Jai Singh
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2023-0094Deceased
All 3 responses received
· Deadline: 11 May 2023
Response Status
Responses
3 of 3
56-Day Deadline
11 May 2023
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coroner's Concerns
1. A multitude of factors contributed to Mr. Singh's death across the custodial and healthcare teams within HMP Birmingham. Many steps have been taken by all organisations with responsibility for Mr. Singh's safety and health during his time at HMP Birmingham to rectify failings that have been identified such as the consistent failure to use interpreters, poor communication and record keeping within and between teams, the absence of meaningful engagement with Mr. Singh's family, insufficient consideration of family concerns and failings in the use of the ACCT system.
2. Much of the evidence at the inquest focused on the central issue of repeated missed opportunities to identify that Mr. Singh required admission to the prison's inpatient ward, ward 2, and assessment for section 48 transfer to a medium secure unit (which would have been likely to result in transfer to a medium secure unit). The consequences of the failure to transfer Mr. Singh to an inpatient setting were compounded by the fact that he was not taken onto the mental health team's caseload promptly and therefore did not have the benefit of an allocated CPN and the oversight and input of a mental health multi-disciplinary team. Many steps have been undertaken by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust (who provide mental health services within the prison) to minimise the risk of such a situation occurring again.
3. However, there are two features of the mental health care provided to Mr. Singh that create a risk to the lives of others that have not yet been rectified:
i. the fact that the mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist; and
ii. the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
4. In Mr. Singh's case it is my conclusion that it is likely that if a psychiatrist had been at a mental health MDT meeting held on the 19th January 2022 they would have identified that he needed to be admitted to ward 2 without further delay. At the very least the need for urgent review by a psychiatrist and CPN would have been recognised and facilitated which would in turn have led to admission. CPNs in Mr. Singh's case continually failed to identify the significance of repeatedly and consistently reported psychotic symptoms and consequently he did not receive adequate assessment and treatment which increased his risk of self harm and suicide which in turn was not sufficiently identified. The absence of a psychiatrist at the MDT creates a risk that the significance of some symptoms and presentations will not be recognised and further deaths could occur due to lack of appropriate assessment and treatment.
5. Other electronic health care records systems used in mental health settings have a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The risk assessment document provides a prompt to clinicians to formally consider risk and come to a reasoned, documented conclusion that then feeds into decision making. The record also provides a reliable, easily accessible source of risk history. No such facility is in use on SystemOne at HMP Birmingham. Further, the evidence given was that such a system is not being used routinely across mental health care within the prison estate and is not provided as standard on SystemOne. This creates an ongoing risk to life arising from under-estimation of risk as a result of clinicians not formally considering and assessing current risk levels, and salient risk history not being easily accessible. It is understood by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust that it should be possible to create a specific risk assessment record within SystemOne and this is being considered locally. However, the evidence given was that this issue should be highlighted nationally and that the developers and distributors of SystemOne should be involved so as to ensure the best available solution is identified.
2. Much of the evidence at the inquest focused on the central issue of repeated missed opportunities to identify that Mr. Singh required admission to the prison's inpatient ward, ward 2, and assessment for section 48 transfer to a medium secure unit (which would have been likely to result in transfer to a medium secure unit). The consequences of the failure to transfer Mr. Singh to an inpatient setting were compounded by the fact that he was not taken onto the mental health team's caseload promptly and therefore did not have the benefit of an allocated CPN and the oversight and input of a mental health multi-disciplinary team. Many steps have been undertaken by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust (who provide mental health services within the prison) to minimise the risk of such a situation occurring again.
3. However, there are two features of the mental health care provided to Mr. Singh that create a risk to the lives of others that have not yet been rectified:
i. the fact that the mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist; and
ii. the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
4. In Mr. Singh's case it is my conclusion that it is likely that if a psychiatrist had been at a mental health MDT meeting held on the 19th January 2022 they would have identified that he needed to be admitted to ward 2 without further delay. At the very least the need for urgent review by a psychiatrist and CPN would have been recognised and facilitated which would in turn have led to admission. CPNs in Mr. Singh's case continually failed to identify the significance of repeatedly and consistently reported psychotic symptoms and consequently he did not receive adequate assessment and treatment which increased his risk of self harm and suicide which in turn was not sufficiently identified. The absence of a psychiatrist at the MDT creates a risk that the significance of some symptoms and presentations will not be recognised and further deaths could occur due to lack of appropriate assessment and treatment.
5. Other electronic health care records systems used in mental health settings have a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The risk assessment document provides a prompt to clinicians to formally consider risk and come to a reasoned, documented conclusion that then feeds into decision making. The record also provides a reliable, easily accessible source of risk history. No such facility is in use on SystemOne at HMP Birmingham. Further, the evidence given was that such a system is not being used routinely across mental health care within the prison estate and is not provided as standard on SystemOne. This creates an ongoing risk to life arising from under-estimation of risk as a result of clinicians not formally considering and assessing current risk levels, and salient risk history not being easily accessible. It is understood by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust that it should be possible to create a specific risk assessment record within SystemOne and this is being considered locally. However, the evidence given was that this issue should be highlighted nationally and that the developers and distributors of SystemOne should be involved so as to ensure the best available solution is identified.
