Hilary Guedalla
PFD Report
All Responded
Ref: 2023-0198
All 1 response received
· Deadline: 3 Aug 2023
Coroner's Concerns (AI summary)
Multiple communication failures meant staff were unaware of a patient's high suicide risk and allowed unescorted leave. Inadequate record-keeping, brief un-noted risk assessments, and delayed, confused responses to a missing patient compounded the risk, exacerbated by short-staffing.
View full coroner's concerns
Evidence was given by staff members of the East London Foundation NHS Trust that:
1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardener Ward (“the unit”) which was part of a secure facility of the hospital, alone, when a clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a serious risk of suicide.
2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision had been made.
3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the 28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all staff on the unit.
4. The “Sign in/Sign out” book which was supposed to record the movements of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when service users went out for short periods.
5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be permitted to leave the unit.
6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk which they posed would have been evident.
7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency of the situation by staff generally.
8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing.
9. No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing.
10. The unit was short-staffed and this affected the care provided to the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and record keeping generally.
The summary of the evidence given, as set out above, sets out the matters of concern.
1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardener Ward (“the unit”) which was part of a secure facility of the hospital, alone, when a clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a serious risk of suicide.
2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision had been made.
3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the 28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all staff on the unit.
4. The “Sign in/Sign out” book which was supposed to record the movements of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when service users went out for short periods.
5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be permitted to leave the unit.
6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk which they posed would have been evident.
7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency of the situation by staff generally.
8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing.
9. No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing.
10. The unit was short-staffed and this affected the care provided to the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and record keeping generally.
The summary of the evidence given, as set out above, sets out the matters of concern.
Responses
Action Taken
The Trust will ensure that all ward staff are aware of service user’s leave status and clinical decisions regarding leave, and is investing £800,000 for Safer Staffing and reviewing recruitment strategy and processes. (AI summary)
The Trust will ensure that all ward staff are aware of service user’s leave status and clinical decisions regarding leave, and is investing £800,000 for Safer Staffing and reviewing recruitment strategy and processes. (AI summary)
View full response
Dear Sir
RE: Regulation 28 Response for Billy Guedalla
This is a formal response to your Regulation 28 report sent on 12 June 2023 where you set out concerns relating to the care of Billy Guedalla whilst under East London NHS Foundation Trust’s (the Trust’s) care.
I understand that at the inquest into Billy’s death you heard evidence from the Clinical Director for City and Hackney outlining the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their death. However, you remained concerned about the risk of future deaths in relation to the following areas:
1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardner Ward (“the unit”) which was part of a secure facility of the hospital alone, when a clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a risk of suicide.
2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision had been made.
3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the 28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all staff on the unit.
4. The “Sign in/Sign Out” book which was supposed to record the movements of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when service users went out for short periods.
5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be permitted to leave the unit.
6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk that they posed would have been evident.
7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff generally.
8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing.
9. No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing.
10. The unit was short staffed and this affected the care provided to the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and recording generally.
I would like to offer my sincere apologies to Billy’s family on behalf of the Trust. I would also like to assure Billy’s family and the Coroner that the Trust has reviewed the issues highlighted by the Regulation 28 report and has planned or undertaken the actions outlined below.
1) The clinical decision made, that Billy should not leave Gardner Ward unescorted was not followed and 2) this decision was not communicated to all members of staff.
I share your concern that critical information surrounding clinical decision making in relation to Billy’s leave was not followed nor passed on to all Gardner Ward staff members.
Expected practice at the Trust is that all clinical decisions made in relation to all inpatient service users’ leave should be recorded on RIO (the Trust’s electronic patient record) by the relevant clinician. I understand that this information was not recorded nor was it reviewed or disseminated amongst the Gardner Ward staff.
In order to ensure that this does not occur again, at the next Gardner Ward away day on 23 August 2023 all staff will be reminded again of the importance of properly recording clinical decisions (whether made by themselves or in Ward Management Meetings or Ward Rounds) as well as reviewing the RIO notes prior to making important clinical decisions. This same discussion will be repeated at the next away days for all City and Hackney inpatient wards. Considerations about the differences in recording such information between formal and informal service users will be discussed. A memo has been sent out to all ward staff on 27 July 2023 by the Clinical Director reinforcing these expectations too.
Additionally, the Clinical Director for City and Hackney has updated the junior doctor induction programme to include this information.
