear to me specifically which concerns resulted in the decision to issue the Report to UKHMA but it may assist to outline the involvement UKHMA has had with stakeholders in relation to issues arising from the incident on 22nd August 2020 and the action which UKHMA considers it is in a position to take.
17. MAIB reported on 14th December 2023 and its report contained a number of recommendations. UKHMA received one recommendation (recommendation 2023/14). The recommendation was issued to the British Ports Association (“BPA”), UKHMA and the UK Major Ports Group (“UKMPG”). The wording of the recommendation was to, “Contribute to the development of guidance for their members clarifying the requirements and best practices for the oversight of small commercial craft operating in their areas of responsibility”. This recommendation stemmed from the conclusion at
3.1.15 of the report which stated “The framework for the licensing and oversight of commercially operated craft can be complex and subject to interpretation and would benefit from further guidance”, which in turn was a consequence of the report’s findings at 2.9.5 relating to the framework for the licensing of commercially operated craft and the finding that harbour authorities would benefit from further guidance on how to best regulate and oversee commercial high-speed operators in their area of responsibility.
18. In considering the context of this recommendation, UKHMA considers it may be important for the Coroner to understand the following limitations in respect of the powers of Statutory Harbour Authorities (“SHAs”) and the Harbour Masters they employ:
a. Each SHA has different, bespoke, legal powers relating to their port / harbour;
b. It can be difficult / take a long time to make changes to each SHAs regulations (Harbour Orders to amend / obtain statutory powers are currently taking in the region of 4 years for the Marine Management Organisation to determine and unless an SHA has suitable powers of General Direction to utilise, byelaw applications to the Department for Transport can also take years to determine);
c. Harbour Master’s themselves (as opposed to the SHA entities they work for) usually have very limited powers to issue new regulations (the main power being the power of ‘special direction’ to issue a direction to a particular vessel in particular circumstances – i.e. to a particular vessel to move from a berth, or to proceed to a particular place within the port etc.).
19. During the period up to the issue of the MAIB’s final report and recommendations, the UKHMA contributed to the investigation as a key consultee. A number of on-line meetings between the MAIB and the Incident report consultees were held to discuss both the report’s findings and the MAIB’s recommendations.
UKHMA - PO BOX 312, MORPETH, NE61 9GN Tel: (Executive officer & Secretary); (Membership & Accounts) Email:
20. The UKHMA’s formal response to recommendation 2023/14 was sent to the MAIB on 12th January 2024 and was as follows, “The UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA) will propose to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that guidance regarding small commercial craft operating within harbour areas is developed as part of the review of the Port Marine Safety Code Guide to Good Practice (GTGP). UKHMA are participating in the current review of the GTGP and will contribute to the development of such guidance, which will be published by the MCA as the appropriate regulatory and enforcement body”.
21. UKHMA’s response to the MAIB additionally said “UKHMA will make the above proposal for inclusion in the agenda for the next meeting of the GTGP working group on 31st January 2024. The completion date for the review of the GTGP is currently expected to be approximately quarter 3 of 2024”.
22. As a professional members association, the UKHMA communicated and engaged with its membership regarding the interim MAIB report, the final report and its findings via its internal email porthole and eNews letters, allowing for feedback and response to the UKHMA Officers and Council.
23. The MAIB report, and the issues and recommendations arising from it, were brought to the PMSC steering group where the UKHMA contributed to discussions around how the learnings could be considered for inclusion in the new edition of the PMSC and the GTGP.
24. There has also continued to be engagement by UKHMA with the MAIB and MCA regarding the certification, operation and enforcement of MCA Coded craft and passenger vessels within SHAs.
25. During the 2024 UKHMA Autumn conference (November 2024, London) an expert panel session was held to discuss and consider the Seadogz report outcomes and future best practice of Coded craft within SHAs. The panel included senior officers of the MCA, MAIB and the UKHMA. Conclusion:
26. On behalf of UKHMA, I am grateful for you identifying the UKHMA as an organisation who may be able to assist in relation to the matters set out within your report.
27. I hope that this response assists you in understanding the UKHMA’s role and the action it has and will continue to take in relation to the safety of marine operations in ports and harbours.