Responses
Response received
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Dear Ms Brown
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Jai Singh who died on 28 January 2022.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 15 March 2023 concerning the death of Jai Singh on 28 January 2022. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Mr Singh’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen to assure the family and the Coroner that the concerns raised about Mr Singh’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.
NHS England is the responsible organisation for the commissioning of healthcare into prisons, which is devolved to regional teams. Commissioning healthcare in prisons is done on a principle of equivalence, which has been defined by the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) and broadly states the aim is to ensure people detained in prisons in England, are offered provision of and access to appropriate services and treatment, considered to be at least consistent in range and quality, with that available in the wider community.
NHS England is unable to comment on the matters of concern highlighted that relate to booking of interpreters, communication, and engagement with Mr Singh’s family as these are matters for response locally. I have considered the concern raised in your report regarding the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness, within the SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham and my response is as follows:
Matters of Concern:
The absence of ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham.
At first reception into prison, a healthcare professional (or trained healthcare assistant under the supervision of a registered nurse) carries out a health assessment of patients.
This first night screening takes place in line with guidelines from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and all patients are asked at this assessment National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG
16 May 2023
if they have been convicted of murder, manslaughter, or another offence with a long sentence. If a patient answers yes to this question, there is a specific referral made to the Mental Health team for assessment, and this is recorded in a Health and Justice Information System (HJIS), SystmOne template.
There is also a comprehensive section in this first night screening template relating to mental health which asks questions around the patient’s mental health history. This includes whether they have ever seen a healthcare professional or used a service for a mental health problem such as psychiatry, general practice, psychology, counselling, community mental health services, alcohol or substance misuse or learning disability.
If the patient answers yes to this question, they will be asked for further detail and a referral made to the Mental Health team, again being recorded using the template available on SystmOne.
There are several opportunities during the first night screening where an Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) can be requested or opened if concerns are identified.
Within 7-days of the first health assessment, a further second-stage health assessment for every person in prison is conducted. Included in this is a correctional mental health screen (CMHS), also recorded on the available SystmOne template and based on the results of this, a further mental health assessment should either be conducted, or a referral made for this and again recorded on SystmOne.
In terms of training in support of the use of SystmOne, North of England Commissioning Support Unit (NECS) is the implementation and training partner for The Phoenix Partnership (TPP) SystmOne and works across the Health and Justice environment.
In 2020, at the refresh of the Secure Environment Assessment Toolkit (SEAT) suite of clinical templates, each site received a group overview of how to complete the clinical template suite. This training was delivered by a Regional Project Manager and training expert and documentation around attendees to these sessions was maintained.
The documentation including technical guidance around the SEAT implementation, and how to complete the templates, is stored on the NECS training platform. All users have access to this platform, and it includes an overview to completing national clinical templates. There is also provision to request further one-to-one training from NECS, which can be delivered face-to-face or via Microsoft Teams.
The fact the mental health multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist.
MDT members can include a variety of practitioners, specialists and care-givers from a wide range of different services, including Psychiatrists. NHS England would not however prescribe to have a psychiatrist included in every MDT.
The decision about who is best placed to sit in specific MDT meetings, is led by the history and presentation of the patient, and on a case-by-case basis which is made locally.
The absence of ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham.
Risk assessments are carried out in line with relevant National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance for the mental health assessment of people in prison. There are templates available within SystmOne for this purpose. Any concern relating to record keeping within SystmOne, is for Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust (BSMHT) to respond to locally as a separate matter.
I do hope this reassures you that in terms of mental health assessment, information and prompts available to staff, there are templates available on SystmOne which provide this and are used in prison healthcare and there is training in place to support this. If there is evidence that current information relating to the templates is lacking, we would need to understand more about specifically what is needed, and a risk assessment could then be deployed nationally to review and update.
Thank you for bringing this important issue to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Re: Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths – Jai Singh who died on 28 January 2022.
Thank you for your Report to Prevent Future Deaths (hereafter “Report”) dated 15 March 2023 concerning the death of Jai Singh on 28 January 2022. In advance of responding to the specific concerns raised in your Report, I would like to express my deep condolences to Mr Singh’s family and loved ones. NHS England is keen to assure the family and the Coroner that the concerns raised about Mr Singh’s care have been listened to and reflected upon.
NHS England is the responsible organisation for the commissioning of healthcare into prisons, which is devolved to regional teams. Commissioning healthcare in prisons is done on a principle of equivalence, which has been defined by the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) and broadly states the aim is to ensure people detained in prisons in England, are offered provision of and access to appropriate services and treatment, considered to be at least consistent in range and quality, with that available in the wider community.
NHS England is unable to comment on the matters of concern highlighted that relate to booking of interpreters, communication, and engagement with Mr Singh’s family as these are matters for response locally. I have considered the concern raised in your report regarding the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness, within the SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham and my response is as follows:
Matters of Concern:
The absence of ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham.