In order to provide an additional safety net to ensure that appropriate information sharing occurs, a daily Safety Huddle comprised of the entire multi-disciplinary team now takes place on all City and Hackney inpatient wards each morning. Critical clinical information about all service users is shared during the Safety Huddles. Important clinical decisions and risk information discussed at the Safety Huddles are expected to be documented on RIO (this expectation will also be further reinforced at the away day and junior doctor induction).
Additionally, all inpatient leave arrangements (for both formal and informal service users) are now documented on the relevant nursing office whiteboard in each City and Hackney inpatient ward. The leave arrangements are reassessed at every shift handover and the whiteboard is updated accordingly. It is expected that all staff members check the whiteboard before allowing leave of any type.
Further, junior stuff members are now required to speak to the shift co-ordinator (the most senior staff member) prior to allowing patient leave.
3) The information from the ward round that Billy made a serious suicide attempt the previous night was not communicated to staff members.
I was also troubled to hear that important risk information about Billy, highlighted at a Ward Round was not communicated to staff members.
As mentioned above, I anticipate that the daily Safety Huddles will assist in ensuring that important new risk information about service users is passed onto all staff members.
4) The ‘Sign in/Sign Out book was frequently not completed.
I have been provided with assurances that the process for managing the Sign In/Sign Out book (the “book”) on all inpatient units in City and Hackney has been improved. The book is now located at the nursing office to enhance completion. It has been revised to include the following information: service user name, whether leave is escorted (and by whom) or not, location of planned leave, time left and time returned, the validity of Section 17 leave papers for detained patients, description of items taken, and whether search on return was completed.
Presently, either the nurse in charge or the shift coordinator spot checks the book to ensure completion one time per shift. However, work is being done to develop a more robust audit system.
5) There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user is permitted to leave.
The Trust’s approach to address this via the whiteboard system, the Safety Huddles and the additional expectations on junior staff members to check leave with the shift co-ordinator prior to allowing leave are explained under point 1 and 2 above.
6) The medical notes were not reviewed prior to deciding that Billy should be allowed to leave.
The Gardner Ward away day outlined above, will highlight the importance of regularly reviewing RIO notes. Further, the implementation of Safety Huddles, the whiteboard system and the requirement to seek approval of senior staff members prior to allowing service user leave will ensure only those patients permitted to take leave are allowed to do so.
7) Once Billy was found to be missing, there was a delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to convey suicide risk to the police and ambulance service, and lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff. And
8) The policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted
I acknowledge that the delay in notifying the police, ambulance and family when they were discovered missing should not have occurred. Further, when emergency services were notified, there was a failure to convey Billy’s suicide risk.
The following actions have taken place to ensure that this does not occur again:
a. On the 13 July 2022, staff from Gardner Ward attended the “Time to Think” forum. There, the Trust’s Health, Safety and Security Planning Manager led the meeting and reinforced the correct escalation processes to use when a service user is missing.
b. In June 2023, the Trust’s Missing and Absent without Leave policy was reviewed and it is now awaiting ratification.
c. The Trust is now engaged at a senior level with the Metropolitan Police to develop a strategy around, “Right Care, Right Person” which is anticipated to lead to improvements in the coordination of response to missing inpatients by both organisations.
9) No efforts were made to contact Billy’s family once it was discovered they were missing
I am aware that you heard oral evidence at inquest that a single attempt was made to call Billy’s family when they went missing. However, this call took place well after it was discovered and no further attempts were made to contact their family. The Trust wholeheartedly acknowledges that this response was not commensurate to the situation.
I can confirm that explicit information about contacting family members is provided in the updated policy and was discussed with Gardner Ward staff during its review of the policy.
Staff also specifically reflected upon the impact of not contacting Billy’s family promptly when they were discovered missing at the Time to Think Forum on 13 July
2022.
10) Gardner Ward was short staffed and this affected the care provided to Billy.
Although there is a particular need to focus on the staffing levels of nurses, the issue of staffing levels across the full multi-disciplinary team is relevant to the care provided on a ward. The current vacancy rate, as of June 2023, for all staff in City & Hackney Mental Health Directorate is 4.4%. This rate varies amongst different staff groups, for example:
a) Nursing staff: 8.4% b) Doctors: 5.7% c) Psychologists and social workers: 3.2% d) Allied Health Professionals (e.g. occupational therapists, art therapists): 14% e) Support to nursing staff (e.g. Life skills recovery workers): 1.2%
As highlighted at inquest, there are currently national challenges with staffing in the NHS which impact on the Trust’s efforts to achieve full recruitment with substantive staff. But, I can assure Billy’s family that the Trust is making best efforts to achieve this across all staff groups.
