Joan Talbot

PFD Report All Responded Ref: 2025-0569
Date of Report 11 November 2025
Coroner Liliane Field
Response Deadline est. 6 January 2026
All 1 response received · Deadline: 6 Jan 2026
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Due to a lack of continuity across different admitting teams, the significance of a patient's repeated symptoms was not fully appreciated, delaying necessary investigation.
View full coroner's concerns
1. Mrs Talbot had been admitted on 3 occasions when a history of diarrhoea, at times bloody, was reported before her final fourth admission. On each occasion she came under a different admitting team. There were gaps in continuity of care such that the significance of her history of diarrhoea was not fully appreciated resulting in delays in this presentation being investigated. Although the Trust has subsequently introduced a new record system that has the potential to assist with continuity of care, it has not asked itself how this system can be used most effectively to ensure continuity of care in this specific scenario, whether further refinements to the existing systems and processes may be required.
Responses
Kings College Hospital NHS Trust NHS / Health Body
23 Dec 2025
Action Planned
A cross-trust working group is being established to improve the use of the EPIC system, focusing on issues such as copy/paste practices and care plan updates. The group will design quality improvement projects, review EPIC training, and monitor the impact of changes. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Assistant Coroner Field,

Response to Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths: Mrs Joan Talbot

We are grateful to you, for bringing matters of concern to the attention of King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (the Trust), through your Regulation 28 Prevention of Future Deaths report dated 11th November 2025 (PFD). This was a very sad case, and the Trust wishes to express its sincere condolences to the family of Mrs Talbot. The Trust has given careful and thorough consideration to the concerns you have raised, and its formal response is set out below.

Your summary and recommendations were as follows:

“ In many respects, the Trust has moved on in a positive way from the systems in place at the time when Mrs Talbot was under its care. The functions of EPIC outlined by clearly have the potential to improve continuity of care. However, setting aside the training in EPIC necessitated by its introduction, it is not clear that training has evolved at the same pace or reached all those who need it. As has pointed out, the standards referred to in her statement should have been in place at the time. 3 17. I do not feel it would be proportionate to defer my decision on this issue in order to ask the Trust to provide the further evidence suggested by for the simple reason that I have been left with the overall impression that, despite having the tools with potential to help improve continuity of care between different admitting teams in patients with multiple admissions, the Trust has not taken the additional necessary step to ask itself how these tools can be used most effectively in this specific scenario, whether further refinements to the existing systems and processes may be required and therefore what further targeted training may be necessary to support healthcare professionals, as well as how to evaluate the effectiveness of these tools. Their effectiveness appears to be assumed.”

Patient safety and quality are central priorities for the Trust. Accordingly, the issues highlighted in the PFD have been subject to thorough review by both the Patient Safety Team and the Executive Team.

The Trust has further considered the PFD in collaboration with colleagues at Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Foundation Trust (GSTT), recognising that all EPIC-related development and configuration is undertaken on a cross-Trust basis following the joint procurement of the EPIC electronic patient record system. Since EPIC Go-

Live in October 2023, a number of quality improvement pieces of work have been undertaken to improve patient safety & quality, through an initial ‘stabilisation phase’ of urgent work, followed by an ‘optimisation phase’ of improving functionality across a number of domains. We are conscious that further improvements are required and we are not complacent with regard to pace and scope of this work. Improvements in medical notes documentation commenced over the last few months, in particular a ‘Problem List Etiquette Guide’ has been produced, which outlines expectations for the use of problem lists and associated documentation fields. Although the referenced problem list functionality was not yet deployed at the time of the incident (as the previous electronic patient record system was still in operation), the Trust acknowledges there is scope to enhance both EPIC’s documentation capabilities and the guidance provided to clinicians regarding its use. Therefore, in response to the concerns raised, the Trust has committed to establishing a cross-Trust EPIC Documentation Quality Group (‘DQG’). The DQG will be responsible for developing mechanisms to assess and monitor data quality, overseeing enhancements to documentation functionality, and leading targeted quality improvement initiatives. The drafting of the DQG’s terms of reference has specifically addressed the matters raised within the PFD, ensuring that the DQG’s work programme is both data-driven and aligned with identified risks. Subject to final approval, it is anticipated that the DQG will be operational from early 2026 and will report through existing EPIC governance and oversight structures. The draft terms of reference can be found in Appendix 1 (attached). It is planned to signed off the scope and membership of the meeting across both Trusts in January. In the meantime, the Problem List Etiquette Guide will be tabled and discussed at the Clinical Directors Meeting and the Governance Lead Forum in early 2026 so that learning in relation to the PFD can be facilitated.

We trust that this response provides assurance that the matters raised in the PFD have been carefully considered and that appropriate actions are being taken to reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring in the future. The Trust will continue to monitor the effectiveness of these actions through its established governance and reporting arrangements.

Should you require any further information or clarification in relation to this response, the Trust would be pleased to provide this.
Sent To
  • [REDACTED], Chief Executive Officer, King’s College Hospital NHS Trust, King’s College Hospital, Denmark Hill, London, SE5 9RS
Response Status
Linked responses 1 of 1
56-Day Deadline 6 Jan 2026
All responses received
About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 6 September 2022, I commenced an investigation into the death of Joan Elizabeth Talbot, aged 74 years. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 26 June 2025 The conclusion of the inquest was that Joan Talbot died on 24 August 2022 at King’s College Hospital, London. The medical cause of death was recorded as 1a Sepsis due to urinary tract infection and proctocolitis 1b Migrated ureteric stent 1c radiation induced scarring in the pelvis and ureters due to previous cervical carcinoma 2 Obesity I concluded with the following narrative Recognised long term complications of radiotherapy administered as necessary treatment for cancer
Circumstances of the Death
Joan Talbot had a complex past medical history which included cervical cancer for which she had been treated with radiotherapy in 1987 which caused progressive and significant damage over the years initially affecting her bladder causing recurrent urinary tract infections. Her clinical condition began to deteriorate rapidly from March 2022, necessitating three hospital admissions with urinary tract infections, hydronephrosis caused by scarring from the radiotherapy and which required stenting and recurrent bouts of diarrhoea, at times bloody. She was admitted on a fourth and final time to KCH on 14 August 2022 with worsening bloody diarrhoea and a working diagnosis of acute colitis. Whilst waiting for a CT scan to investigate the diarrhoea she developed sepsis and was found to have a dislodged ureteric stent causing hydronephrosis and requiring a nephrostomy as urgent treatment for the sepsis. Her condition continued to deteriorate, and she died despite the nephrostomy and treatment for sepsis. At postmortem the acute colitis was found to be due to ischaemic colitis caused by radiation injury. It was also found that her bladder had been destroyed as a result of recurrent infections, also as a consequence of radiation injury.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.