At first reception into prison, a healthcare professional (or trained healthcare assistant under the supervision of a registered nurse) carries out a health assessment of patients.
This first night screening takes place in line with guidelines from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and all patients are asked at this assessment National Medical Director NHS England Wellington House 133-155 Waterloo Road London SE1 8UG
16 May 2023
if they have been convicted of murder, manslaughter, or another offence with a long sentence. If a patient answers yes to this question, there is a specific referral made to the Mental Health team for assessment, and this is recorded in a Health and Justice Information System (HJIS), SystmOne template.
There is also a comprehensive section in this first night screening template relating to mental health which asks questions around the patient’s mental health history. This includes whether they have ever seen a healthcare professional or used a service for a mental health problem such as psychiatry, general practice, psychology, counselling, community mental health services, alcohol or substance misuse or learning disability.
If the patient answers yes to this question, they will be asked for further detail and a referral made to the Mental Health team, again being recorded using the template available on SystmOne.
There are several opportunities during the first night screening where an Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork (ACCT) can be requested or opened if concerns are identified.
Within 7-days of the first health assessment, a further second-stage health assessment for every person in prison is conducted. Included in this is a correctional mental health screen (CMHS), also recorded on the available SystmOne template and based on the results of this, a further mental health assessment should either be conducted, or a referral made for this and again recorded on SystmOne.
In terms of training in support of the use of SystmOne, North of England Commissioning Support Unit (NECS) is the implementation and training partner for The Phoenix Partnership (TPP) SystmOne and works across the Health and Justice environment.
In 2020, at the refresh of the Secure Environment Assessment Toolkit (SEAT) suite of clinical templates, each site received a group overview of how to complete the clinical template suite. This training was delivered by a Regional Project Manager and training expert and documentation around attendees to these sessions was maintained.
The documentation including technical guidance around the SEAT implementation, and how to complete the templates, is stored on the NECS training platform. All users have access to this platform, and it includes an overview to completing national clinical templates. There is also provision to request further one-to-one training from NECS, which can be delivered face-to-face or via Microsoft Teams.
The fact the mental health multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist.
MDT members can include a variety of practitioners, specialists and care-givers from a wide range of different services, including Psychiatrists. NHS England would not however prescribe to have a psychiatrist included in every MDT.
The decision about who is best placed to sit in specific MDT meetings, is led by the history and presentation of the patient, and on a case-by-case basis which is made locally.
The absence of ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystmOne records at HMP Birmingham.
Risk assessments are carried out in line with relevant National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance for the mental health assessment of people in prison. There are templates available within SystmOne for this purpose. Any concern relating to record keeping within SystmOne, is for Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust (BSMHT) to respond to locally as a separate matter.
I do hope this reassures you that in terms of mental health assessment, information and prompts available to staff, there are templates available on SystmOne which provide this and are used in prison healthcare and there is training in place to support this. If there is evidence that current information relating to the templates is lacking, we would need to understand more about specifically what is needed, and a risk assessment could then be deployed nationally to review and update.
Thank you for bringing this important issue to my attention and please do not hesitate to contact me should you need any further information.
Response received
View full response
Dear Mrs Brown,
RE: Prevention of Future Deaths Report for Jai Singh Puni (deceased)
Further to the Prevention of Future deaths report dated 15 March 2023, the Trust has now had an opportunity to review the Matters of Concern raised. I would like to begin by offering my sincere condolences to the family of Mr Puni for his very sad loss. As a Trust we have taken your concerns very seriously and have aimed to act on these issues as quickly as possible to ensure lessons are learned to benefit other patients in the future. I will respond to each issue in turn.
1. The mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist.
The Trust has begun a 3 month pilot which will ensure a Consultant Psychiatrist attends the MDT meetings at the Prison each week. The Secure Care and Offender Health Clinical Governance Committee (CGC) will review the outcomes for the pilot after 3 months, to ascertain if this is clinically beneficial to patients. Our primary aim is to ensure that our patients receive the best care at the right time and this pilot will ensure that this review takes place.
2. The absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
The Trust is restricted to what it can change on SystemOne due to it being the national software used in prisons. We are however meeting with the software company on 27 April 2023 to discuss the concerns raised within the PFD. Any changes to be made at a national level by SystemOne may take some time. Consequently the Trust has looked to how it will be able introduce risk assessment documentation into the system and ensure that Trust staff complete this in the interim.
Customer Relations │ Mon – Fri, 8am – 6pm
Website: www.bsmhft.nhs.uk
Head Office Uffculme Centre 52 Queensbridge Road Birmingham B13 8QY
A risk assessment has been added to the System One software that is accessible for the Trust staff only. This will be rolled out to staff with a dissemination plan, which is attached. The plan includes a practice alert and a Standard Operating Procedure to be sent to all clinical staff. This has now taken place. This will set out the requirements for the risk assessments to be completed. This will ensure that going forward all patients will receive a risk assessment when one is necessary. The roll out of this will be complete by 20 May 2023.