City and Hackney is currently managing nursing staff vacancies using the following strategies:
a) Staffing levels across the directorate are discussed face to face at a daily Huddle every Monday – Friday at a designated venue. The Duty Senior Nurse, Borough Lead Nurse, Ward Managers and matrons are present. The Psychiatric Liaison Teams and Home Treatment Team also feed into the Huddle. Safe staffing levels are considered alongside appropriate actions such as redeployment, booking temporary staff and block booking Trust bank staff.
b) A Band 5 registered nurse is currently responsible for ‘red flag’ reporting (reviewing staff shortages on the daily rota and the numbers of service users
requiring enhanced observations). This information is fed into the daily Huddle (outlined above) and to the Borough Lead Nurse for consideration of a planned response. It also supports matrons in planning.
c) Twilight Shifts have been introduced. Band 6 nursing colleagues from the community teams attend between 5.30 to 9 pm when the wards are busiest to ensure smooth transitions to night shifts.
d) A live spreadsheet is maintained and reviewed weekly by the ward matrons to highlight recruitment gaps and support the recruitment process
e) There is a recruitment drive in City and Hackney for band 5 and 6 nurses.
A recent Trust-wide review of the Trust’s inpatient activity (clinical demand and benchmarking against national standards for comparable services) was undertaken in January 2023. This review contributes to ensuring the Trust meets Safer Staffing expectations for services. In particular, that the right staff with the right skills are in the right place at the right time. The review has resulted in an increased investment in inpatient staffing based on the identified needs of the services. Since April 2023, an £800,000 investment for Safer Staffing has been provided to the City and Hackney directorate within ELFT. The benefits of the increased investment will be reduced reliance on temporary staffing at times of high acuity and better resourced teams to meet the needs of service users. In addition to this we have reviewed our recruitment strategy and processes.
I hope I have provided reassurance to you and Billy’s family about the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their sad death. I offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to the family at this difficult time.
RE: Regulation 28 Response for Billy Guedalla
This is a formal response to your Regulation 28 report sent on 12 June 2023 where you set out concerns relating to the care of Billy Guedalla whilst under East London NHS Foundation Trust’s (the Trust’s) care.
I understand that at the inquest into Billy’s death you heard evidence from the Clinical Director for City and Hackney outlining the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their death. However, you remained concerned about the risk of future deaths in relation to the following areas:
1. The deceased was allowed to leave Gardner Ward (“the unit”) which was part of a secure facility of the hospital alone, when a clinical decision had been taken that they should not be allowed to leave the unit unaccompanied by staff, because they posed a risk of suicide.
2. The decision that the deceased should not be allowed unescorted leave was not communicated to all members of staff working in the unit such that the person who allowed the deceased to leave was unaware that the decision had been made.
3. The relevant information gathered during the Ward Round on the 28th October 2021, which included the fact that the deceased had attempted to take their own life, the night before, was not adequately communicated to all staff on the unit.
4. The “Sign in/Sign Out” book which was supposed to record the movements of service users in the unit was frequently not completed, particularly when service users went out for short periods.
5. There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user should be permitted to leave the unit.
6. The member of staff who allowed the deceased to leave the unit made a brief risk assessment of them before deciding whether they should be allowed to leave. That person did not consult any medical notes or records about the deceased when making that assessment. Had that member of staff consulted the deceased’s medical notes and records, the serious suicide risk that they posed would have been evident.
7. Once the deceased was found to be missing from the unit, there was an unexplained delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to inform either of the serious suicide risk which the deceased posed to themselves and a lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff generally.
8. The hospital policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted and in what manner, once a patient was found to be missing.
9. No proper efforts were made to contact members of the deceased’s family once the deceased was found to be missing.
10. The unit was short staffed and this affected the care provided to the deceased, the assessment of the deceased whilst in the unit and recording generally.
I would like to offer my sincere apologies to Billy’s family on behalf of the Trust. I would also like to assure Billy’s family and the Coroner that the Trust has reviewed the issues highlighted by the Regulation 28 report and has planned or undertaken the actions outlined below.
1) The clinical decision made, that Billy should not leave Gardner Ward unescorted was not followed and 2) this decision was not communicated to all members of staff.
