Alan Fallows

PFD Report All Responded Ref: 2024-0458
Date of Report 19 August 2024
Coroner Adam Hodson
Response Deadline ✓ from report 14 October 2024
All 1 response received · Deadline: 14 Oct 2024
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Datix reports were not completed timely, subjected to automated approval, and used templates, leading to incomplete information and missed opportunities to investigate patient safety incidents effectively.
View full coroner's concerns
1. Firstly, I have heard that the Datix report for Mr Fallows' first fall on 12 February was not completed at the time by staff, and the nurse in question is now retired and thus it was not possible to ascertain why it had not been completed. The report was only completed retrospectively two months later by staff once an inquest had been opened and a request for evidence was sent to the Trust. A Datix is a risk management information system which gathers information on processes and errors and allows staff to report on any issue which may compromise patient safety, which is central to good clinical governance and best practice, as well as contributing to learning. Whilst the failure to create the DATIX here could be a one-off, I am concerned that staff may not be aware of the importance of completing these reports and doing so in a timely fashion, which I understand should be completed within 24 hours of incident or knowledge of an incident. It is not difficult to see that where incidents are not being logged and reviewed, patient safety could be compromised, and future deaths could occur as a consequence;
2. Secondly, I was concerned to read that the Datix relating to the fall of 12 February (code U454194) appears to have undergone some kind of automated approval and sign off process in June 2024, and regrettably staff were unable to shed any light during the inquest on what happened/happens during this process. This is in contrast to the Datix relating to the second fall (code U441480) which appears to have gone through a “manual” approval and sign off process and the matter closed on 06/06/20204 (with the name of the approver being redacted on the form). I am concerned that if the Trust has any kind of automation process for the review and approval of Datix reports, there may be missed opportunities for humans to correctly identify any incident that compromises patient safety and which give rise to a risk of death;
3. Thirdly, I was concerned to hear from Senior Ward Sister that nursing staff utilise templates or pro-forma text when completing DATIX reports. The use of templates, whilst time saving, can easily lead to incorrect or incomplete information being provided on incidents (as happened in Mr Fallows' care) and therefore there is a real risk that opportunities will be lost to correctly investigate incidents which affect patient safety and which may cause a risk of death.
Responses
University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust NHS / Health Body
15 Aug 2024
Action Taken
UHB updated training provided by the falls team to reinforce reporting requirements following a fall and updated the Datix system so governance lead within the patient safety team is named as final approver. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Mr Hodson,

Inquest touching the death of Alan Stanley Fallows Response to Regulation 28 Report to prevent future deaths

I am writing in response to the Regulation 28 notice issued following the conclusion of the inquest on 15 August 2024 touching the death of Mr Fallows who died on 28 March 2024 at Good Hope Hospital (part of University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust (UHB)).

We have carefully considered the concerns raised within your report to prevent future deaths and would respond as follows:

Reporting of incidents retrospectively

You heard evidence that following Mr Fallows' fall on 12 February 2024 an incident report form was not completed at that time and that the incident was reported retrospectively upon an Inquest being opened and statements being requested.

We have been unable to identify why an incident report wasn’t completed at the time of the fall as the member of staff has retired however retrospectively reporting an incident is expected if the incident had not been reported at the time.

An analysis of reporting data based on a 12 month period of falls across UHB demonstrates that falls were reported:

a) Same day – 86.4% b) The following day – 98.4% c) Within 2 days – 99.1%

The above data provides assurance that most falls are reported within 2 days. Whilst the data is reassuring, we have updated the training provided by our falls team to reinforce the reporting requirements following a fall.

Automated approval of incident

During the Inquest you raised a concern in relation to an automated approval and sign off process of incidents. In this case, the incident report relating to Mr Fallows fall on 12 February 2024 recorded the final approver as ‘automated’ which was in contrast to Mr Fallows second fall which included details of a named ‘final approver’.

All reported incidents are reviewed by an individual before the approval and sign off/closure process. We do not have an automated approval and sign off process for incidents and all incidents are closed following review by an individual. For low level incidents, such as the incident relating to the first fall where the level of harm is low, these incidents are closed following review by a local manager. Following this review an automatic closure process is run which ‘stamps’ the record with the final approver as ‘automated’.

Where the level of harm is moderate or above, these are reviewed by a member of the Clinical Governance and Patient Safety team prior to closure and the governance lead within this department will be named as the final approver.

In all cases, there is a manual review before an incident is closed.

In addition to the above review, our falls team review every incident report form, relating to a patient fall, on a daily basis. The team review the incident, the patient record which includes a review of the post-fall assessment, to identify if there has been patient harm. The incident report form is also reviewed by the senior nurse/ward manager which ensures there is appropriate review following a patient fall.

Use of templates when completing DATIX reports

You heard evidence from the Senior Ward Sister that nursing staff utilise templates or pro- forma text when completing DATIX reports [incident reports] and you are concerned that this approach may lead to incorrect or incomplete information being recorded.

We can confirm that we do not have a template list of actions for incident report forms. Within our electronic patient record there is a post-fall section in the daily care plan which includes a number of actions that staff must take following a fall which includes; ensuring that neurological observations have been commenced, ensuring that an incident form has been submitted, ensuring that the Next of Kin have been informed etc. In this case the Senior Sister used a set list of actions to ensure all necessary falls prevention interventions were in place. I can provide assurance that templates are not used.

In addition to the above, the daily review of incidents undertaken by the falls team acts as an additional independent individualised review.

I would like to assure you that the concerns raised within the Regulation 28 Report have been thoroughly investigated and I hope the information provided above provides reassurance to you of the processes that are in place.
Sent To
  • University Hospitals Birmingham
Response Status
Linked responses 1 of 1
56-Day Deadline 14 Oct 2024
All responses received
About PFD responses

Organisations named in PFD reports must respond within 56 days explaining what actions they are taking.

Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On 11 April 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of Alan Stanley FALLOWS. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest . The conclusion of the inquest was; Death due to natural causes, contributed to by injuries sustained from an in-patient fall whilst in hospital
Circumstances of the Death
Mr Fallows was admitted into Good Hope Hospital in Birmingham on 08/02/2024 following a fall at home and was diagnosed as having sustained a suspected broken elbow as well as having postural hypotension. He was initially discharged but readmitted on 09/02/2024 due to a CT scan showing a chronic subdural haematoma. On 10/02/2024 a falls assessment was incorrectly completed but which still deemed him to be at high risk of falls, and on 12/02/2024 bed rails were put in place following an assessment. Later that day he had an unwitnessed fall but did not sustain injuries. His falls risk assessment was not updated following this fall, although his bed rails assessment was updated three days later on 15/02/2024. On 16/02/2024, he had a further unwitnessed fall and suffered a minor head injury and a fracture to his right neck of femur. On 17/02/2024 he was transported to Birmingham Heartlands Hospital for surgery which was uneventful. On 02/03/2024, he was transferred to Solihull Hospital for physiotherapy, but subsequently developed severe bilateral aspiration pneumonia. Despite optimal treatment, his condition deteriorated over the course of three weeks, and he sadly died on 28/03/2024. Although gaps in care were identified, it is impossible to say whether his falls could have been prevented. Based on information from the Deceased’s treating clinicians the medical cause of death was determined to be: 1a Aspiration pneumonia 1b Frailty of old age 1c II Fracture right neck of femur (operated), Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease
Copies Sent To
Medical Examiner, ICS, NHS England, CQC
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.