I hope that we have been able to provide you with reassurance that we have taken action in regard to the concerns that you have raised, to ensure continuous improvement in the care we provide to our patients.
RE: Prevention of Future Deaths Report for Jai Singh Puni (deceased)
Further to the Prevention of Future deaths report dated 15 March 2023, the Trust has now had an opportunity to review the Matters of Concern raised. I would like to begin by offering my sincere condolences to the family of Mr Puni for his very sad loss. As a Trust we have taken your concerns very seriously and have aimed to act on these issues as quickly as possible to ensure lessons are learned to benefit other patients in the future. I will respond to each issue in turn.
1. The mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist.
The Trust has begun a 3 month pilot which will ensure a Consultant Psychiatrist attends the MDT meetings at the Prison each week. The Secure Care and Offender Health Clinical Governance Committee (CGC) will review the outcomes for the pilot after 3 months, to ascertain if this is clinically beneficial to patients. Our primary aim is to ensure that our patients receive the best care at the right time and this pilot will ensure that this review takes place.
2. The absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
The Trust is restricted to what it can change on SystemOne due to it being the national software used in prisons. We are however meeting with the software company on 27 April 2023 to discuss the concerns raised within the PFD. Any changes to be made at a national level by SystemOne may take some time. Consequently the Trust has looked to how it will be able introduce risk assessment documentation into the system and ensure that Trust staff complete this in the interim.
Customer Relations │ Mon – Fri, 8am – 6pm
Website: www.bsmhft.nhs.uk
Head Office Uffculme Centre 52 Queensbridge Road Birmingham B13 8QY
A risk assessment has been added to the System One software that is accessible for the Trust staff only. This will be rolled out to staff with a dissemination plan, which is attached. The plan includes a practice alert and a Standard Operating Procedure to be sent to all clinical staff. This has now taken place. This will set out the requirements for the risk assessments to be completed. This will ensure that going forward all patients will receive a risk assessment when one is necessary. The roll out of this will be complete by 20 May 2023.
I hope that we have been able to provide you with reassurance that we have taken action in regard to the concerns that you have raised, to ensure continuous improvement in the care we provide to our patients.
Response received
View full response
Dear Ms Brown
Re: Regulation 28 report – Jai SINGH
Thank you for your email of 16th March 2023. I apologise for the delay in responding.
I have previously been a fulltime NHS GP, and for the last 19 years been the clinical director and principal clinical safety officer for TPP, a company based in Leeds that supplies the SystmOne product for use by the prison service (inter alia). The product has been in continuous usage for 24 years. There is only one version of SystmOne.
I am grateful that colleagues from NHS England were able to share ’ report. His report details the way SystmOne is used in the prison service and usefully highlights the different areas of responsibility with regard to usage of electronic medical records and training.
SystmOne provides our users with many tools to support patient care – the creation of data entry templates, the development of decision support for particular circumstances, and the ability to produce alerts, reminders and warnings as data is entered. The decision to use these, and how they should be used is in the hands of the commissioner of the system. Professor Powis’ report details how the system is used for mental health assessments.
I agree with your statement that systems used in mental health settings provide a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The SystmOne mental health module is used in a third of Mental Health Trusts in England and supports this functionality. This exact functionality is not available in SystmOne prisons (as it was not commissioned to deliver this1) but equivalent data entry and alerting can be created (as above) using the in-built Clinical Development Kit.
1 makes reference to the fact that prison healthcare is commissioned under the principle of equivalence ‘… with that available within the wider community.’
From a system perspective I am confident that SystmOne is working correctly and in a safe manner.
Please let me know if you have further concerns.
Re: Regulation 28 report – Jai SINGH
Thank you for your email of 16th March 2023. I apologise for the delay in responding.
I have previously been a fulltime NHS GP, and for the last 19 years been the clinical director and principal clinical safety officer for TPP, a company based in Leeds that supplies the SystmOne product for use by the prison service (inter alia). The product has been in continuous usage for 24 years. There is only one version of SystmOne.
I am grateful that colleagues from NHS England were able to share ’ report. His report details the way SystmOne is used in the prison service and usefully highlights the different areas of responsibility with regard to usage of electronic medical records and training.
SystmOne provides our users with many tools to support patient care – the creation of data entry templates, the development of decision support for particular circumstances, and the ability to produce alerts, reminders and warnings as data is entered. The decision to use these, and how they should be used is in the hands of the commissioner of the system. Professor Powis’ report details how the system is used for mental health assessments.
I agree with your statement that systems used in mental health settings provide a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The SystmOne mental health module is used in a third of Mental Health Trusts in England and supports this functionality. This exact functionality is not available in SystmOne prisons (as it was not commissioned to deliver this1) but equivalent data entry and alerting can be created (as above) using the in-built Clinical Development Kit.
1 makes reference to the fact that prison healthcare is commissioned under the principle of equivalence ‘… with that available within the wider community.’
From a system perspective I am confident that SystmOne is working correctly and in a safe manner.