I share your concern that critical information surrounding clinical decision making in relation to Billy’s leave was not followed nor passed on to all Gardner Ward staff members.
Expected practice at the Trust is that all clinical decisions made in relation to all inpatient service users’ leave should be recorded on RIO (the Trust’s electronic patient record) by the relevant clinician. I understand that this information was not recorded nor was it reviewed or disseminated amongst the Gardner Ward staff.
In order to ensure that this does not occur again, at the next Gardner Ward away day on 23 August 2023 all staff will be reminded again of the importance of properly recording clinical decisions (whether made by themselves or in Ward Management Meetings or Ward Rounds) as well as reviewing the RIO notes prior to making important clinical decisions. This same discussion will be repeated at the next away days for all City and Hackney inpatient wards. Considerations about the differences in recording such information between formal and informal service users will be discussed. A memo has been sent out to all ward staff on 27 July 2023 by the Clinical Director reinforcing these expectations too.
Additionally, the Clinical Director for City and Hackney has updated the junior doctor induction programme to include this information.
In order to provide an additional safety net to ensure that appropriate information sharing occurs, a daily Safety Huddle comprised of the entire multi-disciplinary team now takes place on all City and Hackney inpatient wards each morning. Critical clinical information about all service users is shared during the Safety Huddles. Important clinical decisions and risk information discussed at the Safety Huddles are expected to be documented on RIO (this expectation will also be further reinforced at the away day and junior doctor induction).
Additionally, all inpatient leave arrangements (for both formal and informal service users) are now documented on the relevant nursing office whiteboard in each City and Hackney inpatient ward. The leave arrangements are reassessed at every shift handover and the whiteboard is updated accordingly. It is expected that all staff members check the whiteboard before allowing leave of any type.
Further, junior stuff members are now required to speak to the shift co-ordinator (the most senior staff member) prior to allowing patient leave.
3) The information from the ward round that Billy made a serious suicide attempt the previous night was not communicated to staff members.
I was also troubled to hear that important risk information about Billy, highlighted at a Ward Round was not communicated to staff members.
As mentioned above, I anticipate that the daily Safety Huddles will assist in ensuring that important new risk information about service users is passed onto all staff members.
4) The ‘Sign in/Sign Out book was frequently not completed.
I have been provided with assurances that the process for managing the Sign In/Sign Out book (the “book”) on all inpatient units in City and Hackney has been improved. The book is now located at the nursing office to enhance completion. It has been revised to include the following information: service user name, whether leave is escorted (and by whom) or not, location of planned leave, time left and time returned, the validity of Section 17 leave papers for detained patients, description of items taken, and whether search on return was completed.
Presently, either the nurse in charge or the shift coordinator spot checks the book to ensure completion one time per shift. However, work is being done to develop a more robust audit system.
5) There was no proper system for identifying whether a service user is permitted to leave.
The Trust’s approach to address this via the whiteboard system, the Safety Huddles and the additional expectations on junior staff members to check leave with the shift co-ordinator prior to allowing leave are explained under point 1 and 2 above.
6) The medical notes were not reviewed prior to deciding that Billy should be allowed to leave.
The Gardner Ward away day outlined above, will highlight the importance of regularly reviewing RIO notes. Further, the implementation of Safety Huddles, the whiteboard system and the requirement to seek approval of senior staff members prior to allowing service user leave will ensure only those patients permitted to take leave are allowed to do so.
7) Once Billy was found to be missing, there was a delay in informing the police and ambulance service, a failure to convey suicide risk to the police and ambulance service, and lack of appreciation of the urgency by staff. And
8) The policy which applied to missing patients was not properly adhered to by staff and there was confusion about who should be contacted
I acknowledge that the delay in notifying the police, ambulance and family when they were discovered missing should not have occurred. Further, when emergency services were notified, there was a failure to convey Billy’s suicide risk.
The following actions have taken place to ensure that this does not occur again:
a. On the 13 July 2022, staff from Gardner Ward attended the “Time to Think” forum. There, the Trust’s Health, Safety and Security Planning Manager led the meeting and reinforced the correct escalation processes to use when a service user is missing.
b. In June 2023, the Trust’s Missing and Absent without Leave policy was reviewed and it is now awaiting ratification.
c. The Trust is now engaged at a senior level with the Metropolitan Police to develop a strategy around, “Right Care, Right Person” which is anticipated to lead to improvements in the coordination of response to missing inpatients by both organisations.