28. Should you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 25 August 2020 I commenced an investigation into the death of Emily Jane LEWIS aged
15. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 31 October 2024. The conclusion of the inquest was that: On 22nd August 2020 the Deceased died at Southampton General Hospital, Tremona Road, Southampton, Hampshire. Earlier that day she had sustained upper abdominal when the RIB Seadogz, on which she was a passenger, collided with a buoy, projecting her forward into the extended handhold in front of her causing fatal injuries: the Deceased's liver was compressed against her spinal column leading to transection, along with contusion of the pancreas.
15. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 31 October 2024. The conclusion of the inquest was that: On 22nd August 2020 the Deceased died at Southampton General Hospital, Tremona Road, Southampton, Hampshire. Earlier that day she had sustained upper abdominal when the RIB Seadogz, on which she was a passenger, collided with a buoy, projecting her forward into the extended handhold in front of her causing fatal injuries: the Deceased's liver was compressed against her spinal column leading to transection, along with contusion of the pancreas.
Circumstances of the Death
On 22nd August 2020 the Deceased was a passenger on a RIB experience ride on Seadogz, a 600bhp RIB capable of speeds well over 40kts. Following high speed manoeuvres in Southampton Water, Seadogz passed astern of a ferry, went through its wash and struck a buoy at a speed of 38.4kts. The Deceased sustained the fatal injuries set out in Box 3. Seadogz hit the buoy because the skipper did not become aware of its proximity in sufficient time to take avoiding action. To leave matters there would omit the multifactorial issues affecting RIB design, operation, planning, and regulation that contributed to this tragic collision. The skipper had lost positional awareness in the moments before the collision. This was most likely due to a combination of being desensitised to the risk of high-speed rib operations and the high mental workload associated with operating Seadogz alone at high speed near other marine assets. It is highly likely that the skipper's decision to conduct the transit close to the ferry significantly contributed to his high mental workload and loss of positional awareness. The tasks associated with acting as sole watchkeeper, navigator and passenger attendant undoubtedly increased the skipper's mental workload: the Small Commercial Vehicle and Pilot Boat Code recommends an additional trained crew member as being fundamental to ensure safe operation of a high speed passenger RIB given the high mental workload of single-handed operation. The skipper's field of vision ahead was obscured by the passengers in front of him, the raised bow as the RIB planed at high speed, and when the bow rose and dropped having crossed the ferry's wake in the moments before the collision. Forward visibility complied with BS EN ISO 11591 - but the standard did not evaluate the effect on forward visibility of full loading of passengers with the craft at maximum running trim. The Seadogz seating arrangement provided inadequate passenger protection in the event of a sudden deceleration, the handhold for the Deceased inflicted her fatal injuries. The size of the passengers allocated to the bench seat, including the Deceased meant that they could not effectively brace themselves against forward motion. Neither the SCV nor the Recreational Craft Directive provided specific conditions or guidance re seat design or RIB protection. Had guidance in Maritime Guidance Note 436 (M+F) been followed this may have prompted the skipper to refuse the Deceased boarding. The skipper may have experienced a negative startle response when he suddenly observed the buoy ahead. It is likely that passengers became desensitised to the high speed close passing of navigation buoys and vessels, reducing their ability to alert the skipper to an impending hazard. The MAIB described the Seadogz's written risk assessment as cursory and generic, it did not consider the risk of impact or collision during a RIB experience ride. No safety management system with external review process or structured approach to learning from the RIB's previous accidents existed. Significant limitations existed in application of the SCV Code to high-speed passenger craft operators. The framework of licensing can be complex. ABP (the harbour authority) had not assessed the risks of high-speed commercial passenger craft operations in its area, there was no agreement between ABP and operators about maintenance and use of craft. ABP have taken mitigatory steps. MAIB describe the requirements and guidance for operators of commercial high-speed craft as "confusing and inconsistent" Further, "in the last 15 years, the MAIB has investigated numerous accidents involving high-speed passenger craft and made various recommendations to improve the safety of this sector. However, as yet, little has been done to provide proper protection to passengers and crew from these hazards that routinely result in life-changing injury, and occasionally death."
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Public inquiry recommendations addressing similar themes
Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.