Please let me know if you have further concerns.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 1 February 2022 I commenced an investigation into the death of Jai SINGH. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on the 10th March 2023. The conclusion of the jury at the inquest was; Suicide The following matters probably caused or contributed to Mr Singh's death:
* The failings of safer custody to appropriately communicate and document family concerns to other staff within the prison.
* The failure to use interpretation services to effectively communicate with Mr Singh by both the custodial and the healthcare teams.
* The failure to communicate relevant information within and between the custodial team and the healthcare team
* The failings to appropriately open, re-open and carry out the ACCT process.
* The failure to carry out sufficient and thorough welfare checks.
* That Mr Singh did not undergo an assessment for section 48 transfer.
* A significant lack of rigor in respect to the completion of official prison and healthcare documentation.
* That Mr Singh was not admitted to ward 2 and remained on a residential wing. The following matters possibly caused or contributed to Mr Singh's death:
* Failings to heed and communicate family concerns by both the custodial team and the healthcare team.
* The failure to allocate an individual community psychiatric nurse as a single point of contact following the opening of an ACCT. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Jai Singh died at City Hospital on the 28th January 2022 having been admitted after he was found in cardiac arrest in his cell at HMP Birmingham on the 27th January 2022. Mr. Singh had asphyxiated due to placing a bag over his head. He received CPR from prison staff and paramedics and was resuscitated but had suffered irreparable brain and organ damage. Mr. Singh had been detained at HMP Birmingham on the 21st September 2021 whilst on remand awaiting trial for the murder of his wife. From the time of his admission Mr. Singh’s family were concerned that he was suffering from a severe mental health condition and raised this in numerous emails and telephone calls to safer custody. The content of calls and emails was not recorded on NOMIS casenotes for the information of the custodial team and was not consistently communicated to the mental health team. The information that was passed to the mental health team was not clearly recorded in the SystemOne journal for all clinicians to see. Consequently, the opportunity to identify risk and open an ACCT document was missed. From an early stage Mr. Singh was reporting psychotic behaviour to community psychiatric nurses and was noted to be behaving unusually by custodial staff but he denied any active suicidal or self-harming thoughts. His cellmate and a Chaplain raised concerns about his behaviour but still an ACCT book was not opened. On the 22nd November 2021 an ACCT book was opened after Mr. Singh reported wanting to kill himself. The ACCT assessment, reviews and care plan were deficient leading to the ACCT being closed prematurely on the 30th November 2021. The post closure process was also inadequate. During the time Mr. Singh was at HMP Birmingham he had a number of welfare checks due to family concerns but these were superficial and perfunctory and never carried out with an interpreter even though Mr. Singh's English was poor. Consequently, his risk was not adequately assessed. Following an assessment on the 3rd December 2021 a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist instructed by Mr. Singh’s criminal defence team identified that Mr. Singh was suffering with auditory hallucinations, low mood, tiredness and suicidal ideation and made a diagnosis of schizophrenia with an effective element. The Psychiatrist made a referral to a secure inpatient unit, The Hatherton Centre, for a transfer under section 48 of the Mental Health Act. The referral was sent to the Hatherton Centre but was not sent to HMP Birmingham straightaway. The referral to the secure unit was not accepted because it was made by an independent psychiatrist rather than the prison's mental health team. The mental health team at HMP Birmingham were, however, contacted on the 13th December 2021 by a psychiatrist from the Hatherton Centre who stated that there had been a request for assessment for transfer and asked for further information. He was given misleading information that Mr. Singh was "coping well" and therefore informed the mental health team that an assessment would not be carried out. No note was made of the conversation with the Hatherton Centre psychiatrist and no action was taken to investigate and pursue a section 48 transfer. The information provided by the independent Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and the history of psychotic symptoms in SystemOne records ought to have resulted in an assessment by the Hatherton Centre. An assessment would have been likely to result in section 48 transfer. Whilst Mr. Singh remained at HMP Birmingham awaiting transfer he ought to have been under the care of the mental health team and housed on ward 2 (the mental health inpatient wing). Mr. Singh continued to report that he was hearing voices, hallucinating, struggling to sleep and low in mood. He was reviewed by GPs at the prison on the 29th November, 13th December, 4th January and 25th January who prescribed antidepressants and sleeping medication which Mr. Singh reported were not working. On the 14th January 2022 a prison Consultant Psychiatrist determined that Jai Singh required urgent admission to the inpatient psychiatric ward for assessment. However, the admission was not facilitated and Mr. Singh remained on a residential wing. The decision not to admit Mr. Singh to the ward was not recorded in his SystemOne records. Mr. Singh received no further input or support from the mental health team. When he was seen by a GP on the 25th January 2022 it was identified that medication was not helping and Mr. Singh needed to be seen by a psychiatrist but the GP thought he was going to be transferred to Ward 2 and therefore took no further action. All actions taken following Mr. Singh being found in cardiac arrest on the 27th January 2022 were appropriate. Following a post mortem the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage 1b Multi-organ failure 1c Cardio-Pulmonary arrest due to asphyxia II CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. –
1. A multitude of factors contributed to Mr. Singh's death across the custodial and healthcare teams within HMP Birmingham. Many steps have been taken by all organisations with responsibility for Mr. Singh's safety and health during his time at HMP Birmingham to rectify failings that have been identified such as the consistent failure to use interpreters, poor communication and record keeping within and between teams, the absence of meaningful engagement with Mr. Singh's family, insufficient consideration of family concerns and failings in the use of the ACCT system.