9) No efforts were made to contact Billy’s family once it was discovered they were missing
I am aware that you heard oral evidence at inquest that a single attempt was made to call Billy’s family when they went missing. However, this call took place well after it was discovered and no further attempts were made to contact their family. The Trust wholeheartedly acknowledges that this response was not commensurate to the situation.
I can confirm that explicit information about contacting family members is provided in the updated policy and was discussed with Gardner Ward staff during its review of the policy.
Staff also specifically reflected upon the impact of not contacting Billy’s family promptly when they were discovered missing at the Time to Think Forum on 13 July
2022.
10) Gardner Ward was short staffed and this affected the care provided to Billy.
Although there is a particular need to focus on the staffing levels of nurses, the issue of staffing levels across the full multi-disciplinary team is relevant to the care provided on a ward. The current vacancy rate, as of June 2023, for all staff in City & Hackney Mental Health Directorate is 4.4%. This rate varies amongst different staff groups, for example:
a) Nursing staff: 8.4% b) Doctors: 5.7% c) Psychologists and social workers: 3.2% d) Allied Health Professionals (e.g. occupational therapists, art therapists): 14% e) Support to nursing staff (e.g. Life skills recovery workers): 1.2%
As highlighted at inquest, there are currently national challenges with staffing in the NHS which impact on the Trust’s efforts to achieve full recruitment with substantive staff. But, I can assure Billy’s family that the Trust is making best efforts to achieve this across all staff groups.
City and Hackney is currently managing nursing staff vacancies using the following strategies:
a) Staffing levels across the directorate are discussed face to face at a daily Huddle every Monday – Friday at a designated venue. The Duty Senior Nurse, Borough Lead Nurse, Ward Managers and matrons are present. The Psychiatric Liaison Teams and Home Treatment Team also feed into the Huddle. Safe staffing levels are considered alongside appropriate actions such as redeployment, booking temporary staff and block booking Trust bank staff.
b) A Band 5 registered nurse is currently responsible for ‘red flag’ reporting (reviewing staff shortages on the daily rota and the numbers of service users
requiring enhanced observations). This information is fed into the daily Huddle (outlined above) and to the Borough Lead Nurse for consideration of a planned response. It also supports matrons in planning.
c) Twilight Shifts have been introduced. Band 6 nursing colleagues from the community teams attend between 5.30 to 9 pm when the wards are busiest to ensure smooth transitions to night shifts.
d) A live spreadsheet is maintained and reviewed weekly by the ward matrons to highlight recruitment gaps and support the recruitment process
e) There is a recruitment drive in City and Hackney for band 5 and 6 nurses.
A recent Trust-wide review of the Trust’s inpatient activity (clinical demand and benchmarking against national standards for comparable services) was undertaken in January 2023. This review contributes to ensuring the Trust meets Safer Staffing expectations for services. In particular, that the right staff with the right skills are in the right place at the right time. The review has resulted in an increased investment in inpatient staffing based on the identified needs of the services. Since April 2023, an £800,000 investment for Safer Staffing has been provided to the City and Hackney directorate within ELFT. The benefits of the increased investment will be reduced reliance on temporary staffing at times of high acuity and better resourced teams to meet the needs of service users. In addition to this we have reviewed our recruitment strategy and processes.
I hope I have provided reassurance to you and Billy’s family about the learning that has taken place as a consequence of their sad death. I offer my sincere and heart-felt condolences to the family at this difficult time.
Sent To
- East London NHS Foundation Trust
Response Status
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56-Day Deadline
3 Aug 2023
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Source: Courts and Tribunals Judiciary
Report Sections
Investigation and Inquest
On the 11th November 2021 I commenced an investigation into the death of Hilary Clare (Billy) Guedalla who died aged 46 on the 30th October 2021 .
The investigation resulted in an inquest, which was conducted by myself over a period of 5 days and concluded on 19th May 2023.
I made a determination at inquest that the deceased died as a result of suicide and returned a narrative conclusion as follows:
1. The deceased suffered from long standing psychiatric conditions of a Recurrent Depressive Disorder and complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
2. On occasions, the deceased’s psychiatric conditions led to psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient, on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2021. Those admissions were associated with the deceased exhibiting suicidal ideation and sometimes involved attempts to take their own life.
3. On the 26th October 2021, the deceased was admitted to Gardener Ward, Homerton Hospital, London E9 as a voluntary patient suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition.
