Lucas Pollard
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2024-0058
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 28 Mar 2024
Response Status
Responses
1 of 1
56-Day Deadline
28 Mar 2024
All responses received
About PFD responses
Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.
Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Coroner’s Concerns
(1) That a Critical Care Team was not dispatched immediately given the serious nature of the call and the likely lack of clinical information for some considerable time ie waiting for the land ambulance, known to be more than 20 minutes away, to arrive and assess.
(2) That the End Of Shift Policy was applied without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation and the RRV, positioned only 3 minutes from the incident, was consequently not deployed.
(3) There was clear evidence from the 999 call both from the caller and the obvious deterioration of Lucas from sounds in the background but that did not prompt a review of the management of the incident by EEAST.
(4) While the medical evidence after consideration of the clinical presentation and the post mortem examination was clear that Lucas would not have survived, at the time of the call that was not and could not be known. Application of the policy as it was, in future situations, may represent a threat to a patient's life.
(2) That the End Of Shift Policy was applied without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation and the RRV, positioned only 3 minutes from the incident, was consequently not deployed.
(3) There was clear evidence from the 999 call both from the caller and the obvious deterioration of Lucas from sounds in the background but that did not prompt a review of the management of the incident by EEAST.
(4) While the medical evidence after consideration of the clinical presentation and the post mortem examination was clear that Lucas would not have survived, at the time of the call that was not and could not be known. Application of the policy as it was, in future situations, may represent a threat to a patient's life.
Responses
The Trust plans to integrate its Critical Care desk function into all control rooms and will review its End of Shift Policy by June 2024. They will also raise awareness on active listening and call escalation through a newsletter and supervision for call handlers.
AI summary
View full response
Dear Mr Cummings I am writing further to the inquest into the death of Lucas Pollard, which concluded on 18 January
2024. I understand that a number of EEAST staff gave evidence in relation to the Serious Incident investigation that took place. Following the inquest, you made a Regulation 28 Preventing Future Death report on 1 February 2024 outlining your concerns in relation to the dispatch arrangements of the critical care team; the rigid application of the End of Shift Policy without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation; and that the deterioration of Lucas did not lead to a further review of the call. I have outlined the actions we are taking in relation to each of these aspects below: A Critical Care Team was not dispatched immediately and there was likely a lack of clinical information for some considerable time, whilst waiting for the land ambulance to arrive. Generally, if the journey time for the Critical Care Team to arrive with a patient exceeds 45 minutes, they may not be immediately dispatched as the land crew may arrive and decide to leave scene immediately. Other factors that influence dispatch decisions at any given time include competing calls requiring further interrogation and triage that may also require higher levels of care and regional availability. The integration of the Critical Care desk function from a two-person team into all three control rooms will significantly enhance EEAST’s ability to identify, continually monitor and reassess need for enhanced care. We will also share a case study of our attendance to Lucas with the Critical Care Desk clinicians for awareness. The End of Shift Policy was applied without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation and the Rapid Response Vehicle was not deployed. The End of Shift Policy currently states that “in the event of a call where there is a significant clinical patient concern, this should be immediately reviewed by a Clinical Coordinator and/or a Senior Ambulance Operations Centre (AOC) Clinician. If either the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician deems it necessary, they have the ability and authority to authorise an override of
the last 30 minutes and dispatch the nearest available resource”. Unfortunately, the escalation to the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician did not happen on this occasion. The End of Shift Policy is currently being reviewed in order to ensure it remains clinically appropriate for our patients’ needs but also meets our obligations in relation to staff welfare. Once the policy has been reviewed and approved, it will be shared with all AOC staff and included in any update training. We aim to complete this piece of work by the end of June 2024. There was clear evidence from the 999 calls and the obvious deterioration of Lucas from sounds in the background but that did not prompt a review of the call. There were opportunities to escalate this call to the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician for further review. Active listening and escalation of calls are covered throughout the Call Handlers’ training course, with specific emphasis on the type of calls that should be escalated. An article will be published in What’s Out Wednesday, which is the weekly newsletter shared with all AOC staff across the Trust, for general awareness in order to remind staff of the importance of active listening and escalating calls where appropriate. In addition, it will be picked up specifically with the call handlers in their supervision/1:1 meetings. I am happy to provide you with a further update once these actions have been completed. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require any further information in the meantime.