2. Much of the evidence at the inquest focused on the central issue of repeated missed opportunities to identify that Mr. Singh required admission to the prison's inpatient ward, ward 2, and assessment for section 48 transfer to a medium secure unit (which would have been likely to result in transfer to a medium secure unit). The consequences of the failure to transfer Mr. Singh to an inpatient setting were compounded by the fact that he was not taken onto the mental health team's caseload promptly and therefore did not have the benefit of an allocated CPN and the oversight and input of a mental health multi-disciplinary team. Many steps have been undertaken by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust (who provide mental health services within the prison) to minimise the risk of such a situation occurring again.
3. However, there are two features of the mental health care provided to Mr. Singh that create a risk to the lives of others that have not yet been rectified:
i. the fact that the mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist; and
ii. the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
4. In Mr. Singh's case it is my conclusion that it is likely that if a psychiatrist had been at a mental health MDT meeting held on the 19th January 2022 they would have identified that he needed to be admitted to ward 2 without further delay. At the very least the need for urgent review by a psychiatrist and CPN would have been recognised and facilitated which would in turn have led to admission. CPNs in Mr. Singh's case continually failed to identify the significance of repeatedly and consistently reported psychotic symptoms and consequently he did not receive adequate assessment and treatment which increased his risk of self harm and suicide which in turn was not sufficiently identified. The absence of a psychiatrist at the MDT creates a risk that the significance of some symptoms and presentations will not be recognised and further deaths could occur due to lack of appropriate assessment and treatment.
5. Other electronic health care records systems used in mental health settings have a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The risk assessment document provides a prompt to clinicians to formally consider risk and come to a reasoned, documented conclusion that then feeds into decision making. The record also provides a reliable, easily accessible source of risk history. No such facility is in use on SystemOne at HMP Birmingham. Further, the evidence given was that such a system is not being used routinely across mental health care within the prison estate and is not provided as standard on SystemOne. This creates an ongoing risk to life arising from under-estimation of risk as a result of clinicians not formally considering and assessing current risk levels, and salient risk history not being easily accessible. It is understood by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust that it should be possible to create a specific risk assessment record within SystemOne and this is being considered locally. However, the evidence given was that this issue should be highlighted nationally and that the developers and distributors of SystemOne should be involved so as to ensure the best available solution is identified.
* The failings of safer custody to appropriately communicate and document family concerns to other staff within the prison.
* The failure to use interpretation services to effectively communicate with Mr Singh by both the custodial and the healthcare teams.
* The failure to communicate relevant information within and between the custodial team and the healthcare team
* The failings to appropriately open, re-open and carry out the ACCT process.
* The failure to carry out sufficient and thorough welfare checks.
* That Mr Singh did not undergo an assessment for section 48 transfer.
* A significant lack of rigor in respect to the completion of official prison and healthcare documentation.
* That Mr Singh was not admitted to ward 2 and remained on a residential wing. The following matters possibly caused or contributed to Mr Singh's death:
* Failings to heed and communicate family concerns by both the custodial team and the healthcare team.
* The failure to allocate an individual community psychiatric nurse as a single point of contact following the opening of an ACCT. CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH Jai Singh died at City Hospital on the 28th January 2022 having been admitted after he was found in cardiac arrest in his cell at HMP Birmingham on the 27th January 2022. Mr. Singh had asphyxiated due to placing a bag over his head. He received CPR from prison staff and paramedics and was resuscitated but had suffered irreparable brain and organ damage. Mr. Singh had been detained at HMP Birmingham on the 21st September 2021 whilst on remand awaiting trial for the murder of his wife. From the time of his admission Mr. Singh’s family were concerned that he was suffering from a severe mental health condition and raised this in numerous emails and telephone calls to safer custody. The content of calls and emails was not recorded on NOMIS casenotes for the information of the custodial team and was not consistently communicated to the mental health team. The information that was passed to the mental health team was not clearly recorded in the SystemOne journal for all clinicians to see. Consequently, the opportunity to identify risk and open an ACCT document was missed. From an early stage Mr. Singh was reporting psychotic behaviour to community psychiatric nurses and was noted to be behaving unusually by custodial staff but he denied any active suicidal or self-harming thoughts. His cellmate and a Chaplain raised concerns about his behaviour but still an ACCT book was not opened. On the 22nd November 2021 an ACCT book was opened after Mr. Singh reported wanting to kill himself. The ACCT assessment, reviews and care plan were deficient leading to the ACCT being closed prematurely on the 30th November 2021. The post closure process was also inadequate. During the time Mr. Singh was at HMP Birmingham he had a number of welfare checks