4. At a ward round at that hospital on the 28th October 2021, at around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take her own life the night before in hospital and that they had equipment at home for the purposes of ending their life.
5. The deceased’s condition worsened thereafter and staff at the hospital considered that the deceased should not be allowed out of the ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021 but not communicated to all staff on the ward.
6. The deceased asked a member of the clinical staff to leave the ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was unaware of the decision that had been made that the deceased should not be allowed out alone. The member of staff carried out a brief assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did not refer to any medical notes and records. The deceased was then allowed to leave the ward.
7. Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves
No-one else was involved. The deceased was found by members of the London Fire Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day.
8. After the deceased had left the ward, night staff found the deceased to be missing at around 8pm on the 29th October 2021. Staff first contacted the police 2.10am and again at 2.46am on the 30th October, 2021 and requested that the police carry out a welfare check. They did not inform the police that the deceased was a serious suicide risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did not do this until 3pm on the 30th October 2021 and in any event, that request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address.
9. At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother attended the ward having made a pre-arranged booking to visit the deceased. She was shocked to be informed that the deceased had left the ward. She enlisted support from family and friends which led to the attendance of emergency services at the deceased’s home address, between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021.
10. The deceased should not have been permitted to leave the ward alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own life when they did.
11. The decision that the deceased should not be permitted unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the ward.
12. The information that the deceased had tried to end their own life on the ward on the evening of the 27th October 2021 was also not properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital staff did not fully comply with the patient admission policy when the deceased was admitted on the 26th October 2021 as records were not properly updated and no physical health assessment was made of the deceased within 24 hours.
13. The decision that the deceased was to receive 1:1 support following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically be met because of staff shortages on the ward. There was a failure to recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because of those staffing issues.
14. The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was allowed to leave the ward at 6pm on the 29th October 2021 by that member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s mental state for the purposes of assessing their safety. That member of staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did not consider any written record about the deceased or ask any other member of staff about how the deceased was.
15. There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied to missing patients.
16. Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services and failed to contact the ambulance service as advised by the police in the early hours of the 30th October 2021.
17. When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the urgent and serious suicide risk which the deceased presented to themselves.
18. Hospital staff also failed to properly contact Billy’s family and friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them which could have enabled them to be located.
19. Staffing levels on both the 29th and 30th October 2021 were not adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above.
20. The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being unaware that the deceased should not leave the ward unaccompanied, amounts to a serious failure which directly caused or contributed to the deceased’s death.
21. The other failures set out above amount to missed opportunities which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.
The investigation resulted in an inquest, which was conducted by myself over a period of 5 days and concluded on 19th May 2023.
I made a determination at inquest that the deceased died as a result of suicide and returned a narrative conclusion as follows:
1. The deceased suffered from long standing psychiatric conditions of a Recurrent Depressive Disorder and complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
2. On occasions, the deceased’s psychiatric conditions led to psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient, on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2021. Those admissions were associated with the deceased exhibiting suicidal ideation and sometimes involved attempts to take their own life.
3. On the 26th October 2021, the deceased was admitted to Gardener Ward, Homerton Hospital, London E9 as a voluntary patient suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition.
4. At a ward round at that hospital on the 28th October 2021, at around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take her own life the night before in hospital and that they had equipment at home for the purposes of ending their life.
5. The deceased’s condition worsened thereafter and staff at the hospital considered that the deceased should not be allowed out of the ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021 but not communicated to all staff on the ward.
6. The deceased asked a member of the clinical staff to leave the ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was unaware of the decision that had been made that the deceased should not be allowed out alone. The member of staff carried out a brief assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did not refer to any medical notes and records. The deceased was then allowed to leave the ward.
7. Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves
No-one else was involved. The deceased was found by members of the London Fire Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day.
8. After the deceased had left the ward, night staff found the deceased to be missing at around 8pm on the 29th October 2021. Staff first contacted the police 2.10am and again at 2.46am on the 30th October, 2021 and requested that the police carry out a welfare check. They did not inform the police that the deceased was a serious suicide risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did not do this until 3pm on the 30th October 2021 and in any event, that request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address.
9. At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother attended the ward having made a pre-arranged booking to visit the deceased. She was shocked to be informed that the deceased had left the ward. She enlisted support from family and friends which led to the attendance of emergency services at the deceased’s home address, between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021.