2024. I understand that a number of EEAST staff gave evidence in relation to the Serious Incident investigation that took place. Following the inquest, you made a Regulation 28 Preventing Future Death report on 1 February 2024 outlining your concerns in relation to the dispatch arrangements of the critical care team; the rigid application of the End of Shift Policy without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation; and that the deterioration of Lucas did not lead to a further review of the call. I have outlined the actions we are taking in relation to each of these aspects below: A Critical Care Team was not dispatched immediately and there was likely a lack of clinical information for some considerable time, whilst waiting for the land ambulance to arrive. Generally, if the journey time for the Critical Care Team to arrive with a patient exceeds 45 minutes, they may not be immediately dispatched as the land crew may arrive and decide to leave scene immediately. Other factors that influence dispatch decisions at any given time include competing calls requiring further interrogation and triage that may also require higher levels of care and regional availability. The integration of the Critical Care desk function from a two-person team into all three control rooms will significantly enhance EEAST’s ability to identify, continually monitor and reassess need for enhanced care. We will also share a case study of our attendance to Lucas with the Critical Care Desk clinicians for awareness. The End of Shift Policy was applied without evidence of an ongoing reassessment of the situation and the Rapid Response Vehicle was not deployed. The End of Shift Policy currently states that “in the event of a call where there is a significant clinical patient concern, this should be immediately reviewed by a Clinical Coordinator and/or a Senior Ambulance Operations Centre (AOC) Clinician. If either the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician deems it necessary, they have the ability and authority to authorise an override of
the last 30 minutes and dispatch the nearest available resource”. Unfortunately, the escalation to the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician did not happen on this occasion. The End of Shift Policy is currently being reviewed in order to ensure it remains clinically appropriate for our patients’ needs but also meets our obligations in relation to staff welfare. Once the policy has been reviewed and approved, it will be shared with all AOC staff and included in any update training. We aim to complete this piece of work by the end of June 2024. There was clear evidence from the 999 calls and the obvious deterioration of Lucas from sounds in the background but that did not prompt a review of the call. There were opportunities to escalate this call to the Clinical Coordinator or Senior AOC Clinician for further review. Active listening and escalation of calls are covered throughout the Call Handlers’ training course, with specific emphasis on the type of calls that should be escalated. An article will be published in What’s Out Wednesday, which is the weekly newsletter shared with all AOC staff across the Trust, for general awareness in order to remind staff of the importance of active listening and escalating calls where appropriate. In addition, it will be picked up specifically with the call handlers in their supervision/1:1 meetings. I am happy to provide you with a further update once these actions have been completed. Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require any further information in the meantime.
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 08 June 2023 I commenced an investigation into the death of Lucas Tyler POLLARD aged 14. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 18 January 2024. The conclusion of the inquest was that: Lucas Tyler Pollard was aged 14 at the time of his death on the 1st June 2023. He had been given a new electric moped the day before. He had no prior experience of riding the moped. It was in sound mechanical order although the tyres were significantly underinflated. It was not designed to carry pillion passengers. He went out to ride it with a friend in the early hours of the 1st June 2023 in Leighton Buzzard. It was dry and there was very little other traffic. He was driving east along Leighton Road and his friend was riding pillion when the bike tilted to the right (offside) and then struck a sign post at approximately 20 miles per hour. He sustained very severe injuries to his chest, liver, spleen and pelvis and suffered catastrophic internal haemorrhage. A category 1 ambulance with a target response time of 7 minutes was dispatched from Luton Ambulance Station. It was known that the journey time would be in excess of 20 minutes. A critical care clinician considered the deployment of an air ambulance. That had an estimated journey time of greater than 40 minutes and was not dispatched. There was a rapid response vehicle based at the Leighton Buzzard Ambulance station with an estimated response of 3 minutes. That was dispatched by the computer aided dispatch system but then cancelled by a dispatcher as it would contravene East of England Ambulance Service End of Shift Policy. Deployment of the rapid response vehicle would have enabled aid to be given to Lucas much before the arrival of the ambulance from Luton. There was no discussion between the critical care clinician and the dispatcher. However, I found that the multiple injuries suffered by Lucas during the collision were catastrophic and mean't that he would not survive the collision whatever aid had been provided.
Circumstances of the Death
Lucas Tyler Pollard was aged 14 when he died at the Luton and Dunstable University Hospital. He had been driving his new electric moped at about 1.30 am on the 1st June 2023 when he collided with street furniture and sustained catastrophic unsurvivable injuries. He had no prior experience of riding the moped. A nearby resident heard the collision and went to his aid and called emergency services. The call recording illustrates the first-aider's increasing concern as Lucas deteriorated. Lucas can be heard in the background very clearly to be deteriorating rapidly and significantly. A Category 1 (C1) ambulance was dispatched followed by another as there were two casualties. C1 reflects an emergency response travelling with blue lights and sirens. The EEAST uses a computer aided dispatch (CAD) system which also automatically dispatched a solo paramedic in a rapid response vehicle (RRV). Fire co-responders were also deployed. A General Broadcast (GB) was not made. A GB is an alert to any other nearby resources who might possibly assist. EEAST policy requires a GB where there are no nearby resources. The first ambulance sent was based at the Luton ambulance station meaning it was greater than 20 minutes away. The second ambulance was also greater than 20 minutes away. The target response time for a C1 ambulance is an average of 7 minutes and 15 minutes for 90% of calls. It was known at the time of dispatch that it would greatly exceed the target time. A Critical Care Dispatcher was aware of the call and nature and considered deploying a Critical Care Team (CCT) but opted to let the crew from the first ambulance to assess and report. This was despite the crew being at least 20 minutes away. The nearest CCT was 42 minutes away by air. It was night which presents difficulties in safe landing etc. It was accepted on reflection that the CCT should have been sent. The RRV was 3 minutes from the scene. The proximity of the RRV was not revealed in the EEAS Serious Incident Investigation Report but emerged during questioning. The RRV was dispatched by the CAD but then immediately cancelled by a dispatcher due to the Trust's End of Shift Policy seemingly without regard to the actuality of the situation, that the two dispatched ambulances were more than 20 minutes away, a CCT was not dispatched and that a RRV 3 minutes away could have rendered essential aid. The End of Shift Policy limits the calls crews can be dispatched to within the last one hour and last 30 minutes of their shift. The coding allocated to Lucas did not permit the RRV to be sent. As mentioned above, there was clear evidence through the call of Lucas's markedly deteriorating condition. There appears to have been no coding reassessment. The Critical Care Dispatcher and the "routine" dispatcher were not in the same location but could see each other's entries into the computer system in real time as they were made. There was no direct dialogue between them. There was no evidence of a dynamic overview reassessment of the situation as it progressed. Had there been, it is possible, likely even, that the RRV would have been deployed. Medical evidence was clear Lucas would not have survived but that was not known at the time of the call.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.