due to family concerns but these were superficial and perfunctory and never carried out with an interpreter even though Mr. Singh's English was poor. Consequently, his risk was not adequately assessed. Following an assessment on the 3rd December 2021 a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist instructed by Mr. Singh’s criminal defence team identified that Mr. Singh was suffering with auditory hallucinations, low mood, tiredness and suicidal ideation and made a diagnosis of schizophrenia with an effective element. The Psychiatrist made a referral to a secure inpatient unit, The Hatherton Centre, for a transfer under section 48 of the Mental Health Act. The referral was sent to the Hatherton Centre but was not sent to HMP Birmingham straightaway. The referral to the secure unit was not accepted because it was made by an independent psychiatrist rather than the prison's mental health team. The mental health team at HMP Birmingham were, however, contacted on the 13th December 2021 by a psychiatrist from the Hatherton Centre who stated that there had been a request for assessment for transfer and asked for further information. He was given misleading information that Mr. Singh was "coping well" and therefore informed the mental health team that an assessment would not be carried out. No note was made of the conversation with the Hatherton Centre psychiatrist and no action was taken to investigate and pursue a section 48 transfer. The information provided by the independent Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and the history of psychotic symptoms in SystemOne records ought to have resulted in an assessment by the Hatherton Centre. An assessment would have been likely to result in section 48 transfer. Whilst Mr. Singh remained at HMP Birmingham awaiting transfer he ought to have been under the care of the mental health team and housed on ward 2 (the mental health inpatient wing). Mr. Singh continued to report that he was hearing voices, hallucinating, struggling to sleep and low in mood. He was reviewed by GPs at the prison on the 29th November, 13th December, 4th January and 25th January who prescribed antidepressants and sleeping medication which Mr. Singh reported were not working. On the 14th January 2022 a prison Consultant Psychiatrist determined that Jai Singh required urgent admission to the inpatient psychiatric ward for assessment. However, the admission was not facilitated and Mr. Singh remained on a residential wing. The decision not to admit Mr. Singh to the ward was not recorded in his SystemOne records. Mr. Singh received no further input or support from the mental health team. When he was seen by a GP on the 25th January 2022 it was identified that medication was not helping and Mr. Singh needed to be seen by a psychiatrist but the GP thought he was going to be transferred to Ward 2 and therefore took no further action. All actions taken following Mr. Singh being found in cardiac arrest on the 27th January 2022 were appropriate. Following a post mortem the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage 1b Multi-organ failure 1c Cardio-Pulmonary arrest due to asphyxia II CORONER’S CONCERNS During the course of the inquest the evidence revealed matters giving rise to concern. In my opinion there is a risk that future deaths will occur unless action is taken. In the circumstances it is my statutory duty to report to you. The MATTERS OF CONCERN are as follows. –
1. A multitude of factors contributed to Mr. Singh's death across the custodial and healthcare teams within HMP Birmingham. Many steps have been taken by all organisations with responsibility for Mr. Singh's safety and health during his time at HMP Birmingham to rectify failings that have been identified such as the consistent failure to use interpreters, poor communication and record keeping within and between teams, the absence of meaningful engagement with Mr. Singh's family, insufficient consideration of family concerns and failings in the use of the ACCT system.
2. Much of the evidence at the inquest focused on the central issue of repeated missed opportunities to identify that Mr. Singh required admission to the prison's inpatient ward, ward 2, and assessment for section 48 transfer to a medium secure unit (which would have been likely to result in transfer to a medium secure unit). The consequences of the failure to transfer Mr. Singh to an inpatient setting were compounded by the fact that he was not taken onto the mental health team's caseload promptly and therefore did not have the benefit of an allocated CPN and the oversight and input of a mental health multi-disciplinary team. Many steps have been undertaken by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust (who provide mental health services within the prison) to minimise the risk of such a situation occurring again.
3. However, there are two features of the mental health care provided to Mr. Singh that create a risk to the lives of others that have not yet been rectified:
i. the fact that the mental health team multi-disciplinary team (MDT) does not include a psychiatrist; and
ii. the absence of any ongoing risk assessment documentation for patients with mental illness within the SystemOne records at HMP Birmingham.
4. In Mr. Singh's case it is my conclusion that it is likely that if a psychiatrist had been at a mental health MDT meeting held on the 19th January 2022 they would have identified that he needed to be admitted to ward 2 without further delay. At the very least the need for urgent review by a psychiatrist and CPN would have been recognised and facilitated which would in turn have led to admission. CPNs in Mr. Singh's case continually failed to identify the significance of repeatedly and consistently reported psychotic symptoms and consequently he did not receive adequate assessment and treatment which increased his risk of self harm and suicide which in turn was not sufficiently identified. The absence of a psychiatrist at the MDT creates a risk that the significance of some symptoms and presentations will not be recognised and further deaths could occur due to lack of appropriate assessment and treatment.