10. The deceased should not have been permitted to leave the ward alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own life when they did.
11. The decision that the deceased should not be permitted unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the ward.
12. The information that the deceased had tried to end their own life on the ward on the evening of the 27th October 2021 was also not properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital staff did not fully comply with the patient admission policy when the deceased was admitted on the 26th October 2021 as records were not properly updated and no physical health assessment was made of the deceased within 24 hours.
13. The decision that the deceased was to receive 1:1 support following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically be met because of staff shortages on the ward. There was a failure to recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because of those staffing issues.
14. The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was allowed to leave the ward at 6pm on the 29th October 2021 by that member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s mental state for the purposes of assessing their safety. That member of staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did not consider any written record about the deceased or ask any other member of staff about how the deceased was.
15. There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied to missing patients.
16. Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services and failed to contact the ambulance service as advised by the police in the early hours of the 30th October 2021.
17. When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the urgent and serious suicide risk which the deceased presented to themselves.
18. Hospital staff also failed to properly contact Billy’s family and friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them which could have enabled them to be located.
19. Staffing levels on both the 29th and 30th October 2021 were not adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above.
20. The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being unaware that the deceased should not leave the ward unaccompanied, amounts to a serious failure which directly caused or contributed to the deceased’s death.
21. The other failures set out above amount to missed opportunities which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.
Circumstances of the Death
The circumstances surrounding the death are set out in Box 3 above.
Copies Sent To
Care Quality Commission for England
Inquest Conclusion
1. The deceased suffered from long standing psychiatric conditions of a Recurrent Depressive Disorder and complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
2. On occasions, the deceased’s psychiatric conditions led to psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient, on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2021. Those admissions were associated with the deceased exhibiting suicidal ideation and sometimes involved attempts to take their own life.
3. On the 26th October 2021, the deceased was admitted to Gardener Ward, Homerton Hospital, London E9 as a voluntary patient suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition.
4. At a ward round at that hospital on the 28th October 2021, at around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take her own life the night before in hospital and that they had equipment at home for the purposes of ending their life.
5. The deceased’s condition worsened thereafter and staff at the hospital considered that the deceased should not be allowed out of the ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021 but not communicated to all staff on the ward.
6. The deceased asked a member of the clinical staff to leave the ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was unaware of the decision that had been made that the deceased should not be allowed out alone. The member of staff carried out a brief assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did not refer to any medical notes and records. The deceased was then allowed to leave the ward.
7. Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves
No-one else was involved. The deceased was found by members of the London Fire Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day.
8. After the deceased had left the ward, night staff found the deceased to be missing at around 8pm on the 29th October 2021. Staff first contacted the police 2.10am and again at 2.46am on the 30th October, 2021 and requested that the police carry out a welfare check. They did not inform the police that the deceased was a serious suicide risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did not do this until 3pm on the 30th October 2021 and in any event, that request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address.
9. At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother attended the ward having made a pre-arranged booking to visit the deceased. She was shocked to be informed that the deceased had left the ward. She enlisted support from family and friends which led to the attendance of emergency services at the deceased’s home address, between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021.
10. The deceased should not have been permitted to leave the ward alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own life when they did.
11. The decision that the deceased should not be permitted unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the ward.
12. The information that the deceased had tried to end their own life on the ward on the evening of the 27th October 2021 was also not properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital staff did not fully comply with the patient admission policy when the deceased was admitted on the 26th October 2021 as records were not properly updated and no physical health assessment was made of the deceased within 24 hours.
13. The decision that the deceased was to receive 1:1 support following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically be met because of staff shortages on the ward. There was a failure to recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because of those staffing issues.
14. The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was allowed to leave the ward at 6pm on the 29th October 2021 by that member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s mental state for the purposes of assessing their safety. That member of staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did not consider any written record about the deceased or ask any other member of staff about how the deceased was.
15. There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied to missing patients.
16. Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services and failed to contact the ambulance service as advised by the police in the early hours of the 30th October 2021.
17. When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the urgent and serious suicide risk which the deceased presented to themselves.
18. Hospital staff also failed to properly contact Billy’s family and friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them which could have enabled them to be located.
19. Staffing levels on both the 29th and 30th October 2021 were not adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above.
20. The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being unaware that the deceased should not leave the ward unaccompanied, amounts to a serious failure which directly caused or contributed to the deceased’s death.