5. Other electronic health care records systems used in mental health settings have a rolling risk assessment document that clinicians are required to review and update at certain points in a patient's management. The risk assessment document provides a prompt to clinicians to formally consider risk and come to a reasoned, documented conclusion that then feeds into decision making. The record also provides a reliable, easily accessible source of risk history. No such facility is in use on SystemOne at HMP Birmingham. Further, the evidence given was that such a system is not being used routinely across mental health care within the prison estate and is not provided as standard on SystemOne. This creates an ongoing risk to life arising from under-estimation of risk as a result of clinicians not formally considering and assessing current risk levels, and salient risk history not being easily accessible. It is understood by Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Trust that it should be possible to create a specific risk assessment record within SystemOne and this is being considered locally. However, the evidence given was that this issue should be highlighted nationally and that the developers and distributors of SystemOne should be involved so as to ensure the best available solution is identified.
Circumstances of the Death
Jai Singh died at City Hospital on the 28th January 2022 having been admitted after he was found in cardiac arrest in his cell at HMP Birmingham on the 27th January 2022. Mr. Singh had asphyxiated due to placing a bag over his head. He received CPR from prison staff and paramedics and was resuscitated but had suffered irreparable brain and organ damage. Mr. Singh had been detained at HMP Birmingham on the 21st September 2021 whilst on remand awaiting trial for the murder of his wife. From the time of his admission Mr. Singh’s family were concerned that he was suffering from a severe mental health condition and raised this in numerous emails and telephone calls to safer custody. The content of calls and emails was not recorded on NOMIS casenotes for the information of the custodial team and was not consistently communicated to the mental health team. The information that was passed to the mental health team was not clearly recorded in the SystemOne journal for all clinicians to see. Consequently, the opportunity to identify risk and open an ACCT document was missed. From an early stage Mr. Singh was reporting psychotic behaviour to community psychiatric nurses and was noted to be behaving unusually by custodial staff but he denied any active suicidal or self-harming thoughts. His cellmate and a Chaplain raised concerns about his behaviour but still an ACCT book was not opened. On the 22nd November 2021 an ACCT book was opened after Mr. Singh reported wanting to kill himself. The ACCT assessment, reviews and care plan were deficient leading to the ACCT being closed prematurely on the 30th November 2021. The post closure process was also inadequate. During the time Mr. Singh was at HMP Birmingham he had a number of welfare checks due to family concerns but these were superficial and perfunctory and never carried out with an interpreter even though Mr. Singh's English was poor. Consequently, his risk was not adequately assessed. Following an assessment on the 3rd December 2021 a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist instructed by Mr. Singh’s criminal defence team identified that Mr. Singh was suffering with auditory hallucinations, low mood, tiredness and suicidal ideation and made a diagnosis of schizophrenia with an effective element. The Psychiatrist made a referral to a secure inpatient unit, The Hatherton Centre, for a transfer under section 48 of the Mental Health Act. The referral was sent to the Hatherton Centre but was not sent to HMP Birmingham straightaway. The referral to the secure unit was not accepted because it was made by an independent psychiatrist rather than the prison's mental health team. The mental health team at HMP Birmingham were, however, contacted on the 13th December 2021 by a psychiatrist from the Hatherton Centre who stated that there had been a request for assessment for transfer and asked for further information. He was given misleading information that Mr. Singh was "coping well" and therefore informed the mental health team that an assessment would not be carried out. No note was made of the conversation with the Hatherton Centre psychiatrist and no action was taken to investigate and pursue a section 48 transfer. The information provided by the independent Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and the history of psychotic symptoms in SystemOne records ought to have resulted in an assessment by the Hatherton Centre. An assessment would have been likely to result in section 48 transfer. Whilst Mr. Singh remained at HMP Birmingham awaiting transfer he ought to have been under the care of the mental health team and housed on ward 2 (the mental health inpatient wing). Mr. Singh continued to report that he was hearing voices, hallucinating, struggling to sleep and low in mood. He was reviewed by GPs at the prison on the 29th November, 13th December, 4th January and 25th January who prescribed antidepressants and sleeping medication which Mr. Singh reported were not working. On the 14th January 2022 a prison Consultant Psychiatrist determined that Jai Singh required urgent admission to the inpatient psychiatric ward for assessment. However, the admission was not facilitated and Mr. Singh remained on a residential wing. The decision not to admit Mr. Singh to the ward was not recorded in his SystemOne records. Mr. Singh received no further input or support from the mental health team. When he was seen by a GP on the 25th January 2022 it was identified that medication was not helping and Mr. Singh needed to be seen by a psychiatrist but the GP thought he was going to be transferred to Ward 2 and therefore took no further action. All actions taken following Mr. Singh being found in cardiac arrest on the 27th January 2022 were appropriate. Following a post mortem the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Hypoxic-ischaemic brain damage 1b Multi-organ failure 1c Cardio-Pulmonary arrest due to asphyxia
Copies Sent To
2) Children of Jai Singh
3) Ministry of Justice (MOJ)
4) Birmingham Community Health Care (‘BCHC’)
5) Birmingham and Solihull Mental Health Foundation Trust (‘BSMHT’)
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.