21. The other failures set out above amount to missed opportunities which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.
2. On occasions, the deceased’s psychiatric conditions led to psychiatric in-patient admission to hospital, usually as a voluntary patient, on a number of occasions between 2013 and 2021. Those admissions were associated with the deceased exhibiting suicidal ideation and sometimes involved attempts to take their own life.
3. On the 26th October 2021, the deceased was admitted to Gardener Ward, Homerton Hospital, London E9 as a voluntary patient suffering a worsening of their psychiatric condition.
4. At a ward round at that hospital on the 28th October 2021, at around 11am, the deceased indicated to staff that they had tried to take her own life the night before in hospital and that they had equipment at home for the purposes of ending their life.
5. The deceased’s condition worsened thereafter and staff at the hospital considered that the deceased should not be allowed out of the ward alone, for her own safety because, in effect they were a high risk of suicide. That decision was made in the morning of the 29th October 2021 but not communicated to all staff on the ward.
6. The deceased asked a member of the clinical staff to leave the ward, at around 6pm on the 29th October 2021. That member of staff was unaware of the decision that had been made that the deceased should not be allowed out alone. The member of staff carried out a brief assessment of the deceased, largely based on their appearance, but did not refer to any medical notes and records. The deceased was then allowed to leave the ward.
7. Sometime between leaving the ward and around 3pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased took their own life by hanging themselves
No-one else was involved. The deceased was found by members of the London Fire Brigade between 3 and 4pm, on that day.
8. After the deceased had left the ward, night staff found the deceased to be missing at around 8pm on the 29th October 2021. Staff first contacted the police 2.10am and again at 2.46am on the 30th October, 2021 and requested that the police carry out a welfare check. They did not inform the police that the deceased was a serious suicide risk. They were advised to contact the London Ambulance Service but did not do this until 3pm on the 30th October 2021 and in any event, that request did not generate attendance at the deceased’s home address.
9. At around 2pm on the 30th October 2021, the deceased’s mother attended the ward having made a pre-arranged booking to visit the deceased. She was shocked to be informed that the deceased had left the ward. She enlisted support from family and friends which led to the attendance of emergency services at the deceased’s home address, between 3-4pm on the 30th October 2021.
10. The deceased should not have been permitted to leave the ward alone. Had clinical staff observed the decision not to allow the deceased out without a staff member, the deceased would not have taken their own life when they did.
11. The decision that the deceased should not be permitted unescorted leave failed to be communicated to all staff members on the ward.
12. The information that the deceased had tried to end their own life on the ward on the evening of the 27th October 2021 was also not properly communicated to all staff on the ward or added to any document which concerned a proper risk of assessment of them. Also, the hospital staff did not fully comply with the patient admission policy when the deceased was admitted on the 26th October 2021 as records were not properly updated and no physical health assessment was made of the deceased within 24 hours.
13. The decision that the deceased was to receive 1:1 support following the ward round of the 28th October 2021 could not realistically be met because of staff shortages on the ward. There was a failure to recognise that this plan would could not realistically be achieved because of those staffing issues.
14. The assessment made of the deceased before the deceased was allowed to leave the ward at 6pm on the 29th October 2021 by that member of staff was inadequate as a risk assessment of the deceased’s mental state for the purposes of assessing their safety. That member of staff relied solely on the deceased’s presentation at that moment and did not consider any written record about the deceased or ask any other member of staff about how the deceased was.
15. There was a complete failure to appreciate the urgency of locating the deceased once the night staff found them to be missing at about 8pm on the 29th October 2021 and to follow the hospital policy which applied to missing patients.
16. Night shift staff took far too long to contact the emergency services and failed to contact the ambulance service as advised by the police in the early hours of the 30th October 2021.
17. When the police were contacted, staff completely failed to state the urgent and serious suicide risk which the deceased presented to themselves.
18. Hospital staff also failed to properly contact Billy’s family and friends after they went missing from the ward or leave messages for them which could have enabled them to be located.
19. Staffing levels on both the 29th and 30th October 2021 were not adequate and this contributed to the failings set out above.
20. The failure set out above which relates to the staff member being unaware that the deceased should not leave the ward unaccompanied, amounts to a serious failure which directly caused or contributed to the deceased’s death.
21. The other failures set out above amount to missed opportunities which may directly or indirectly, have prevented the deceased’s death.
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Data sourced from Courts and Tribunals Judiciary under the Open Government Licence.